JUDGMENT : MITALI THAKURIA, J. Heard Mr. T. Deuri, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. P. Borthakur, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam for the State respondent No.1. None is present to represent the respondent No.2. 2. This appeal has been preferred by the accused appellant against the judgment and order dated 05.12.2019, passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Kokrajhar in Sessions Case No.68/2019, whereby the appellant was convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 8 (eight) years for committing an offence under Section 376 of the IPC and fine of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand), in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for another 6 (six) months and to undergo simple imprisonment for 2 (two) years for committing an offence under Section 420 of the IPC and to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 (six) months for committing an offence under Section 506 of the IPC. 3. The prosecution case, as revealed from the FIR lodged by the informant/the victim of the case is that the accused being known as Kabiraj, she was brought by her father for treatment of jaundice fever. The Kabiraj/accused stated her father to keep the victim in the residence of the accused person for better treatment and accordingly, she was left in the residence of the accused person and the accused taking the advantage, sexually assaulted the victim and committed rape against her forcefully. Accused person also instructed her not to disclose the matter of rape to anyone. While victim was developing her 27 weeks pregnancy, the family members saw her physical transformation and on query of the family members, the victim disclosed the evil deeds of the accused person and accordingly, she lodged the FIR before the police. On receipt of the FIR, the officer-in-charge of the Bagribari Police Station registered the Bagribari P.S. Case No.53/18, against the accused person, namely, Melason Marak under Sections 120(B)/354/420/376/506 of the IPC. The investigation officer visited the place of occurrence, recorded the statement of the witnesses including the statement of victim under Section 164 of the CrPC and the victim was medically examined. After completion of the investigation and having found sufficient evidence against the accused person, submitted the charge sheet against him under Section 376/420/506 IPC. 4. As the offence is exclusively Sessions triable, hence the learned Addl. After completion of the investigation and having found sufficient evidence against the accused person, submitted the charge sheet against him under Section 376/420/506 IPC. 4. As the offence is exclusively Sessions triable, hence the learned Addl. CJM, Kokrajhar committed the case to the court of learned Sessions Judge, Kokrajhar and the learned Sessions Judge, Kokrajhar registered it as a Sessions case and transferred the same to the Asstt. Sessions Judge, Kokrajhar for disposal. On appearance of the accused person and hearing the counsel for both sides, prima-facie materials were found against the accused Melason Marak under Section 376/420/506 IPC. Hence, formal charge was framed against the accused under the aforesaid section of law and the same being read over and explained, the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as eight (8) witnesses including the M.O. and I.O. and exhibited four (4) documents in support of its case. The accused person was examined under Section 313 of the CrPC and the accused denied the allegation made by prosecution. The defence examined none in support of his innocence. 5. The accused/appellant had declined to adduce any evidence on his behalf and after recording his statement under section 313 of the CrPC, wherein the accused/appellant took the plea that the allegations brought against him are false and baseless. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court, after hearing the parties and upon perusing the materials on record, passed the impugned judgment and order dated 05.12.2019, which is assailed in the present appeal. 6. Mr. T. Deuri, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant during the course of argument had submitted that from the statement made by the witnesses it can be seen that there was a consensual relationship between the victim and the accused/appellant. The victim was alone in the house of the accused/appellant but in spite of the forceful sexual relationship with her, she did not sought for any help nor make any complaint to any person, which otherwise established that there was a consensual relationship between the victim and the accused/appellant. Mr. Deuri further submitted that the PW.4 had admitted in his evidence that there was consensual relationship between the victim and the accused/ appellant and thereafter only the father of the victim called for a village bichar, where both the accused/appellant and the victim girl had admitted the incident. Mr. Deuri further submitted that the PW.4 had admitted in his evidence that there was consensual relationship between the victim and the accused/ appellant and thereafter only the father of the victim called for a village bichar, where both the accused/appellant and the victim girl had admitted the incident. More so, the PW.7 also deposed in his evidence that both the accused/appellant and the victim had admitted about the incident. Thus, it is not a case that the there was any forceful relationship with the victim, rather it was purely consensual relationship. 