Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
( 2026:HHC:20652 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Civil Revision No. 16 of 2026 Reserved on : 01.04.2026 Decided on : 30.05.2026 Onkar Dass …Petitioner Versus Meeran Devi …Respondent The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the petitioner : Mr. R.K. Gautam, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Jai Ram Sharma, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge Petitioner Onkar Dass has filed the present Civil Revision, against the order dated 12.02.2026, passed by the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No. 1 Una, District Una, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned trial Court’).
2. Vide order dated 12.02.2026, the learned trial Court has dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 C.P.C., filed by the petitioner, in Civil Suit titled as “Meeran Devi Vs Onkar Dass”. 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2
3. For the sake of convenience, parties to the lis, are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned trial Court.
Brief facts:
4. Plaintiff Meeran Devi, has filed a suit for permanent injunction, restraining the defendant from changing the nature, raising any sort of construction, alienating, in any way and manner, ousting the plaintiff, from land, measuring 352.41 Sq.mtrs., as comprised in Khewat No. 606 min, Khatauni No. 1257 min, Khasra No. 1420/2 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land’), as entered and recorded in jamabandi, for the year 202021, situated in Up Mohal Galua (Una), Tehsil and District Una, H.P. In the alternative, relief of mandatory injunction, directing the defendant to remove the debris of superstructure, if so raised, over any portion of the suit land and to restore the suit land to its original position, as it existed, has also been sought. 4.1 In the said suit, defendant Onkar Dass has filed the written statement, as well as, an application under
Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, with a prayer to reject the plaint.
3 4.2 The said application has been filed on the ground, that the plaintiff has filed the suit, on the basis of agreement to sell and as per the said document, the value of the suit land is Rs. 1,44,00,000/ and the plaintiff has not affixed proper Court fees on the plaint, as per valuation of the suit. In addition to this, suit is also stated to be not maintainable, as, in the absence of title of the suit land, in favour of the plaintiff, he cannot seek the relief, as claimed. 4.3 This application has been contested by the plaintiff, on the ground that in view of the relief claimed, the requisite Court fees has been affixed and reasserting her right and interest in the suit land, she has prayed that she has every right to file the suit and there is no ground to accept the application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C.
5. The application has been dismissed by the learned trial Court, vide order dated 12.02.2026.
6. Against the dismissal of the application under
Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C., the present revision has been preferred before this Court.
Contentions of the parties:
7. The order, by virtue of which, the application has been dismissed, has been assailed before this Court,
4 on the ground, that the order is not sustainable in the eyes of law, as, agreement to sell does not create or confer any right or interest in the suit property in favour of the plaintiff.
8. Reasserting the fact that agreement to sell does not create any right or interest in the suit land, the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC have been reiterated to plead that the suit does not disclose any legal cause of action and suit for injunction is not maintainable, on agreement to sell, as, the plaintiff has not filed the suit for specific performance.
9. The order has further been assailed on the ground that the suit is not maintainable and the plaintiff is required to file the suit for Specific Performance of the Contract.
10. According to the defendant, the plaintiff is having no cause of action to file the suit. As such, Sh. R.K. Gautam, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Jai Ram Sharma, Advocate, has prayed that the present revision may kindly be allowed, by allowing the application, filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, by rejecting the plaint, on
5 the ground that the plaintiff is having no cause of action and suit is not maintainable.
11. Per contra, Sh. N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate, appearing for plaintiff Meeran Devi, has supported the order passed by learned trial Court, by virtue of which, application under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC, has been dismissed. According to him, the plaintiff has every right to protect her possession, even, without filing the suit for Specific Performance.
12. In order to buttress his contentions, it has also been argued that the defendant has not removed the encumbrances/charges over the suit land. As such, there was no occasion for the plaintiff to file the suit for Specific Performance, on account of nonperformance of the part of the contract by the defendant himself. Hence, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application.
Discussion & findings:
13. As per the record, plaintiff has filed the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant. As per the stand taken in the plaint, the relationship between the parties is governed by the agreement of sale, dated 27.12.2024. The said agreement has been annexed
6 with the suit. Although, the factum of agreement of sale, has been disputed by the defendant, but, the said defence is not liable to be taken into consideration, while deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 14. While deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, only the averments made in the plaint are to be seen. The agreement has been annexed with the plaint. As per the agreement, defendant had agreed to sell the suit land for a sum of Rs. 1,44,00,000/ and the earnest amount of Rs. 15,00,000/ was received in cash and Rs. 10,00,000/ by way of cheque bearing No. 569233, by the plaintiff, out of the bank account maintained in Canara Bank, Branch Una. Last date for the execution and registration of the sale deed, as per the document was fixed on 30.04.2025. In the document, which, has been relied upon by the plaintiff, as agreement of sale, a note has been given that the land, which is the subject matter of the agreement is level land, out of Khasra No. 420/2 and the defendant has agreed to receive proportionate less amount, in case, the land out of Khasra No. 420/2 was not found plane. Whereas, in the plaint, plaintiff has asserted that the defendant had parted with the possession of the suit
7 land, in favour of the plaintiff, immediately i.e. on
27.12.2024. The note, which has been given in the agreement, has been interpreted as delivery of possession. The said contention of the plaintiff is not liable to be accepted at this stage, as the stand as taken in para 2 of the plaint, qua delivery of possession is contrary to the document, which governs the relationship between the parties. 15.
