1 2026:HHC:20653 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA FAO(MVA) No.  : 471 of 2018 Reserved on    :  07.05.2026 Decided on      :  30.05.2026 Reliance General Insurance Company …Appellant Versus Sat Pal & Ors. …..Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? ____________________________________________________________ For the Appellant : Mr. Jagdish Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondents      : Mr.   Sumit   Sharma,   Advocate   for respondents No.1 to 4. Mr.   Varun   Chauhan,   Advocate,   for respondent No.5. __________________________________________________________ Virender Singh, Judge Appellant­Reliance   General   Insurance   Company Limited has filed the present appeal, under Section 173 of the Motor   Vehicles   Act,   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   ‘M.V.   Act’), against the award dated 05.05.2018, passed by learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal­II, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushehar,  H.P., (hereinafter referred to as the ‘learned Tribunal’), in R.B.T. No.87­ R/2 of 2016/15, titled as Sat Pal & others versus  Joginder Singh & another. 2 2026:HHC:20653 2. By way of award dated 05.05.2018, the learned Tribunal has allowed the claim petition, filed by the respondents No.1   to   4   and   awarded   a   sum   of   Rs.24,74,000/­   along   with interest @ 9% per annum. However, the ultimate liability to pay the   amount   of   compensation   along   with   interest   has   been fastened upon the Insurance Company (appellant). Brief Facts:­ 3. For the sake of convenience, parties to the present appeal, are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to by the learned Tribunal. 4. Necessary   facts,   as   borne   out   from   the   record, may be summed up, as under:­ 4.1. The petitioners, being sons, widow and mother of deceased­Thakur Dass had filed the claim petition, under Section 166 of M.V. Act, before the learned Tribunal. They have sought the compensation on account of death of Thakur Dass, in a road side   accident,   involving   Vehicle   No.HP01K­5100,   owned   and driven by respondent No.1 and insured with respondent No.2. 4.2. According to the petitioners, Thakur Dass, at the time of his death, was 62 years and he was retired Ayurvedic Medical   Officer   and   was   drawing   pension   of   more   than   Rs. 35,000/­ per month. The deceased, after retirement, was doing 3 2026:HHC:20653 private practice at Anni and was earning more than Rs. 60,000/­ per   month. In   addition   to   this,   the   deceased   was   owner   in possession   of   apple   orchard   and   earning   more   than   Rs. 10,00,000/­   per   annum. The   accident   had   taken   place   on 28.05.2015 at about 7:00 PM, at Kotgali near village Kotlu. 4.3. Elaborating their stand, it has been pleaded that the   accident   in   question   had   taken   place,   due   to   rash   and negligent driving of respondent No.1, as he drove the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and could not control the same, due to which, the offending vehicle went off the road and had   fallen   into   deep   gorge. Thakur   Dass   died   on   the   spot. Postmortem examination of his dead body was conducted by the Medical Officer, CHC, Anni District Kullu H.P. 4.4. The   matter   was   also   reported   to   the   police   of Police   Station,   Karsog,   where,   FIR   No.75   of   2015,   dated 29.05.2015 has been registered. 4.5. According to the petitioners, Thakur Dass was retired   Ayurvedic   Medical   Officer;   he   was   also   doing   private practice and pursuing the horticulture pursuits, by selling apple crops. 4.6. The   petitioners   have   also   pleaded   about   their bright past and bleak future. 4 2026:HHC:20653 4.7. Since, the accident, in question, has solely been attributed to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, as such, it has been prayed that the amount of compensation   of   Rs.40,00,000/,   along   with   interest   @   9%   be awarded to them. Stand of the respondents before the learned Tribunal 5. When, put to notice, the claim petition has been contested by the respondents. 