Vihoshe Kini, S/O Late Hezukhu v. State Of Nagaland Represented By The Chief Secretary
2026-03-17
Devashis Baruah
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Devashis Baruah, J. Heard Mr. Moa Jamir, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Mr. Mosemsa Longkumer, learned Government Advocate appears on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5. 2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking a direction upon the respondent authorities to pay certain amount which as per the petitioner is an undisputed amount alongwith interest @18% per annum. 3. This Court duly takes note of that in the year 2010 the petitioner was granted a contract for maintenance of the Dimapur to Ganeshnagar road of a value of Rs. 37,17,200/- (Rupees Thirty Seven Lakhs Seventeen Thousand Two Hundred). It is mentioned that the said work was completed on 09.11.2010. It is further seen that vide another contract dated 05.09.2011, another Work order was issued for improvement of town road at Dmr. Opposite Road to Bank Colony, Dimapur. It is also mentioned that the said contract was completed on 27.09.2011. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that the contractual dues payable to the petitioner have not been paid. The petitioner submitted a Representation on 15.02.2012. Thereupon another Representation was issued on 20.09.2016 and finally a legal notice was issued on 25.10.2022. It is the case of the petitioner that inspite of these representations as well as the Legal Notice so issued, the respondents have not made any payment. 5. Mr. Mosemsa Longkumer, learned Government Advocate, who appears on behalf of the State respondents submitted that the claim of the petitioner, if at all true, is a claim of the year 2010-2011 and it would be difficult for the respondent authorities to trace out any of the documents to verify as to whether the petitioner is at all entitled to the amount so claimed. The learned counsel further submitted that in the circumstance any writ is issued in the instant proceedings, a valid defence of the respondents to deny would be lost as the respondents would not be able to cross-verify the claims with contemparous records. The learned counsel therefore submitted that this Court may not like to entertain the writ petition. 6. This Court have duly taken note of the respective submissions and have also perused the materials on record. The materials on record show that the petitioner was granted one Work Order in the year 2010 and the other Work Order was issued in the year 2011.
6. This Court have duly taken note of the respective submissions and have also perused the materials on record. The materials on record show that the petitioner was granted one Work Order in the year 2010 and the other Work Order was issued in the year 2011. The completion as claimed by the petitioner was sometime in the year 2010 and 2011. The petitioner waited for a long 15 (fifteen) years to approach this Court. Any directions passed in the instant case directing the respondents herein to verify and to make payment would be difficult for the respondents to comply taking into account that such verification with contempareas records may not be available. A valid right of defence which the respondents have would be taken away if any writ is being issued. In this regard, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu , reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 wherein the Supreme Court observed that delay and laches is one of the pertinent aspects which needs to be taken into consideration while exercising the writ jurisdiction. Paragraph Nos. 16 and 17 of the said Judgment being relevant, is reproduced herein under:- “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court.
Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons — who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle”. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 7. It is the opinion of this Court that the instant writ petition suffers from insurmountable delay and laches. There is no explanation in the writ petition as to why the petitioner had approached this Court after a hiatus of 15 (fifteen) years. Under such circumstances, this Court is not inclined to entertain the instant writ petition. 8. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. 9.
There is no explanation in the writ petition as to why the petitioner had approached this Court after a hiatus of 15 (fifteen) years. Under such circumstances, this Court is not inclined to entertain the instant writ petition. 8. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. 9. Before parting with the record, this Court, however, observes that the dismissal of the instant writ petition shall not prejudice the petitioner to approach the competent civil court, if so permissible under law.