J UDGMENT & O RDER : KAUSHIK GOSWAMI, J. Heard Mr. O. P. Bhati, learned counsel appearing for the appellants. Also heard Mr. A. C. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. G. Bharadwaj, learned counsel and Mr. S. Barman, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent. 2. Factual Matrix 2.1. The appellants, as plaintiffs, instituted Title Suit No. 14/2004 before the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Nalbari (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”), seeking declaration that Sale Deed No. 1907/2002 dated 12.08.2002 is forged, fraudulent and collusive, along with consequential reliefs including cancellation of mutation. 2.2. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statements. Upon trial, the learned trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. 2.3. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent No. 1 preferred Title Appeal No. 15/2007 before the District Judge, Nalbari, (hereinafter referred to as the “first appellate court”). The learned first appellate court, being the final court of facts, re-appreciated the evidence and reversed the findings of the trial court. 3. Issues Framed by the Trial Court 3.1 The learned trial court framed the following issues: “1. Whether the Suit is maintainable in the present form? 2. Whether there is any cause of action for the Suit? 3. Whether the Suit is barred by limitation? 4. Whether the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 5. Whether the Suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties? 6. Whether the Deed of Sale is liable to be cancelled? 7. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to get a declaration about the title by issuing precept to Sub-Registrar, Nalbari for cancellation of the Deed of Sale in the concerned Register book? 8. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to get a declaration for cancellation of the mutation of Defendant No. 1 over the D/L? 9. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for confirmation of possession or permanent injunction? 10. What relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to?” 4. Substantial Question of Law 4.1 . This Court, while admitting the appeal, framed the following substantial question of law: “Whether the learned lower appellate court erred in fundamentals of law relating to transfer of immovable property jointly owned in entertaining the sale deed (Ext. 4), admittedly executed only by the appellant No. 1 and not by the co-owners, i.e., the appellant Nos. 2 and 3?” 5. Submissions 5.1. Mr. 4), admittedly executed only by the appellant No. 1 and not by the co-owners, i.e., the appellant Nos. 2 and 3?” 5. Submissions 5.1. Mr. O. P. Bhati, learned counsel for the appellants contends that appellant Nos. 2 and 3, being co-owners, their rights could not have been transferred by appellant No. 1 alone, and their signatures as witnesses do not amount to execution. 5.2. Per contra, Mr. A. C. Sarma, learned senior counsel for the respondents submits that no substantial question of law arises and the appeal seeks re-appreciation of evidence, which is impermissible. 6. Scope of Interference under Section 100 of the CPC. 6.1. The law governing second appeals is no longer res integra. The jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is confined to substantial questions of law. 6.2. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179 , the Apex Court held as under: “ 14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be „substantial? a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law „involving in the case? there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” 6.3. Further, in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal , reported in 2006 (5) SCC 545 , the Apex Court held that a substantial question of law arises only when the findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or where material evidence has been ignored, or legal principles have been erroneously applied. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “ 20. The question of law raised will not be considered as a substantial question of law, if it stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court. Where the facts required for a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere appreciation of facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Ramkrishna Govind Morey held that whether the trial court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference. (See Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar.) 21. The phrase „substantial question of law, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying question of law, means—of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with—technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta the phrase substantial question of law as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju: (Sir Chunilal case, SCR p. 557) ‘[W]hen a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.’ This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial : (Sir Chunilal case, SCR pp. 557-58) ‘The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.’ 22. In Dy. Commr. v. Rama Krishna Narain also it was held that a question of law of importance to the parties was a substantial question of law entitling the appellant to a certificate under (the then) Section 100 CPC. 23. To be „substantial? a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law „involving in the case? there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case or not, the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. (See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari.) 24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to „decision based on no evidence?, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 6.4. A reading of the aforesaid judgments, it is evident that a substantial question of law must arise from the case as pleaded. Such a question must be debatable, not previously settled by law, and must materially affect the rights of the parties. Crucially, it must emerge from the pleadings, the issues framed, and the findings recorded by the courts below. A reading of the aforesaid judgments, it is evident that a substantial question of law must arise from the case as pleaded. Such a question must be debatable, not previously settled by law, and must materially affect the rights of the parties. Crucially, it must emerge from the pleadings, the issues framed, and the findings recorded by the courts below. A question which merely invites re-appreciation of evidence or relates to factual errors does not qualify as a substantial question of law. Put differently, a new contention raised for the first time before the high court cannot be entertained as such, unless it goes to the root of the matter and is founded on the existing record. Therefore, unless the question is firmly rooted in the pleadings and has a direct and substantial bearing on the ultimate decision of the case, it cannot be treated as a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. 