1 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA FAO(MVA) No.405 of 2018 Reserved on:- 07.05.2026 Date of Decision: 30.05.2026 Reliance General Insurance Company …Appellant Versus Asha Devi & Ors. …..Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes. ____________________________________________________________ For the Appellant : Mr. Jagdish Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Sumit Sharma, Advocate for respondents No.1 to 3. Mr. Varun Chauhan, Advocate, for respondent No.4. __________________________________________________________ Virender Singh, Judge Appellant-Reliance General Insurance Company Limited has filed the present appeal, under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘M.V. Act’), against the award dated 02.05.2018, passed by learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushehar, H.P., (hereinafter referred to as the ‘learned Tribunal’), in R.B.T. No.41- R/2 of 2016/15, titled as Asha Devi and others versus Joginder Singh & another. 2. By way of award dated 02.05.2018, the learned Tribunal has allowed the claim petition, filed by the respondents 2 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) No.1 to 3 and awarded a sum of Rs.19,60,000/- along with interest @ 9% per annum. However, the ultimate liability to pay the amount of compensation along with interest has been fastened upon the Insurance Company (appellant). Brief Facts:- 3. For the sake of convenience, parties to the present appeal, are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to by the learned Tribunal. 4. Necessary facts, as borne out from the record, may be summed up, as under:- 4.1. The petitioners-claimants, being widow, daughter, son and mother of Vidya Sagar had filed the claim petition, under Section 166 of M.V. Act, before the learned Tribunal. They have sought the compensation on account of death of Vidya Sagar, in a road side accident, involving Vehicle No.HP01K-5100, (hereinafter referred to as the offending vehicle) owned and driven by respondent No.1 and insured with respondent No.2. 4.2. According to them, age of Vidya Sagar, at the time of his death, was 39 years and he was earning Rs.35,000/- per month, by way of working as Mason and pursuing the horticulture pursuits. The accident had taken place on 28.05.2015 at about 7:00 PM, at Kotgali near village Kotlu. 3 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) 4.3. Elaborating their stand, it has been pleaded that the accident in question had taken place, due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1, as he drove the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and could not control the same, due to which, the offending vehicle went off the road and had fallen into deep gorge. Vidya Sagar died on the spot. Postmortem examination of the dead body was conducted by the Medical Officer, CHC, Anni District Kullu H.P. 4.4. The matter was also reported to the police of Police Station, Karsog, where, FIR No.75 of 2015, dated 29.05.2015 has been registered. 4.5. According to the claimants, Vidya Sagar was mason by profession and used to construct the houses, in the area and as such, he was earning Rs.15,000/- per month and he was also pursuing the horticulture pursuits and earning Rs.2,00,000/-, by selling apple crops. 4.6. The claimants have also pleaded about their bright past and bleak future. 4.7. Since the accident in question has solely been attributed to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, as such, it has been prayed that the amount of 4 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) compensation of Rs.30,00,000/, along with interest @9% be awarded to them, against the respondents. Stand of the respondents before the learned Tribunal 5. When, put to notice, the claim petition has been contested by the respondents. 5.1. Respondent No.1/owner-cum-driver, has filed reply, by taking the preliminary objections that the claim petition is not maintainable. According to him, he was neither rash, nor, negligent, however, the accident had taken place due to sudden mechanical defect, in the offending vehicle. In the regard, respondent No.1, has relied upon the cancellation report submitted, by the police of Police Station Karsog, before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karsog, in FIR No.75 of 2015, dated 29.05.2015, registered under Sections 279, 337, 304- A IPC. Another preliminary objections have been taken that the petitioners have not approached the Court with clean hands and the learned Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. 5.2. On merits, the contents of the claim petition have been denied, on the basis of the preliminary objections. 5.3. Reliance General Insurance Company-insured of the offending vehicle has filed its separate reply, by taking the 5 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) preliminary objections, that the claim petition is not maintainable; the petitioners have no locus-standi to file the claim petition; the offending vehicle was being plied, in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy; Respondent No.1, i.e. driver of the vehicle was not having a valid and effective license, at the time of accident and the deceased was travelling in the vehicle, as unauthorized/gratuitous passenger at the time of accident. 