2026:JHHC:1076 -1 of 7- IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Misc. Appeal No. 470 of 2025 Awadhesh Kumar Tiwary, aged about 58 years, son of Late Maksudan Tiwary, resident of Qtr. No. F-82, Mandir Colony, P.O. and P.S. Dugda, District Bokaro (owner of alleged offending Ambassador Car). … … … Appellant Versus 1. Vijay Kumar Jaiswal son of Late Anant Lal Jaiswal, resident of Village Dugda, Tola Chandwadih, P.O. and P.S. Dugda, District Bokaro. 2. Ajay Kumar Jaiswal, son of Late Anant Lal Jaiswal, resident of Village Dugda, Tola Chandwadih, P.O. and P.S. Dugda, District Bokaro (Owner of Motorcycle No. JH-10B-5772). … Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE --------- For the Appellant : Mr. Atanu Banerjee, Advocate For the Respondent No.1: Mr. Jiten Kumar Dey, Advocate Mr. Basu Kumar Dey, Advocate. For the Respondent No.2: Miss. Pragati Prasad, Advocate --------- 08/Dated:15.01.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. With the consent of and at the request of the learned counsel for the parties, this appeal is taken up for final disposal. 3. This appeal challenges the judgment and Award dated 19.09.2024 made by the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Bermo at Tenughat. 4. By the impugned judgment and Award, the Tribunal has awarded one Mr. Vijay Kumar Jaiswal (respondent No. 1) compensation of Rs. 3,24,314/- along with simple interest @ 7 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the complaint petition i.e. 31.07.2004 till realization of the same from the appellant herein for the disability suffered by the 1st respondent after being involved in a vehicular accident which occurred on 24.11.2003 in which the first 2026:JHHC:1076 -2 of 7- respondent was alleged to have suffered medical as well as functional disability of 51 per cent. 5. Earlier, vide judgment and Award dated 30.07.2018, the same compensation had been awarded to the 1st respondent. However, that Award was set aside by this Court vide judgment and order dated 22.11.2023 in M.A. No. 597 of 2018 and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal to examine any member of the Medical Board constituted in this case for issuing the Disability Certificate to the first respondent and decide the case afresh in the light of the guideline issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar & Anr., (2011) 1 SCC 343. 6. Pursuant to the above remand, the impugned judgment and award have been made after examining Dr Mahendra Prasad, one of the members of the Medical Board, as was directed by this Court in its judgment and order dated 22.11.2023. 7. Mr. Atanu Banerjee learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in this case, there was no evidence of the appellant’s vehicle being involved in the accident. He submitted that, though the first respondent claimed that the accident occurred on 24.11.2003, the complaint was filed only on 17.04.2004. Ultimately, the appellant was acquitted on 29.03.2007, and the judgment of acquittal is a part of the record, as Exhibit-E. He submitted that there was no independent evidence or witnesses in support of the appellant’s vehicle being involved in the accident. 8. Mr Banerjee, without prejudice, submitted that even if the first respondent’s motorcycle did come and hit the appellant’s 2026:JHHC:1076 -3 of 7- Ambassador car, there was no evidence that this impact was responsible for any alleged injuries or disabilities that the first respondent claims he suffered. He has submitted that in fact the appellant’s vehicle was stationary and it was the first respondent who came and collided with the same. 9. Mr. Banerjee submitted that the impugned Award ignores the distinction between the medical disability and the functional disability. Both disabilities have been equated, in breach of the law laid down in Raj Kumar (Supra). For this reason, the impugned Award warrants interference. 10. Mr Banerjee finally submitted that the falsity of the first respondent’s claim becomes evident because no prescription or medical document has been produced, only bills from pharmacies or cash memos. He submitted that no claim should have been allowed based upon such sketchy evidence. He further submitted that there was no explanation by the first respondent as to why the first respondent obtained treatment in Dhanbad when the accident took place in Dugda in Bokaro district. 11. For all the above reasons, Mr. Banerjee submitted that this appeal should be allowed and the impugned judgment and Award should be set aside. 12. Mr Basu Kumar Dey, the learned counsel for the first respondent (claimant), submitted that in this case, soon after the accident, the appellant assured that he would finance the medical treatment and therefore, there may have been some delay in filing the complaint. He submitted that this is reflected in the ‘punchnama’, 2026:JHHC:1076 -4 of 7- which is part of the record at Exhibit-2. He submitted that an acquittal in a criminal case is not particularly relevant, as criminal trials are decided on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He submitted that the proceedings for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act are to be decided on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. 13. Mr Basu Kumar Dey submitted that in this case, the impugned Award specifically refers to the aspect of functional disability, but after considering the nature of duties that were being discharged by the first respondent and the disability suffered, concludes that the functional disability would be equal to the medical disability. Therefore, he submits that no incorrect principle has been applied. 