7. Analysis 7.1. Hence, the foundational requirement for raising a substantial question of law is that it must arise from the pleadings and findings of the courts below. 7.2. In the present case, a careful examination of the plaint and the evidence on record reveals that there is no specific pleading to the effect that appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are co-owners of the suit property to the extent of their alleged share. On the contrary, the suit property has not been projected as co-ownership property at any stage of the proceedings. 7.3. No issue on co-ownership was framed by the learned trial court, nor was any evidence led to substantiate such a plea. 7.4. On the contrary, the materials on record clearly indicate that the suit property stood mutated in the name of appellant No. 1 alone after the death of his father, the original owner. The appellant No. 1 thereafter executed a registered sale deed in favour of the respondent No. 1 in respect of the said suit property which stood mutated in his name. Notably, appellant Nos. 2 and 3 admittedly signed the said sale deed as attesting witnesses, and no objection whatsoever was raised by them at any relevant stage. 7.5. At this stage, it is apposite to notice the statutory position under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the TP Act, 1882”). The relevant provisions read as under: “ 7. 2 and 3 admittedly signed the said sale deed as attesting witnesses, and no objection whatsoever was raised by them at any relevant stage. 7.5. At this stage, it is apposite to notice the statutory position under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the TP Act, 1882”). The relevant provisions read as under: “ 7. Persons competent to transfer .—Every person competent to contract and entitled to transferable property, or authorised to dispose of transferable property not his own, is competent to transfer such property either wholly or in part and either absolutely or conditionally, in the circumstances, to the extent and in the manner, allowed and prescribed by any law for the time being in force. 44. Transfer by one co-owner .—Where one of two or more co-owners of immoveable property legally competent in that behalf transfers his share of such property or any interest therein, the transferee acquires as to such share or interest, and so far as is necessary to give effect to the transfer, the transferor's right to joint possession or other common or part enjoyment of the property, and to enforce a partition of the same, but subject to the conditions and liabilities affecting, at the date of the transfer, the share or interest so transferred. Where the transferee of a share of a dwelling-house belonging to an undivided family is not a member of the family, nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle him to joint possession or other common or part enjoyment of the house. 54. “Sale” defined .—“Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made .—Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale .—A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.” 7.6. A reading of the aforesaid provisions, it appears that under Section 7 of the TP Act, 1882, every person competent to contract and entitled to transferable property is competent to transfer such property. In the present case, the suit property stood mutated exclusively in the name of appellant No. 1, and there is no material on record to show any legal restriction on his competence to transfer the same. In absence of any established co-ownership right, appellant No. 1 must be deemed to have had the authority to execute the sale deed. 7.7. Section 44 of the Act, which contemplates transfer by one co-owner, pre-supposes the existence of a legally recognized co-ownership. As already noted, neither the pleadings nor the evidence establishes any such co-ownership in favour of appellant Nos. 2 and 3. Consequently, the said provision has no application to the facts of the present case. 7.8. Section 54 of the Act defines a “sale” as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised, and mandates that such transfer, in the case of immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/- and upwards, can be made only by a registered instrument. The record discloses that the sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1 was duly executed and registered. Once such a registered conveyance is proved, title stands transferred to the purchaser, and any challenge thereto must be founded on legally sustainable grounds such as fraud or want of title, which, in the present case, have not been established. 7.9. The learned first appellate court has, upon detailed re-appreciation of evidence has recorded a categorical finding that the sale deed was duly executed before the Sub-Registrar and that the plea of fraud has not been established. 7.10. 7.9. The learned first appellate court has, upon detailed re-appreciation of evidence has recorded a categorical finding that the sale deed was duly executed before the Sub-Registrar and that the plea of fraud has not been established. 7.10. Such findings, being pure findings of fact, cannot be interfered with in second appeal unless shown to be perverse or contrary to law. No such perversity or legal infirmity is made out in the present case. 7.11. The question now sought to be urged regarding co-ownership does not arise from the pleadings or the issues framed and, therefore, cannot be treated as a substantial question of law. 7.12. The present appeal essentially seeks re- appreciation of evidence and substitution of findings, which is impermissible in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. 8. Conclusion 8.1. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds: (a) The appeal does not involve any substantial question of law; (b) The findings of the first appellate court are based on proper appreciation of evidence; (c) No perversity or legal infirmity is demonstrated. 9. Order The second appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. 10. Return the Trial Court Records (TCR).