5.1. Respondent   No.1/owner­cum­driver,   has   filed reply, by taking the preliminary objections that the claim petition is not maintainable. According to him, he was neither rash, nor, negligent, however, the accident had taken place due to sudden mechanical defect, which occurred, in the offending vehicle. In this regard, respondent No.1, has relied upon the cancellation report, submitted by the police of Police Station Karsog, before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karsog, in FIR No.75 of 2015, dated 29.05.2015, registered under Sections 279, 337, 304­A IPC. Another preliminary objection has been taken that the petitioners have not approached the Court with clean hands and the learned Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. 5 2026:HHC:20653 5.2. On merits, the contents of the claim petition have been denied, on the basis of the preliminary objections. 5.3. Reliance General Insurance Company­insurer of the offending vehicle has filed his separate reply, by taking the preliminary   objections,   that   the   claim   petition   is   not maintainable;   the   petitioners   have   no   locus­standi   to   file   the claim petition;  the offending vehicle was being plied, in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy;  respondent No.1, i.e. driver of the vehicle was not having a valid and effective license, at the time of accident; the deceased was travelling in the vehicle,   as   unauthorized/gratuitous   passenger,   at   the   time   of accident. 5.4. On merits, the contents of the claim petition have been denied mainly for want of knowledge. 6. Thus, the respondents have prayed for dismissal of the claim petition. 7. From the pleadings of the parties, following issues were   framed   by   the   learned   Tribunal,   vide   order   dated 28.11.2016: 1) Whether   deceased   Thakur   Dass   died   on 28.05.2015, at about 7:00 PM, at Kotgali near village Kotlu due of rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1, who was driving the vehicle bearing   HP01K­5100   rashly   and   negligently? ..OPP 6 2026:HHC:20653 2) If   issue   No.1   is   proved   in   affirmative,   what amount of compensation petitioners entitled to and from whom? ...OPP 3) Whether  the  petitioners  have  not  come  to   the court with clean hands? OPR­1 4) Whether the vehicle was plied in contravention of terms and conditions of Insurance Policy? OPR­2 5) Whether driver of the vehicle was not possessing a valid driving license at the time of accident? OPR­2 6) Whether   the   deceased   Thakur   Dass   was travelling   as   a   gratuitous   passenger   in   the offending vehicle? OPR­2 7) Whether the petition is filed in collusion with the respondent No. 1? OPR­2 8) Relief. 8. Thereafter,   parties   to   the   lis   were   directed   to adduce   evidence. After   closure   of   the   evidence,   the   learned Tribunal,   upon   hearing   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,   has allowed the claim petition of the petitioners, by way of the award which is impugned herein. Contentions of the appellant (Insurer­Company) 9. Appellant­Insurance   Company   has   assailed   the award   mainly,   on   the   ground   that   the   learned   Tribunal   has wrongly decided issue No.1, in favour of the petitioners, as it has been proved on record that after the investigation, the police has filed the cancellation report, before the Court of learned Judicial 7 2026:HHC:20653 Magistrate First Class, Karsog, District Mandi, H.P., which was accepted vide documents RW­1/F and RW­1/G. 9.1. On   the   basis   of   the   above   facts,   it   has   been impressed upon this Court to hold that the sine qua non for seeking of the compensation, under the provisions of Section 166 of   M.V.  Act,   i.e.   rashness  and   negligence   of   the   driver   of   the offending vehicle, is lacking in the present case.  According to the appellant, when, the very base of the case i.e. rash and negligent driving   of   respondent   No.1,   has   not   been   proved,   then,   the petitioners are not entitled for any compensation. 9.2. The award has been assailed on the ground that as per Ex.RW­1/A, the driver of the offending vehicle was having the license to drive only Light Motor Vehicles and not Transport Vehicles, as such, he was not authorized to drive the vehicle in question, as per Section 14(2)(a)(i) of the M.V. Act. 9.3. The award has also been assailed, on the ground that the learned Tribunal has wrongly given the addition, as 50% on account of future prospects, but has not deducted the income tax for the purpose of computation of compensation. 9.4. Lastly, the award has been assailed on the ground that the learned Tribunal has wrongly awarded the interest @ 9%, 8 2026:HHC:20653 wheres, according to the appellant, the same should have been @6% per annum. 9.5. On   the   basis   of   the   above   facts,   Mr.   