Judgment : Arun Dev Choudhury, J. 1. Heard Mr. S Chakraborty, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. S Shome, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This intra-court appeal calls into question the correctness of the judgment rendered by the learned single judge, whereby the award dated 20.11.2019, passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Guwahati, Assam, in Reference Case No. 3/2019, was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication. 3. The essential facts are not in dispute. The respondent workman was dismissed from his service upon conclusion of a domestic inquiry, invoking Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act. He approached the tribunal. 4. The management filed written objections. Thereafter, it chose not to appear. 5. The proceedings went ex-parte. Issues were framed. Evidence was adduced by the workman. The Tribunal rendered its award, directing reinstatement with back wages. 6. The learned single judge interfered with such an award, principally on the premises that- (I) the Tribunal had not elaborately dealt with each issue; and (II) the management's absence was attributable to the failure of its panel advocate. 7. The question before this court is not whether another view was possible, but whether remand was justified in law. 8. Judicial review under Article 226, more particularly, exercising its certiorari jurisdiction against an order of an Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, does not contemplate a rehearing of the facts, nor does it sanction remand merely because a different judicial mind might have framed the reasons differently. 9. The touchstone is perversity, jurisdictional error or manifest violation of natural justice. 10. Brevity of reasoning, in itself, is not illegality. An award cannot be said to be non-speaking merely because it is concise. 11. What must be seen is whether the tribunal applied its mind to the controversy before it and rendered the decision within jurisdiction. 12. It is true that the learned Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal has not answered every issue framed separately; however, it has dealt with every issue framed. In our opinion, the decision cannot be termed as an award without any reason or without discussing the evidence and materials before it, as the respondents have projected. 13. The other argument on merit of Mr. In our opinion, the decision cannot be termed as an award without any reason or without discussing the evidence and materials before it, as the respondents have projected. 13. The other argument on merit of Mr. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel, is that the learned Presiding judge, while passing the order, did not place reliance on “all the materials on record” which includes the “evidence taken in departmental proceeding”, also doesn't find favour with us. 14. The award clearly shows that whatever materials were produced by the workman relating to the departmental proceedings, those were duly considered. On the other hand, no material was produced by the management, except for filing a written statement and that too in a very casual manner, which was rightly termed by the learned Presiding Judge as “evasive” 15. Now, coming to the explanation tendered by the management for its non-participation viz that the panel advocate failed to appear and did not inform them, even if assumed to be correct, cannot constitute a ground for undoing a validly conducted adjudication. 16. A litigant who has entered his appearance and has filed pleadings bearing a continuing obligation to prosecute his case with diligence, negligence of counsel, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, demonstrated by cogent materials, binds the party. If every omission of a legal representative were to become a passport to reopen concluding proceedings, finality would be rendered illusory, and the discipline of adjudication fatally weakened. 17. No affidavit of the concerned advocate was placed before the writ court. No material was produced to establish bona fide inability beyond the management's control. Therefore, what emerges is not a denial of opportunity but a failure to avail of it. 18. The statutory framework also reinforces this conclusion. 19. Section 11 of the Industrial Dispute Act vests the Labour Court and Tribunal with procedural autonomy, subject to rules framed under the Act of 1947. 20. Section 11(1) permits regulation of its own procedure. Section 11 (3) confers certain powers of a Civil Court for limited purposes. Most significantly, Section 11(9), as inserted by amendment, mandates that every award be submitted within a prescribed time frame and that, where proceedings have been held up, the reasons be recorded. This procedural autonomy is not ornamental but is functional. 21. Section 11 (3) confers certain powers of a Civil Court for limited purposes. Most significantly, Section 11(9), as inserted by amendment, mandates that every award be submitted within a prescribed time frame and that, where proceedings have been held up, the reasons be recorded. This procedural autonomy is not ornamental but is functional. 21. Thus, the scheme under Section 11 contemplates that proceedings be conducted with expedition and that awards be rendered within a prescribed time frame. 22. The aforesaid legislative intent is unmistakable. Industrial disputes, especially those concerning individual workmen, must not languish. 23. Expedition is not merely a matter of administrative efficiency; it is a statutory imperative. The power to proceed ex parte, where a party, despite notice, abstains from participating, or, after participation and filing a written statement, does not appear, is inherent in this design. To hold otherwise would permit a recalcitrant party to erase the adjudicatory process impeded indefinitely. 24. The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, amplify this mandate. Rule 10-A contemplates structured and time-bound adjudication of disputes concerning individual workmen. Rule 10-B mandates day-to-day proceedings, circumscribes adjournments, and obliges the Tribunal to record reasons where adjournment is unavailable. These provisions are a legislative response to the endemic delays that historically plagued industrial adjudication. These embody a conscious effort to ensure that procedural laxity does not deprive substantive justice. Therefore, a remand solely upon a party's negligence sits uneasily with this statutory discipline. It has the effect of nullifying timelines and unsettling finality. 25. Remand is a judicial remedy of last resort. It is justified where issues remain wholly undecided; where jurisdiction is absent, or where foundational principles of natural justice are demonstrably violated. It is not a mechanism to afford a second opportunity to a party that has chosen not to participate. 26. The Tribunal in the present case framed issues, considered the pleadings, the evidence and other materials before it, and rendered its award. The management’s decision not to cross- examine or present rebuttal evidence was either a matter of choice or neglect. It was not a consequence of the denial of opportunity. 27. To permit reopening in such circumstances would amount to conferring a premium upon negligence and diluting the discipline of adjudication which Section 11 and Rules 10A and 10B seek to secure. Industrial jurisprudence balances two competing values: the fairness of procedure and the finality of resolution. It was not a consequence of the denial of opportunity. 27. To permit reopening in such circumstances would amount to conferring a premium upon negligence and diluting the discipline of adjudication which Section 11 and Rules 10A and 10B seek to secure. Industrial jurisprudence balances two competing values: the fairness of procedure and the finality of resolution. Fairness demands notice and opportunity. Finality demands responsibility in availing that opportunity. The record discloses that notices were served and an opportunity afforded to the management. The Tribunal was therefore justified in proceeding ex-parte and discharging its statutory function. 28. Therefore, in our opinion, the learned single judge, in setting aside the award solely to enable the defaulting employer to participate afresh, transgressed the limited contours of judicial review and overlooked the statutory command of expeditiousness embedded in the Act and the Rules. 29. In our opinion, for the above noted reasons, the interference by way of remand cannot be sustained. 30. Accordingly, the judgment and order dated 16.10.2025, passed by the learned single judge in WP(C) No.2291/2020 is interfered with and is set aside. 31. The award dated 20.11.2019, passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Guwahati, in Reference Case No. 3/2019 is restored. 32. There shall be no order as to cost.