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2026 DAILYLAW 10413 (GAU)

L. Atopu Sumi v. State of Nagaland

2026-04-23

Yarenjungla Longkumer

body2026
JUDGMENT : YARENJUNGLA LONGKUMER, J. The petitioner in the instant writ petition is aggrieved by the Order No. VLS-59/SETTLEMENT/2-24-D/332-34 dated 15.04.2025, passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur. By the impugned order it was held that the land on which the petitioner has constructed the approach road to his residence is not his land and that the road is not a private road belonging to the petitioner. 2. The brief facts set out in the writ petition leading to the passing of the impugned order is that the petitioner had bought 3 Bighas of land from one Horen Mech and Janmojoy Mech at Padampukhuri, Dimapur. The sale and purchase has been recorded in a Sale Deed dated 01.02.2010. The seller, Mr. Horen Mech also owned an adjoining plot of land. When he sold the land to the petitioner he also gave a land measuring 18 feet in breadth through his land for an approach road to the land sold by him to the petitioner. This approach road led only to the plot of the petitioner. 3. Thereafter, the land bought by the petitioner was mutated in his name and jamabandi was issued to the petitioner covering his land measuring 3 Bighas under Patta No. 1314, Dag No. 263/1811 at Padampukhuri Block. Subsequently, when Patta books were issued by the revenue authorities, the jamabandi was submitted by the petitioner and in lieu of which he was issued a Patta book with serial no. 556, 119/16. Thereafter, the petitioner separated one bigha from the aforesaid 3 Bighas purchased by him and got it registered under a separate Patta bearing no. 1548, Dag No. 2057 and Patta book serial no. 557, 120/16. 4. Subsequently, the petitioner learnt that the remaining land of Shri Horen Mech, which was adjoining the land of the petitioner was sold to one Mr. P.S. Felix. It was also learned that Mr. Felix had bought the said land in the name of his son P.S Athem. This was the land on which the previous owner Horen Mech had allowed the petitioner to have an approach road to his land. Shri Horen Mech executed a Sale Declaration dated 15.02.2012 wherein it is mentioned that he has sold 4 Bighas to one Shri P.S. Athem, son of Shri P.S.Felix. In this declaration it is clearly mentioned that the aforesaid purchaser shall also have the right to use the approach road. Shri Horen Mech executed a Sale Declaration dated 15.02.2012 wherein it is mentioned that he has sold 4 Bighas to one Shri P.S. Athem, son of Shri P.S.Felix. In this declaration it is clearly mentioned that the aforesaid purchaser shall also have the right to use the approach road. This approach road is the road which led to the petitioner’s land. Thus the land on which the approach road was situated was not sold to Mr. Felix but only the right to use the same was given as per the Sale Declaration dated 15.02.2012. Mr. Felix also purchased the land adjoining the above mentioned land from one Shri Shihato. 5. Sometime in the month of February 2012, the petitioner was contacted by Mr. Felix. He wanted to construct a brick wall encircling the land which he had purchased from Shri Horen Mech and Shri Shihato. However, the approach road leading to the petitioner’s land was running right through the middle of his land. Therefore, Mr. Felix offered the petitioner a stretch of land on the side for an alternative approach road to his land in exchange for the approach road given by Shri Horen Mech. The petitioner agreed and sometime in the month of March, 2012, Mr. Felix constructed the wall surrounding his land leaving space for the petitioner to have an approach road to his land. 6. It is also stated by the petitioner that the stretch of land carved out by Mr. Felix from his land was exchanged for the earlier approach road which led to the petitioner’s land. The land was carved out by Mr. Felix for the alternative approach road exclusively for the petitioner based on the agreement between them that the petitioner would forego his right to use the old approach road. Beside the new approach road lay the land of respondent no. 5 and one Shri Samuel Odyuo also. However, both these lands were already having separate and different approach roads. It is also the case of the petitioner that since the year 2012 the petitioner has been maintaining this approach road and he has spent nearly 6 Lakhs in repairing and maintaining the approach road to his land. 7. Sometime in the year 2015, Mr. Felix sold his entire land bought from Horen Mech and Shihato to the husband of the respondent no. 4. This land was already walled by Mr. 7. Sometime in the year 2015, Mr. Felix sold his entire land bought from Horen Mech and Shihato to the husband of the respondent no. 4. This land was already walled by Mr. Felix and the approach road in question is outside the brick wall. The petitioner has constructed his residential house on the land purchased by him from Horen Mech and the husband of respondent no. 4 has also constructed his residential house on the land purchased from Felix. 