Jagdish Thakur,   Advocate,   appearing   for   the   appellant   (Insurance Company) has prayed that the appeal may kindly be allowed, by setting aside the award or to reduce the amount of compensation. Contentions   of   learned   Counsel   for   the   respondents (petitioners before the Tribunal) 10. Per   contra,   Mr.   Sumit   Sharma,   Advocate, appearing for respondents No.1 to 4 (petitioners), has supported the  award   and  prayed  that   in  order  to  achieve  the   legislative intent, the awarded amount is liable to be enhanced, so that the same could fall within the definition of ‘just compensation’. 10.1. To   buttress   his   contention,   learned   counsel appearing for the petitioners has prayed that the learned Tribunal has not awarded   ‘just compensation’ under the heads   ‘loss of consortium’, ‘funeral expenses’ and ‘loss of estate’. 10.2. Heavily   relying   upon   the   decision   of   Hon’ble Supreme   Court   in  National   Insurance   Company   Limited versus   Pranay   Sethi   and   others,   reported   in  (2017),   16 Supreme Court Case 680  and in  Magma General Insurance Company  Limited vs. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram and others, 9 2026:HHC:20653 reported in  (2018) 18 SCC 130,  it has been prayed that the awarded amount may kindly be enhanced. Contentions of learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 (driver cum owner) 11. The   learned   counsel   appearing   for   respondent No.2, has supported the award passed by the learned Tribunal and it has been prayed that the appeal may kindly be dismissed. Analysis and Discussions 12. In the present case, Reliance General Insurance Company has assailed the award, on the ground that the driver was not having valid and effective license to drive the offending vehicle. Perusal of the record shows that as per the document Ex.RW/A, which is the copy of registration certificate,  the vehicle is   Bolero   LX­2WD   seven   seater. As   per   the   driving   license Ex.RW1/E, respondent No.1, was authorized to drive Light Motor Vehicle. 13. Learned Tribunal has relied upon the decision of this Court in United India Insurance Company Limited versus Madan Lal and others, 2915 (2) T.A.C. 243 (H.P.),  as well as, the decision of this Court in Manohar Lal versus Sukh Bahadur and  others,   2015(3)   Him. L.R.   1338. As   such   the   learned 10 2026:HHC:20653 Tribunal has rightly held that the Insurance Company has failed to point out any fundamental breach of the policy. 14. Moreover,   as   per   the   documentary   evidence adduced on the file, copy of RC of the offending vehicle as Ex.RW­ 1/A.   As per this document, the offending vehicle is Bolero LX 2WD 7 Seater and its seating capacity is 9 and the said vehicle was   having   the   contract   carriage   permit   from   27.1.2012   to 31.08.2015. The   accident   in   question   had   taken   place   on 28.5.2015. Meaning thereby, at the relevant time the vehicle was having the valid contract carriage permit. Fitness certificate was also valid and the driver was holding a valid and effective driving licence, copy of which is Ex.RW­1/E.   As per Ex.RW­1/E, the holder of the driving licence was having authorize to drive LMV w.e.f. 8.9.2003. 15. In view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Cout   in  Bajaj   Alliance   General   Insurance   Company   Ltd. Versus   Rambha   Devi   &   Others,   (2025)   3   Supreme   Court Cases 95, the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for the Insurance   Company   are   devoid   of   any   merits,   as   the   Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the above case has held that the driver, who is having driving licence to drive LMV can legally drive transport 11 2026:HHC:20653 vehicle   gross   weight   of   which   is   below   7500   kg. Relevant paragraphs 175 to 181 of the judgment are reproduced as under:­ 175. The licensing regime under the MV Act and the MV Rules, when read as a whole, does not provide for a separate endorsement for operating a ‘Transport Vehicle’, if a driver already holds a LMV license. We must however clarify that the exceptions   carved   out   by   the   legislature   for special vehicles like e­carts and e­rickshaws, or vehicles carrying hazardous goods, will remain unaffected by the decision of this Court. 