7. To that regard, Mr. Deuri, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant had also cited the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uday vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2003) 4 SCC 46 wherein in para 21 of the said judgment held as under: “21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no strait jacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the Courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the Court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.” 8. Mr. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.” 8. Mr. Deuri, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant further submitted that the medical evidence also does not support the case of the prosecution and at the time of medical examination of the victim, the Doctor had opined that sexual offence might or might not taken place with the victim. More so, no DNA test was conducted for confirmation of paternity of the child. To that regard, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijayan vs. State of Kerala reported in (2008) 14 SCC 763 and emphasized on para 5 of the said judgment, which reads as under: “5. The present case wholly depends upon the testimony of the prosecutrix. The incident in the present case took place seven months prior to d the date of lodging the complaint as a realisation dawned upon her that she has been subjected to rape by the appellant-accused. No complaint or grievance was made either to the police or the parents prior thereto. The explanation for delay in lodging the FIR is that the appellant-accused promised her to marry therefore the FIR was not filed. In cases where the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is available, it is very dangerous to convict e the accused, specially when the prosecutrix could venture to wait for seven months for filing the FIR for rape. This leaves the accused totally defenceless. Had the prosecutrix lodged the complaint soon after the incident, there would have been some supporting evidence like the medical report or any other injury on the body of the prosecutrix so as to show the sign of rape. If the prosecutrix has willingly submitted herself to sexual intercourse and waited for seven months for filing the FIR it will be very hazardous to convict on such sole oral testimony. Moreover, no DNA test was conducted to find out whether the child was born out of the said incident of rape and that the appellant-accused was responsible for the said child. In the face of lack of any other evidence, it is unsafe to convict the accused. Moreover, no DNA test was conducted to find out whether the child was born out of the said incident of rape and that the appellant-accused was responsible for the said child. In the face of lack of any other evidence, it is unsafe to convict the accused. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the trial court and the learned Single Judge of the High Court in convicting the appellant-accused 9 under Section 376 IPC cannot be sustained. Consequently, we set aside the judgment and order of the trial court as also of the High Court and quash the conviction and sentence of the appellant-accused under Section 376 IPC. The accused may be released forthwith from custody if not required in any other case.” 9. Mr. Deuri, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant further submitted that to establish a case under Section 375 of the IPC, it has to be established as to whether, there was consent obtained by the accused/appellant at the time of commission of the sexual offence with her. But in the instant case, it is seen that the victim neither raised any protest nor disclosed about the rape committed by the accused/appellant which otherwise establishes that consent was obtained from the victim when there was any sexual assault on the victim. To substantiate his plea, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant also relied on another decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kaini Rajan vs. State of Kerala reported in (2013) 9 SCC 113 and emphasized on para 12 to 20 of the said judgment, which read as under: 12. Section 375 IPC defines the expression “rape”, which indicates that the first clause operates, where the woman is in possession of her senses, and therefore, capable of consenting but the act is done against her will; and second, where it is done without her consent; the third, fourth and fifth, when there is consent, but it is not such a consent as excuses the offender, because it is obtained by putting her on any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. The expression “against her will” means that the act must have been done in spite of the opposition of the woman. An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the case. The expression “against her will” means that the act must have been done in spite of the opposition of the woman. An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the case. “Consent” is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in the mind of a person to permit the doing of an act complained of. Section 90 IPC refers to the expression “consent”. Section 90, though, does not define “consent”, but describes what is not consent. “Consent”, for the purpose of Section 375, requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances. 