JUDGMENT : PRANJAL DAS, J. 1. Heard Mr. Vikramjeet Devnath, learned counsel for the applicant. Also heard Mr. Tongpok Pongener, learned counsel and Mr. Laknyei Phom, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2. 2. The applicant/Insurance company is seeking to file an appeal under Section 173 of the MV Act, 1988 against the Judgment and Award dated 16.10.2023 passed by the learned Member, MACT, Mokokchung in MAC case No. 40 of 2018, whereby the Tribunal was pleased to award a total compensation of Rs. 23,59,800/- (Twenty Three Lakhs Fifty Nine Thousand Eight Hundred) to the claimants (respondent no. 1 and 2 herein) along with interest of 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition. However, there is stated to be a delay of 321 days in preferring the appeal and hence an application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, thereby giving rise to the instant interlocutory proceeding. 3. The applicant/Insurance company has narrated the grounds of delay in para 7 thereof. The applicant has also filed an additional affidavit wherein also in paragraphs 2 and 3, narration regarding the delay and its explanation thereof has been given. The explanation regarding the delay, including the various dates that emerges from para 7 of the delay condonation petition and para 2 and 3 of the additional affidavit may be enumerated in the following tabular format:- 4. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, it is stated that 5 months and 19 days lapsed from the date of receipt of the Judgment by the Panel Lawyer and processing of the same at the Head Office of the applicant at Chennai. It is also stated that though legal opinion was given on 03.05.2024 to the Head Office, but after 5 months and 19 days, the Head Office on 20.10.2024 instructed the counsel to prepare the MAC Appeal. 5. It is stated and submitted that there was delay on the part of the applicant at every stage and except for mentioning the dates and the decisions taken, there was no explanation as to why the delay had occasioned. In this backdrop, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, contends that the said statements should not be accepted as showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 321 days. In this backdrop, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, contends that the said statements should not be accepted as showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 321 days. It is also stated and contended that the applicant has taken a casual and negligent attitude and that, except mentioning dates, the applicant has failed to give any cogent reasons to condone the delay, which is also on the higher side. 6. The learned counsel for the applicant drawing attention to Paragraph 7 of the main application, and Paragraph 2 of the additional affidavit, has submitted that the said paragraphs have enumerated the explanations for the delay that occurred in filing the appeal. It is submitted that when the impugned judgment was rendered, he was not yet empanelled by the Insurance Company and only subsequently, he came to be empanelled and that this also contributed to the delay. It is submitted that in several decisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has indicated that a liberal approach should be adopted on the question of delay condonation. 7. He further submits that in the impugned judgment, though the claim petition was filed under Section 163A of the MV Act 1988, but the learned Tribunal stating that the 2019 amendment had abolished the second schedule, proceeded to decide the matter and make the award under Section 166 of the MV Act, 1988. In this context, it is submitted that a question of law is involved and therefore the delay should be condoned and the matter heard on merits. 8. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the applicant cites the following decisions:- (i) Raheem Shah & Anr. Vs. Govind Singh & Ors. 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 572 (ii) Inder Singh Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh,  2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339 (iii) Hemlata Verma Vs. M/s ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Ltd & Anr. in  Civil Appeal No. 5131 of 2019 (iv) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107 9. On the other hand, the Mr. Tongpok Pongener, learned counsel and Mr. Laknyie Phom, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 (claimants) submits that delay has not been properly explained and that the applicant has only given various dates on which communications were made within the organization. 10. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107 9. On the other hand, the Mr. Tongpok Pongener, learned counsel and Mr. Laknyie Phom, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 (claimants) submits that delay has not been properly explained and that the applicant has only given various dates on which communications were made within the organization. 10. Referring to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the claimants, the learned counsel submits that apart from inadequate explanation of the delay, there are also huge gaps in between the different dates, which have not been properly explained. The learned counsel submits that there is no sufficient merit in the prayer for delay condonation. 11. Similarly, in support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 cites the following decision:- (i) Post Master General & Ors. Vs. Living Media India Limited & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563 12. I have perused the delay condonation application, the additional affidavit filed by the applicant, the affidavit-in-opposition filed by respondent nos. 1 and 2 and considered the rival submissions. I have also perused the decisions cited at the bar. 13. Before proceeding further, we may look at some of the case laws on the subject of limitation. In Pathapati Subba Reddy (by LRs.) & Ors Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA), (2024) 12 SCC 336 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court scanned some important past decisions on the Limitation Act, especially pertaining to condonation of delay and summarized the principles in Para 28, which is reproduced herein below:- “ 28. