J UDGMENT : A.D. C HOUDHURY , J. 1. Heard Mr. V.A Chowdhury, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Ms. B Bhuyan, learned Public Prosecutor, Assam and Ms. S Sarma, learned Legal Aid Counsel for respondent No.2. 2. The present appeal under section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is preferred against the judgment and order dated 05.07.2022, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, cum Special Judge, POCSO Kamrup (M) in Sessions Case No.401/2018, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted the accused person under section 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act and sentenced him to undergo Rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default, simple imprisonment for another three months. 3. The prosecution case in brief is that an ejahar was lodged by the informant (PW-1) on 28.08.2018 before the O/C, Jalukbari PS, alleging that on 27.08.2018, the accused, Md. Azizul Haque sexually abused her minor daughter aged about 8 years. 4. On receipt of the Ejahar, Jalukbari PS case No.1159/2018 under section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012, was registered. During the investigation, the IO visited the place of the occurrence, drew a sketch map of the scene, and recorded statements from the victim and other witnesses. The statement of the victim was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C as well. The Investigating Officer got the victim medically examined. 5. Upon completion of the investigation, the IO submitted a charge sheet against the accused-appellant under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 6. After receiving the charge sheet, the case was transferred to the learned Special Judge, POCSO. The accused appeared before the learned Special Judge, and the trial court framed charges against the accused appellant under section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and read over and explained the same to the accused person, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried and accordingly, the trial proceeded. 7. During the trial, the prosecution examined 6 witnesses and presented 9 documents. After the closure of the prosecution case, the statement of the accused was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C., in which the accused pleaded total denial. The accused also examined defence witness and exhibited documents in support of his case. 8. 7. During the trial, the prosecution examined 6 witnesses and presented 9 documents. After the closure of the prosecution case, the statement of the accused was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C., in which the accused pleaded total denial. The accused also examined defence witness and exhibited documents in support of his case. 8. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the materials on record, the learned trial court convicted and sentenced the accused as recorded hereinabove. 9. Mr. VU Chowdhury, learned counsel for the appellant, argues that the learned Trial court failed to note the serious contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. According to Mr. Chowdhury, in the version of the informant mother (PW-1) in the FIR, she did not mention that she was informed about the incident by the victim girl herself, but while deposing before the court, the informant stated that the whole incident was narrated to her by the victim girl. According to him, the version in the FIR and the evidence of PW-1 are different. 10. The learned counsel further contends that the only eyewitness (PW-3) apart from the victim was declared hostile by the prosecution. According to Mr. Chowdhury, the evidence of the PW-1 and PW-4 is hearsay evidence and therefore, the conviction of the appellant based on such evidence is not sustainable in law. 11. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the non-examination of vital witnesses creates a doubt in the prosecution's case. In this regard, the learned counsel contends that though the victim in her statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C disclosed the presence of her sister Jayanti Devi, such person was not examined. 12. According to him, the reliance of the learned Special Judge on the 164 Cr.P.C statement of the victim is absolutely erroneous; at best, such a statement has only corroborative value. The reliance on the medical evidence is also vitiated inasmuch as such evidence is not conclusive. 13. While concluding Mr. Chowdhury argues that the testimony of the victim cannot be termed as “startling in quality” inasmuch as her statement that PW-3 witnessed the incident and took her back to her residence was not supported by the PW-4 herself. Though PW-4 was declared hostile and prosecution had duly cross-examined her, the said witness remained firm as regards her statement made before the learned trial court. 14. Per contra, Ms. Though PW-4 was declared hostile and prosecution had duly cross-examined her, the said witness remained firm as regards her statement made before the learned trial court. 14. Per contra, Ms. Bhuyan learned Addl. PP argues that in a case like the present one, a person can be convicted only on the victim's sole testimony. According to her, the victim remained firm throughout, regarding the accused's involvement, as reflected in her statement recorded under sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., as well as in her statements before the trial court. 