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2026 DAILYLAW 10387 (GAU)

Amenla Lkr v. State of Nagaland

2026-03-25

Devashis Baruah, Yarenjungla Longkumer

body2026
JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. 1. Heard Mr. Taka Kichu, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Ms. Inaholi, learned Government Advocate appears on behalf of the State respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and Mr. Mhasilezo Rote, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the respondent No. 4. 2. The petitioner in the instant proceedings is the wife of one Shri Dauda (detenu) who by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution has challenged the Detention Order dated 14.04.2025 passed by the District Magistrate, Peren; the Government Approval Order dated 21.04.2025 issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland and the Confirmation Order dated 11.07.2025 issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland. 3. From a perusal of the present writ petition, it reveals that an FIR was filed by one Kedidaung Sephe alleging about the disappearance of 2 (two) staff members from their office, K&J Project Private Limited located at Keletzai Colony, Ward No. 2. It was also inter alia stated in the said FIR that these 2 (two) persons namely, Mr. Bamdev Rout and Md. Irfan Ali were last seen on the office premises on 23.03.2025 at around 11.00 A.M. to 11.30 AM. The informant requested the Officer-in-Charge of Peren Police Station to initiate an investigation into the disappearance of the said two (2) persons. 4. On the basis of the said FIR, Peren P.S. Case No. 003/2025 was registered on 25.03.2025. The husband of the petitioner was arrested on 08.04.2025 and the case was registered under Section 140(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 and Section 7 of the Nagaland Security Regulation, 1962. 5. The records further reveal that on 14.04.2025, the husband of the petitioner was put under detention in terms with Sections 3(1) and 3(3) of the National Security Act, 1980 (for short “the Act of 1980”). On the same day a proposal was submitted to the Home Commissioner, Nagaland, Kohima seeking the approval from the State Government under Section 3(4) of the Act of 1980 informing of the detention of the husband of the petitioner. 6. We find it very pertinent to take note of the Grounds of Detention which is a part of the Order dated 14.04.2025. Taking into account its relevance, the same is reproduced herein under: “ GROUND OF DETENTION NO. 6. We find it very pertinent to take note of the Grounds of Detention which is a part of the Order dated 14.04.2025. Taking into account its relevance, the same is reproduced herein under: “ GROUND OF DETENTION NO. PRN/CON-7/2016/141 Dated, Peren the 14 April 2025 SHRI DAUDA, SS CAPT., NSCN (U), S/O LT. RAMGENG, AGE-42, R/O OF NCHANGRAM VILLAGE, DISTRICT-PEREN, PO/PS- TENING, P/ADD- NEIPHROLIE COLONY, CHUMOUKEDIMA UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY ACT, 1980. Whereas, the undersigned has made Detention Order against you under the provision of the National Security Act, 1980. Now, therefore, in pursuance of Section 5 of the said Act, the undersigned hereby inform you that the said detention order has been made against you on the following ground: a) Security of the State of Nagaland. b) Maintenance of Public Order. The particulars which have bearing on the above two matters are specified in the schedules attached. You are also informed that you have the option to make a representation to the Detaining Authority, Central Government and State Government through the concerned Jail authorities. You have also a right to claim a personal hearing before the Advisory Board constituted by the State Government under the aforesaid Act.” 7. It is also relevant to take note of the Schedule to the Grounds of Detention which is also reproduced herein under: “ SCHEDULE NO. PRN/CON-7/2016/141 Dated, Peren the 14th April 2025 SHRI DAUDA, SS CAPT., NSCN (U), S/O LT. RAMGENG, AGE-42, R/O OF NCHANGRAM VILLAGE, DISTRICT PEREN, PO/TS-TENING, P/ADD NEIPHROLIE COLONY, CHUMOUKEDIMA UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 1980. 1. That Shri. Dauda, SS Capt., NSCN (U), was arrested at Jalukie under Peren District, Nagaland on 08/04/2025 by Jalukie PS personnel and accordingly a case has been registered under Peren PS C/No. 03/25 U/S. 140 (2) BNS R/W 27 Arms Act R/W 7 NSR. 2. That the accused SS cadre joined the underground group in the year 1999 and is now actively working as SS Capt. NSCN(U). 3. That Shri. Dauda, SS Capt., NSCN (U) who has been arrested is a threat to peace and tranquility of the state of Nagaland. Therefore, he (Dauda) should be detained under the said NSA Act, 1980. 4. 2. That the accused SS cadre joined the underground group in the year 1999 and is now actively working as SS Capt. NSCN(U). 3. That Shri. Dauda, SS Capt., NSCN (U) who has been arrested is a threat to peace and tranquility of the state of Nagaland. Therefore, he (Dauda) should be detained under the said NSA Act, 1980. 4. That the subject is presently under judicial custody but there is likelihood of him being released on bail and in the event of his release he is likely to indulge in similar prejudicial activities unless an effective alternative measure is called for. On the examination of the report forwarded by the sponsoring authority, the case of the subject is found fit to be booked under the National Security Act, 1980. Hence, in order to prevent him from further indulging in activities prejudicial to the defence of the Indian security of the state and maintenance of Public Order, the undersigned has ordered the detention of the subject under the said Act.” 8. From a perusal of the Schedule to the Grounds of Detention, it appears that the District Magistrate, Peren had taken cognizance of the fact that the husband of the petitioner was arrested on 08.04.2025 and it is further mentioned that the husband of the petitioner was in judicial custody, but there is a likelihood of him being released on bail and in the event of his release he is likely to indulge in similar prejudicial activities unless an alternative effective measure is called for. 9. The record further reveals that on 21.04.2025, the Order of Detention was approved by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland in terms with Section 3(5) of the Act of 1980 with an observation that the husband of the petitioner be detained and kept in Central Jail, Dimapur for an initial period of 3 (three) months w.e.f. the date of detention till 13.07.2025 and within this period the detention would be reviewed as required under the provisions of the Act of 1980. 