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: 28.1. Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; 28.2. A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; 28.3. The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; 28.4. The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; 28.4. In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; 28.5. Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; 28.6. Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; 28.7. Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; 28.8. Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 14. One of the contentions of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the impugned judgment passed by the MACT, Mokokchung is erroneous as the learned Tribunal converted the proceeding from one under Section 163A of the MV Act to one under Section 166 of the MV Act, merely on the ground that the Second Schedule stood abolished by the Amendment of 2018. It was contended that there are bonafide grounds and merits in the appeal, and that the said aspect may be also seen while considering the question of condonation of delay in the instant case. In the context of such contentions, it remains to be seen as to what extent, if any, the Court adjudicating delay condonation under the Limitation Act can go into the aspects of merit of the main proceeding. 15. Now, in Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), amongst the principles laid down as enumerated above - one of the principles enumerated (Para 28.7), is that a delay condonation adjudication under the Limitation Act cannot go into the merits of the main proceeding. 16. 15. Now, in Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), amongst the principles laid down as enumerated above - one of the principles enumerated (Para 28.7), is that a delay condonation adjudication under the Limitation Act cannot go into the merits of the main proceeding. 16. While laying down this principle, the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to the judgment in State of Jharkhand & Ors. Vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani, (2009) 2 SCC 667 , and it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), that it was settled in Ashok Kumar Chokhani (supra), that in a delay condonation adjudication, the Court should go into the merits of the main proceeding. 17. However, in a recent decision of Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr. 2025 SCC Online SC 1093 , the Hon’ble Apex Court took a somewhat different view and indicated the possibility of entering into the merits of the main matter in a delay condonation proceeding in certain situations, especially after the applicant seeking delay condonation has broadly made out sufficient causes for delay condonation. The relevant para 31 of Thirunagalingan (supra) may be reproduced herein below:- “ 31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.” 18. The judgment in Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), was delivered by a two Judge Bench; the judgment in Ashok Kumar Chokhani (supra), was also delivered by a two Judge Bench; while the quorum of Thirunagalingan (supra) is also two Judges. Thus, I find that there is an apparent conflict on the issue between the judgment in Thirunagalingan (supra) and the judgment in Ashok Kumar Chokhani (supra), and Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra). 19. With regard to such a situation, the Constitution bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors. Thus, I find that there is an apparent conflict on the issue between the judgment in Thirunagalingan (supra) and the judgment in Ashok Kumar Chokhani (supra), and Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra). 19. With regard to such a situation, the Constitution bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors. (2017) 16 SCC 680 held that the judgments delivered by Coordinate Bench would be binding on another Coordinate Bench at a later point of time. In this context, two relevant paragraphs of Pranay Sethi (supra) may be reproduced herein below:- “18. In this regard, we may refer to a passage from Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey, AIR 1962 SC 83 : (AIR p. 88, para 10) “10. Law will be bereft of all its utility if it should be thrown into a state of uncertainty by reason of conflicting decisions, and it is therefore desirable that in case of difference of opinion, the question should be authoritatively settled. It sometimes happens that an earlier decision [Dasrath Singh v. Damri Singh, 1925 SCC OnLine Pat 242 : AIR 1927 Pat 219] given by a Bench is not brought to the notice of a Bench [Ram Asre Singh v. Ambica Lal, AIR 1929 Pat 216] hearing the same question, and a contrary decision is given without reference to the earlier decision. The question has also been discussed as to the correct procedure to be followed when two such conflicting decisions are placed before a later Bench. The practice in the Patna High Court appears to be that in those cases, the earlier decision is followed and not the later. In England the practice is, as noticed in the judgment in Gundavarupu Seshamma v. Kornepati Venkata Narasimharao [Gundavarupu Seshamma v. Kornepati Venkata Narasimharao, 1939 SCC OnLine Mad 367 : ILR 1940 Mad 454] that the decision of a Court of Appeal is considered as a general rule to be binding on it. There are exceptions to it, and one of them is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 22, Para 1687, pp. 799-800: “1687. … the court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if given per incuriam. There are exceptions to it, and one of them is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 22, Para 1687, pp. 799-800: “1687. … the court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if given per incuriam. A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of a coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, or when it has acted in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords. In the former case it must decide which decision to follow, and in the latter it is bound by the decision of the House of Lords.’ In Katragadda Virayya v. Katragadda Venkata Subbayya [Katragadda Virayya v. Katragadda Venkata Subbayya, 1955 SCC OnLine AP 34 : AIR 1955 AP 215 ] it has been held by the Andhra High Court that under the circumstances aforesaid the Bench is free to adopt that view which is in accordance with justice and legal principles after taking into consideration the views expressed in the two conflicting Benches, vide also the decision of the Nagpur High Court in D.D. Bilimoria v. Central Bank of India [D.D. Bilimoria v. Central Bank of India, 1943 SCC OnLine MP 97 : AIR 1943 Nag 340] . The better course would be for the Bench hearing the case to refer the matter to a Full Bench in view of the conflicting authorities without taking upon itself to decide whether it should follow the one Bench decision or the other. We have no doubt that when such situations arise, the Bench hearing cases would refer the matter for the decision of a Full Court.” 21. In Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P. [Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P., (2002) 4 SCC 234 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 496] , another Constitution Bench dealing with the concept of precedents stated thus: (SCC p. 245, para 22) “22. … The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes confidence in the system, therefore, there is this need for consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this Court. … The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes confidence in the system, therefore, there is this need for consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this Court. It is in the above context, this Court in Raghubir Singh [Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754 ] held that a pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of the same or smaller number of Judges. …” 20. Going by the said proposition rendered by the Constitution bench, the principles laid down on the subject in Ashok Kumar Chokhani (supra) followed by the principle summarized in Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) have to be followed. The same would mean that in a delay condonation adjudication, the Court should not go into the merits of the main proceeding and that, only the merits of the ‘sufficient cause’ under Section 5 of the Act has to be seen. 21. The learned counsel for the applicant has referred to the decision in Raheem Shah & Anr. (supra), Inder Singh (supra), Hemlata Verma (supra) and the leading case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) – to support his contentions that a justice oriented approach should be taken, regarding delay condonation and that such a process should not be subject to any hyper technicalities. There is no doubt about the settled proposition that per se the interpretation regarding delay condonation has to be liberal and avoid hyper technicalities. Nevertheless, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ used by the legislature in Section 5 pertaining to delay condonation should also be given a realistic and meaningful interpretation, so as to serve the purpose for which it was used by the legislature. Especially in civil disputes, expiry of the period of limitation confers a valuable right upon the other side and therefore, condonation of delay cannot be a matter of mere formality and for the asking. 22. The aspect of sufficient cause and bonafide explanation for the delay has to be inevitably seen by the Court adjudicating delay condonation. There is no law that organizations, including government organizations, have to be treated differently from private litigants, on the question of limitation and delay condonation. 22. The aspect of sufficient cause and bonafide explanation for the delay has to be inevitably seen by the Court adjudicating delay condonation. There is no law that organizations, including government organizations, have to be treated differently from private litigants, on the question of limitation and delay condonation. Due to the impersonal nature of organizations, especially government/public sector organizations, some administrative delays, perhaps would be inevitable from a realistic point of view. However, administrative process within organizations should not be an excuse for large amounts of delay and without sufficient explanation for the same. 23. Coming back to the facts of the instant case, I go back to the tabular format enumerated as part of Para 3. Upon carefully perusing the contents of the same, I find that while the judgment copy was received in the Head office on 21.11.2023, but the Appellant company contacted the counsel only in the 2 nd week of March, 2024 and thereafter, the counsel received the claim folder on 26.04.2024. The counsel for the Insurance Company was reasonably prompt in giving his legal opinion on 03.05.2024. Thereafter, the Head office instructed the counsel to prepare the appeal only on 20.10.2024. 24. Thus, I find that, apart from the unexplained delay between receiving the copy of the claim and instructing the counsel for empanelment, there is also a large unexplained time gap between the opinion given by the counsel and instruction given by the Head office to actually file the appeal. Thus, this Court is constrained to hold that apart from the quantum of delay being on the higher side (321 days), there are large gaps between the dates which have not been explained properly and in this regard, I find force in the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 regarding the same. 25. Upon considering the entire matter, this Court is unable to agree that the delay of 321 days in preferring the MAC Appeal has been properly explained by the applicant, by showing sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 26. Consequently, the applicant fails to pass the test of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and the instant interlocutory application stands dismissed. 27. The IA stands disposed of.