15. While endorsing the arguments advanced by the learned Addl. PP, Ms. S Sarma, learned counsel for respondent No.2 argues that the penetration has been established beyond any reasonable doubt inasmuch as, the accused failed to rebut the initial presumption. 16. Before dealing with the arguments advanced, let this Court first scrutinise the evidence led by the parties, in the following sub-paragraphs: I. PW-1 Runu Devi, the mother of the victim, is also the informant, who deposed that the victim had informed her that the accused took her (the victim) to his house and asked her to remove her pants and attempted to commit rape on her. One nearby woman, namely. Dalimi Das (PW-3) witnessed the incident and informed her about it; thereafter, PW-1 lodged the FIR. She proved the FIR as Exhibit-1 and her signature as Exhibit-1(1). In her cross-examination, she deposed that she had not witnessed the occurrence. II. PW-2 is the victim girl. The victim is a minor girl, but she responded maturely to some of the questions offered to her by the learned Trial Court, and therefore, she was examined as a witness without administering an oath. The victim in her deposition stated that she knew the accused person, and one day, while playing with her sister, the accused took her to his house and tried to do bad things with her. One lady, namely, Dalimi (sister in law) PW-3, arrived there, saw the same, and then sent her home. PW-2, in her cross-examination, deposed that her parents had not tutored her to depose against the accused. The victim, in her 164 Cr.P.C. statement, further stated that on 27.08.2018 at about 1 PM, she was playing near her house, when one person named Geda/Azizul Haque approached her, took her to his home, and made her lie on the bed. PW-2, in her cross-examination, deposed that her parents had not tutored her to depose against the accused. The victim, in her 164 Cr.P.C. statement, further stated that on 27.08.2018 at about 1 PM, she was playing near her house, when one person named Geda/Azizul Haque approached her, took her to his home, and made her lie on the bed. He opened both of his pants and inserted his genitals into her. Suddenly, her sister-in-law (PW-3) came and took her out. The victim girl further deposed that in the evening, she informed her mother about the incident, and when her mother confronted the accused, the accused fled the scene by breaking the fence. III. PW-3 Dalimi Namasudra @ Dalimi Das is projected as the eyewitness of this case. She deposed that on the day of the occurrence, at about 12.30 pm, when she went to the accused's house to fetch some eggs, she saw the victim girl inside. PW-3 further deposed that when she heard her mother complaining about the girl’s stomach pain, she informed the mother about seeing the victim lying in the bed of the accused and advised the mother not to send the victim to the house of the accused. PW-3 was declared hostile and was cross-examined by the prosecution. During the cross-examination, she admitted that she had stated before the police about seeing the victim lying on the bed of the accused. She denied the suggestion that she had seen the accused on top of the victim and that the wearing apparel of the victim was completely removed. PW-3 admitted that she had asked the mother of the victim not to send the victim girl to the house of the accused. IV. PW-4, namely, Saru Bharali, is a hearsay witness. She deposed that on the day of the occurrence, she heard a hue and cry raised by Dalimi (PW-3), and on enquiry, PW-4 came to know that PW-3 saw the accused person and the victim girl in an indecent/compromising position. PW-4, in her cross- examination, denied the suggestion of the defence that no incident occurred as alleged in the ejahar. V. PW-5 Dr. Reshma Talukdar is the doctor who examined the victim on 29.08.2018. She deposed that at the relevant point of time, she was working as an MO in the department of Forensic Medicine, Guwahati Medical College and Hospital. PW-4, in her cross- examination, denied the suggestion of the defence that no incident occurred as alleged in the ejahar. V. PW-5 Dr. Reshma Talukdar is the doctor who examined the victim on 29.08.2018. She deposed that at the relevant point of time, she was working as an MO in the department of Forensic Medicine, Guwahati Medical College and Hospital. At around 1.25 pm, she had examined the victim as produced by the Woman Police, WHG Fatima Begum. She recorded the following: i. Genital organs healthy. ii. Vulva is healthy but swollen, tender to the touch, and red. iii. Hymen is having fresh tears at 11, 2 o’clock position; iv. In Vagina redness is present on the inner wall; v. Cervix can’t be accessed. vi. Uterus not palpable P/A vii. Evidence of venereal disease was not detected at the time of examination. viii. Vaginal swabs were collected from around the vaginal swab. This expert witness opined that although radiological data supporting age was not found; however, based on clinical/dental examination, the age of the victim is approximately 6 years and below 12 years. No evidence of recent sexual intercourse on her person at the time of examination was found; however, a sign of penetration is present, which means that there was no presence of spermatozoa or gonococci, which may remain up to 72 hours. But if the victim takes a bath or washes her undergarments, there may be no spermatozoa or gonococci present. The