176. As discussed earlier in this judgment, the definition of LMV under Section 2(21) of the MV Act explicitly provides what a ‘Transport Vehicle’ ‘means’. This   Court   must   ensure   that   neither provision i.e. the definition under Section 2(21) or the second part of  Section 3(1)  which concerns the   necessity   for   a   driving   license   for   a ‘Transport Vehicle’ is reduced to a dead letter of law. Therefore,   the   emphasis   on   ‘Transport Vehicle’   in   the   licensing   scheme   has   to   be understood only in the context of the ‘medium’ See   Rule   8A   of   MV   Rules,’Minimum   training required for driving E­ rickshaw or E­cart’ See Rule 9 of MV Rules, ’Educational Qualification for   drivers   of   goods   carriages   carrying dangerous   or   hazardous   goods’   and   ‘heavy’ vehicles. This   harmonious   reading   also   aligns with   the   objective   of   the   1994   amendment   in Section 10(2) to simplify the licensing procedure. 177. The   above   interpretation   also   does   not defeat the broader twin objectives of the MV Act i.e.   road   safety   and   ensuring   timely compensation   and   relief   for   victims   of   road accidents. The aspect of road safety is earlier discussed   at   length. An   authoritative pronouncement   by   this   Court   would   prevent insurance   companies   from   taking   a   technical plea   to   defeat   a   legitimate   claim   for compensation   involving   an   insured   vehicle weighing below 7,500 kgs driven by a person holding   a   driving   license   of   a   ‘Light   Motor Vehicle’ class. 12 2026:HHC:20653 178. In an era where autonomous or driver­less vehicles are no longer tales of science fiction and app­based   passenger   platforms   are   a   modern reality,   the   licensing   regime   cannot   remain static. The amendments that have been carried out by the Indian legislature may not have dealt with all possible concerns. As we were informed by   the   Learned   Attorney   General   that   a legislative exercise is underway, we hope that a comprehensive amendment. The classes medium goods   vehicle[(10(2)(e)],   medium   passenger vehicle[10(2)(f)],heavy   goods   vehicle[10(2)(g)]   and heavy   passenger   vehicle   [10(2)(h)]   were   deleted and   a   new   class   ‘Transport   Vehicle’   was introduced   in  Section   10(2)(e)  to   address   the statutory   lacunae   will   be   made   with   necessary corrective measures. 179. Just   to   flag   one   concern,   the   legislature through the 1994 amendment in Section 10(2)(e) in order to introduce ‘transport vehicle’ as a separate class could not have intended to merge light motor vehicle (which continued as a distinct class) along with   medium,   and   heavy   vehicles   into   a   single class.   Else,   it   would   give   rise   to   a   situation   in which Sri (our hypothetical character), wanting to participate in the cycling sport, is put through the rigorous training relevant only for a multisport like Triathlon, which requires a much higher degree of endurance   and   athleticism.   The   effort   therefore should   be   to   ensure   that   the   statute   remains practical and workable. 180. Now harking back to the primary issue and noticing that the core driving skills (as enunciated in the earlier paragraphs), expected to be mastered by all drivers are universal – regardless of whether the   vehicle   falls   into   “Transport”   or   “Non­ Transport” category, it is the considered opinion of this Court that if the gross vehicle weight is within 7,500 kg ­ the quintessential common man’s driver Sri, with LMV license, can also drive a “Transport Vehicle”.  We are able to reach such a conclusion as none of the parties in this case has produced any empirical data to demonstrate that the LMV driving licence holder, driving a ‘Transport Vehicle’, is a significant cause for road accidents in India. The additional eligibility criteria as specified in MV Act  and MV Rules as discussed in this judgment 13 2026:HHC:20653 will   apply   only   to   such   vehicle   (‘medium   goods vehicle’, ‘medium passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’   and   ‘heavy   passenger   vehicle’),   whose gross   weight   exceeds   7,500   Kg.   Our   present interpretation   on   how   the   licensing   regime   is   to operate for drivers under the statutory scheme is unlikely to compromise the road safety concerns. This   will   also   effectively   address   the   livelihood issues   for   drivers   operating   Transport   Vehicles (who clock maximum hours behind the wheels), in legally operating “Transport vehicles” (below 7,500 Kg),   with  their   LMV  driving   license.   