5.4. On merits, the contents of the claim petition have been denied mainly for want of knowledge. 6. Thus, the respondents have prayed for dismissal of the claim petition. 7. From the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Tribunal, vide order dated 14.12.2016: 1). Whether deceased Vidya Sagar died on 28.05.2015, at about 7:00 PM, at Kotgali near village Kotlu due of rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1, who has driving the vehicle bearing HP01K-5100?..OPP. 2). If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what amount of compensation, the petitioner are entitled and from whom? ...OPP. 3). Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form? OPR-1&2. 6 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) 4). Whether the petitioner has no locus-standi to file the present petition? OPR-2. 5). Whether the vehicle was plied in contravention of terms and conditions of insurance policy? OPR-2. 6). Whether driver of the offending vehicle was not having a valid driving license at the time of accident? OPR-2. 7). Whether the petition is filed in collusion with respect No.1? ..OPR-2. 8). Whether the deceased Vidya Sagar was traveling as an unauthorized/gratuitous passenger in the offending vehicle? OPR-2. 9). Whether the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands and concealed the material facts? OPR-1. 10). Relief. 8. Thereafter, parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence. After closure of the evidence, the learned Tribunal, upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, has allowed the claim petition of the petitioners, by way of the award which is impugned herein. Contentions of the appellant (Insurer-Company) 9. Appellant-Insurance Company has assailed the award mainly, on the ground that the learned Tribunal has wrongly decided issue No.1, in favour of the claimants, as it has been proved on record that after the investigation, the police has 7 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) filed the cancellation report, before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karsog, District Mandi, H.P., which was accepted vide documents RW-1/F and RW-1/G. 9.1. On the basis of the above facts, it has been impressed upon this Court to hold that the sine qua non for seeking of the compensation, under the provisions of Section 166 of M.V. Act, i.e. rashness and negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle, is lacking in the present case. According to the appellant, when, the very base of the case i.e. rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1, has not been proved, then, the claimants are not entitled for any compensation. 9.2. The award has been assailed on the ground that as per Ex.RW-1/A, the driver of the offending vehicle was having the license to drive only Light Motor Vehicles and not Transport Vehicles, as such, he was not authorized to drive the vehicle in question, as per Section 14(2)(a)(i) of the M.V. Act. 9.3. The award has also been assailed, on the ground that the learned Tribunal has wrongly taken the income of deceased as Rs.10,000/- per month, by considering him as mason, whereas, according to appellant, there is no documentary proof to the said effect, as such, the income of deceased-Vidya Sagar should have been assessed, on the basis of the minimum 8 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) wages, prevalent at the relevant time i.e. in the year 2015. In this regard, the appellant has relied upon the fact that at the relevant time, wages of the skilled workers were Rs.215/-per day, or Rs.6,450/- per month. 9.4. Similarly, the amount, which has been deducted, on account of personal expenses of deceased-Vidya Sagar, is also stated to be wrong. According to the appellant, the same is ought to have been 1/3rd, as there were only 3 persons, who were dependent upon the deceased. 9.5. Lastly, the award has been assailed on the ground that the learned Tribunal has wrongly awarded the interest @ 9%, wheres, according to the appellant, the same should have been @6% per annum. 9.6. On the basis of the above facts, Mr. Jagdish Thakur, Advocate, appearing for the appellant (Insurance Company) has prayed that the appeal may kindly be allowed, by setting aside the award or to reduce the amount of compensation. Contentions of learned Counsel for the respondents (claimants before the Tribunal) 10. Per contra, Mr. Sumit Sharma, Advocate, appearing for respondents No.1 to 3 (claimants), has supported the award and prayed that in order to achieve the legislative 9 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) intent, the awarded amount is liable to be enhanced, so that the same could fall within the definition of ‘just compensation’. 