doctor, in her cross-examination, deposed that the accused was not examined, whereas the victim was examined as detailed in the medical report. She further deposed that penetration usually occurs due to sexual penetration, as it is of a very serious nature. She denied the defence's suggestion that injury to the hymen may occur from cycling. She further deposed that the hymen tear as found may sustain because of any reason other than penetration. VI. PW-6 is the Investigating Officer of this case. According to her, on the fateful day, she was working as WSI at Jalukbari PS. The informant, namely, Runu Devi, lodged an ejahar before the O/C Jalukbari PS and the same was registered as Jalukbari PS case No.1159/2018 under section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and was entrusted with the investigation to PW-6. According to her, on the fateful day, she was working as WSI at Jalukbari PS. The informant, namely, Runu Devi, lodged an ejahar before the O/C Jalukbari PS and the same was registered as Jalukbari PS case No.1159/2018 under section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and was entrusted with the investigation to PW-6. The IO accordingly recorded the statement of the victim girl along with the informant and sent the victim girl for medical examination. The statement of the victim girl under section 164 Cr.P.C was also recorded. During the investigation, the IO visited the place of occurrence, recorded the statements of the witnesses and drew a sketch map. She proved the Exhibit-5 sketch map. The accused was arrested. She proved Exhibit-6 as the arrest memo. The IO collected the victim's birth certificate as proof of age. After completion of the investigation and finding sufficient materials against the accused person, namely, Azizul Haque, a charge sheet was submitted under section 376(A/B) IPC read with section 4 of the POCSO Act vide charge sheet No.230/2018 dated 30.03.2018. She proved the charge sheet as Exhibit-9. PW-6, in her cross-examination, deposed that she did not make any prayer for the recording of the confessional statement of the accused. She stated that none of the witnesses in their statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C disclosed that they had seen the accused taking away the victim girl to the house of the accused or calling the victim to the house of the accused. She further deposed that she did not seize the birth certificate of the victim girl to ascertain her age. The IO further deposed that she drew the sketch map after visiting the place of occurrence and did not inspect the body parts (internal) of the victim girl, and therefore, she could not say anything about the external injury on the body of the victim. PW-6 further deposed that she did not seize the wearing apparel of the victim girl, nor did she seize the accused person's apparel. 17. Now let us examine the evidence of the defence witness recorded as DW-1. 1. DW-1 Rumi Parbin is the wife of the accused. she knows all the other witnesses. PW-6 further deposed that she did not seize the wearing apparel of the victim girl, nor did she seize the accused person's apparel. 17. Now let us examine the evidence of the defence witness recorded as DW-1. 1. DW-1 Rumi Parbin is the wife of the accused. she knows all the other witnesses. She affirms that on the date of incident, she, her son and her husband were in their residence and the victim girl did not come to their house and she has also never visited their house. It was projected that the informant borrows eggs from her husband but never pays and on the day of the incident her husband asked the informant for money and later the informant made the allegation and she is not aware what happened thereafter. During cross examination She denies that she deposed falsely, she also deposed that PW-3 did come to their house to fetch eggs on that day. 18. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record, and re-appreciated the evidence. 19. At the outset, the edifice of the prosecution's case rests upon the testimony of the child victim, PW2. 20. Before dealing with her evidence, let us briefly state the principle as regards the reliability of a child witness. 21. The principle that the sole testimony of a child victim of sexual assault can form the basis of a conviction is firmly embedded in criminal jurisprudence and has, over time, been refined to balance sensitivity with judicial caution. At its core lies the recognition that sexual offences, particularly against children, are typically committed in seclusion away from public gaze. To insist upon independent corroboration as a rule would, in many cases, render the law sterile and incapable of responding to the realities of such crime. 22. The law, therefore, does not treat a child witness as inherently unreliable. On the contrary, if the testimony of the child is found to be natural, consistent, and free from material embellishment, it can be acted upon even in the absence of corroboration. 23. As a note of caution, it is recorded that such a principle is not unqualified. Courts are enjoined to subject such testimony to careful scrutiny, not because of any presumption of falsity, but owing to the susceptibility of children to tutoring, imagination, or external influence. 24. 23. As a note of caution, it is recorded that such a principle is not unqualified. Courts are enjoined to subject such testimony to careful scrutiny, not because of any presumption of falsity, but owing to the susceptibility of children to tutoring, imagination, or external influence. 