13. We are, in this case, concerned with a situation where the incident alleged to have occurred at 8.30 AM in day light and at a place near the compound of one Karunakaran, not within the four walls of a house or a building. Accused was not a stranger. The The prosecutrix had previous acquaintance with the accused or else in all probability she would have resisted forcefully, attracting passersby or people from the neighbourhood. She has stated that she was threatened and made to believe that the accused would marry her. She later became pregnant and delivered a child, and the paternity of the child is disputed by the accused. FIR was lodged after a period of 10 months from the date of incident. 14. This Court examined the scope of Section 375 IPC in a case where the facts have some resemblance with the one in hand. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in Deelip Singh alias Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar (2005) 1 SCC 88 . In that case, this Court examined the meaning and content of the expression “without her consent” in Section 375 IPC as well as whether the consent given by woman believing the man’s promise to marry her, is a consent which excludes the offence of rape. This Court endorsed the principle that a misrepresentation as regards the intention of the person seeking consent, i.e. the accused, could give rise to the misconception of fact. This Court endorsed the principle that a misrepresentation as regards the intention of the person seeking consent, i.e. the accused, could give rise to the misconception of fact. While applying this principle to a case arising under Section 375 IPC, this Court held that the consent given pursuant to a false representation that the accused intends to marry, could be regarded as consent given under misconception of fact. But a promise to marry without anything more will not give rise to “misconception of fact” within the meaning of Section 90 IPC. This Court further held that; “28. ….. If on facts, it is established that at the very inception of the making of promise the accused did not really entertain the intention of marrying her and the promise to marry held out by him was a mere hoax, the consent ostensibly given by the victim will be of no avail to the accused to exculpate him from the ambit of the second clause of Section 375 IPC.” In the facts of that case, this Court held, that the predominant reason which weighed with her in agreeing for sexual intimacy with the accused was the hope generated in her of the prospect of marriage with the accused. The Court held that she came to the decision to have a sexual affair only after being convinced that the accused would marry her and it is quite clear from her evidence, which is in tune with her earlier version given in the first information report. The Court noticed that she was fully aware of the moral quality of the act and the inherent risk involved and that she considered the pros and cons of the act. 15. In Ramdas and Others v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 2 SCC 170 , this Court held that : “23……… the conviction in case of rape can be based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, but that can be done in a case where the Court is convinced about the truthfulness of the prosecutrix and there exist no circumstances which cast a shadow of doubt over her veracity.” 16. Vijayan v. State of Kerala (2008) 14 SCC 763 was a case where the complaint was made by the prosecutirx after the alleged commission of rape on her by the accused. At the time of making the case, the prosecutrix was pregnant for about seven months. Vijayan v. State of Kerala (2008) 14 SCC 763 was a case where the complaint was made by the prosecutirx after the alleged commission of rape on her by the accused. At the time of making the case, the prosecutrix was pregnant for about seven months. This Court did not place reliance on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. The Court noticed that flaw that no DNA test was conducted to find out whether the child was born out of the said incident and the accused was responsible for the said child. 17. K. P. Thimmappa Gowda v. State of Karnataka (2011) 14 SCC 475 , was a case where the accused had assured the prosecutrix that he would marry her and had sexual affair, which was repeated on several occasions as well. But he did not marry and she became pregnant. That was a case where there was delay of eight months in filing the complaint. The accused was given the benefit of doubt holding that it would not be possible to conclude that the alleged sexual act was committed without the consent of the prosecutrix. 18. We have already referred to the evidence of PW2 to PW4 and that their consistent version is that PW2 had previous acquaintance with the accused being her elder brother’s friend for a period of more than two years before the date of incident. The place of the alleged incident and the time is very crucial, so for as this case is concerned. It was early morning at 8.30 AM and the place of the alleged incident was on the side of a public road. If she had made any semblance of resistance or made any hue and cry it would have attracted large number of people from the locality. Further the first information report, as already indicated, was lodged after a period of 10 months of the alleged incident. All these factors cast some shadow of doubt on the version of PW2. 