8. Thereafter, the respondent no. 4 also purchased the land of Shri Samuel Odyuo which is on the other side of the approach road at one end. On this land the respondent no. 4 runs a school namely, the Milon School. She has also encircled this land with a brick wall. It is stated that the approach road of the petitioner was never the approach road to the land of Shri Samuel Odyuo which was purchased by respondent no. 4 and on which she has built the school. The school of the respondent no. 4 has a different approach road. 9. The petitioner initially did not have any objection to pedestrians using this approach road but he did not want vehicles to be using his approach road as the use of the approach road by vehicles was damaging the road, hence, the petitioner constructed a gate at the starting end of his approach road. At this juncture, the respondent nos. 4 and 5 raised objections leading to complaints made by them to the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur. 10. Subsequently, a Summon dated 28.02.2025 was issued by the Revenue-cum-Resettlement Officer/Respondent no. 3 asking the petitioner to appear before him on 06.03.2025. In the Summon it was also mentioned that the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur had directed for a spot verification by a surveyor and accordingly, the District Land Records and Survey Office (DLRSO for short) had conducted the survey and submitted Report NO. VLS-59/SETTLEMENT/2024-D/10262 dated 18.11.2024 along with a trace map. 11. The petitioner and the complainants appeared before the respondent no. 3 and the parties were heard. The petitioner filed his written statement and also gist of arguments on 13.03.2025 and the respondent nos. 4 and 5 also filed their gist of arguments. After the hearing was concluded and the gist of arguments were filed as directed, another Summon dated 25.03.2025 was issued by the respondent no. 3 and the parties were heard. The petitioner filed his written statement and also gist of arguments on 13.03.2025 and the respondent nos. 4 and 5 also filed their gist of arguments. After the hearing was concluded and the gist of arguments were filed as directed, another Summon dated 25.03.2025 was issued by the respondent no. 3 asking the petitioner, the respondent nos. 4 and 5 and Shri Felix to appear on 29.03.2025. Mr. Felix also filed an affidavit and on 29.03.2025, Mr. Felix appeared before the respondent no. 3 by virtual mode. 12. Thereafter, the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 was passed by which it was found that the approach road does not fall within the land of the petitioner and further the petitioner was directed to remove/dismantle the gate on the approach road and to vacate the same within a period of 15 days from the date of passing of the Order dated 15.04.2025. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has come before this Court. 13. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Imti Longjem as well as the learned Senior Government Advocate, Mr. Moa Imchen for the State respondents and learned counsel, Mr. T.B. Jamir for the respondent nos. 4 and 5. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the instant case the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur by the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 has decided the right, title and interest over a disputed land and that the impugned Order has been passed without jurisdiction. It is submitted that the Deputy Commissioner Dimapur in a proceeding under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 (The Regulation of 1886 for short) cannot adjudicate a matter where there are disputed facts with regard to title over immovable property. It is only the civil court which has the jurisdiction to decide title. 15. Another submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Complaint dated 30.09.2024 submitted by the respondent nos. 4 and 5 to the Deputy Commissioner has not been furnished to the petitioner. It is also submitted that the respondent no. 3/Revenue Officer had heard the parties and directed them to file their gist of arguments. Only after hearing was concluded and the gists of arguments were filed, another Summon was issued to Mr. Felix to appear on 29.03.2025. Mr. Felix was also allowed to file an affidavit and examined as a witness. Therefore the respondent no. 3/Revenue Officer had heard the parties and directed them to file their gist of arguments. Only after hearing was concluded and the gists of arguments were filed, another Summon was issued to Mr. Felix to appear on 29.03.2025. Mr. Felix was also allowed to file an affidavit and examined as a witness. Therefore the respondent no. 3 has treated the entire proceeding as a suit and he adjudicated the matter as if he was conducting a civil suit proceeding. The respondent no. 3 does not have the jurisdiction to conduct a civil suit and more particularly the procedures prescribed by the CPC and the provisions relating to examination of witnesses were not followed. Moreover, because of poor network the petitioner was unable to cross-examine Mr. Felix properly and the statement of Mr. Felix was also not recorded. On the other hand the petitioner requested the respondent no. 3 to allow him to produce the Padampukhuri Village Council Members, Gaonburas and Shri Samuel Odyuo to ascertain whether the approach road in question is a public road or the private road of the petitioner. However, the respondent no. 3 chose not to examine them and decided the matter solely on the basis of the claims made by the respondent nos. 4 and 5. 16. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur by the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 held that the land on which the approach road lies does not belong to the petitioner. Thus the right, title and interest over the land on which the approach road lies has been decided against the petitioner in a revenue proceeding whereas such right, title and interest in immovable property can only be adjudicated in a civil court by adducing evidence in accordance with law. 17. Another ground taken by the petitioner is that the proceedings in the instant case were conducted and heard only by the respondent no. 3. However, the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 has been passed by the respondent no. 2. A perusal of the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 itself clearly reveals that the respondent no. 2 has passed the impugned order as if he had conducted the case. On this ground alone the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 is untenable in law. 18. 3. However, the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 has been passed by the respondent no. 2. A perusal of the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 itself clearly reveals that the respondent no. 2 has passed the impugned order as if he had conducted the case. On this ground alone the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 is untenable in law. 18. The petitioner has relied on the following authorities in respect of his contention- i. Jitendra Singh Versus State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802 ii. Dayal Hari Paul Versus Pradip Kumar Lahkar reported in (2007) 4 GLR 610 iii. Legal Heirs of Late C. Das Versus Chairman, Assam Board reported in 2012 (3) GLT 264 iv. Government of Andhra Pradesh Versus Thummala Krishna Rao reported in (1982) 2 SCC 134 , v. Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji Versus Union of India reported in (2019) 20 SCC 705 , vi. Union of India Versus Vaisavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited, vii. Thanda Bala Choudhury Versus Birendra Kumar Choudhury reported in (2002) 3 GLR, viii. Daulatram Lakhani Versus State of Assam reported in (1989) 1 GLR 131 and ix. Phutovi Chishi and Others Versus State of Nagaland And Others reported in (2016) 2 GLR 137 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the respondent nos. 2 and 3 could not have directed the petitioner to dismantle the gate on his approach road and to vacate the same within a period of 15 days in a proceeding under the Regulation of 1886. Even assuming but not admitting that the petitioner was occupying public land, the authorities could have only taken necessary steps under the Nagaland Eviction of Persons in Unauthorized Occupation of Public Land Act, 1971 (the Act of 1971 for short). Thereby the petitioner would have been given show-cause notice before eviction and he would have had the opportunity to reply to the notice. However, in the instant case no notice has been given to the petitioner before issuing the order for removal/dismantling of the gate on the approach road and to vacate within a period of 15 days. Thereby the petitioner would have been given show-cause notice before eviction and he would have had the opportunity to reply to the notice. However, in the instant case no notice has been given to the petitioner before issuing the order for removal/dismantling of the gate on the approach road and to vacate within a period of 15 days. Learned counsel, by relying on the case of Opto Circuit India Limited Versus Axis Bank and Others reported in (2021) 6 SCC 707 , submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case has held that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it is to be done in that manner alone and in no other manner. The State respondents have, therefore, committed a gross irregularity by taking steps under the Regulation of 1886 instead of resorting to the Act of 1971. In view of the above submissions and the authorities relied upon, the learned counsel for the petitioner prays that the petition may be allowed and the Order dated 15.04.2025 may be quashed and set aside. 20. Per contra, learned Senior Government Advocate, Mr. Moa Imchen has argued that the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025, which is under challenge in the present writ petition did not decide right, title and interest over the approach road but simply held that the said road was a public road and not a private road after meticulously perusing all the revenue documents and statements given by the parties and also relying on the survey report. It is also argued that the Sale Deed dated 01.02.2010 purported to have been executed between Shri Horen Mech and the petitioner is not a registered document. 21. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Government Advocate that upon receiving the complaint from the respondent nos. 4 and 5 a survey was conducted by the DLRSO and the report dated 18.11.2024 submitted by the Survey Officer clearly shows that the length of the approach road starting from the gate constructed by the petitioner and his residence is 440 ft. and it falls under 4 Dags. The petitioner’s Patta No. 1314 is under Dag No. 263/1811 and the petitioner’s Patta No. 1548 is under Dag No 2057. However, the approach road is under Dag No. 259, 264, 268 and 265. and it falls under 4 Dags. The petitioner’s Patta No. 1314 is under Dag No. 263/1811 and the petitioner’s Patta No. 1548 is under Dag No 2057. However, the approach road is under Dag No. 259, 264, 268 and 265. Therefore, there is no connection between the petitioner’s land and the approach road. Further, the survey report also found that the petitioner is in excess occupation of an area of 14 Lessas. 22. The learned Senior Government Advocate has further submitted that it is apparent from the revenue records that the approach road leading to the petitioner’s land does not fall under his Patta land and as such it is a public road and the construction of a gate 400 ft. away from the Patta land of the petitioner is illegal. Another submission of the learned Senior Government Advocate is that the petitioner has admitted that the Summon was served on him, that he has appeared for the hearing and that he has also submitted his written statement and gist of arguments. This shows that the petitioner has taken part in the proceedings without any protest. When the witness, Mr. Felix appeared through virtual mode during the hearing the petitioner had cross-examined him and it was affirmed that the approach road was donated by Mr. Felix for the benefit and convenience of the residents of that area and the petitioner or any other person has no right to claim the land over the approach road. Mr. Felix also affirmed that the signature on the Land Exchange Agreement dated 01.10.2024 was not his signature. Therefore, the purported Land Exchange Agreement dated 01.10.2024 relied upon by the petitioner has been disowned by Mr. Felix. 23. Learned Senior Government Advocate has also contended that the revenue courts have jurisdiction to determine the issue in the present writ petition under Section 165(1) of the Regulations of 1886 and Rule 18(1) of the Settlement Rules under the Regulation of 1886. He has further submitted that it was the Revenue cum Resettlement Officer who had initiated and conducted the proceedings. The Sub-Divisional Officer holds the charge of Revenue cum Resettlement Officer and Rule 3(ii) of the Settlement Rules under the Regulation of 1886 empowers the Deputy Commissioner to delegate the power under Rule 18(1) and (2) to a Sub- Divisional Officer. He has further submitted that it was the Revenue cum Resettlement Officer who had initiated and conducted the proceedings. The Sub-Divisional Officer holds the charge of Revenue cum Resettlement Officer and Rule 3(ii) of the Settlement Rules under the Regulation of 1886 empowers the Deputy Commissioner to delegate the power under Rule 18(1) and (2) to a Sub- Divisional Officer. The learned Senior Government Advocate therefore, submits that the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 has been passed by the Revenue Authorities in exercise of their power under the Regulation of 1886 and they have the jurisdiction to issue the same. He, therefore, submits that the Order dated 15.04.2025 is valid and justified and does not require any interference by this Court. 24. Learned counsel, Mr. T.B. Jamir appearing for respondent nos. 4 and 5 has adopted the submissions of the learned Senior Government Advocate and further raises preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the present writ petition. Learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner is praying for a writ of certiorari to quash and set aside the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur as ex-officio Revenue Officer in exercise of the jurisdiction of power and procedure prescribed under the Regulation of 1886. Under the Regulation of 1886 the Deputy Commissioner/Settlement Officer/Survey Officer and such other officers/revenue officers functions as a court. An order passed by such a quasi-judicial authority cannot be quashed in an application for a writ of certiorari. On this point the learned counsel relied on the case of Smt. Ujjam Bai Versus State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1962 SC 1621 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a writ cannot lie against the order of a quasi judicial authority but the aggrieved person has the right to file a statutory appeal against the same. In the instant case, the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 has been passed under the Regulation of 