24. The test, therefore, is one of the intrinsic worth; whether the statement bears the ring of truth; indicators which amounts significance are spontaneity, coherence, absence of major contradictions, and inconsistencies across statements, including under section 164 Cr.P.C. and before the court. 25. Minor discrepancies, particularly in peripheral details, are not only tolerable but expected given the age and trauma of the victims. In this context, the requirement of corroboration has been consciously diluted. It is not a rule of law but a rule of prudence to be applied only where the court finds it unsafe to rely upon the testimony in isolation. 26. Where the deposition of the child victim inspires confidence, it stands at par with that of an injured witness entitled to great weight, as it is unlikely that a victim of such an offence would falsely implicate an innocent person while shielding the real perpetrator. 27. Medical or circumstantial evidence, where available, serves a corroborative role but is not indispensable. 28. Indeed, the absence of medical evidence or even inconclusive medical findings cannot override a trustworthy ocular account of the victim in case of a sexual offence against a child. Conversely, medical evidence supporting the possibility of the act lends assurance to the child's version. 29. The approach, therefore, is one of calibrated judicial assessment; neither to approach the testimony with suspicion merely because of the age of the witness nor to accept it uncritically. 30. Where, upon the scrutiny, the court finds the evidence of the child victim to be credible and of sterling quality, a conviction can safely be reached upon. 31. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled proposition of law, let us analyse the deposition of PW2. 32. At the threshold, it is to be noted that the trial court, upon interacting with the victim, found her capable of understanding and responding to questions, and therefore rightly proceeded to record her evidence without oath. 33. Her deposition in court is natural, consistent, and free from material contradictions. 32. At the threshold, it is to be noted that the trial court, upon interacting with the victim, found her capable of understanding and responding to questions, and therefore rightly proceeded to record her evidence without oath. 33. Her deposition in court is natural, consistent, and free from material contradictions. She has clearly identified the accused and narrated the sequence of events in a manner that is commensurate with her age and understanding, stating that while she was playing, the accused took her to his house and attempted to do “bad things” with her. 34. This version stands materially fortified by her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., wherein she has given a more detailed account of the occurrence, including the act of penetration and the circumstances in which she was rescued. The consistency between her statements at different stages lends strong assurance to her credibility. 35. Importantly, in her cross-examination, nothing has been elicited to discredit her testimony. Rather, she has categorically denied any tutoring, thereby ruling out the possibility of fabrication. The minor variations, if any, are but natural for a child of tender years, recounting a traumatic incident and do not affect the core of the prosecution case. 36. Her evidence finds corroboration from the surrounding circumstances, including the presence of PW-3 at the relevant time and the medical findings indicating signs of penetration. In such circumstances, the testimony of PW-2 is wholly reliable, of sterling quality, and sufficient to form the basis of conviction. 37. To summaries, the deposition of PW2, read in conjunction with her statement under section 164 Cr.P.C., discloses a consistent narrative as to the identity of the accused, the place of occurrence and the nature of the complaint. 38. The trustworthiness of PW2's deposition, based on the alleged discrepancy between the narrative in the FIR and her deposition is equally without substance. 39. The FIR is not an encyclopedia of facts; it is only the earliest version intended to set the criminal law in motion. The omission as to the precise source of information, whether directly from the victim or through another, does not render the prosecution case suspect, particularly when the substratum of the allegation remains unaltered. 40. The submissions regarding the so-called hostility of PW3, projected as eye witness, also do not carry the case of defence any further. 41. The omission as to the precise source of information, whether directly from the victim or through another, does not render the prosecution case suspect, particularly when the substratum of the allegation remains unaltered. 40. The submissions regarding the so-called hostility of PW3, projected as eye witness, also do not carry the case of defence any further. 41. Even if the said witness did not fully support the prosecution version in the court, her testimony, to the extent it establishes the presence of the victim in the house of the accused at the relevant time, lends assurance to the version of the victim. 