14. Mr Dey submitted that there is ample evidence on record to establish the accident and the fact that the first respondent suffered permanent disablement of 51 per cent on account of the injuries sustained in the said accident. He submitted that the compensation has been determined conservatively, if not incorrectly, because no provision has been made for future prospects. Accordingly, Mr Dey submitted that this appeal may be dismissed, but the compensation amount may be enhanced. 15. Mrs. Pragati Prasad learned counsel for the second respondent adopted the arguments of Mr. Dey, the learned counsel for the first respondent. 16. The rival contentions now fall for determination. 17. In this case, there is ample evidence on record to establish the factum of the accident and that the first respondent suffered injuries resulting in his 51 per cent disablement on account of the accident 2026:JHHC:1076 -5 of 7- that took place on 24.11.2003 involving an accident with the appellant’s motor vehicle. Such evidence is both oral and documentary. The fact that the complaint was filed, was ultimately registered as an F.I.R., and, after investigation, the police authorities deemed it appropriate to charge-sheet the appellant is one of the pieces of evidence that could have been considered and has been correctly considered. 18. Though, there was some delay in filing the complaint, the same has been explained by the first respondent and the explanation, particularly, when considered with the ‘punchnama’ on record, cannot be said to be moonshine or unacceptable. The subsequent acquittal in the criminal case is also not quite relevant. It is well settled that criminal trials are adjudicated on the touchstone of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, claims under the Motor Vehicles Act are adjudicated on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, based upon the subsequent acquittal, there is no ground to hold that the accident was not on account of any rashness or negligence on the part of the appellant. 19. After the remand, Dr. Mahendra Prasad was examined on behalf of the first respondent (claimant). Admittedly, he was a member of the Medical Board, which had certified that the first respondent had 51 per cent bodily disabilities. Evidence of Dr. Mahendra Prasad is considered in detail in paragraphs 5, 8 and other paragraphs of the impugned Award. This is not a case where the Tribunal has mechanically equated the medical disability with the 2026:JHHC:1076 -6 of 7- functional disability in breach of the principles laid down in the case of Raj Kumar (Supra). 20. The Tribunal has given due weight to the Doctor’s evidence that the first respondent was capable of performing his work with his hand and could move freely with the help of a stick. However, the Tribunal has also noted that the first respondent was working as an Assistant in a T.V./Fridge shop owned by his brother, where it would be normal for him to have to bend down or climb stairs to lift heavy articles/object. The Tribunal noted that with hip injury and disability of almost 51 per cent, it would not be possible for the first respondent to do all the tasks which he could otherwise easily do before the accident for earning his livelihood. Therefore, the finding that the medical and functional disability being at par is not a product of some non-application of mind or the misapplication of the law laid down in the case of Raj Kumar (Supra). 21. The Tribunal in this case has determined the compensation amount extremely conservatively. No addition has been made towards future prospects. Therefore, there is no case made out to interfere with the compensation amount determined in this matter. The Tribunal has awarded only compensation of Rs. 3,24,314/-, with interest at 7 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition. 22. There is no case made out to interfere with the impugned judgment and Award and this appeal is liable to be dismissed. 23. Though the accident took place on 24.11.2003, to date, it appears that the first respondent has not been paid any 2026:JHHC:1076 -7 of 7- compensation. Even at the time of securing a stay, the appellant has not deposited any amount. Even today, while I was inclined to order a deposit, the submission made was that the appeal itself be taken up for final hearing since the execution was already pending. The appeal was accordingly taken up for final hearing. 24. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, a direction is liable to be issued to the appellant to deposit the entire awarded amount in this Court within four weeks without insisting upon the first respondent pursuing the execution petition. This is, unless, of course, the appellant secures a stay on the judgment and order just pronounced in the meantime. 25. The amount should be deposited in this Court within four weeks with due intimation to the learned counsel for the first respondent. Upon deposit, the learned counsel for the first respondent must furnish bank and identity details of the first respondent to the Registry of this Court so that the Registry can transfer this amount directly into the first respondent’s Bank account. 26. This appeal is dismissed. Though the appeal is dismissed, the matter should be posted for reporting compliance on 19.02.2026. In any event, the stay on the execution is also vacated. No order as to costs. Pending Interlocutory Application no longer survives and is accordingly disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) 15.01.2026 APK/VK Uploaded on 20.01.2026