1886 which also provides for an appeal against such order. Another contention of the learned counsel is that the petitioner is not an aggrieved person as the approach road in question does not fall within the land of the petitioner. In the instant case, the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 has been passed under the Regulation of 1886 which also provides for an appeal against such order. Another contention of the learned counsel is that the petitioner is not an aggrieved person as the approach road in question does not fall within the land of the petitioner. The learned counsel for respondent 4 and 5 has also relied on the Order dated 19.03.2021 in Writ Appeal 12/2019 where a Division Bench of this Court had held that the persons aggrieved will have their statutory remedies under the Regulations of 1886 against the order of the Deputy Commissioner or in the alternative seek their remedy before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore the petitioner if aggrieved could have filed an appeal under the Regulation of 1886 or in the alternative approach this court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 25. With regard to the merit of the case, the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 4 and 5 submits that for almost 10 years the residents of the area and the public have been using the approach road without any interference and obstruction. The petitioner had, however, illegally constructed an unauthorized gate on the approach road claiming that the approach road belongs to him as his private property and thereby causing illegal obstruction and inconvenience to the residents and the public and also restricted movement for the school staff, parents and students of Milon School. 26. Therefore, on 30.09.2024, the respondent nos. 4 and 5 filed a joint complaint before the Deputy Commissioner/ex-officio Revenue Officer and also to the Chairman, Padampukhuri Village Council, Dimapur against the illegal construction of an unauthorized gate by the petitioner on the approach road. It is stated that the approach road falls within the land purchased by Mr. Felix from Horen Mech and as per the terms and conditions of the sale declaration Mr. Felix has been given only the right to use the approach road. 27. Learned counsel states that it is seen from the Complaint dated 30.09.2024 that the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur registered a case and directed the office of the DLRSO to conduct spot verification and submit a report. Accordingly, the DLRSO conducted the spot verification and submitted a report. Felix has been given only the right to use the approach road. 27. Learned counsel states that it is seen from the Complaint dated 30.09.2024 that the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur registered a case and directed the office of the DLRSO to conduct spot verification and submit a report. Accordingly, the DLRSO conducted the spot verification and submitted a report. Summons were issued to the parties and they were allowed to put forth their respective claims and counter-claims and also to file written statement and gist of arguments. 28. The Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur after hearing the parties had issued the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 holding that the approach road does not fall under private land and further directed the petitioner to remove the gate within a period of 15 days. 29. Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 4 and 5 also submits that under the Regulations of 1886 the Deputy Commissioner/Settlement Officers/Survey Officers are Revenue Officers and they function as a court and the procedure to be followed is also provided under Chapter VIII of the Regulations of 1886. A bare perusal of the Order dated 15.04.2025 shows that the same has been passed by the Revenue Officer. Moreover, the only issue for determination before the Revenue Officer was whether the gate that was constructed by the petitioner falls on a private land or is a public road. The impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 only holds that the approach road does not fall within the land of the petitioner. The learned counsel states that the petitioner cannot claim any right, title and interest over the public road in question based on the Sale Deed dated 01.02.2010 or the Land Exchange Agreement dated 01.10.2024. 30. The learned counsel further submits that the petitioner has filed his written statement and gist of arguments before the Revenue Officer, which is completely silent about non-receipt of the Complaint dated 30.09.2024 and also silent about non-receipt of the survey report dated 18.11.2024. Therefore, the ground taken by the petitioner regarding violation of principles of natural justice is an afterthought and not sustainable in law. 31. Learned counsel, accordingly, submits that the petitioner’s claim of title over the approach road can only be decided by a competent civil court and it is upon the petitioner to approach such forum for declaration of his right and title over the approach road. 31. Learned counsel, accordingly, submits that the petitioner’s claim of title over the approach road can only be decided by a competent civil court and it is upon the petitioner to approach such forum for declaration of his right and title over the approach road. However, in the instant petition, the impugned order has not decided any title over the approach road and, therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability and also on merits as the petitioner has failed to make out a case calling for the interference of this Court. 