10. It is the case of the petitioner that a representation was submitted by her husband to the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Home Department, Political Branch, the District Magistrate, Peren, Nagaland, the Chairman Advisory Board, NSA, Nagaland as well as to the Joint Secretary, Internal Security-II Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi. 11. 10. It is the case of the petitioner that a representation was submitted by her husband to the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Home Department, Political Branch, the District Magistrate, Peren, Nagaland, the Chairman Advisory Board, NSA, Nagaland as well as to the Joint Secretary, Internal Security-II Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi. 11. The record reveals that on 11.07.2025, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland confirmed the detention of the petitioner’s husband and further observed that the petitioner’s husband be detained for another period of 3 (three) months w.e.f. 14.07.2025 to 13.10.2025 within which period his detention would be reviewed as required under the provisions of the Act of 1980. The records further reveal that on 13.10.2025, the period of detention of the husband of the petitioner was further extended by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland w.e.f. 14.10.2025 till 13.01.2026. Further to that, on 09.01.2026, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland further extended the period of detention for another period of 3 (three) months w.e.f. 14.01.2026 till 13.04.2026. It is under such circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the instant Writ Petition seeking a writ in the nature of Habeas corpus and any other appropriate writ, direction and order for setting aside the Detention Order dated 14.04.2025, the Approval Order dated 21.04.2025, the Confirmation Order dated 11.07.2025 and the various subsequent extensions whereby the petitioner’s husband detention was extended up to 13.04.2026. 12. The record reveals that this Court vide an order dated 18.03.2026 issued notice and thereby directed the respondents to bring on record their stand by filing their affidavits. This Court further directed that taking into account that the instant case pertains to a case wherein the personal liberty of a person is concerned, the records be produced. In pursuance thereto, although no affidavit has been filed by the respondents in the instant proceedings, but the records has been produced. 13. This Court further directed that taking into account that the instant case pertains to a case wherein the personal liberty of a person is concerned, the records be produced. In pursuance thereto, although no affidavit has been filed by the respondents in the instant proceedings, but the records has been produced. 13. We have perused the records and from a perusal of the records, it is seen that the representation which was submitted by the petitioner’s husband was forwarded by the Superintendent of Central Jail, Dimapur on 06.05.2025 to the Special Secretary, Home Department, Political Branch along with copies to the Joint Secretary, Internal Security-II Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi; the Detaining Authority, i.e., the District Magistrate, Peren, Nagaland as well as to the Secretary, Advisory Board, NSA. 14. We also find it from the records that on 14.04.2025, the Grounds of Detention in Annexure-B, the Detention Order in Annexure-A, the Schedule in support on the Grounds of Detention in Annexure-C were served upon the petitioner’s husband. The records also reveal that the representation so submitted by the petitioner to all the authorities, more particularly the District Magistrate, Peren, the Central Government, the Nagaland Advisory Board as well as the State Government were all rejected. 15. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ameena Begum Vs. State of Telangana & Others, (2023) 9 SCC 587 submitted that the subjective satisfaction on which the Detaining Authority had issued the Detention Order and the subsequent Approval Order and the Confirmation Order including the subsequent extension orders from time to time by the Government of Nagaland are not based upon materials. It is the specific submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned Detention Order is based upon extraneous considerations and the said aspect of the matter would be very much apparent from the fact that on 08.04.2025, the petitioner’s husband was arrested under stringent provisions of law, i.e., under Section 140(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 and Section 7 of the Nagaland Security Regulation, 1962 and 6 (six) days later the husband of the Petitioner was put under preventive detention. 16. 16. The learned counsel also submitted that when the offence in question can very well be tried under the normal criminal process, there was no requirement that the petitioner's husband should have been put under preventive detention. 17. Per contra, Ms. Inaholi, the learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent State submitted that the petitioner's husband is a SS captain of the banned outfit NSCN(U) and taking into consideration that there is a likelihood of him being released on bail and in the event of his release, he is likely to indulge in similar prejudicial activities, steps were being taken for putting the petitioner’s husband under preventive detention. 