Perforce   Sri must   drive   responsibly   and   should   have   no occasion to be called either a maniac or an idiot (as mentioned   in   the   first   paragraph),   while   he   is behind the wheels. Such harmonious interpretation will substantially address the vexed question of law before this Court. 181.   Our   conclusions   following   the   above discussion are as under:­ (I) A driver holding a license for Light Motor Vehicle (LMV)   class,   under  Section   10(2)(d)  for   vehicles with   a   gross   vehicle   weight   under   7,500   kg,   is permitted to operate a ‘Transport Vehicle’ without needing   additional   authorization   under  Section 10(2)(e) of the MV Act specifically for the ‘Transport Vehicle’ class. For licensing purposes, LMVs and Transport   Vehicles   are   not   entirely   separate classes. An overlap exists between the two. The special   eligibility   requirements   will   however continue   to   apply   for,   inter   alia,   e­carts,   e­ rickshaws,   and   vehicles   carrying   hazardous goods. (II)   The   second   part   of  Section   3(1),   which emphasizes the necessity of a specific requirement to drive a ‘Transport Vehicle,’ does not supersede the definition of LMV provided in  Section 2(21)  of the MV Act. (III) The additional eligibility criteria specified in the MV   Act and   MV   Rules   generally   for   driving ‘transport   vehicles’   would   apply   only   to   those intending   to   operate   vehicles   with   gross   vehicle weight   exceeding   7,500   kg   i.e.   ‘medium   goods vehicle’, ‘medium passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’ and ‘heavy passenger vehicle’. 14 2026:HHC:20653 (IV) The decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is upheld but for reasons as explained by us in this judgment. In   the   absence   of   any   obtrusive omission, the decision is not per incuriam, even if certain   provisions   of   the  MV  Act  and   MV  Rules were not considered in the said judgment.” (self emphasis supplied) 16. If the facts and circumstances of the present case are seen in the light of the above decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,   as   per   the   registration   certificate,   gross   weight   of   the vehicle does not exceed 7500 kgs, as such, respondent No.1, was having a valid and effective driving license. 17. It is the case of the Insurance Company that the basic   ingredients   for   seeking   the   compensation,   under   the provisions of M.V. Act, that too, under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, it was for the petitioners to plead and prove that the accident in question had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the   respondent   No.1,   while,   driving   the   offending   vehicle. According to Shri Jagdish Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company, such evidence is lacking in the present case, as such, dismissal of the petition has been sought. 18. In order to buttress his contention, it has been pointed out that the police, after the investigation, has submitted the cancellation report. The respondents have also examined RW­ 3, Keshva Nand, mechanic HRTC Karsog, who has mechanically 15 2026:HHC:20653 inspected the offending vehicle and submitted the report Ex.RW­ 3/A.  In the cross examination, this witness has admitted that if brake pipe is broken or brake system is not working properly, in that   eventuality,   driver   can   observe   the   defect   at   the   time   of driving the vehicle. He has also admitted that wall joint cannot break suddenly and it breaks, all of sudden, only, in case, when there were already cracks on it. When the court question was put to this witness, he has replied that the vehicle could be stopped by applying the brakes, if the vehicle was moving in normal speed. 19. From the above facts, the negligence of the driver is writ large, as in the proceedings under M.V. Act, the liability of the tort feasor is to be fixed on the touchstone of preponderance of   the   probability. The   proceedings   under   the   M.V.   Act,   are altogether different from the criminal proceedings, where the guilt of the accused is to be proved by the prosecution, beyond any reasonable doubt. 20. In the present case, respondent No.1 has taken the   plea   that   the   accident   had   taken   place   due   to   sudden mechanical defect, which occurred, in the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle Joginder Singh has not bothered to put appearance to say about the fact that he used to maintain the vehicle properly. Admittedly,   the   vehicle   was   under   the   exclusive   control   of 16 2026:HHC:20653 Joginder Singh at the relevant time and it was for him to plead and   prove   as   how   the   accident   had   taken   place,   which   has resulted into loss of valuable lives. 