42. It is a settled principle of criminal law that testimony of a hostile witness is not effaced from the record merely because the witness has recanted in whole or in part from their previous statement. 43. The court is duty-bound to shift the evidence with care and may accept those portions of the testimony which are found to be credible, consistent and in consonance with the overall prosecution case. 44. Hostility does not render the witness wholly unreliable; it only puts the court on guard to scrutinize the evidence more cautiously. 45. If, upon such scrutiny, certain aspects of the deposition receive corroboration from other evidence on record, whether oral, documentary or circumstantial, those portions can be safely relied upon. Conversely, the part which is inconsistent, evasive or demonstratively false may be discarded. 46. The approach, therefore, is not one of rejection but of selective acceptance based on the touchstone of reliability and truthfulness. 47. In the case in hand, as recorded hereinabove, the testimony of the victim, PW-2, is found to be credible, consistent, and in consonance with the overall prosecution case. Similarly, testimony of the PW-3, to the extent it establishes the presence of the victim in the house of the accused at the relevant time, lends assurance to the version of the victim. 48. The argument of non-examination of certain witnesses, including the sister of the victim, is equally untenable. 49. The non-examination of certain witnesses is not by itself fatal to the prosecution case; it becomes so only when the omission goes to the root of the matter and creates a reasonable doubt as to the truthfulness or completeness of the prosecution version. 50. 49. The non-examination of certain witnesses is not by itself fatal to the prosecution case; it becomes so only when the omission goes to the root of the matter and creates a reasonable doubt as to the truthfulness or completeness of the prosecution version. 50. The test is whether the witness withheld was a material witness, one who could have unfolded the genesis of the occurrence or whose testimony was essential to establish a crucial link in the chain of events. 51. If such a witness is deliberately withheld without a plausible explanation and the existing evidence suffers from inherent consistencies or gaps that that witness alone could have clarified, an adverse inference may legitimately be drawn against the prosecution. 52. However, in the case in hand, the evidence of PW- 2 is otherwise cogent, reliable and sufficient to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, supported by the corroborative medical examination and therefore, non-examination of such witness (the sister) who was stated to be playing with the victim, in the opinion of this court, is merely cumulative and does not vitiate the prosecution case. 53. In our estimation, in the present case, the non- examination of the said witness does not create any dent in the prosecution case, particularly when the testimony of the victim is cogent and trustworthy. 54. Now coming to the medical evidence (PW5), it is far from contradicting the prosecution case, lending significant corroboration. 55. The presence of fresh hymenal tears, redness and tenderness in the genital region clearly indicates penetration. The absence of spermatozoa, as explained by the PW-5, is not determinative, especially having regard to the possibility of delay, washing or other intervening factors. The suggestion that such injuries could be caused otherwise, remains a mere theoretical possibility and does not probabalize the defence. 56. Coming to the alleged lapses in the investigation, as highlighted in the cross-examination of the investigating officer, such as non-seizure of wearing apparel or failure to examine the accused medically, are indeed matters of concern. 57. Such deficiencies undoubtedly reflect on the fairness or thoroughness of the investigation; yet the court's primary duty is to evaluate whether the evidence that has actually come on record is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 58. 57. Such deficiencies undoubtedly reflect on the fairness or thoroughness of the investigation; yet the court's primary duty is to evaluate whether the evidence that has actually come on record is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 58. If the testimony of material witnesses, particularly that of the victim, is found to be cogent, credible and trustworthy and is supported by surrounding circumstances or medical opinion, such lapses do not corrode the sub-stratum of the prosecution case. 59. At the same time, where the investigation is so perfunctory or tainted that it creates serious doubts about the veracity of the prosecution version, or where vital gaps remain unfilled which go to the root of the case, the benefit must be ensured to the accused. 60. The doctrine, therefore, is one of balance. 61. The court must remain alive to investigative shortcomings, but cannot allow the fate of a criminal trial to be determined solely by the competence or lack thereof of the investigating agency, lest it result in rewarding inefficiency and undermining substantive justice. 62. In the case in hand, based on the evidence that was available, more particularly of the PW-2 and PW-5, in the opinion of this court, the lapses, as highlighted, are not fatal to the prosecution case. 63. The contention that the prosecution failed to establish the age of the victim does not merit acceptance in the facts of the present case. 64. It is significant that at no stage during the trial did the defence raise any objection or even a suggestion disputing the age of the victim. 