18. On the basis of the aforesaid submission by the learned counsels for the parties and taking into account the pleadings in the writ petition and the records which have been produced by the Ms. Inaholi, the learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State respondents, the following point for determination arises: (i) Whether in the facts of the instant case, the Detention Order, the Approval Order, as well as the Confirmation Order can be interfered with on the ground of not reflecting the existence of cogent materials that the husband of the petitioner was likely to be released on bail? 19. At the outset, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ameena Begum (supra) wherein at paragraph No.28 and its sub-paragraphs, the Supreme Court enumerated the circumstances when a Constitutional Court would be entitled to examine the legality of the orders of preventive detention. At paragraph No.29 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court further observed that if the Court finds the exercise of power to be bad and/or vitiated applying any of the tests which were enumerated in paragraph No.28 thereby rendering the detention order vulnerable, it shall be the duty of the Constitutional Court for righting the wrong. Paragraph Nos. 28 and 29 are quoted hereinbelow: “28. Paragraph Nos. 28 and 29 are quoted hereinbelow: “28. In the circumstances, of a given case, a constitutional Court when called upon to test the legality of orders of preventive detention would be entitled to examine whether: 28.1 The order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the exercise of the power is predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of the power not being satisfied; 28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining authority has applied its mind to all relevant circumstances and the same is not based on material extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute; 28.3. Power has been exercised for achieving the purpose for which it has been conferred, or exercised for an improper purpose, not authorised by the statute, and is therefore ultra vires; 28.4. The detaining authority has acted independently or under the dictation of another body; 28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of self-created rules of policy or in any other manner not authorised by the governing statute, has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case; 28.6. The satisfaction of the detaining authority rests on materials which are of rationally probative value, and the detaining authority has given due regard to the matters as per the statutory mandate; 28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind existence of a live and proximate link between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him or is based on material which is stale; 28.8. The ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction is/are such which an individual, with some degree of rationality and prudence, would consider as connected with the fact and relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry in respect whereof the satisfaction is to be reached; 28.9. The grounds on which the order of preventive detention rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the satisfaction for the detention, giving him the opportunity to make a suitable representation; and 28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law, have been strictly adhered to. 29. The grounds on which the order of preventive detention rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the satisfaction for the detention, giving him the opportunity to make a suitable representation; and 28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law, have been strictly adhered to. 29. Should the Court find the exercise of power to be bad and/or to be vitiated applying any of the tests noted above, rendering the detention order vulnerable, detention which undoubtedly visits the person detained with drastic consequences would call for being interdicted for righting the wrong.” 20. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraph No.28 of the judgment in the case of Ameena Begum (supra), would show that the Writ Court would be within its jurisdiction to examine as to whether the Detention Order was based on requisite satisfaction, albeit subjective, of the Detaining Authority inasmuch as the absence of such satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of exercise of the power is predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of the power not being satisfied. The Constitutional Court can also examine as to whether in reaching such requisite satisfaction, the Detaining Authority had applied its mind to all relevant circumstances and the same is not based on material extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute. It was also observed that the satisfaction which has to be arrived at have to be on the basis of the existence of a live proximate link between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him or is based on material which is stale. 21. In the backdrop of the said proposition settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Ameena Begum (supra), let this Court consider as to whether a preventive Detention Order ought to have been passed in the instant case that too when the detenu was already in custody in connection with serious offences or for that matter whether the non-consideration of the fact that the detenu is already in custody in connection with serious offences would have a vital bearing on the subjective satisfaction arrived at for passing the Detention Order. 22. In the case of Dharmendra Sugan Chand Chelawat Vs. 22. In the case of Dharmendra Sugan Chand Chelawat Vs. Union of India, ( 1990) 1 SCC 746 , it was observed that an order of detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that: (i) the Detaining Authority was aware of the fact that the detenue was already in detention. (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenue is already in detention. The Supreme Court further clarified the expression “compelling reasons” in the context of making an order for detention on a person already in custody to mean that there must be cogent materials before the Detaining Authority on the basis of which it may satisfy that: a) The detenue is likely to be released from custody in near future. b) Taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenue, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. 