10.1. To buttress his contention, learned counsel appearing for the claimants has argued that the learned Tribunal has not awarded ‘just compensation’ under the heads ‘loss of consortium’, ‘funeral expenses’ and ‘loss of estate’. 10.2. Heavily relying upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited versus Pranay Sethi and others, reported in (2017), 16 Supreme Court Case 680 and in Magma General Insurance Company Limited vs. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram and others, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 130, it has been prayed that the awarded amount may kindly be enhanced. Contentions of learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 (driver cum owner) 11. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4, has supported the award passed by the learned Tribunal and it has been prayed that the appeal may kindly be dismissed. Analysis and Discussion 12. In the present case, Reliance General Insurance Company has assailed the award, on the ground that the driver was not having valid and effective license to drive the offending vehicle. Perusal of the record shows that as per the document 10 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) Ex.RW/A, which is the copy of registration certificate, the vehicle is Bolero LX-2WD seven seater. As per the driving license Ex.RW1/E, the respondent No.1, was authorized to drive Light Motor Vehicle. 13. Learned Tribunal has rightly relied upon the decision of this Court in United India Insurance Company Limited versus Madan Lal and others, 2015 (2) T.A.C. 243 (H.P.), as well as, the decision of this Court in Manohar Lal versus Sukh Bahadur and others, 2015(3) Him. L.R. 1338. As such the learned Tribunal has rightly held that the Insurance Company has failed to point out any fundamental breach of the policy. 14. Moreover, as per the documentary evidence adduced on the file, copy of RC of the offending vehicle as Ex.RW- 1/A. As per this document, the offending vehicle is Bolero LX 2WD 7 Seater and its seating capacity is 9 and the said vehicle was having the contract carriage permit from 27.1.2012 to 31.08.2015. The accident in question had taken place on 28.5.2015. Meaning thereby, at the relevant time the vehicle was having the valid contract carriage permit. Fitness certificate was also valid and the driver was holding a valid and effective driving licence, copy of which is Ex.RW-1/E. As per Ex.RW-1/E, the 11 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) holder of the driving licence was authorized to drive LMV w.e.f. 8.9.2003. 15. In view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Cout in Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company Ltd. Versus Rambha Devi & Others, (2025) 3 Supreme Court Cases 95, the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company are devoid of any merits, as the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the above case has held that the driver, who is having driving licence to drive LMV can legally drive transport vehicle gross weight of which is below 7500 kg. Relevant paragraphs 175 to 181 of the judgment are reproduced as under:- 175. The licensing regime under the MV Act and the MV Rules, when read as a whole, does not provide for a separate endorsement for operating a ‘Transport Vehicle’, if a driver already holds a LMV license. We must however clarify that the exceptions carved out by the legislature for special vehicles like e-carts and e-rickshaws, or vehicles carrying hazardous goods will remain unaffected by the decision of this Court. 176. As discussed earlier in this judgment, the definition of LMV under Section 2(21) of the MV Act explicitly provides what a ‘Transport Vehicle’ ‘means’. This Court must ensure that neither provision i.e. the definition under Section 2(21) or the second part of Section 3(1) which concerns the necessity for a driving license for a ‘Transport Vehicle’ is reduced to a dead letter of law. Therefore, the emphasis on ‘Transport Vehicle’ in the licensing scheme has to be understood only in the context of the ‘medium’ See Rule 8A of MV Rules,’Minimum training required for driving E- rickshaw or E-cart’ See Rule 9 of MV Rules, ’Educational Qualification for drivers of goods carriages carrying dangerous or hazardous goods’ 12 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) and ‘heavy’ vehicles. This harmonious reading also aligns with the objective of the 1994 amendment in Section 10(2) to simplify the licensing procedure. 177. The above interpretation also does not defeat the broader twin objectives of the MV Act i.e. road safety and ensuring timely compensation and relief for victims of road accidents. The aspect of road safety is earlier discussed at length. An authoritative pronouncement by this Court would prevent insurance companies from taking a technical plea to defeat a legitimate claim for compensation involving an insured vehicle weighing below 7,500 kgs driven by a person holding a driving license of a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ class. 