19. Behaviour of the parents of the prosecutirix viz. PW3 and PW4 also appears to be strange. On their evidence they stated that they came to know about the relations between the appellant and the prosecutrix when they found her pregnant. Prosecutrix had told them that the appellant had agreed to marry her. They knew the appellant and his family already. Behaviour of the parents of the prosecutirix viz. PW3 and PW4 also appears to be strange. On their evidence they stated that they came to know about the relations between the appellant and the prosecutrix when they found her pregnant. Prosecutrix had told them that the appellant had agreed to marry her. They knew the appellant and his family already. However, there is not even a whisper that they approached the appellant or his family members for marrying the prosecutrix. They straightaway went to the police station to lodge the report, that too after the birth of the child. All these factors cast a doubt on the prosecution version. The version of victim, in rape commands great respect and acceptability, but, if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court of the veracity of the victim’s evidence, then, it is not safe to rely on the uncorroborated version of the victim of rape. 20. The trial Court as well as the High Court has committed an error in holding that the accused is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC. In such circumstances, we are inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant and order accordingly. 10. Mr. Deuri, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant further submitted that it is an admitted fact that the rape causes greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can also cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. In that regard, the view expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Raju & others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2008) 15 SCC 133 has also been relied by the learned counsel for the accused/appellant and the para 11 of the said judgment reads as under: “11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.” 11. The learned counsel for the accused/appellant further submitted that the accused/appellant had took the plea while cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and also at the time of recording his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC that a false case is lodged against him only to drive him out from the village wherein he constructed a new house over the land purchased by him and only with that view a false case is lodged against him and the other villagers also cooperated the informant to that effect. The learned counsel further submitted that the accused/appellant had well explained his plea, while recording his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC, while replying to the question No.9, put forward by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge. Mr. Deuri further submitted that till date the accused/appellant is in jail for more than 6 years 3 months and considering his length of detention also, he may be acquitted in the present case and remaining sentence may be set aside by this Court. 12. Mr. P. Borthakur, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam appearing for the State respondent submitted that the PWs.3, 4 & 7 are the neighbours of both the accused/appellant and the victim, who supported the case of the prosecution to the extent that they were all present in the village bichar wherein the accused/appellant admitted his guilt and he was also asked to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- in the said village bichar. But without giving the fine or accepting the victim, the accused/appellant fled away from the village, for which the case was lodged against the accused/appellant. Mr. Borthakur, the learned Addl. But without giving the fine or accepting the victim, the accused/appellant fled away from the village, for which the case was lodged against the accused/appellant. Mr. Borthakur, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam further submitted that from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, it is seen that the accused/appellant kept the victim in his own residence only with a pretext of providing her treatment for jaundice. In the same time, in the village bichar, the accused/appellant also confessed his guilt. Mr. Borthakur further submitted that it is not a case that the victim and accused/appellant had love relationship nor it is a case wherein the accused/appellant promised to marry her. But from the evidence of the PW.2/the victim, it is established that she went to the house of the accused/appellant only for her treatment and she was taken by her own father, as the accused/appellant was known as a kabiraj in the village. As such, there was no consensual relationship between them and the consent of the victim was obtained only under force and she was also threatened with dire consequences if she discloses the incident to others. Accordingly, it is not a case that consent was obtained from the victim and out of love affairs they had physical relationship which was purely consensual, rather it was a case wherein the accused/appellant had committed rape on her under threat. 13. Mr. P. Borthakur, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam further submitted that there is nothing to disbelieve the PW.2/the victim of the case who is consistent in her statement in every stage of the case that is her statement made under Section 161 and Section 164 of the CrPC fully corroborates with her statement while recording her evidence before the learned Trial Court. Mr. Borthakur further submitted that it is a settled position of law that conviction can be based solely on the evidence of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence. Accordingly, Mr. Borthakur submitted that the learned Trial Court below had rightly passed the order and judgment and hence, there is no need of any interference by this Court. 