As per the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, rejection of the plaint, has been sought on two grounds: the plaint has not been properly valued and sufficient court fee has not been affixed; and non existence of any kind of relief, under the law, in absence of title of the plaintiff, as well as, the jurisdiction of the Court. 16. The said application has been rejected by the learned trial Court, mainly on the ground that the plaint discloses a cause of action and the relief claimed is held to be injunction and not for Specific Performance. As such, suit cannot be said to be undervalued for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction. 17. The scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a case “The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational
8 Institution Versus B. Gunashekar & Another, Neutral Citation No. 2025 INSC 490”, relevant paragraphs 13 to 14.1, are reproduced as under:
“13. Seemingly, the appellant institution's journey began nearly 150 years ago, and its possession of the disputed property dates back to 1905, when it was initially leased and subsequently conveyed by the Commissioner of Civil and Military Station of Bangalore. The present dispute arose when the respondents filed a suit in O.S. No. 25968 of 2018 seeking permanent injunction against the appellant. The respondents' claim rests entirely on an agreement to sell dated 10.04.2018, purportedly executed by certain individuals who, notably, are not parties to the suit. The appellant, confronted with this litigation, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC seeking rejection of the plaint. Both the trial court and the High Court rejected the said application filed by the appellant. Hence, this appeal came to be filed by the appellant before us. 14. Let us first examine the scope and purpose of
Order VII Rule 11 CPC11. This Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through legal representatives, (2020) 7 SCC 366, explained in detail the applicable law for deciding the application for rejection of the plaint. The relevant paragraphs of the said decision are reproduced below:
“23.1 …
23.2. The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. 23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted. 23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a
9 litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words : (SCC p.324, para 12)
“12. …The whole purpose of conferment of such power is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the Court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the Court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.”
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to. 23.6.
Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. 23.7. Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under:
“14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.– (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint. (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. 10 (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.” (emphasis supplied)
23.8. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11(a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint. 23.9.
In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. 23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into
consideration.
23.11. The test for exercising the power under
Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success I which reads as : (SCC p.562, para 139)
“139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.”
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. (2007) 5 SCC 614, the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry
11 whether the allegations are true in fact. D.Ramachandran v. R.V.Janakiraman (1999) 3 SCC 267.
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
23.14. The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the
judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557. The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain (supra).
23.15. The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint
“shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint.
24. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit.
24.1. In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam (2005) 10 SCC 51, this Court held:
“24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove an order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material
facts on which it is founded” (emphasis supplied)
24.2. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467, this Court held that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC what is
12 required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something purely illusory, in the following words: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
“5. …The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing …” (emphasis supplied)
24.3. Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 170, this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint. 24.4. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174, held that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court. ….. 28. A threeJudge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1, held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words “right to sue” means the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted.
Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected.”
13
14.1. Thus, it is clear that the above provision viz., Order VII Rule 11 CPC serves as a crucial filter in civil litigation, enabling courts to terminate proceedings at the threshold where the plaintiff's case, even if accepted in its entirety, fails to disclose any cause of action or is barred by law, either express or by implication. The scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC and the authority of the courts is well settled in law. There is a bounden duty on the Court to discern and identify fictitious suit, which on the face of it would be barred, but for the clever pleadings disclosing a cause of action, that is surreal. Generally, subclauses (a) and (d) are stand alone grounds, that can be raised by the defendant in a suit. However, it cannot be ruled out that under certain circumstances, clauses (a) and (d) can be mutually inclusive. For instances, when clever drafting veils the implied bar to disclose the cause of action; it then becomes the duty of the Court to lift the veil and expose the bar to reject the suit at the threshold. The power to reject a plaint under this provision is not merely procedural but substantive, aimed at preventing abuse of the judicial process and ensuring that court time is not wasted on fictitious claims failing to disclose any cause of action to sustain the suit or barred by law. Therefore, the appeal before us requires careful consideration of the scope of rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, particularly, in the context of the suit filed based on an agreement to sell against third parties in possession.” (Self emphasis supplied)