178. In an era where autonomous or driver-less vehicles are no longer tales of science fiction and app-based passenger platforms are a modern reality, the licensing regime cannot remain static. The amendments that have been carried out by the Indian legislature may not have dealt with all possible concerns. As we were informed by the Learned Attorney General that a legislative exercise is underway, we hope that a comprehensive amendment. The classes medium goods vehicle[(10(2)(e)], medium passenger vehicle[10(2)(f)],heavy goods vehicle[10(2)(g)] and heavy passenger vehicle [10(2)(h)] were deleted and a new class ‘Transport Vehicle’ was introduced in Section 10(2)(e) to address the statutory lacunae will be made with necessary corrective measures. 179. Just to flag one concern, the legislature through the 1994 amendment in Section 10(2)(e) in order to introduce ‘transport vehicle’ as a separate class could not have intended to merge light motor vehicle (which continued as a distinct class) along with medium, and heavy vehicles into a single class. Else, it would give rise to a situation in which Sri (our hypothetical character), wanting to participate in the cycling sport, is put through the rigorous training relevant only for a multisport like Triathlon, which requires a much higher degree of endurance and athleticism. The effort therefore should be to ensure that the statute remains practical and workable. 180. Now harking back to the primary issue and noticing that the core driving skills (as enunciated 13 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) in the earlier paragraphs), expected to be mastered by all drivers are universal – regardless of whether the vehicle falls into “Transport” or “Non-Transport” category, it is the considered opinion of this Court that if the gross vehicle weight is within 7,500 kg - the quintessential common man’s driver Sri, with LMV license, can also drive a “Transport Vehicle”. We are able to reach such a conclusion as none of the parties in this case has produced any empirical data to demonstrate that the LMV driving licence holder, driving a ‘Transport Vehicle’, is a significant cause for road accidents in India. The additional eligibility criteria as specified in MV Act and MV Rules as discussed in this judgment will apply only to such vehicle (‘medium goods vehicle’, ‘medium passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’ and ‘heavy passenger vehicle’), whose gross weight exceeds 7,500 Kg. Our present interpretation on how the licensing regime is to operate for drivers under the statutory scheme is unlikely to compromise the road safety concerns. This will also effectively address the livelihood issues for drivers operating Transport Vehicles (who clock maximum hours behind the wheels), in legally operating “Transport vehicles” (below 7,500 Kg), with their LMV driving license. Perforce Sri must drive responsibly and should have no occasion to be called either a maniac or an idiot (as mentioned in the first paragraph), while he is behind the wheels. Such harmonious interpretation will substantially address the vexed question of law before this Court. 181. Our conclusions following the above discussion are as under:- (I) A driver holding a license for Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) class, under Section 10(2)(d) for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight under 7,500 kg, is permitted to operate a ‘Transport Vehicle’ without needing additional authorization under Section 10(2)(e) of the MV Act specifically for the ‘Transport Vehicle’ class. For licensing purposes, LMVs and Transport Vehicles are not entirely separate classes. An overlap exists between the two. The special eligibility requirements will however continue to apply for, inter alia, e-carts, e-rickshaws, and vehicles carrying hazardous goods. (II) The second part of Section 3(1), which emphasizes the necessity of a specific requirement 14 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) to drive a ‘Transport Vehicle,’ does not supersede the definition of LMV provided in Section 2(21) of the MV Act. (III) The additional eligibility criteria specified in the MV Act and MV Rules generally for driving ‘transport vehicles’ would apply only to those intending to operate vehicles with gross vehicle weight exceeding 7,500 kg i.e. ‘medium goods vehicle’, ‘medium passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’ and ‘heavy passenger vehicle’. (IV) The decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is upheld but for reasons as explained by us in this judgment. In the absence of any obtrusive omission, the decision is not per incuriam, even if certain provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules were not considered in the said judgment.” (self emphasis supplied) 16. If the facts and circumstances of the present case are seen in the light of the above decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as per the registration certificate gross weight of the vehicle does not exceed 7500 kgs, as such, respondent No.1, was having a valid and effective driving license. 