14. Hearing the submissions made by the learned counsel for both sides, I have also perused the case record, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses vis-à-vis the judgment and order passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge. 15. 14. Hearing the submissions made by the learned counsel for both sides, I have also perused the case record, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses vis-à-vis the judgment and order passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge. 15. To arrive at a just decision, let us scrutinize the statement of the prosecution witnesses. 16. PW.4 Bitel Marak deposed in his evidence that the incident took place about two years ago where the father of the victim called for a village bichar where both the accused/appellant and victim girl admitted about the incident. This witness also deposed that there was an illicit relationship between the victim and the accused/appellant. However, the accused/appellant refused to accept the victim and offered to pay an amount of Rs. 3,000/- as fine and he took one week time for payment of the same but later on he fled away from the village. From his cross-evidence also it is seen that there were about 50/60 persons present in the said village bichar. It is also admitted by him that the accused/appellant purchased a plot of land and constructed a house thereon and also engaged himself with cultivation. But this witness denied the suggestion that only to drive the accused/appellant away from the village, a false and concocted case has been lodged against him. 17. PW-1 Ander Marak stated in his evidence that the victim is his daughter. He knows the accused. Incident took about one and half years back. While his daughter was suffering from jaundice, he came to know about one Kabiraj who treats jaundice and he brought his daughter before the Kabiraj, who is the present accused. The accused person advised him to keep his daughter there for doing her treatment which was to continue for three days. Due to good faith, the PW-1 kept her in the house of accused's niece. After few days while the relatives saw that her physical condition deteriorated and asked her, came to know that she was pregnant by the accused. A village bichar took place but accused declined to accept her. As per his statement, his daughter informed that the accused committed rape on her forcefully. The victim girl gave birth to a female child and she was living with PW-1 along with her new born daughter. A village bichar took place but accused declined to accept her. As per his statement, his daughter informed that the accused committed rape on her forcefully. The victim girl gave birth to a female child and she was living with PW-1 along with her new born daughter. In cross-examination, the PW1 admitted that after three months pregnancy the victim lodged the FIR and in the village bichar more than one hundred persons including him. 18. PW.2 (the victim) deposed in her evidence that the incident took place one and half years back. She lodged the FIR before police station. She give her thumb impression upon the FIR. While she was suffering from jaundice, upon advice of villagers, her father brought her to the residence of Kabiraj/the present accused appellant. While the accused appellant advised her father to keep her at the residence of accused for few days for her continuous treatment, she was kept at the residence of the accused's niece but ultimately accused kept her in his residence and on the first day accused raped forcefully without her will and warned her not to inform any other and if informed, dire consequence will take took place. While her aunt Nimki Sangma saw her health is deteriorated and on inquiry, she informed the matter of rape to her. At that time she was three months pregnant. Later on she lodged the FIR, which is Ext.1 and Ext.1(1) is her thumb impression. The victim gave birth to a female child on 29.08.2018 and she was living with her father. After five months from the day of incident she lodged FIR before police. 19. PW.3 Mangal Sangma deposed that he knows the accused and the informant/victim. a village bichar took place with regard to the illegal relation of the accused with the victim. In that village bichar, accused confessed his guilt and declined to accept the victim and a fine amount of Rs. 3,000/- was imposed. Accused took seven days time to make payment of the fine but he fled away from the village. In his cross-examination, this witness stated that the village bichar held in public field and approximately 150 persons were present in the village bichar. 20. PW.5 Madhabi Barman came to know from the victim that accused committed rape upon her. Accused took seven days time to make payment of the fine but he fled away from the village. In his cross-examination, this witness stated that the village bichar held in public field and approximately 150 persons were present in the village bichar. 20. PW.5 Madhabi Barman came to know from the victim that accused committed rape upon her. This witness stated that the victim was brought for medical checkup and recording her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC. She also came to know that the victim was suffering from jaundice for which she was taken to the house of the accused/appellant for treatment, when he had committed rape on her. 21. PW-6 Dr. Monisha Boro Phukan is the then Medical and Health Officer of the RNB Civil Hospital, Kokrajhar who examined the victim on 28.05.2018. After examination of the victim, the Medical Officer opined that the victim is above 18 years but below 25 years and the sexual offence may or may not be taken place and the victim is carrying pregnancy of 27 weeks, as per sonography report as on 31st May 2018. Ext.3 is the Medical report and Ext.3(1) is her signature. 