32. I have duly considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings and also the authorities relied upon. 33. The court will first examine the issue of maintainability. Smti Ujjam Bai (Supra) is a landmark Supreme Court case holding that a writ petition under Article 32 cannot be maintained solely for erroneous tax assessments made by quasi-judicial authorities acting within their jurisdiction. The case affirmed that Article 32 is intended for violations of fundamental rights, not to correct administrative errors of law or fact, which should be challenged through statutory appeals. This case established that the Supreme Court cannot act as a court of appeal for every tax dispute. However, the facts can be distinguished from the instant case as the Regulations of 1886 does provide for appeal to the Revenue Board but in the State of Nagaland there is no Revenue Board constituted under the Regulations of 1886. Moreover, in W.A 12/2019 the proceeding before the Deputy Commissioner was in respect of determination of rights, title and interest. In the present case it is not a determination of title but a determination as to whether the road in question was a public road or private road. Only the revenue records would show whether the approach road is a public road or private road. Therefore, this petition in its present form is maintainable and the petition is considered on its merits. 34. Regulation 165 (1) of the Regulations of 1886 reads: “In the case of unsettled land any person, who without authority has encroached upon or occupied it shall be liable to ejectment forthwith”. Therefore, this petition in its present form is maintainable and the petition is considered on its merits. 34. Regulation 165 (1) of the Regulations of 1886 reads: “In the case of unsettled land any person, who without authority has encroached upon or occupied it shall be liable to ejectment forthwith”. And Rule 18 (1) of the Settlement Rules states, “Subject as hereinafter provided, the Deputy Commissioner may eject any person from land over which no person has acquired the rights of a proprietor, landholder, or settlement-holder”.In the case of Taher Ali Versus State of Assam and 2 Others in WP(C) 6158/2019 , the question as to whether eviction notice is required to be served upon persons in occupation of public land came up for consideration and a coordinate bench of this court held: "15. From the above, it is clear that the amended provisions of Rule 18 (2) of the Settlement Rules does not mandate issuance of any notice upon persons coming in the ambit of the said sub-rule. The petitioners are admittedly in unauthorized occupation over "sarkari khas" and it is evident from the materials on record that they do not have any bonafide claim of right over such land. Such being the position, there was no requirement under the Settlement Rules for the authorities to serve any eviction notices upon any of the petitioners. Notwithstanding the same, the respondents had served notices upon the petitioners granting them 15 (fifteen) days time to vacate the land, thereby complying with the principle of Natural Justice." 35. The issue of eviction under Rule 18 of the Settlement Rules of the Regulations of 1886 has also been dealt with by a coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Bharati Das and 2 others Versus State of Assam and Others in WP(C) 9025/2019 where the learned Single Judge has held that when there is a bona fide claim of right over the land, prior notice under Rule 18(2) is required to be served. In the case of Taher Ali (Supra), as quoted above it was held that in case of encroachers over “sarkari khas” land, there was no requirement for serving eviction notice upon the encroachers under Rule 18(2) of the Settlement Rules. In the case of Taher Ali (Supra), as quoted above it was held that in case of encroachers over “sarkari khas” land, there was no requirement for serving eviction notice upon the encroachers under Rule 18(2) of the Settlement Rules. However, in both the decisions, it was held that there should be compliance of the Rule of audi alteram partem even in case of eviction of encroachers upon Government land. 36. A similar issue came up for consideration before a division bench of this court in W.P(C)No.4179/2009 , Md. Ishaque Ali & others Vrs State of Assam & others . The petitioners challenged eviction notices issued in 2009 for encroaching on government land in Ulubari Mouza, Guwahati. The petitioners had argued that summary eviction under Rule 18(2) of the Settlement