17. It is the case of the Insurance Company that the basic ingredients for seeking the compensation, under the provisions of M.V. Act, that too, under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, are rashness and negligence on the part of the driver and it was for the petitioners to plead and prove that the accident in question had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent No.1, while, driving the offending vehicle. According to Shri Jagdish Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company, such evidence is lacking in the present case. 15 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) 18. In order to buttress his contention, it has been pointed out that the police, after the investigation, has submitted the cancellation report. The respondents have also examined RW- 3, Keshva Nand, mechanic HRTC Karsog, who has mechanically inspected the offending vehicle and submitted the report Ex.RW- 3/A. In the cross examination, this witness has admitted that if brake pipe is broken or braking system is not working properly, in that eventuality, driver can observe the defect at the time of driving the vehicle. He has also admitted that wall joint cannot break suddenly and it breaks all of sudden, only in case, when there were already cracks on it. When the court question was put to this witness, he has replied that the vehicle could be stopped by applying the brakes, if the vehicle was moving in normal speed. 19. From the above facts, the negligence of the driver is writ large, as in the proceedings under M.V. Act, the liability of the tort feasor is to be fixed on the touch stone of preponderance of the probability. The proceedings under the M.V. Act, are altogether different from the criminal proceedings, where the guilt of the accused is to be proved by the prosecution, beyond any reasonable doubt. 16 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) 20. In the present case, respondent No.1 has taken the plea that the accident had taken place due to sudden mechanical defect in the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle Joginder Singh has not bothered to put appearance to say about the fact that he used to maintain the vehicle properly. Admittedly, the vehicle was under the exclusive control of Joginder Singh at the relevant time and it was for him to plead and prove as to how the accident had taken place, which has resulted into loss of valuable lives. 21. Merely, asserting the fact that the cancellation report has been filed on account of some mechanical defect, is too short to exonerate respondent No.1 from the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. In the cancellation report, although it has been mentioned that the accident had taken place due to breakage of wall joint, but, in view of the deposition of RW- 3, the offending vehicle could be stopped, if the same was moving in normal speed. The statement on oath, made by RW-3, is sufficient to hold that the accident in question had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1. 22. Since the award has also been assailed on the ground of quantum, as such, this Court would now proceed further to discuss the evidence, so adduced, by the parties to the 17 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) present lis, to ascertain, as to whether the amount of compensation, which has been awarded by the learned Tribunal, falls within the definition of ‘just compensation’ or requires any interference by this Court. 23. As per the pleadings, Vidya Sagar was mason and horticulturist and was earning Rs.35,000/- per month. Claimant No.1-Asha Devi, when appeared in the witness box, as PW-1, has filed the affidavit, in her examination-in chief, as Ex.PW-1/A, in which, she has also asserted that her husband was mason, by profession and also doing the agriculture and horticulture pursuits and as such, he was earning to Rs.35,000/- per month. In cross examination, she has deposed that her husband was mason, by profession and earning Rs.600/-per day. 24. PW-2-Radha Devi, deposed on the similar lines, in her examination- in-chief, however, her evidence is not liable to be taken into consideration, as, she has deposed, in the cross examination, that the income of Shri Vidya Sagar, during his lifetime, has been disclosed to this witness by his wife (PW-1). 