18. At the cost of repetition, agreement to sell is totally silent about the delivery of possession.
Since, the agreement to sell governs the relationship between the parties, as such, this Court has to see as to whether the said document creates any right in favour of the plaintiff. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in B. Gunashekar’s case (supra), has also discussed the value of agreement to sell, visavis, the provisions of Order VII Rule
14 11 CPC. Relevant paragraphs 15 and 15.1 of the
judgment, are reproduced as under:
“15. Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC mandates rejection of the plaint where it does not disclose a cause of action. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India & Another, (2006) 6 SCC 207, this Court pointed out that cause of action means every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support their right to
judgment. It consists of bundle of facts which narrate the circumstances and the reasons for filing such suit. It is the foundation on which the entire suit would rest. Therefore, it goes without saying that merely including a paragraph on cause of action is not sufficient but rather, on a meaningful reading of the plaint and the documents, it must disclose a cause of action. The plaint should contain such cause of action that discloses all the necessary facts required in law to sustain the suit and not mere statements of fact which fail to disclose a legal right of the plaintiff to sue and breach or violation by the defendant(s). It is pertinent to note here that even if a right is found, unless there is a violation or breach of that right by the defendant, the cause of action should be deemed to be unreal. This is where the substantive laws like Specific Relief Act, 1963, Contract Act, 1872, and Transfer of Property Act, 1882, come into operation. A pure question of law that can be decided at the early stage of litigation, ought to be decided at the earliest stage. In the present case, the respondents' claim based on an agreement to sell. The legal effect of such an agreement must be examined in light of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which explicitly states that a contract for the sale of immovable property does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This principle has been consistently upheld by this Court in the following judgments: (i) Rambhau Namdeo Gajre (supra)
“13. The agreement to sell does not create an interest of the proposed vendee in the suit property. As per Section 54 of the Act, the title in immovable property valued at more than Rs 100 can be conveyed only by executing a registered sale deed. Section 54 specifically provides that a contract for sale of immovable property is a contract evidencing the fact that the sale of such property shall take place on the terms settled between the parties, but does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. It is not disputed before us that the suit land sought to be conveyed is of the value of
15 more than Rs 100.
Therefore, unless there was a registered document of sale in favour of Pishorrilal (the proposed transferee) the title of the suit land continued to vest in Narayan Bapuji Dhotra (original plaintiff) and remain in his ownership. This point was examined in detail by this Court in State of U.P. v. District Judge (1997) 1 SCC 496, and it was held thus: (SCC pp. 499500, para 7)
“7. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions we find that the High Court with respect had patently erred in taking the view that because of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act the proposed transferees of the land had acquired an interest in the lands which would result in exclusion of these lands from the computation of the holding of the tenureholder transferor on the appointed day. It is obvious that an agreement to sell creates no interest in land. As per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the property in the land gets conveyed only by registered sale deed. It is not in dispute that the lands sought to be covered were having value of more than Rs 100. Therefore, unless there was a registered document of sale in favour of the proposed transferee agreement holders, the title of the lands would not get divested from the vendor and would remain in his ownership. There is no dispute on this aspect. However, strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for Respondent 3 on Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. We fail to appreciate how that section can at all be relevant against the third party like the appellant State.
That section provides for a shield of protection to the proposed transferee to remain in possession against the original owner who has agreed to sell these lands to the transferee if the proposed transferee satisfies other conditions of Section 53A. That protection is available as a shield only against the transferor, the proposed vendor, and would disentitle him from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferees who are put in possession pursuant to such an agreement. But that has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the said lands till they are legally conveyed by sale deed to the proposed transferees. Such a right to protect possession
16 against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed in service against a third party like the appellant State when it seeks to enforce the provisions of the Act against the tenureholder, proposed transferor of these lands.” (emphasis supplied) There was no agreement between the appellant and the respondent in connection with the suit land. The doctrine of partperformance could have been availed of by Pishorrilal against his proposed vendor subject, of course, to the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned above. It could not be availed of by the appellant against the respondent with whom he has no privity of contract. The appellant has been put in possession of the suit land on the basis of an agreement of sale not by the respondent but by Pishorrilal, therefore, the privity of contract is between Pishorrilal and the appellant and not between the appellant and the respondent. The doctrine of partperformance as contemplated in Section 53A can be availed of by the proposed transferee against his transferor or any person claiming under him and not against a third person with whom he does not have a privity of contract.” (ii) Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Another (2012) 1 SCC 656, wherein, this Court comprehensively examined the nature of rights created by an agreement to sell and concluded that such agreements create, at best, a personal right enforceable against the vendor.
