Apurba Kumar Nath S/o. Late Rebat Chandra Nath v. State Of Assam, Represented By The Principal Secy.
2026-02-11
Arun Dev Choudhury, Ashutosh Kumar
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
Judgment : Arun Dev Choudhury, J. 1. Heard Mr. H Baruah, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. NJ Khataniar, learned standing counsel, Secondary Education Department for respondent Nos.1 & 5 and Ms. S Sarma, learned Government Advocate for respondent Nos.2 to 4. 2. The challenge in this Writ Appeal is to the order dated 19.11.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.6472/2025, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant against the rejection of his candidature by the District Level Scrutiny Committee (DLSC), for appointment on compassionate ground, has been negated on the ground of the issue being a stale one. 3. The District Level Scrutiny Committee (DLSC) in its meeting dated 29.11.2024, had rejected the claim of the appellant on the ground that more than 2 years had elapsed since the death of the father of the appellant, based on a new Office Memorandum dated 18.09.2024, issued by the Personnel Department, Government of Assam, whereby a stricter timeline was introduced. 4. The appellant's father, an Assistant Teacher at Chabukdhara High School in Morigaon district, Assam, passed away on 14.06.2016 while in service. As the sole breadwinner of the family, his death left his family financially distressed, and the appellant, being an unemployed youth, applied for his appointment under the relevant scheme of the Government of Assam for compassionate appointment. Such an application was filed on 10.07.2016. 5. In the meeting of the District Level Committee (DLC) dated 29.11.2024, the case of the appellant was considered; however, a decision was notified on 20.01.2025, rejecting the case of the appellant. The reason for rejection was that the appellant had spent more than 2 years since the death of his father. 6. Alleging that the DLSC misdirected itself in not looking into the background facts of the case, the appellant preferred a writ petition before this court, which was rejected vide the impugned order dated 19.11.2025. 7. The learned Single Judge noted that the appellant, apart from filing his application on 10.07.2016, did not follow up on the same except for filing one representation before the Deputy Commissioner, Morigaon, on 09.09.2022. 8. Mr.
7. The learned Single Judge noted that the appellant, apart from filing his application on 10.07.2016, did not follow up on the same except for filing one representation before the Deputy Commissioner, Morigaon, on 09.09.2022. 8. Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the appellant, has argued that the DLSC arbitrarily rejected the application of the appellant on the ground that the period of two (2) years had elapsed as per Principle No.10 of the Policy for compassionate appointment and also in view of the Office Memorandum dated 18.09.2024. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Malaya Nanda Sethy v . State of Orissa & Ors reported in AIR 2022 SC 2836 , contended that the delay is attributed to the respondent authorities and for this reason, the petitioner should not be penalised. However, such a contention was rejected by the learned Single Judge for the reason that the judgment in Malaya Nanda Sethy is distinguishable from the case of the appellant, inasmuch as, in Malaya Nanda Sethy , the issue was relatable to a change of policy during the pendency of the application of Malaya Nanda Sethy 10. Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the appellant, argues that, no doubt, the appellant has been able to survive for all these years, but that does not mitigate his sufferings, which are continuing, and it cannot be said that the appellant’s survival reflects that he has been able to eke out a living for himself. 11. The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant may stir the emotions of the court, but then the law accepts the hard reality that such compassionate appointment cannot be directed after a long passage of time. 12. It will only be a repetition of the law regarding compassionate appointment, but the courts have consistently held that appointment on compassionate grounds cannot be treated as a source of recruitment. It is only to provide succour to the dependants of the deceased employee to avoid destitution and overcome the sudden financial crisis. It is not a vested right to be exercised at any time in future and even in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on behalf of the appellant claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities deciding such a claim, the immediacy is diluted and lost. 13. In the present case, as argued by Mr.
It is not a vested right to be exercised at any time in future and even in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on behalf of the appellant claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities deciding such a claim, the immediacy is diluted and lost. 13. In the present case, as argued by Mr. Baruah, the suffering has not abated, but then this court is reminded of the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Electricity Board & Another Vs. Hakim Singh, 1997 (8) SCC , where such a direction for consideration of compassionate appointment was held to be contrary to the constitution for the reason that the compassionate appointment is not to provide hereditary employment, but to provide immediate financial relief to the deceased employee's family. 14. The same appears to be the thought process of the learned Single Judge while refusing to interfere with the decision of the DLSC in not considering the candidature of the appellant for compassionate appointment. 15. As regards the ratio in Malaya Nanda Sethy , in our opinion, shall not render any assistance to the case of the appellant inasmuch as, even otherwise, the fact remains that the father of the petitioner expired in the year 2016, he filed his first representation after 6 years from the death of his father and therefore, the immediacy was diluted and lost. 16. We do not find any infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge. 17. The delay of about 6 years for consideration of the case of the appellant since the death of his father has completely diluted the immediacy of the case of the appellant, and such delay prevents us from taking any other view than what the learned Single Judge has taken with respect to the case of the appellant. 18. Finding no merit in this appeal, we dismiss the same.