65. The absence of a specific challenge to age in cross-examination assumes significance, for it indicates that the factum of minority was not seriously put in issue. In such circumstances, prosecution cannot be faulted for not leading more elaborate or technical evidence on that aspect. That apart, the medical evidence on record lends sufficient assurance to the minority of the victim. 66. The doctor (PW5), upon clinical and dental examination, opined that the age of the victim was approximately above 6 years but below 12 years. Though such an opinion is not based on radiological assessment and may not yield mathematical precision, it nonetheless constitutes relevant and admissible evidence, more particularly, when it is based on dental and overall clinical examination of the victim that too which remained unchallenged during trial. 67. Though such an opinion is not based on radiological assessment and may not yield mathematical precision, it nonetheless constitutes relevant and admissible evidence, more particularly, when it is based on dental and overall clinical examination of the victim that too which remained unchallenged during trial. 67. When such medical opinion is considered alongside the overall circumstances, namely, the consistent description of the victim's age at the time of occurrence as 7 years in the FIR, in her deposition before the court as 8 years and the absence of any challenge from the defence, the conclusion regarding minority stands sufficiently established. 68. The absence of any contra-evidence or even a suggestion that the victim was above statutory age, the plea now sought to be raised, appears to be an afterthought. The court cannot be persuaded to discard otherwise reliable evidence on a hyper-technical plea, particularly when the materials on record, taken cumulatively, clearly indicate that the victim was a child well within the protective ambit of the statute. 69. In our opinion, though the accused tried to project that through the DW-1 that the victim and PW-3 did not visit their house on the fateful day, however, the defence failed to dislodge the evidence of PW-2 and the medical evidence, beyond that the projection made through the DW-1 was never projected during the cross-examination of any of the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, such defence testimony is to of no avail to the accused. 70. Tested on the avail of these principles discussed herein above, the testimony of the victim, duly corroborated by the medical evidence and supported in material particulars by surrounding circumstances, inspires confidence. The defence has not been able to elicit any material contradiction or improbability which would render her version unworthy of credence. Nor could it dent the prosecution case through their defence witness. 71. In our considered view, the appeal does not warrant interference. The submissions urged on behalf of the appellant, though not insubstantial, at first blush failed to dislodge the core of the prosecution's case when tested on the touchstone of settled principles governing the appreciation of evidence in cases under the POCSO regime. 72. In view of the foregoing discussion and reasons, we are satisfied that the Learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence on record and arrived at a finding of guilt which does not suffer from perversity or legal infirmity. 73. 72. In view of the foregoing discussion and reasons, we are satisfied that the Learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence on record and arrived at a finding of guilt which does not suffer from perversity or legal infirmity. 73. The conviction of the appellant under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is accordingly affirmed. The appeal is therefore dismissed. 74. Now coming to the submission for leniency in sentence earnestly advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, does not command acceptance in the backdrop of the present case. 75. The offence in question is one under the POCSO Act, 2012 involving a child of tender age, where the evidence on record establishes clear signs of penetrative sexual assault. 76. The gravity of the offence, the vulnerability of the victim and the breach of trust inherent in such acts weigh heavily against the grant of any undue indulgence. The statute itself reflects a legislative mandate of deterrence by prescribing a stringent minimum sentence, thereby circumscribing judicial discretion. 77. While factors such as absence of prior antecedents or socio-economic background may be relevant in appropriate cases, they cannot eclipse the paramount consideration of the nature and seriousness of the crime. 78. In offences against children, the principle of proportionality must be informed as much by the rights of the victim as by the circumstances of the offender. 79. Any unwarranted reduction in sentence in such cases would not only dilute the deterrent purpose of law but also risk undermining public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. 80. In the circumstances, the sentence imposed by the learned trial court cannot be said to be excessive or disproportionate so as to warrant interference at the hands of this Appellate Court. Accordingly, such prayer stands rejected.