Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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2026:CGHC:21315
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 3709 of 2026 Smt. Jyoti Dindoure W/o Rohit Dindoure Aged About 43 Years Posted As Superintendent At Kasturba Gandhi Balika Aavasiy Vidyalay Chatarkhar Block And District- Mungeli (C.G.)
Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, School Education Department, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Managing Director, Samagra Shiksha State Office Pension Bada Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Collector Cum- District Mission Director, Samagra Shiksha, Mungeli District- Mungeli (C.G.) 4 - District Education Officer Cum District Project Officer Samagra Shiksha, District- Mungeli (C.G.) 5 - District Mission Co- Ordinator Samagra Shiksha, District- Mungeli (C.G.) 6 - Chief Executive Officer Cum District Project Director Samagra Shiksha, Zila Panchayat Mungeli District- Mungeli (C.G.) 7 - Smt. Mamta Diwakar, In Charge Superintendent , At Kasturba Gandhi Balika Aavasiy Vidyalay Chatarkhar District- Mungeli (C.G.)
Respondent(s)
RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2026.05.07 14:43:18 +0530
2 (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Mateen Siddique, Advocate For State : Mr. Vivek Verma, GA For Resp No. 2 & 5 : Mr. Anadi Sharma, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru
Order on Board 07/05/2026
1. By the present Writ Petition, the petitioner is seeking quashment of the
order dated 15/07/2025 (Annexure-P/1) passed by the respondent No. 4 and also sought a direction towards the respondents’ authorities to give the charge of Superintendent of Kasturba Gandhi Balika Aavasiy Vidyalay Chatarkhar Block & District Mungeli to the petitioner.
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that initially the petitioner was posted as Teacher and subsequently by order dated 26/09/2016 she has been promoted to the post of Lecturer and was posted at Kasturba Gandhi Balika Aavasiy Vidyalay Chatarkhar Block & District Mungeli as Superintendent. According to the learned counsel, in the meanwhile, the petitioner has taken medical leave as also the child care leave and as such, by the order impugned the charge of the Superintendent was given to the respondent No. 7, who is working as Teacher and is junior to the petitioner. He would submit that according to the letter dated 15/07/2014 (Annexure-P/4) the post of Superintendent can be given to the Lecturer (Panchayat) having the stream of English, Maths & Science. Learned counsel would submit that after completion of leave, the petitioner joined her duties on 05/10/2025 and despite the said fact, the respondent
3 No. 7 has not given the charge of the Superintendent to the petitioner for which, the petitioner approached the Respondent authorities and requested for giving the charge, however, the same does not fructify. According to the learned counsel, the said action of the respondent authorities is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the circular/guidelines dated 04/08/2011, 07/02/2013 & 14/07/2013, wherein it has been categorically held that the charge cannot be given to the juniors bypassing the senior officers. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State as also the respondent No. 2 & 5 would oppose the aforesaid submission of the petitioner and would submit that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands and even the petitioner has suppressed the material facts. By placing the copies of applications dated 26/06/2025 and 21/07/2025, which are taken on record, they would submit that in fact, the petitioner herself made a request for relieving her from the post of Superintendent and to post her in a separate school, stating therein that since her husband is heart patient and had been inserted three stents and nobody is there to take care of him as her children are studying outside. According to the learned counsel, on the one hand the petitioner herself is requesting for relieving from the post of Superintendent and on the other hand, she is claiming charge of the said post. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings and documents appended thereto.
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5. The pleadings and documents placed on record would indicate that the petitioner has not approached this Court with complete candour. Though in the writ petition it has been pleaded that during the period when the petitioner was on medical leave and child care leave, the charge of Superintendent was handed over to respondent No.7, who is allegedly junior to the petitioner, but the petitioner has conspicuously omitted to disclose that she herself had submitted applications dated 26/06/2025 and 21/07/2025 requesting the authorities to relieve her from the charge of Superintendent and to post her in a separate school on account of the serious medical condition of her husband. The said documents, which have been brought on record by the respondents, clearly demonstrate that the arrangement assigning charge to respondent No.7 was not an arbitrary administrative action taken behind the back of the petitioner. 6. It is well settled that a litigant invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must approach the Court with clean hands and must disclose all material facts having bearing on the controversy. Suppression of material facts disentitles a party from obtaining equitable relief in writ jurisdiction. In the present case, the petitioner deliberately omitted to mention the aforesaid applications dated 26/06/2025 and 21/07/2025. Had the said facts been disclosed, the entire complexion of the case would have been different. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner has suppressed material facts from this Court and on this ground alone, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 5
7. Even otherwise, the contention of the petitioner that being senior she has an indefeasible right to hold the charge of Superintendent cannot be accepted. Once the petitioner herself requested for being relieved from the charge, she cannot subsequently turn around and challenge the consequential administrative arrangement made by the authorities pursuant to her own request. A person cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate simultaneously. 8. Further, the assignment of current charge is essentially an administrative arrangement and does not confer any substantive right.
Unless it is shown that the action of the authorities is patently arbitrary, mala fide or contrary to any statutory provision, this Court would be slow in interfering with such administrative decisions in exercise of writ jurisdiction. In the present case, no statutory rule has been shown which mandates that the charge must invariably be restored to the petitioner immediately upon her joining duties. 9. The circulars/orders relied upon by the petitioner regarding seniority also do not advance her case in the peculiar facts of the present matter, inasmuch as the respondent authorities did not bypass the petitioner on their own volition, but acted upon her own request seeking relief from the post. Therefore, the plea that a junior has been favoured in violation of seniority principles is devoid of substance. 10. It is a settled proposition of law that any person invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution must approach the Court with clean hands and must
6 disclose all material and relevant facts. Suppression or concealment of material information disentitles such a petitioner from seeking any relief in equity. The jurisdiction under Article 226 being discretionary in nature cannot be invoked by a person who is guilty of suppressing material
facts or misleading the Court.
11. The Supreme Court, in K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. [(2008) 12 SCC 481], held that the party who approaches the Court must come with clean hands, put forward all facts before the Court without suppression, and that if there is suppression of material facts, the Court would be justified in refusing to entertain the petition, irrespective of the merits of the case.
12. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid principle squarely applies to the facts of the present case. The petitioner, while challenging the order by which the charge of Superintendent was handed over to respondent No.7, intentionally withheld the material fact that she herself had submitted applications requesting the authorities to relieve her from the said charge on account of her personal and family difficulties. The impugned arrangement having been made on the basis of the petitioner’s own request, she cannot now be permitted to assail the same by taking a contrary stand before this Court. Such suppression of material facts not only disentitles the petitioner from claiming equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but also renders the challenge devoid of bona fides.
13. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court is of the considered opinion
7 that the petitioner has failed to make out any case warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition, being devoid of merit and suffering from suppression of material facts, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Rahul/Gowri