Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
( 2026:HHC:19746 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
CMPMO No. 12 of 2026.
Decided on : 21
st May, 2026.
Sushil Kumar & Ors.
....Petitioners.
Versus Naiya Kumar & Anr.
....Respondents.
Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioners: Mr. Vinod Sharma & Mr. Vidya Sagar, Advocates. For the Respondents: Ex-parte.
Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral). The present petition arises out of the order as passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No.1, Kangra, on 29.10.2025 in CMA No. 829 of 2025, whereby application filed by the present petitioners/defendants under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC has been rejected.
2. The facts of the case are that the plaintiffs/respondents filed suit for grant of decree for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants/petitioners to the effect that the land bearing Khata No. 215, Khatoni No. 365, Khasra Nos. 234, 235, 240, 241, 242, Kita 5, area measuring 0-07-58 hectares 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2 ( 2026:HHC:19746 ) situated at Mohal and Mauza Kawari, Tehsil Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P. is in the exclusive ownership and possession of the plaintiffs. Further, it has been averred that sale deed No.575 dated 05.06.2009 allegedly executed by Sh. Jagdish Chand, predecessor of the plaintiffs in favour of Shri Gian Chand, predecessor of the defendants is the result of fraud, fabrication, without any
consideration and the same is liable to be quashed and set aside being null and void. It has been averred in the plaint that the plaintiffs are exclusive owners in possession of the suit land along with house existing over the suit land and are residing there along with their families and also getting all usufructs therefrom. It is also averred that the sale deed No. 575, dated 05.06.2009 allegedly executed by Sh. Jagdish Chand, predecessor of the plaintiffs in favour of Shri Gian Chand, predecessor of the defendants is the result of fraud, fabrication and the same is liable to be declared as null and void. 3. It has been averred in the plaint that the mutation attested on the basis of the sale deed and the revenue entries being reflected in favour of the defendants be declared as wrong, null and void. Therefore, the suit for declaration and injunction was
3 ( 2026:HHC:19746 ) preferred by the plaintiffs/respondents in the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No.1, Kangra, H.P.
4. After the service before the learned trial Court, the defendants filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint. It was averred in the application that the partition case in the Revenue Court, Nagrota Bagwan, filed by the defendants is pending for Fard Kabza report. Another Civil Suit No.215/2024 was filed by the defendants/petitioners, which is pending before the very same court. It was averred in the application that the Court had granted partial stay to maintain status quo qua the nature, possession and construction over the suit land situated at Mohal and Mauza Kawari, Tehsil Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P. in the said suit. Plaintiff Naiya Kumari did not accept the notice issued by the Court for her service in the said suit. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiffs/respondents to harass the defendants/present petitioners. That the suit is barred by limitation under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and that the iron angles have been put by the petitioners/defendants on the suit land after purchase of the suit land vide sale deed in the year 2009 with the knowledge of the predecessor of the plaintiffs/respondents. 4 ( 2026:HHC:19746 ) Therefore, it was prayed that the present suit instituted by the plaintiffs/respondents is time barred.
It was further prayed that no cause of actions has arisen in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents and against the defendants/petitioners. There is no new cause of action in favour of the plaintiffs and the pleadings as made by the plaintiffs in the plaint misrepresent the factual position besides being scandalous, vexatious and misleading. It was prayed that the application be allowed and the plaint as filed by the respondents/plaintiffs be ordered to be dismissed. 5. The said application was duly resisted and contested by the plaintiffs/respondent by filing reply wherein various preliminary objections with regard to maintainability etc., have been taken. All the averments as made in the application have been refuted and denied. The plaintiffs/respondents prayed for dismissal of the application which was filed by the present petitioners/defendants for rejection of the plaint. 6. Learned trial Court, vide its order dated 29.10.2025, dismissed the application filed for rejection of plaint. 5 ( 2026:HHC:19746 )
7. Feeling aggrieved, the present petitioners/defendants have approached this Court be invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order as passed by the learned trial Court is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. He further submits that the
order which has been passed by the learned trial Court is a non- speaking order as no reasons have been assigned by the learned trial Court while rejecting the application.
9. Notices were issued by this Court on 06.01.2026 for the service of the respondents/plaintiffs. As per the report of the Registry, the said respondents stand duly served, however, non has put in appearance on their behalf and they were proceeded against ex-parte.
10. In the present case, the respondents/plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and injunction against the present petitioners/respondents seeking declaration that the sale deed dated 05.06.2009 allegedly executed by Shri Jagdish Chand, predecessor-in- interest of the plaintiffs in favour of Gian Chand, predecessor-in- interest of the defendants, is the result of fraud, fabrication and the
6 ( 2026:HHC:19746 ) same is liable to be declared as null and void. Various averments have been made in the application, however, this Court will confine itself to the adjudication of the same. The perusal of the order dated 29.10.2025 demonstrates that the learned trial Court has not assigned any reasons while rejecting the said application. The learned trial Court, after noting the facts of the case and relying upon three judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, has rejected the application without assigning any reason for the same. Neither the averments as made in the application nor the submission as made by the learned counsel for the parties have been taken care and in a slip shod manner, the application has been dismissed.
11. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that while passing any order, reasons are required to be assigned by the Court. The said expositions of law is fortified by the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Cntract and Leasing, Kota v. Shukla & Brothers, (2010) 4 SCC 785, the relevant paragraphs No. 24 and 30 thereof read as under:-
“24. Reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases (Wharton's Law Lexicon). Such is the significance of
7 ( 2026:HHC:19746 )
reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty. As a matter of fact it helps in the observance of law of precedent. Absence of reasons on the contrary essentially introduces an element of uncertainty, dis- satisfaction and give entirely different dimensions to the questions of law raised before the higher/appellate courts. In our view, the court should provide its own grounds and reasons for rejecting claim/prayer of a party whether at the very threshold i.e. at admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever precise they may be.
30. In light of the above principles, now we will revert back to the facts of the present appeal. It cannot be doubted that challenge was raised to the order of the Board before the High Court on alleged questions of law as well as mixed question of law and fact. The contention that the respondent had not manufactured the shutters from the tax paid raw material and also that the contract in question was not impartible but a consequential item for completion of the contract required examination by the High Court. In light of the judgments referred to and relied upon by the parties including the judgment of this Court, it is true that requirement of stating reasons for judicial orders necessarily does not mean a very detailed or lengthy order, but there should be some reasoning recorded by the Court for declining or granting relief to the petitioner. The purpose, as already noticed, is to make the litigant aware of the reasons for which the relief is declined as well as to help the higher Court in assessing the correctness of the view taken by the High Court while
8 ( 2026:HHC:19746 ) disposing off a matter. May be, while dealing with the matter at the admission stage even recording of short listening dealing with the merit of the contentions raised before the High Court may suffice, in contrast, a detailed
judgment while matter is being disposed off after final hearing, but in both events, in our view, it is imperative for the High Court to record its own reasoning however short it might be.”
12. Similarly, Hon’ble Apex Court in Kranti Associates Private Limited and another vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, (2010)9 SCC 496 has held as under:
“22. In M/s. Woolcombers of India Ltd. vs. Woolcombers Workers Union and another, AIR 1973 SC 2758, this Court while considering an award under Section 11 of Industrial Disputes Act insisted on the need of giving reasons in support of conclusions in the Award. The Court held that the very requirement of giving reason is to prevent unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching conclusions. The second principle is based on the jurisprudential doctrine that justice should not only be done, it should also appear to be done as well. The learned Judges said that a just but unreasoned conclusion does not appear to be just to those who read the same. Reasoned and just conclusion on the other hand will also have the appearance of justice. The third ground is that such awards are subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court and in the absence of reasons, it is difficult for this Court to ascertain whether the decision is right or wrong (See para 5 page 2761). 9 ( 2026:HHC:19746 )
23. In Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor and others, AIR 1974 SC 87, this Court while dealing with the question of selection under Indian Administrative Service/Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion Regulation) held that the expression "reasons for the proposed supersession" should not be mere rubber stamp reasons. Such reasons must disclose how mind was applied to the subject matter for a decision regardless of the fact whether such a decision is purely administrative or quasi- judicial. This Court held that the reasons in such context would mean the link between materials which are considered and the conclusions which are reached. Reasons must reveal a rational nexus between the two (See para 28 page 98). 24. In Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co.
of India Ltd. vs. The Union of India and another, AIR 1976 SC 1785, this Court held that it is far too well settled that an authority in making an order in exercise of its quasi-judicial function, must record reasons in support of the order it makes. The learned Judges emphatically said that every quasi- judicial order must be supported by reasons. The rule requiring reasons in support of a quasi- judicial order is, this Court held, as basic as following the principles of natural justice. And the rule must be observed in its proper spirit. A mere pretence of compliance would not satisfy the requirement of law (See para 6 page 1789). 25 . In Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 597, which is a decision of great jurisprudence significance in our Constitutional law, Chief Justice Beg, in a concurring but different opinion held that
10 ( 2026:HHC:19746 ) an order impounding a passport is a quasi-judicial decision (Para 34, page612). The learned Chief Justice also held when an administrative action involving any deprivation of or restriction on fundamental rights is taken, the authorities must see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done as well. This principle would obviously demand disclosure of reasons for the decision. 26. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud (as His Lordship then was) in a concurring but a separate opinion also held that refusal to disclose reasons for impounding a passport is an exercise of an exceptional nature and is to be done very sparingly and only when it is fully justified by the exigencies of an uncommon situation. 37. The learned Judge further held that law cannot permit any exercise of power by an executive to keep the reasons undisclosed if the only motive for doing so is to keep the reasons away from judicial scrutiny. (See para 39 page 613). 28.
In Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran vs. State of Kerala and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1918, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer speaking for a three-Judge Bench held that the functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial in character. One of the attributes of quasi- judicial functioning is the recording of reasons in support of decisions taken and the other requirement is following the principles of natural justice. Learned Judge held that natural justice requires reasons to be written for the conclusions made (See para 14 page 1922). 29. In Gurdial Singh Fijji vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1979) 2 SCC 368, this Court, dealing with a service
11 ( 2026:HHC:19746 ) matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor (supra), held that
"rubber-stamp reason" is not enough and virtually quoted the observation in Capoor (supra) to the extent that:
“28…. Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions." (See para 18 page 377).”
13. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has not passed speaking order. Therefore, without touching the merits of the averments as made in the application, the impugned order is set aside with direction to the learned trial Court to restore the application filed by the petitioners/defendants under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC to its original number and thereafter decide the same afresh by affording an opportunity of hearing to both the parties, in accordance with law. 14. With the aforesaid observations, the instant petition stands disposed of, so also, the pending applications, if any. (Romesh Verma) Judge 21st May, 2026. (jai)