JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI, J. Both these writ petitions being connected and filed on an analogous cause of action, the same have been heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment and order. The claim in these writ petitions is with regard to compensation for acquisition of land, the process of which started in the year 1962 and the lands appear to have been finally acquired sometime in the year 1972-73. 2. For the sake of clarity, the reliefs prayed for in one of the writ petitions, being WP(C)/187/2023 are extracted hereinbelow: “PRAYER In the premises aforesaid, it is most respectfully prayed that Your Lordships may be pleased to I. Declare the Letter of Ministry of Defence No. A/83676/TENGA/Q3L [East]/498-SD [Lands] dated 18.09.1971 [Annexure-6], the Declaration No. REV-7/72 dated 13/10/1972 issued by the Government of India, Arunachal Pradesh Administration [Annexure-7] II. Quash and set aside the alleged Award No. CON/101/72 dated 29/03/1973. [ANNEXURE-9] III. Issue a writ of Mandamus directing the authorities more particularly respondent No. 1 & 2 to pay the annual rent for the land measuring 432.47 acres [Defence Land A-1] from 01.01.1964 onwards till date and continue to pay regular rent as per the rate fixed by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh within a time frame. AND IV. Issue a writ of Mandamus directing the authorities to calculate the adequate compensation for the land and other properties against the occupied 432.47 acres of land [Defence Land A-1] by lawfully acquiring the land as provided under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re-Settlement Act 2013 and to pay the calculated compensation within a time frame. V. Or otherwise, to hand over of the vacant possession of the land of 432.47 acres[Defence Land A-1] to the Tukpen Village Council. VI. Issue a direction for continuance of traditional fishing rights over water and rights over its resources. VII. Direct the State of Arunachal Pradesh [respondent 5] to revise the hiring charge as per the Commissioner, Land Management, Govt of Arunachal Pradesh Letter No. LM-75/2014/1294 Dated 13.08.2014 [Annexure-10] AND In the interim direct the State of Arunachal Pradesh to highlight and apprise pertaining to the revision of the hiring charge as per the Commissioner, Land Management, Govt of Arunachal Pradesh Letter No.LM-75/2014/1294 Dated 13.08.2014 [Annexure-10] And for this act of kindness the petitioners as in duty und shall ever pray.” 3. As per the facts projected in these two writ petitions, after the 1962 Chinese aggression, the Indian Army had established the defence base in Rupa and Tenga Circles in the West Kameng district. In the said process, initially lands of the petitioners were taken up for requisition. Though it appears that the land was ultimately acquired in the year 1972-73, it is contended that the petitioners were not aware of any such acquisition process. Bereft of details, the claim, as indicated above, is with regard to a compensation for the lands from which the petitioners have been deprived of. 4. I have heard Shri T. Pertin, learned counsel for the petitioners. I have also heard Shri Y. Doloi, learned Senior Penal Counsel for the Union of India and Shri I. Choudhury, learned Advocate General, AP assisted by Shri Y. Riram, learned State Counsel. 5. Shri Pertin, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the lands were initially requisitioned and the same process continued whereby the petitioners have been dispossessed. He has submitted that no compensation has been paid for acquisition of the land to the petitioners. He has also confirmed that such lands were not donated by the petitioners and therefore, they have a valid claim for compensation. It is to be clarified that so far as WP(C)/186/2023 is concerned, the same pertains to Singchung Village Council whereas the land in WP(C)/187/2023 is concerned, the same pertains to Tukpen Village Council at Rupa. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also drawn the attention of this Court to various provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and has submitted that though there are certain documents to show that a proceeding was initiated vide publication of a notice under Section 4 of the Act dated 29.04.1972, the other procedures including the requirement to give scope to the land affected persons as required under Section 5A of the Act was not fulfilled. He has submitted that to the knowledge of the petitioners, there was no valid acquisition process and in an illegal manner, the petitioners have been deprived of their entitlements for compensation. He has submitted that to the knowledge of the petitioners, there was no valid acquisition process and in an illegal manner, the petitioners have been deprived of their entitlements for compensation. He has also submitted that though in the proceeding, an Award dated 29.03.1973 has come into surface, the land, as such have not been identified and therefore, it cannot be said that the said Award is in the context of the land which is the subject matter of these two writ petitions. 7. In short, the learned counsel for the petitioner is praying for a fair compensation for the land which has ultimately been taken by the army authorities. On the aspect of delay in approaching the Court, he has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. Vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Ors. reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353 and the observations made in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said judgment are pressed into service, which are as follows: “10. In the case at hand, there has been no acquisition. The question that emerges for consideration is whether, in a democratic body polity, which is supposedly governed by the Rule of Law, the State should be allowed to deprive a citizen of his property, without adhering to the law. The matter would have been different had the State pleaded that it has right, title and interest over the said land. It however, concedes to the right, title and interest of the appellants over such land and pleads the doctrine of delay and laches as grounds for the dismissal of the petition/appeal. 11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a true and concrete distinction, between the principle of "eminent domain" and "police power" of the State. Under certain circumstances, the police power of the State may be used temporarily, to take possession of property but the present case clearly shows that neither of the said powers have been exercised. A question then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power" which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated the land owner as a 'subject' of medieval India, but not as a 'citizen' under our constitution.” 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied upon the case of Vidya Devi Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. , reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that for continuing cause of action, the aspect of delay would not arise. In this connection, he has pressed into service the observations made in paragraph 12.12, which read as follows: “12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.” 9. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.” 9. Per contra, Shri Doloi, learned CGC for the Union of India has submitted that the entire premises of approaching this Court is fallacious inasmuch as, both the rental compensation and acquisition compensation have been duly paid to the land affected persons. He has drawn the attention of this Court to the acquisition notification and also to the statements made in the affidavit-in- opposition that in total 1115.941 acres of land was initially hired, which was subsequently acquired by following the due process of law and in terms of the Award, the compensation has been paid. He has also referred to the money receipt of the Treasury Officer, Bomdila to confirm that the acquisition compensation has actually been paid. He has also referred to a list of beneficiaries and has confirmed that the present claim is wholly without any basis. 10. Shri Choudhury, learned Advocate General, AP has submitted that an affidavit-in-opposition has been filed wherein it has been contended that no records could be traced out in connection with the present acquisition process because of the fact that such acquisition was done about 50 years back. 11. The rival submissions have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court have been carefully examined. 12. The dispute which has arisen for determination is in the realm of a factual dispute. While the petitioners contend that there was no validly conducted acquisition proceeding and also the principal issue that no compensation has been received by them, such averments have been categorically denied by the Union of India in their affidavit-in-opposition filed on 23.07.2024. To dispel any doubts on the aspect of disputed questions of fact, the averments made in the affidavit filed by the Union of India, more particularly in paragraph nos. 34 and 35 are extracted hereinbelow: “34. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph Nos.44 and 45 of the writ petition, your humble deponent denies the same and submits that Ministry of Defence acquired the land measuring 1115.941 acres at Tenga Valley by paying acquisition compensation of Rs.7,15,153.3 (i.e Rs.6,96,403.30/-for 1090.941 acres and Rs.18,750/- for 25 acres of land). That with regard to the statements made in paragraph Nos.44 and 45 of the writ petition, your humble deponent denies the same and submits that Ministry of Defence acquired the land measuring 1115.941 acres at Tenga Valley by paying acquisition compensation of Rs.7,15,153.3 (i.e Rs.6,96,403.30/-for 1090.941 acres and Rs.18,750/- for 25 acres of land). Therefore, there is no question of re-measuring the acquired land and again acquired the same under Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re-settlement Act 2013. 35. That with regards to the statements made in paragraph Nos.46 and 47 of the writ petition, the humble deponent denies the same and states that Ministry of Defence paid hiring charges from 1965 till the acquisition of land and paid Rs.7,15,153.3/-(i.e Rs.6,96,403.30/- for 1090.941 acres and Rs.18,750/- for 25 acres of land) for the acquisition compensation as mentioned in above Paras. Therefore, there is no question of paying rental charges again since 1962 or handover the acquired A1 defence land to the Singchung village council land management Committee.” 13. This Court has also looked into the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioners on 30.07.2024 wherein there is no specific in the concerned paragraph, which is extracted hereinbelow: “27. That in response to the averments made in paragraph 29-36, your deponent begs to state that through letter dated 15.06.1978 to till date it is the consistent stand of the office of the Deputy Commissioner, West Kameng district, Bomdila that there are no records of acquisition of the land in question [means 1090.941 acres) and the Defense Estate Office of the Ministry of Defence could not substantiate their claim. As rightly pointed out, the onus of producing evidence for payment of compensation to the rightful owners lies on the Deputy Commissioner, Bomdila however, since there are no records of such payment of compensation in the office of Deputy Commissioner, Bomdila it is clear that no such payment of compensation was paid to the landowners. In response to the letter No. DEO/TZP/LAND/NCST/SINGCHUNG/50 dated 02.12.2020 was replied by the Deputy Commissioner, Bomdila vide BR-2795/486/19-20/687 dated 10.07.2020 [Annexure-16 @108-113 to the writ petition].” 14. The aforesaid averments and the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the parties before this Court would clearly show that the dispute is factual in nature which this Court will not be in a position to adjudicate such a dispute. The aforesaid averments and the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the parties before this Court would clearly show that the dispute is factual in nature which this Court will not be in a position to adjudicate such a dispute. It is trite law that this Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not a Court on facts, more so, when such facts are disputed. This Court is also of the view that the stand of the State Government cannot be held to be unreasonable inasmuch as, it is possible not to be able to trace out records which are 50 years old. 15. Be that as it may, for prima facie satisfaction, the affidavit filed on 23.07.2024 by the respondent nos. 1, 3 & 4contains a certificate of payment issued by the Treasury Officer, Central Treasury, Bomdila certifying that a sum of Rs.6,96,403.30 was paid to the Deputy Commissioner, Bomdila on account of payment of compensation for the land acquired. The said affidavit also contains a list of beneficiaries. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioners has however raised an objection that such list cannot be relied upon as the same does not contain any counter signatures or signatures of the petitioners. It is also contended that the date appearing in the list is of the year 1975 whereas the Award has been stated to be of 1973. 17. As observed above, disputed questions of fact cannot be gone into by this Court. At the same time, if there is a genuine claim of the petitioners, the same cannot be left unredressed. In view of the above, while this Court is not inclined to enter into the process of adjudication as the issues involved disputed questions of fact, the petitioners are given liberty to approach the appropriate Civil Court for the redressal of the grievance, if any. 18. It is however made clear that if such an approach is made, the same is required to be adjudicated strictly on merits as this Court has not expressed any opinion on the inter se merits of either of the parties. This Court also observes that if such an approach is made, the aspect of the delay may be considered in a justice orientated approach. 19. Both the writ petitions are accordingly disposed of.