22. PW-7 deposed that the victim and accused are known to him. While the victim came to the residence of accused for her jaundice treatment at that time accused committed rape upon her. The father of the victim gave a village bichar and in that village bichar both the parties i.e. accused and victim confessed their guilt and accused declined to accept the victim. On that night accused fled away from that village bichar. The informant lodged FIR. 23. The I.O. as the PW-8 deposed that on 27.05.2018, while he was working as the in-charge of Tipkai Police Outpost, the victim lodged a written FIR and the officer-in-charge of the Bagribari Police Station registered the Bagribari P.S. Case No.53/2018 and instructed him to investigate this case. Accordingly, he proceeded to the place of occurrence and recorded the statement of victim. During his investigation the victim stated before the I.O. that the accused threatened her not to disclose to any other, which was done by the accused upon her. Accordingly, he proceeded to the place of occurrence and recorded the statement of victim. During his investigation the victim stated before the I.O. that the accused threatened her not to disclose to any other, which was done by the accused upon her. The I.O. drew sketch map of the place of occurrence, recorded the statement of victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C, medically examined the victim and after completion of investigation, submitted the charge-sheet against the accused under Sections 376/420/506 of the IPC. Ext.4 is the Charge-sheet and Ext.4(1) is his signature. 24. From the discussion of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, it is seen that admittedly there is no other eye witness to the incident and it is the PW.2/victim brought the allegation of rape on her by the accused/ appellant while she was staying in his house for her treatment of jaundice. It is also a fact that at the time of incident, the victim did not raise any alarm nor she had informed about the incident immediately to her family members or relatives but it was her aunt, who asked the victim about her deteriorated health condition or her physical change and then only, she disclosed about the entire incident as to how the accused/appellant committed rape on her. Coming to know about the same, the father of the victim called for a village bichar, wherein the accused/appellant confessed his guilt and was ready to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- in the said village bichar. But instead of paying any fine, the accused/appellant fled away from the village on the same night. 25. Mr. Deuri, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant basically stressed on the point that there was purely a consensual relationship between the victim and the accused/appellant, for which the victim raised no alarm nor she sought for any help from any other people, though she was not put under the lock and key and considering the relationship as a consensual one, Mr. Deuri, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant also relied on the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, as referred above. 26. Deuri, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant also relied on the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, as referred above. 26. But from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, specifically the evidence of the victim who was examined as PW.2 and her father/PW.1, it is seen that there was no such love relationship between the victim and the accused/appellant and there is also no evidence that the relationship was purely consensual one. Rather, it reveals from the evidence of the victim that she was forced to have sexual relationship with the accused/appellant and she was threatened with dire consequence, if she discloses about the incident to others. In the same time, it is also an admitted position that the victim went to the house of the accused/appellant only for her treatment of jaundice, as the accused was known as a quack in the village who used to provide treatment for jaundice. However, she was asked to stay in the house of the accused/appellant and for that reason only, her father kept her in the house of the accused/appellant, wherein such incident of rape had taken place with the victim girl. 27. Thus the question of consensual relationship does not arise in the present case. Rather, it was forceful sexual relationship with the victim by the accused/appellant. The victim was also not aware about her pregnancy and it was only her aunt who asked her about her physical changes and then only, the victim disclosed the entire incident to her aunt as well as to the family members and thereafter, the village bichar was held wherein the accused/appellant also confessed his guilt. 