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2026 DAILYLAW 1023 (RAJ)

MAHESH JAIN S/O OMI JAIN v. SMT INDIRA DEVI W/O KAPOORCHAND JAIN

CSA/39/2026 · 2026-03-16

Maneesh Sharma

body2026

Judgment text

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[2026:RJ-JP:11052] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 39/2026 Mahesh Jain S/o Omi Jain, Aged About 51 Years, R/o Ramgarh Road, Mahwa, Tehsil Mahwa, District Dausa ----Appellant/Defendant Versus 1. Smt. Indira Devi W/o Kapoorchand Jain, Aged About 66 Years, 2. Mahendra S/o Kapoorchand Jain, Aged About 38 Years, 3. Mamta D/o Kapoor Chand Jain, Aged About 43 Years, All are Resident Of Ramgarh Road, Mahwa, District Dausa. ----Respondents/Plaintiffs For Appellant(s) : Mr. Laxmikant Sharma For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA Order 16/03/2026 1. The present civil second appeal has been filed by the appellant/defendant, assailing the judgment and decree dated 19.03.2025 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Mahwa, District Dausa (Rajasthan), in Civil Regular Appeal No.06/2022 (CIS No.06/2022) titled as 'Mahesh Jain Vs. Smt. Indira Devi & Ors.', and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 30.04.2022 passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Mahwa, District Dausa (Rajasthan), in Civil Suit No.2/2015 (CIS No.1/2015) titled as 'Smt. Indra Devi & Ors. Vs. Mahesh Chand Jain', whereby the suit for eviction and arrears of rent filed after terminating the tenancy in terms of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was decreed. [2026:RJ-JP:11052] (2 of 3) [CSA-39/2026] 2. That the present civil second appeal filed after a delay of 185 days. The explanation in the application (CMCC No. 424/2026) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is that after the decree was passed by the learned Appellate Court, learned counsel for the appellant did not inform him of the same. Consequently, the delay of 185 days, in filing the present civil second appeal occurred. The appellant came to know of the judgment and decree only upon issuance of warrants of possession. Accordingly prayed for condonation of the delay. 3. Heard learned counsel for the appellant/defendant. 4. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case that the explanation of the appellant for the 185 days' delay in filing the present second appeal i.e. counsel did not inform him is general and vague. In the application, the appellant had not stated when he met his counsel last and why in last six months he has not enquired about the status of the pending appeal and no specific dates have been written in the application. Thus, it is reflected that the appellant himself remain careless and negligent, the explanation stated in the application is neither bona fide nor sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. Vs. Ved Prakash1, has held as under: "It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as 1 2024 0 Supreme (SC) 1101 [2026:RJ-JP:11052] (3 of 3) [CSA-39/2026] the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief." 6. Thus in my considered opinion, there is no sufficient cause established to condone the delay of 185 days in filing the present civil second appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant, on query being made by this Court, fairly submitted that during the pendency of the hearing of the present second appeal, the impugned judgment and decree has already been executed qua the possession is concerned and, possession of the suit property has already been handed over to the landlord in execution proceeding. 8. In the above circumstances, this Court does not deem it proper and necessary to condone the inordinate delay of 185 days in filing of the present civil second appeal. 9. In this view of the matter, application (CMCC No.424/2026) filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is dismissed. 10. As a result thereof, the present civil second appeal also stands dismissed. 11. The stay application No. 393/2026, application (IA No.1/2026), and application (CMCC No.424/2026), and other pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J Seema/158