bipin prithiani 1 29-wp-11193.25.doc IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 11193 OF 2025 Vidya Shivaji Kunjir & Anr. … Petitioners Versus Manisha Rajaram Kunjir & Ors. … Respondents ****** Mr. Sumit V. Sonare for Petitioners. Mr. Sanjiv Sawant a/w Mr. Samir Suryawanshi and Ms. Bhakti Wast for Respondent No.1. Mrs. G. R. Raghuwanshi, AGP for Respondent-State. ****** CORAM : MANISH PITALE AND SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ. DATE : 21st SEPTEMBER 2026 P.C. : . Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioners are aggrieved by order dated 6th March 2025 passed by respondent No.3-Sub-Divisional Officer, Haveli, Pune (SDO), whereby the said respondent disposed of an objection submitted by respondent No.1 by directing that in the facts of the case, acquisition by consent not being possible, the process of acquisition would have to be taken under Section 19B(3) of the Maharashtra Highways Act, 1955 (Highways Act), as compulsory acquisition. It was further directed that the amount of compensation be deposited before the Competent Court under Section 19C(4) of the Highways Act. bipin prithiani 2 29-wp-11193.25.doc 3. Upon notices being issued, reply affidavits have been filed in this writ petition. 4. The documents filed along with the reply affidavit of respondent No.3, show that on 19th May 2025, an award was already passed by respondent No.3-SDO under Section 19B(3) of the Highways Act, in pursuance of compulsory acquisition that had to be undertaken in the facts and circumstances of the present case, in respect of the subject land located in Gat No.466 situated at Valti, Taluka Haveli, Dist. Pune. It is further brought on record that the respondent No.3-SDO has proceeded to make a reference under Section 19C(4) of the Highways Act, in respect of the dispute between the petitioners and respondent No.1. The amount of compensation determined as per the said award is also deposited before the said Court. 5. It is to be noted that by order dated 29th April 2026, when mediation was proposed on behalf of respondent No.1, the petitioners also agreed to explore the possibility of settlement. Accordingly, the dispute between the parties was referred to learned Mediator. By report dated 26th June 2026, the learned Mediator reported that the mediation had failed. 6. In the light of the failure of mediation, the writ petition was heard on merits. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondent No.1 has raised a baseless dispute, seeking to raise claim in respect of the subject property, when a partition had bipin prithiani 3 29-wp-11193.25.doc already taken place and the respondent No.1 could never raise any claim in respect of the subject property. It was submitted that the partition suit bearing Regular Civil Suit No. 1567 of 2017 filed by the respondent No.1 and others, is without any substance and it cannot be the basis for preventing the petitioners to enter into agreement for acquisition by consent under Section 19B(2) of the Highways Act. It is submitted that the names of the petitioners are recorded in the revenue record (7/12 extract) on the basis of registered documents in their favour and therefore, the respondent No.3-SDO in the impugned order could not have virtually directed abandonment of acquisition by consent and leaving the course open only for compulsory acquisition. It was submitted that due to the actions undertaken by the respondent No.1, the petitioners are illegally deprived of additional 25% compensation, since acquisition by consent carries the said additional compensation. In this regard, attention of this Court was invited to exhibit ‘E’, which recorded that the total compensation through acquisition by consent would come to Rs.5,70,21,723/-, which included 25% additional compensation payable under Section 19B(2) of the Highways Act. By inviting attention of this Court to documents on record, it was asserted that the impugned order deserves to be set aside. In the alternative, it was submitted that respondent No.3-SDO ought to be directed to deposit the additional 25% compensation in the Court, where the reference is already made, so that eventually it can inure to the benefit of the petitioners. bipin prithiani 4 29-wp-11193.25.doc 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 submitted that ideally, the petitioners should have agreed for a mediated solution to the dispute, but they refused to do so. In the absence of resolution through mediation and the claim asserted by the said respondent, there was no alternative for respondent No.3-SDO, but to pass the impugned order. It was submitted that in the process, there is no doubt that all the rightful claimants to the compensation amount are losing out on 25% additional compensation, as even the