Rules under the Regulation of 1886 was discriminatory. It was held by the judgment dated 12.08.2016 in W.P(C)No.4179/2009, that the petitioners are not proprietors, landholders, or settlement holders, and the land is government land, thus lacking any legal right to resist eviction. The court also considered whether the Public Premises Eviction Act applies; it concluded it does not, as the land is not public premises but government land, and the process is lawful under Rule 18(2). The court reaffirmed that the power to eject encroachers is valid and applicable to all categories of government land following the 1997 amendment of the Regulations of 1886. The court dismissed the petitions, ruling that the eviction process was lawful, proper, and in public interest. This judgment affirms the legality of eviction proceedings under the amended Rule 18(2), emphasizing the government’s authority to remove unauthorized occupants from public land in the interest of public purpose. 37. Regarding the jurisdiction of SDO/Revenue cum Resettlement Officer to take action under Rule 18(2), again in the case of Taher Ali (Supra) this Court had held that the power of delegation of the Deputy Commissioner of the District can be extended to the Sub-Divisional Officer as well as the Circle Officer in view of the provisions of Rule 3(11) of the Settlement Rules. 38. A bare perusal of the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 shows that the dispute involved in the instant case is whether the approach road on which the petitioner had constructed a gate is a public road or a private road. 38. A bare perusal of the impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 shows that the dispute involved in the instant case is whether the approach road on which the petitioner had constructed a gate is a public road or a private road. In order to ascertain the same, the Revenue Authority is the appropriate forum to decide the same. Under the Regulation of 1886 the Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, Extra Assistant Commissioner etc. are ex-officio Revenue Officers. Moreover, under Rule 140 of the Regulation of 1886, the Revenue Officers may hold court at any place within the limits of the district to which he is appointed. The Deputy Commissioner also has the power to delegate the hearing of the proceedings to a subordinate Revenue Officer. In a case like the present one where the dispute is whether the approach road is a public road, the examination of land records is mandatory. Therefore, it is only the revenue authority which can examine the land records, conduct demarcation or survey and arrive at a proper finding. Eviction proceedings cannot be the starting point. The right has to be first established as a public road and only then the eviction proceedings can begin. 39. In the instant case, it is found that the proceeding adopted by the Revenue Authorities under the Regulation of 1886 is appropriate and valid. The petitioner has also participated in the proceedings and he has been given due opportunity to file his written statements as well as his gist of arguments. Most significantly, a spot verification and survey was also conducted by the DLRSO and by the report dated 18.11.2024 it was found that the approach road in question did not fall within the Patta land of the petitioner. The respondent nos. 2 and 3 have, therefore, adopted a fact finding, quasi judicial approach under the Regulation of 1886. From the language used in the Order dated 15.04.2025, it is clearly evident that the proceeding by the Revenue Authority was not for declaration of any right, title or interest over any immovable property but it was simply to determine whether the road was a public road or a private road. Upon examining the revenue records and after the survey report it was found that it was a public road and was not private land. Upon examining the revenue records and after the survey report it was found that it was a public road and was not private land. The Revenue cum Resettlement Officer, therefore, has determined the issue and found that the approach road was not in a private land but that it was public road. 40. This Court is, therefore, of the view that there is no infirmity in the Order dated 15.04.2025 as the Revenue cum Resettlement Officer has not decided any title over any immovable property. The Revenue cum Resettlement Officer has only determined that the approach road was a public road. Therefore, the authorities relied upon by the petitioner does not support the petitioner’s case in any manner. This court is also of the view that the Act of 1971 will not apply in the instant case as the definition of ‘Public land” in Section 2(h) of the Act does not include any road or highway. Moreover, the respondent authorities had heard the petitioner and granted him 15 (fifteen) days time to vacate the land, thereby complying with the principle of Natural Justice. 41. In view of the above observations, the instant writ petition is dismissed as bereft of merit. The impugned Order dated 15.04.2025 is upheld. 42. Writ petition is disposed of.