25. In view of the above evidence, the material question, which arises for determination, before this Court, is about the fact, as to whether, the approach of the learned Tribunal to determine the income of Vidya Sagar, as, Rs.10,000/- 18 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) per month, during his life time, is justifiable in the eyes of law or not. 26. The accident had taken place in the year 2015. Vidya Sagar was residing in remote village of Tehsil Anni, District Kullu. H.P. 27. Although, claimants have not produced any documentary evidence to prove the income of Vidya Sagar, during his life time, as Rs.35,000/-, but on this ground, the arguments of learned counsel appearing for the appellant are not liable to be accepted, who has argued that in the absence of any documentary proof, the income of deceased should be taken equivalent to the wages, as provided under Minimum Wages Act, prevailing at that time. 28. The oral evidence is, as, good, as, documentary evidence. It has not been suggested to PW-1, that her husband was not working as mason. The factual position, which has been asserted by claimant No.1, in her examination-in-chief, qua the occupation of her husband as mason, has not been controverted, in the cross examination, by suggesting that her husband was not working as mason. As such, this Court is of the view that deceased might be earning Rs.300/-per day, while, working as mason. The income of Vidya Sagar is liable to be determined, as 19 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) Rs.9,000/- per month, whereas, the learned Tribunal has fallen into an error, by assessing the income of Vidya Sagar, during his lifetime, as Rs.10,000/- per month. 29. The learned Tribunal has wrongly relied upon the evidence of PW-2, who has deposed in her cross examination that the daily wages of the masons, in their area, is Rs.700/-, per day. Evidence is to be considered, as a whole, not in piece meal, as this witness has admitted in her further cross examination that the factual position, with regard to the income of Vidya Sagar has been disclosed to her by PW-1(widow of deceased), as such, her evidence does not fall in the realm of “direct evidence”. 30. The age of Vidya Sagar, at the time of his death has been pleaded as 39 years, and the claimant has produced the postmortem report, in which, age of Vidya Sagar has been mentioned, as 43 years. Matriculation examination certificate of Vidya Sagar has been placed on record as Ex.PW-1/E. As per this document, date of birth of Vidya Sagar is 15.03.1976. The accident in question had taken place on 28.05.2015. Meaning thereby, he was about 39 years of age, at the time of his death. Learned Tribunal has rightly taken the age of deceased-Vidya Sagar, at the time of his death as 39 years. The said findings do not require for any interference. 20 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) 31. In view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra) some addition is required to be made on the monthly income of the deceased, on account of his future prospects, in order to ascertain his established income. Vidya Sagar was working in unorganized sector and as per the decision in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra), 40% amount is liable to be added, on account of future prospects. Relevant paragraphs 59 to 59.8 are reproduced, as under:- “59. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record our conclusions:- 59.1. The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been stated in Sarla Verma, a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench. 59.2. As Rajesh has not taken note of the decision in Reshma Kumari, which was delivered at earlier point of time, the decision in Rajesh is not a binding precedent. 59.3 While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. 21 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) 59.4. In case the deceased was self- employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component. 59.5. For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be guided by paragraphs 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma which we have reproduced hereinbefore. 59.6. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of that judgment. 59.7 The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier. 59.8. Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs.15,000/-, respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.” 32. Judging the facts and circumstances of the present case in view of Pranay Sethi’s case, the established income of Vidya Sagar, thus, comes to Rs.9,000/-+ 40%=Rs.12,600/-. Rs.9,000/- + Rs.3600/- (40% of Rs.9,000/-) =Rs.12,600/- 33. The learned Tribunal has deducted one fourth from the income of Vidya Sagar, towards his personal expenses, 22 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) had he been alive. There were four petitioners, who were dependent on the earning of Vidya Sagar. In this regard, reference can be made to document Ex.PW-1/F, legal heir certificate and Parivar register Ex.PW-1/G. As per judgment of Sarla Verma versus Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121, as approved by Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra), if, the dependents are four to six, then, 1/4th amount is to be deducted. As such, the learned Tribunal has rightly deducted 1/4th, out of the income of the deceased, on account of his personal expenses, had Vidya Sagar been alive. Deducting 1/4th, out of the income of the deceased, on account of his personal expenses, his contribution to his family, thus, comes to Rs.12,600/- -Rs.3150/- =Rs.9450/-. 