respondent No.1 is not averse to acquisition of the subject property by consent, but due to the approach of the petitioners, compulsory acquisition had to be undertaken in this case. 9. The learned AGP appearing on behalf of respondent No.3- SDO submitted that there is no error attributable to the impugned order in the given facts and circumstances. The only course left open for the respondent No.3-SDO was to initiate and complete the process of compulsory acquisition. Such a process was undertaken, which culminated in the said award dated 19th May 2025 and upon determination of compensation, since the dispute has been referred to the Competent Court i.e. the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within whose limit the subject property is situated, no further directions are necessary in the matter. It is submitted that the amount of compensation determined under the said award, is already deposited with the Competent Court. On this basis, it is submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed. bipin prithiani 5 29-wp-11193.25.doc 10. We have considered the rival submissions. We find that the lack of consensus amongst the petitioners and respondent No.1, has resulted in a situation where all of them have lost out on the opportunity of additional 25% compensation that could have been paid for the acquisition of the subject property, had all of them agreed for acquisition of the subject property by consent. 11. In the absence of consensus between the parties and the objection being raised by respondent No.1, it was evident that an agreement by consent for acquisition of the subject property was not possible and therefore, the only course open for respondent No.3-SDO was to initiate process for compulsory acquisition under Section 19B(3) of the Highways Act. 12. Although, the respondent No.1 relied upon documents, including a purported partition deed, the said controversy is alive in the pending Regular Civil Suit No. 1567 of 2017, which has been filed by the respondent No.1 and others. Inter se rights of the parties are yet to be decided. 13. In such a situation, the insistence of the petitioners that respondent No.3-SDO ought to have executed the agreement for acquisition by consent exclusively with them, does not appear to be sustainable. 14. We find that in such a factual backdrop, the respondent No.3-SDO took the only reasonable approach possible and that was to note that since acquisition of the subject property by consent under Section 19B(2) of the Highways Act was not bipin prithiani 6 29-wp-11193.25.doc possible, compulsory acquisition under Section 19B(3) thereof was warranted. In the impugned order, apart from making the said observation, it was also held that the compensation amount after taking recourse to Section 19B(3) of the Highways Act, would have to be deposited before the Competent Court under Section 19C(4) thereof. We are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the approach adopted by the respondent No.3-SDO, while passing the impugned order, cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. We find the approach to be reasonable. 15. It is also an admitted position that in the interregnum, after taking recourse to Section 19B(3) of the Highways Act, the respondent No.3-SDO proceeded to pass the final award dated 19th May 2025, through compulsory acquisition of the subject property. Accordingly, quantum of compensation was also determined. It is also an admitted position that the dispute between the parties, as on today, has been referred by respondent No.3-SDO to the Competent Court, by taking recourse to Section 19C(4) of the Highways Act and the quantum of compensation determined through compulsory acquisition has been already deposited before the said Court. This is evident from the documents filed at exhibit ‘R6’ collectively by respondent No.3- SDO. 16. In such a situation, the alternative plea of the petitioners that additional amount of 25% compensation should be directed to be bipin prithiani 7 29-wp-11193.25.doc deposited with the Competent Court, cannot be accepted. Evidently, this is no longer a case of acquisition by consent and since recourse to compulsory acquisition had to be taken, culminating in the award dated 19th May 2025, we do not find any reason to grant the alternative plea made on behalf of the petitioners. 17. In view of the above, we see no merit in the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. 18. Needless to say, the Competent Court shall decide the dispute referred to it, on its own merits. 19. All rights and contentions of the parties are kept open. (SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.) (MANISH PITALE, J.) BIPIN DHARMENDER PRITHIANI Digitally signed by BIPIN DHARMENDER PRITHIANI Date: 2026.09.23 10:52:56 +0530