JUDGMENT : KAUSHIK GOSWAMI, J. Heard Mr. S Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. M Ahmed, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. By way of the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner assails the judgment dated 20.08.2024 passed in Misc. Appeal No. 01/2024 by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Darrang, Mangaldai, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed and the order dated 29.01.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Darrang in Misc. (J) Case No. 58/2023, arising out of Title Suit No. 19/2023, granting temporary injunction in favour of the respondent, was affirmed. 3. The brief facts, shorn of unnecessary details, are that the petitioner instituted Title Suit No. 19/2023 seeking declaration, confirmation of right, title and interest, and permanent injunction in respect of land measuring 3 Bighas covered by P.P. No. 98 (old)/556 (new), Dag No. 396 (old)/979 (new), situated at Village No. 1½ Baruajhar, Mouza Paschim Dalgaon, P.S. Dalgaon, District Darrang, Assam. Upon appearance, the respondent filed a written statement along with a counter-claim seeking, inter alia, declarations regarding invalidity of certain sale deeds, title over the schedule lands (T, U, V, W), and consequential reliefs including injunction. 4. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner withdrew the same on 19.09.2025 with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action. While permitting withdrawal, the learned Trial Court directed that the counter-claim shall proceed independently in terms of Order VIII Rule 6A read with Rule 6D CPC. Subsequently, the counter-claim was fixed for evidence on 29.11.2025. In the meantime, the respondent filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC seeking temporary injunction restraining the petitioner from interfering with possession over the schedule lands. 5. The learned Trial Court, upon hearing the parties, by order dated 29.01.2024, restrained the petitioner from forcibly entering into the schedule lands and from disturbing the peaceful possession of the respondent till disposal of the proceeding. 6. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred Misc. Appeal No. 01/2024, which came to be dismissed by the learned Appellate Court, affirming the order of temporary injunction. Hence, the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 7. 6. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred Misc. Appeal No. 01/2024, which came to be dismissed by the learned Appellate Court, affirming the order of temporary injunction. Hence, the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that both the courts exceeded their jurisdiction in granting injunction in respect of lands not forming part of the original suit. It is argued that upon withdrawal of the suit, the counter-claim could not have been permitted to proceed independently in respect of properties beyond the scope of the original lis. It is further submitted that the challenge to sale deeds pertains only to Schedule ‘U’ land, and not to Schedules ‘T’, ‘V’ and ‘W’. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the counter-claim is maintainable independently and can encompass connected properties forming part of the same dispute. It is further contended that both the courts have concurrently found possession of the respondent and rightly granted injunction, warranting no interference in supervisory jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on Jag Mohan Chawla V. Dera Radha Swami Satsang , reported in (1996) 4 SCC 699 9. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record, including the decisions cited. 10. It is not in dispute that the original suit instituted by the petitioner has been withdrawn with liberty, and the counter-claim filed by the respondent is presently being adjudicated independently. Admittedly, the dispute in the original suit pertains to approx. 3 Bighas of land out of 5 Bighas of land of schedule-T land. However, in the counter-claim, in addition to the claim of the respondent over schedule-T land, right, title, interest and possession is also sought over schedule-U, V & W land. 11. Order VIII Rule 6A of the Code of Civil Procedure enables a defendant, in addition to a set-off under Rule 6, to raise a counter-claim against the plaintiff in respect of any cause of action accruing either before or after the institution of the suit, provided such claim is within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. 12. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6A stipulates that a counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit, thereby empowering the Court to adjudicate both the original claim and the counter-claim together and render a composite judgment. 13. 12. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6A stipulates that a counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit, thereby empowering the Court to adjudicate both the original claim and the counter-claim together and render a composite judgment. 13. Further, sub-rule (4) clarifies that a counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and shall be governed by the same procedural rules as are applicable to plaints. 14. Of particular significance is Rule 6D of Order VIII CPC, which provides that even where the original suit is stayed, discontinued, or dismissed, the counter-claim may nonetheless proceed independently. 15. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it manifest that a counter-claim possesses an independent character. Even in the absence of the original suit, the counter-claim survives and is to be adjudicated as a separate and substantive proceeding in accordance with law. 16 . The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the counter-claim travels beyond the scope of the original suit by introducing a new cause of action in respect of Schedule -U, V & W land, does not merit acceptance. Order VIII Rule 6A CPC permits a counter-claim in respect of any cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff, whether before or after the institution of the suit, and is not confined strictly to the subject-matter of the original claim. In the present case, the additional properties forming part of the counter-claim are shown to be connected to the suit land and arise out of the same overarching dispute relating to title and possession between the parties. Further, in view of Rule 6D CPC, the counter-claim survives and proceeds independently notwithstanding withdrawal of the suit. Therefore, the inclusion of the schedule-U, V & W land in the counter-claim cannot be construed as impermissible introduction of a new cause of action so as to render the proceedings or the interim relief unsustainable. Pertinently, the Apex Court in Jag Mohan Chawla (Supra) recognizes the wide amplitude and independent nature of a counter-claim. Accordingly, the objection raised by the petitioner is rejected. 17. On perusal of the judgment of the learned Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court, it is evident that both the Courts have granted temporary injunction, primarily on the basis of a prima facie finding that the respondent is in possession of the suit land. 18. Accordingly, the objection raised by the petitioner is rejected. 17. On perusal of the judgment of the learned Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court, it is evident that both the Courts have granted temporary injunction, primarily on the basis of a prima facie finding that the respondent is in possession of the suit land. 18. The Appellate Court, upon examination of the pleadings and materials on record, has recorded a categorical finding that there exists a serious dispute regarding title between the parties. It further held that the respondent has established a prima facie case, that the balance of convenience tilts in his favour, and that interference with his possession would result in irreparable injury. 19. The law governing grant of temporary injunction is well settled. In Wander Ltd. And Another -Vs- Antox India P. Ltd , reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 , it has been held that the grant of an interlocutory injunction is essentially discretionary and appellate interference is warranted only where such discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or perversely. The Court is required to preserve the status-quo pending adjudication, particularly where competing claims are yet to be conclusively determined. 20. Likewise, in Dalpat Kumar and Another -Vs- Prahlad Singh and Others ., reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719 , the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that the grant of injunction is contingent upon the satisfaction of three essential conditions, namely: existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience in favour of the applicant, and likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of such relief. 21. In the present case, the concurrent findings recorded by both, the leaned Trail Court as well as the Appellate Court satisfy the settled parameters governing grant of temporary injunction. No perversity, patent illegality, or jurisdictional error is demonstrated so as to warrant interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 22. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. 23. No order as to costs. 24. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 25 . It is however made clear that the observations made hereinabove are only for the purpose of the adjudication of the present petition arising out of an order of temporary injunction and are prima facie in nature. 22. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. 23. No order as to costs. 24. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 25 . It is however made clear that the observations made hereinabove are only for the purpose of the adjudication of the present petition arising out of an order of temporary injunction and are prima facie in nature. The learned Trail Court shall proceed to decide the suit/counter-claim on its own merits, in accordance with law and without being influenced by any observations made herein.