28. Coming to the medical evidence of the Doctor, it is seen that at the time of her examination, the Doctor had opined that sexual offence might or might not taken place. From the fact of the case it is seen that the victim girl was examined only after her 27 weeks of pregnancy and it is quite probable not to find any mark of violence on her private parts as she was examined after 3/4 months of said occurrence. But it is an admitted fact that the victim got pregnant and subsequently, she also gave birth to a child. But it is an admitted fact that the victim got pregnant and subsequently, she also gave birth to a child. However, it is also a fact that no DNA test was conducted by the prosecution to determine the paternity of the child but at the same time, it is also seen that there is no defence plea that the victim girl had sexual relationship with any other people, except the accused/appellant. Rather, the accused/appellant had confessed in the village bichar about the incident and also accepted to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/-, as he denied to accept the victim as his wife. 29. PWs.3, 4 & 7 are the neighbours of the victim as well as the accused/appellant, who were present at the time of village bichar and there is nothing to disbelieve these prosecution witnesses who supported the case of the prosecution to the extent that a village bichar was held on the complaint made by the father of the victim wherein the allegation of rape was brought against the accused/appellant. 30. It is the case of the defence that a false and concocted case is lodged against the accused/appellant only to drive him out of the village who had purchased a plot of land in the said village and also constructed a house thereon. The prosecution witnesses had denied the said suggestion put by the defence. But except the suggestion and the defence plea, there is no other evidence to substantiate the fact that a false and concocted case is lodged against the accused/appellant only to drive him out from the village. There is no explanation or reason also brought by the defence as to why the villagers tried to drive out the accused/appellant from the village without any reason and thus, the defence plea is also hard to believe that without any reason a person will be prosecuted only with a view to grab his land. There is no evidence that the victim, informant or her family members had any previous grudge against the accused/ appellant to lodge a case with false and concocted allegations. 31. It is a settled position of law that the conviction can be based on solitary evidence of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. There is no evidence that the victim, informant or her family members had any previous grudge against the accused/ appellant to lodge a case with false and concocted allegations. 31. It is a settled position of law that the conviction can be based on solitary evidence of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. In the present case also, it is seen that the victim remains inconsistent in every stage of her evidence and she made the same statement describing as to how the accused/appellant had forceful sexual intercourse with her. 32. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Moti Lal Vs. State of M.P. , reported in 2008 0 AIR (SC) 882 , has held in paragraph Nos. 7 & 9 as under: “7. It is settled law that the victim of sexual assault is not treated as accomplice and as such, her evidence does not require corroboration from any other evidence including the evidence of a doctor. In a given case even if the doctor who examined the victim does not find sign of rape, it is no ground to disbelieve the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. In normal course a victim of sexual assault does not like to disclose such offence even before her family members much less before public or before the police. The Indian women as tendency to conceal such offence because it involves her prestige as well as prestige of her family. Only in few cases, the victim girl or the family members has courage to go before the police station and lodge a case. In the instant case the suggestion given on behalf of the defence that the victim has falsely implicated the accused does not appeal to reasoning. There was no apparent reason for a married woman to falsely implicate the accused after scatting her own prestige and honour. 9. A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge leveled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix. There is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short Evidence Act) similar to illustration (b) of Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is own to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash kewalchand Jain (1990 91) scc 550).” 33. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh , reported in (1993) 2 SCC 622 ; 1993 SCC (Cri) 674 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by the honourable Supreme Court in Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2010) 2 SCC 9 ; AIR 2010 SC 1 , placing reliance an earlier judgment in Rameshwar S/o Kalian Singh v. State of Rajasthan , reported in AIR 1952 SC 54 . Thus the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The Court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. 34. In view of the discussions made above, it is seen that the prosecution could establish that in the pretext of providing treatment for jaundice to the victim, the accused appellant had committed forceful sexual intercourse with the victim and it is also established that the accused appellant also threatened the victim not to disclose about the misdeed to any other. Thus it is seen that the case against the accused appellant under Sections 376/420/506 of the IPC is established and accordingly, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Kokrajhar had passed the order of conviction and sentence against the present accused appellant. 35. Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that there is no need of interference in the present appeal against the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Kokrajhar and accordingly the same stands dismissed and disposed of.