JUDGMENT : Rajesh Mazumdar, J. Heard Mr. P.K. Gogoi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and also heard Ms. M. Bhattacharjee, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate Assam, appearing for the all respondents. 2. At the outset, Ms. M. Bhattacharjee, had prayed for time to file an affidavit-in-opposition to the writ petition and stated that the records of the disciplinary proceedings are available. 3. The matter was kept as part heard on 09.02.2026 and upon production of the records by Ms. M. Bhattacharjee, this Court had taken up the matter for consideration to examine whether the records revealed any infirmity in the process during the disciplinary proceedings. 4. The facts of the case as arising from the records made available to this Court and as reflected in the writ petition, are to the effect that the petitioner was served with a show cause notice dated 26.03.2025 which contained a statement of allegations, a list of documents, and a list of witnesses. The petitioner was asked to file his written statement which he accordingly did on the 28 th of May, 2025. Not being satisfied with the reply filed by the petitioner, the disciplinary authority had appointed an enquiry officer and a presenting officer and the enquiry commenced. 5. The enquiry officer initiated the enquiry proceedings and examined as many as 5 out of the six listed witnesses. Thereafter, the petitioner was asked to submit his statement of defence, which he duly did. The enquiry proceedings were concluded by submission of the enquiry report by the enquiry officer on 02.06.2025. 6. The petitioner was thereafter served a second show-cause notice, although the date in the notice appears to be a typographical error. The petitioner replied to the second show-cause notice. Taking into account the allegation and the defence made, the disciplinary authority had proceeded to impose the punishment of dismissal upon service on the petitioner with effect from 10.07.2025. The appeal preferred by the petitioner herein also came to be dismissed. 7. The petitioner replied to the second show-cause notice. Taking into account the allegation and the defence made, the disciplinary authority had proceeded to impose the punishment of dismissal upon service on the petitioner with effect from 10.07.2025. The appeal preferred by the petitioner herein also came to be dismissed. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the disciplinary proceedings had suffered from gross illegalities, inasmuch as, in the enquiry proceedings he was not allowed the assistance of a defence assistant, he was not allowed the opportunity of cross-examination of the witnesses which were produced on behalf of the disciplinary authority, the enquiry report has been prepared without giving any opportunity to address the submissions of presenting officer etc. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the second show-cause notice has been issued with a pre conceived mind about the guilt of the petitioner and the same would be apparent by the language of the second show cause notice itself. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the disciplinary authority had passed the impugned orders without reference to the reply given by the petitioner to the second show cause notice and therefore, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the entire proceedings require the interference of this Court. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that on the same cause of action two show-cause notices were issued to the petitioner. The counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the first show-cause notice had already stated that the changes was proved beyond reasonable doubt. No reason for disagreement was given while issuing a second show-cause notice again holding the charges to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the issuance of two show-cause notices on the same cause of action is not permissible, therefore, when the first show-cause notice had already been replied to, the disciplinary authority was not authorized to impose punishment based on the second show-cause notice. 12. Ms. M. Bhattacharjee, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, has submitted that a perusal of the records would reveal that the initial charge- sheet was issued along with the list of documents and list of witnesses and was further accompanied by a statement of allegations. 12. Ms. M. Bhattacharjee, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, has submitted that a perusal of the records would reveal that the initial charge- sheet was issued along with the list of documents and list of witnesses and was further accompanied by a statement of allegations. In any event it is not the case of the petitioner that the first show-cause notice suffered any procedural defect. 13. The learned Additional Senior Government Advocate has thereafter submitted that the records would show that the petitioner had conducted cross- examination of at least 4 witnesses and for the other witnesses there was a statement recorded by the enquiry officer that there was no cross-examination done by the petitioner. 14. The learned Additional Senior Government Advocate has submitted when the enquiry report had opined that the guilt of the petitioner had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the disciplinary authority, in all fairness has supplied a copy of the enquiry petitioner along with the second show-cause notice. 15. The learned Additional Senior Government Advocate has further submitted that the second show-cause notice does not indicate that the disciplinary authority had a pre-conceived mind regarding the guilt of the petitioner and had, in fact, required the petitioner to submit a reply within 10 days time. 16. The learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, has further submitted that upon receipt of the reply to the second show-cause notice, the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of dismissal from service after taking into account the conspectus of the matter. It is therefore contended that order of dismissal does not warrant any interference by this Court. 17. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and have also perused through the records available. 18. This Court is conscious that, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters concerning disciplinary proceedings, this Court does not sit as a Court of appeal. It would only evaluate whether the required procedural propriety, as per the relevant provisions of law applicable in the case has been adhered to by the respondent authorities and as to whether the petitioner has suffered any prejudice when he was made to face disciplinary proceedings. In this regard the Court is reminded of the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India and Others vs. P.Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 where it was held “13. In this regard the Court is reminded of the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India and Others vs. P.Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 where it was held “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re- appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14. go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723 , many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: “7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao (1975) 2 SCC 557 , the principles have been further discussed at paragraph-21 to 24, which read as follows: “21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials thatan offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves form reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. 22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shut-down of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion. 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan.” 19. There is no challenge made to the first show-cause notice issued to the petitioner and, therefore, this Court is not called upon to examine the legality or illegality of the same. 20. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan.” 19. There is no challenge made to the first show-cause notice issued to the petitioner and, therefore, this Court is not called upon to examine the legality or illegality of the same. 20. In so far as the enquiry proceedings are concerned, this Court has gone through the records produced by the learned Additional Government Advocate and found that the evidence of different witnesses has been taken up on different dates by issuing proper notices from the enquiry officer. On each occasion when the statement of a particular witness was recorded, the petitioner has either declined to cross-examine the witness or put one or two questions in his cross-examination. Therefore, this Court does not find any force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he has been deprived of the opportunity of cross-examination. 21. This Court further finds from the records of the disciplinary proceeding that the petitioner did not make a request to be assisted by a defense assistant and even during the arguments presented in the case no prejudice had been alleged or demonstrated due to the absence of the defense assistant. 22. The very fact that the petitioner had cross-examined the witnesses and participated in the enquiry proceedings, and did not raise any grievance in that regard either during the enquiry or while submitting his representation to the second show-cause notice, as lead this Court to conclude that the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any prejudice on account of the absence of a defense assistant. 23. Though it is true that in certain cases law may require the appointment of a defense assistant, in the present case we see that the absence of a defense assistant has been taken as a plea only after the disciplinary proceedings culminated in an order adverse to the petitioner and, therefore, to this Court, the said plea appears to be an afterthought. Accordingly, the aforesaid ground taken up by the learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected. 24. In so far as the second show-cause notice is concerned, this Court is of the opinion that it does not amount to a second show-cause notice on the same cause of action. Rather, by way of the second show-cause notice, the petitioner was required to reply to the report prepared by the enquiry officer. 25. 24. In so far as the second show-cause notice is concerned, this Court is of the opinion that it does not amount to a second show-cause notice on the same cause of action. Rather, by way of the second show-cause notice, the petitioner was required to reply to the report prepared by the enquiry officer. 25. Upon perusal of the second show-cause notice, this Court does not find that the disciplinary authority had expressed any conclusive view regarding acceptance or non-acceptance of the findings of the enquiry officer. Therefore, this Court is not convinced that the second show-cause notice failed to meet the requirements of administrative fair play. On the contrary, on facts the same appears to be in compliance with the principle of natural justice. 26. The impugned order has also been perused by this Court. In the impugned order it is seen that the disciplinary authority has gone through all the records and has also referred to the different replies given by the petitioner in his representations against the first and second show-cause notices. 27. This Court cannot evaluate as to whether there was sufficient evidence which could have led the disciplinary authority to frame a particular opinion regarding the allegations levelled against the petitioner. As already indicated in the judgment of P.Gunasekaran (supra), this Court is not in a position to evaluate the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence led during the enquiry proceedings, unless the petitioner is able to show either a case of no evidence or one of perversity in the appreciation of the evidence. Such is not the case in the present litigation. 28. The learned counsel for the petitioner has made attempts to convince this Court that the evidence led was not properly appreciated but unfortunately, re- appreciation of evidence, is not called for in the present since it is not a case of no evidence or perverse appreciation of available evidence. 29. In the order passed by the appellate authority, it is observed that the appellate authority had not only considered the circumstances in which the impugned order had come to be passed but had also evaluated the quantum of punishment imposed upon the petitioner. 30. 29. In the order passed by the appellate authority, it is observed that the appellate authority had not only considered the circumstances in which the impugned order had come to be passed but had also evaluated the quantum of punishment imposed upon the petitioner. 30. In the case Union of India and Others vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 the Apex Court had held that in a matter of disciplinary force, the imposition of punishment on allegations of indiscipline would not require the interference by a Court exercising authority under Article 226 of Constitution of India, unless such punishment shocks the conscience of the Court. The quantum of punishment is essentially left to the wisdom of the disciplinary authority. 31. This Court has noticed that the allegation levelled against the petitioner pertains to theft/participation in theft. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the quantum of punishment imposed in the present case does not call for re-consideration in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 32. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. 33. However, it is made clear that since the learned counsel of the petitioner has submitted that a criminal trial has now been initiated and is in progress, this order of this Court shall not preclude the petitioner from preferring an appeal against the impugned orders to the concerned authorities, in the event he is acquitted in criminal trial. He shall be at liberty to prefer such representation or appeal, as is allowed in law, and the same shall be considered on its own merits without reference to the dismissal of the present writ petition. 34. With the above observation the writ petition is dismissed. No cost. 35. The records produced by Ms M. Bhattacharjee during the course of the proceedings be returned forthwith.