34. The learned Tribunal has applied the multiplier of ‘15’ the age of Vidya Sagar, at the time of his death, has been proved to be 39 years. As such, the learned Tribunal has rightly applied the multiplier of ‘15’ in the present case, which does not require any interference. 35. Thus, the loss of dependency comes to Rs.9450/- x12x15 = Rs.17,01,000/- 23 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) 36. In view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Limited vs. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130, all the claimants are held entitled for the amount under the head ‘loss of consortium’. Relevant paragraphs 21 to 24, are reproduced as under:- 21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Seth(supra) dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is Loss of Consortium. In legal parlance,“consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses ‘spousal consortium’, ‘parental consortium’, and ‘filial consortium’.The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse. 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of “company society, corporation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation. 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline guidance and training. 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. 22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions worldover have recognized that the value of a child’s consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. 23. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In case where a parents has lost their minor 24 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) child, or unmarried son of daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of filial consortium. Parental consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Act. A fe High Courts have awarded compensation on this count. However, there was no clarity with respect to the principles on which compensation could be awarded on loss of filial consortium. 24. The amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under “ loss of consortium”. As laid down in Pranay Sethi. In the preset case, we deem it appropriate to award the father and sister of the deceased, as amount of Rs.40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium. 37. It would be worth while to record herein that initially, the claim petition was filed by four claimants. Apart from respondents No.1 to 3 herein, one Guptu Devi, mother of Vidya Sagar was also one of the claimants, however, on account of her death, during the pendency of the claim petition, on 08.06.2017, an application under Order 1, Rule 10(2) of CPC, for deleting her name has been moved, on the ground that Guptu Devi expired on 08.02.2017. No objection has been made by learned counsel for the respondents, in the application itself. Although, formal order on this application has not been passed by the learned Tribunal, but, in view of the fact that amended head note has been filed, on the same day and no objection has been made by learned counsel for the respondents, now, it can be said that before the decision of the claim petition, only three claimants were there in the present case, as such, compensation under the 25 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) head ‘loss of consortium’, is only granted to three claimants, namely Asha Devi, Monisha and Abhishek. 38. In addition to this, claimants are also entitled for the enhanced amount of compensation under conventional heads i.e. loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses. The entitlement of the claimants, thus, is ascertained as under:- 1.Loss of contribution=Rs.17,01,000/- 2.Loss of estate = Rs.19,500/-(Rs.15,000/-+Rs.4500-) 3.Funeral expenses = Rs.19,500/-(Rs.15,000/-+Rs.4500/-) 4.Loss of consortium= Rs.1,56,000/- (Rs.40,000/- x 3 =1,20,000/-+36,000/-) Total= Rs.18,96,000-(Rs.17,01,000/-+ Rs.19,500/-+Rs.19,500/- +Rs.1,56,000/-) 39. Thus, the claimants are held entitled for a sum of Rs.18,96,000/-, as compensation. 40. In view of the above, the amount of compensation is ordered to be reduced from 19,60,000/- to Rs.18,96,000/-. 41. The learned Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 9% per annum, which is liable to be reduced to 7.5% per annum, in view of the prevailing rate of interest of the nationalized banks. 42. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed. The awarded amount is reduced, in the above terms. The claimants 26 ( 2026:HHC:20653 ) are held entitled for the amount of Rs.18,96,000/-along with interest @ 7.5%, from the date of filing of the petition, till the realization of the amount. 43. In view of the above, now, the amount of compensation is ordered to be apportioned against claimants No.1 to 3, as under:- Claimant No.1 (widow) = 50% Claimants No.2 & 3 (son & daughter) = 25% each. 44. The award passed by the learned Tribunal is modified in the above terms. 45. Memo of costs be prepared. 46. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of. Record be sent back. (Virender Singh) Judge May 30, 2026 (subhash)