The relevant paragraphs read as under:
“16. Section 54 of TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam and Anr. (1977) 3 SCC 247, observed: (SCC pp.25455, paras 3233 & 37)
“32. A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra [1967]1 SCR 293. The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of
17 Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein. 33. In India, the word `transfer' is defined with reference to the word `convey'. The word `conveys' in Section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership… 37....that only on execution of conveyance, ownership passes from one party to another. …"
17. In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra [2004 (8) SCC 614] this Court held:
"10. Protection provided under Section 53 A of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by executing a registered sale deed in favour of the transferee. Such a right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed in service against a third party."
18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred. 19.
Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of Sections 54 and 55 of the TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under Section 53A of the TP Act). According to the TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of the TP Act enacts that sale of immovable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale
18 does not create any interest or charge on its subjectmatter.” (iii) Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd v. Central Bank of India & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine 352
“25. The observations made by this Court in Suraj Lamp (supra) in paras 16 and 19 are also relevant. ….. 26. Suraj Lamp (supra) later came to be referred to and relied upon by this Court in Shakeel Ahmed v. Syed Akhlaq Hussain, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1526 wherein the Court after referring to its earlier judgment held that the person relying upon the customary documents cannot claim to be the owner of the immovable property and consequently not maintain any claims against a thirdparty. The relevant paras read as under:—
“10. Having considered the submissions at the outset, it is to be emphasized that irrespective of what was decided in the case of Suraj Lamps and Industries (supra) the fact remains that no title could be transferred with respect to immovable properties on the basis of an unregistered Agreement to Sell or on the basis of an unregistered General Power of Attorney. The Registration Act, 1908 clearly provides that a document which requires compulsory registration under the Act, would not confer any right, much less a legally enforceable right to approach a Court of Law on its basis.
Even if these documents i.e. the Agreement to Sell and the Power of Attorney were registered, still it could not be said that the respondent would have acquired title over the property in question. At best, on the basis of the registered agreement to sell, he could have claimed relief of specific performance in appropriate proceedings. In this regard, reference may be made to sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act and section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 11. Law is well settled that no right, title or interest in immovable property can be conferred without a registered document. Even the judgment of this Court in the case of Suraj Lamps & Industries (supra) lays down the same proposition. Reference may also be made to the following judgments of this Court:
19 (i). Ameer Minhaj v. Deirdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar (2018) 7 SCC 639 (ii). Balram Singh v. Kelo Devi Civil Appeal No. 6733 of 2022 (iii). Paul Rubber Industries Private Limited v. Amit Chand Mitra, SLP(C) No. 15774 of 2022. 12. The embargo put on registration of documents would not override the statutory provision so as to confer title on the basis of unregistered documents with respect to immovable property. Once this is the settled position, the respondent could not have maintained the suit for possession and mesne profits against the appellant, who was admittedly in possession of the property in question whether as an owner or a licensee. 13. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondent that the judgment in Suraj Lamps & Industries (supra) would be prospective is also misplaced. The requirement of compulsory registration and effect on nonregistration emanates from the statutes, in particular the Registration Act and the Transfer of Property Act. The ratio in Suraj Lamps & Industries (supra) only approves the provisions in the two enactments. Earlier judgments of this Court have taken the same view.”
15.1. Undoubtedly, a sale deed, which amounts to conveyance, has to be a registered document, as mandated under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.
On the other hand, an agreement for sale, which also requires to be registered, does not amount to a conveyance as it is merely a contractual document, by which one party, namely the vendor, agrees or assures or promises to convey the property described in the schedule of such agreement to the other party, namely the purchaser, upon the latter performing his part of the obligation under the agreement fully and in time. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 explicitly lays down that a contract for sale will not confer any right or interest. Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 offers protection only to a proposed transferee who has part performed his part of the promise and has been put into possession, against the actions of transferor, acting against the interest of the transferee. For the proposed transferee to seek any protection against the transferor, he must have either performed his part of obligation in full or in part.
The applicability of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is subject to certain conditions viz., (a) the agreement must be in writing with the owner of the
20 property or in other words, the transferor must be either the owner or his authorised representative, (b) the transferee must have been put into possession or must have acted in furtherance of the agreement and made some developments, (c) the protection under Section 53A is not an exemption to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or in other words, a transferee, put into possession with the knowledge of a pending lis, is not entitled to any protection, (d) the transferee must be in possession when the lis is initiated against his transferor and must be willing to perform the remaining part of his obligation, (e) the transferee must be entitled to seek specific performance or in other words, must not be barred by any of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 from seeking such performance. The protection under Section 53A is not available against a third party who may have an adversarial claim against the vendor. Therefore, unless and until the sale deed is executed, the purchaser is not vested with any right, title or interest in the property except to the limited extent of seeking specific performance from his vendor. An agreement for sale does not confer any right to the purchaser to file a suit against a third party who is either the owner or in possession, or who claims to be the owner and to be in possession. In such cases, the vendor will have to approach the court and not the proposed transferee.” (self emphasis supplied)
20.