23. We further find it relevant to take note of another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Amrit Lal Vs. Union of India, (2001) 1 SCC 341 , wherein the Detaining Authority recorded its satisfaction for detention under the National Security Act, 1980 in view of the fact that the person who was already in jail was going to move a bail application. The Supreme Court observed in the case of Amrit Lal (Supra) that although in the grounds of detention it has been mentioned that there was a likelihood of the detenue moving an application for bail, for which the detention was necessary, there must be cogent materials before the authority passing the Detaining Order that there was likelihood of his release on bail. 24. It is also pertinent to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Geetha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 7 SCC 603 wherein the Supreme Court observed that the Detaining Authority should be aware that the detenue is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenue may be released on bail cannot be ipsi dixit of the Detaining Authority. 25. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 7 SCC 603 wherein the Supreme Court observed that the Detaining Authority should be aware that the detenue is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenue may be released on bail cannot be ipsi dixit of the Detaining Authority. 25. Further to the above, we find it apt to note the judgment in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh Vs. State of Manipur & Others, (2012) 7 SCC 181 , wherein the Supreme Court culled out the three propositions as to when a person, who is in jail can be detained under the detention laws. Paragraph 9 of the said judgment being relevant is quoted hereinbelow: “9. In view of the above, it can be held that there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of criminal case. However, if the detention order is challenged the Detaining Authority has to satisfy the Court the following facts: (1) The authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was actually in custody. (2) There was reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail and further on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order. (3) In view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore, detention order was necessary.” 26. In the backdrop of the above, we would like to revert back to the facts already delineated supra. The materials on record show that the petitioner’s husband was arrested on 08.04.2025 in connection with Peren P.S. Case No. 003/2025 registered under Section 140(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 and Section 7 of the Nagaland Security Regulation, 1962. 27. We find it relevant to take note of that the Superintendent of Police, Peren on 14.04.2025 sent the proposal to the District Magistrate, Peren along with the FIR, Arrest Memo, Seizure Memo, Accused Photo and Joint Interrogation Report. In the said proposal so submitted, there is nothing mentioned by the Superintendent of Police, Peren that the petitioner’s husband was likely to be released on bail. 28. In the said proposal so submitted, there is nothing mentioned by the Superintendent of Police, Peren that the petitioner’s husband was likely to be released on bail. 28. We also find it relevant to take note of that though in the Schedule to the Grounds of Detention, there is a mention that the petitioner, if not detained, is likely to be released on bail, but there appears to be no cogent materials in the records which would indicate as to on what basis that too in absence of the proposal submitted by the Superintendent of Police, Peren mentioning that the petitioner's husband was likely to be released on bail, the District Magistrate, i.e. the Detaining Authority, had incorporated in the Schedule to the Grounds of Detention that the petitioner's husband was likely to be released on bail. 29. We also find it relevant to take note of that even in the proposals so submitted to the Home Commissioner, Nagaland by the Detaining Authority, i.e. the District Magistrate, Peren on 14.04.2025 there is also no whisper that the petitioner's husband was likely to be released on bail. 30. Taking into account that there is no cogent materials shown before us as well as nothing transpires upon perusal of the entire records, as to on what basis the District Magistrate, Peren had the belief that the petitioner's husband was likely to be released on bail, it is our opinion that the subjective satisfaction so formed by the Detaining Authority to put the petitioner’s husband under preventive detention appears to be based on mere ipse dixit statements in the Schedule to the Grounds of Detention, and the same cannot be sustained. 31. Accordingly, we therefore are of the opinion that the Detention Order, the Approval Order, the Confirmation Order as well as the subsequent orders by which the Detention Order had been extended from time to time, requires to be interfered with. 32. 31. Accordingly, we therefore are of the opinion that the Detention Order, the Approval Order, the Confirmation Order as well as the subsequent orders by which the Detention Order had been extended from time to time, requires to be interfered with. 32. We therefore dispose of the instant proceedings with the following observations and directions: (i) The Detention Order dated 14.04.2025 passed by the District Magistrate, Peren; the Government Approval Order dated 21.04.2025 issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland and the Confirmation Order dated 11.07.2025 issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland as well as the various extensions by which the Detention Order was extended and the last being on 09.01.2026, issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, are set aside and quashed. (ii) The records which have been produced by Ms. Inaholi, the learned Government Advocate be returned.