In the present case, the document, which governs the relationship between the parties, stipulates that the sale deed, as per document, was to be executed on or before 30.04.2025 and the suit has been filed on 05.12.2025, for the decree for permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining the defendant from changing the nature, raising any sort of construction and alienating, in any way and manner, ousting the plaintiff from the suit land. Meaning thereby, on that day, the plaintiff has a
21 cause of action to file the suit for Specific Performance. When, the plaintiff was having the cause of action to file the suit for Specific Performance of agreement to sell, then, the suit is not maintainable, in view of the provisions of Sections 41(h) & 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act, which are reproduced as under:
“41(h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust; 41(j) when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter.”
21. Although, the defendant has not mentioned in the application that the suit be rejected on account of the fact that the plaintiff is having no cause of action, but the crux of the application is that the suit has been sought to be rejected on the ground of absence of title of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. Considering the low legal literacy of Indian masses, in the considered opinion of this Court, that the rejection of the suit has been sought on the ground that the plaintiff is not having the cause of action. 22. Although, by way of para 11 of the plaint, an attempt has been made to plead cause of action, but by meaningful reading of the plaint, as mandated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in B. Gunashekar’s case (supra), especially
22 para 14.1, which has been reproduced above, the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit for injunction. 23.
Admittedly, the injunction has been sought on the ground of agreement to sell dated 27.12.2024. On the day, when the suit has been filed, last date for execution and registration of sale deed, as per the agreement has already expired. Hence, the alleged threat to change the nature or to alienate the suit land, does not give any cause of action to the plaintiff to file the suit, for permanent injunction. 24. Since, the Court has to identify the fictitious litigation at the threshold, as such, it seems that on the basis of the clever pleadings qua the fact that the defendant is threatening to change the nature and to alienate the suit land, the plaintiff wants to drag the defendant in the frivolous litigation. 25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dahiben Versus Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through legal representatives, (2020) 7 SCC 366, has expanded the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, by holding that the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC are sort of filter in civil litigation. In para 23.9 of the judgment, it has been held
23 that “in exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out”. As such, by taking the averments of the plaint as it is, the Court has to ascertain the fact, whether the power, under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, is liable to be exercised, in the present case. 26. Admittedly, the agreement, which, governs the relationship between the parties, is not registered. The plaintiff is relying upon the “unregistered document” for the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction, to protect her alleged possession, which does not create any title or interest in favour of plaintiff. On the basis of the said unregistered document, the plaintiff is asserting her possession over the suit land.
The agreement has admittedly been executed after 24.09.2001, the date, when new provision, in the shape of (1A) has been inserted, in Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. The said provision is reproduced, as under:
“17(1A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for
consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or
24 after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said section 53A.”
27. Even, on account of nonregistration of the document, the plaintiff cannot take benefit of Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, are reproduced as under:
“53A. Part performance. Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.”
28. The effect of nonregistration, under Section 17 of the Registration Act, has been provided in Section 49 of
25 the Registration Act. Section 49 of the Registration Act, is reproduced as under:
“49. Effect of nonregistration of documents required to be registered.
No document required by section 17 [or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882)], to be registered shall (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or (b) confer any power to adopt, or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered: [Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered may be received as evidence or a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (3 of 1877) or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument]”. 29. In view of the provisions of Section 49 of the Registration Act, the unregistered agreement to sell, which governs the relationship between the parties can only be taken into consideration for adjudicating a suit for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. 30. In view of the discussion made above, the plaint is nothing, but clever drafting by asserting that by virtue of note given in agreement to sell, the possession has been delivered, but, in view of the provisions of Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act, by way of Section 17(1A), as well as, Section 49 of the Registration Act, no benefit could be
26 derived by the plaintiff on account of nonregistration of the said agreement. As such, the litigation is liable to be terminated, on account of the fact that the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit. 31. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and the order passed by the learned trial Court, by virtue of which the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, has been dismissed, is set aside. Accordingly, the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is liable to be allowed by rejecting the plaint. 32. Ordered accordingly. 33. There shall be no orders as to cost. 34. Record be returned to the quarter concerned.
(Virender Singh)
Judge 30th May, 2026 (Pramod Kumar)