21. Merely, ascertaining the fact that the cancellation report has been filed on account of some mechanical defect is too short   to   exonerate   the   respondent   No.1   from   the   rash   and negligent  driving   of   the  offending   vehicle. In  the   cancellation report, although it has been mentioned that the accident had taken place due to breakage of wall joint, but, in view of the deposition of RW­3, the offending vehicle can be stopped if the same was moving in normal speed. The statement of oath made by RW­3, is sufficient to hold that the accident in question had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1. 22. Since, the award has also been assailed on the ground   of   quantum,   as   such,   this   Court   would   now   proceed further to discuss the evidence, so adduced, by the parties to the present   lis,   to   ascertain,   as   to   whether   the   amount   of compensation, which has been awarded by the learned Tribunal, falls within the definition of ‘just compensation’ or requires any interference by this Court. 23. In   order   to   ascertain   the   fact   whether  ‘just compensation’, has been awarded to the petitioner or not, the first 17 2026:HHC:20653 question, which arises for determination before this Court is as to what was the age of Thakur Dass, at the time of his death. 24. At   the   time   of   accident,   the   age   of   deceased Thakur Dass, has been pleaded as 62 years. Petitioner No.1, Sat Pal, appeared in the witness­box as PW­1 and filed his affidavit Ex.PW­1/A.  He remain silent about the age of his father, at the time of his death. However, in the postmortem report, the age of Thakur Dass has been mentioned as 65 years. As such, in the absence of any evidence, there is no occasion for this Court to take   age   of   the   deceased   contrary   to   the   said   age. Learned Tribunal has wrongly taken the age of deceased as 62 years, at the time of his death, whereas, the same should have been 65 years. 25. The learned Tribunal, in the present case has taken   the   monthly   income   of   deceased   Thakur   Dass   as Rs.38,150/­   per   month. As   per   the   stand   taken   by   the petitioners,   deceased   Thakur   Dass   was   a   retired   Ayurvedic Medical Officer and according to the petitioners, he was earning Rs.1,50,000/­,   per   month,   from   all   sources. Petitioner   No.1, when appeared in the witnesses, as PW­1, has given the pension of his father as Rs.35,000/­. He has moved a step further and deposed   that   after   retirement,   his   father   was   doing   private 18 2026:HHC:20653 practice and earning Rs.60,000/­ per month. However, in the cross­examination,   this   witness   has   deposed   that   he   has   not annexed any document to demonstrate that his father was doing private practice, after superannuation, nor, any proof of income as Rs.60,000/­ from private practice has been annexed. 26. By examining Bank official as PW­3, it has been proved   that   the   last   pension   of   deceased   Thakur   Dass   was Rs.38,150/­ filed document Ex.PW­3/A. 27. In  this factual  background,  the next  question, which arises for determination, before this Court, is about the fact whether any addition towards future prospect is to be given, in the monthly income of the deceased or not. The answer to this question, is in negative as the Hon’ble Supreme Court in  Pranay Sethi’s case supra, has not given any addition to a person, who is above 60 years of age. As such, the learned Tribunal has rightly not   given   any   addition   towards   future   prospects   of   deceased Thakur Dass. Thus, the monthly income of Shri Thakur Dass is held to be Rs.38,150/­. As such, the annual income comes to Rs.4,57,800/­ (Rs.38,150/­ X 12). The income tax component is liable to be deducted from the said income. 28. The age of the deceased, at the time of accident was held to be 65 years. As per the income tax slab, applicable 19 2026:HHC:20653 for   the   financial   year   2015­16,   income   of   Rs.3,00,000/­   was exempted   for   senior   citizen. Thus,   out   of   Rs.4,57,800/­,   the amount   of   total   taxable   income   comes   to   Rs.1,57,800/­ (Rs.4,57,800/­ minus Rs.3,00,000/­). Thus, the tax component comes   to   Rs.15,780/­. The   education   cess   @3%   on   the   said amount of Rs.15780/­ is also liable to be deducted, which comes to Rs.473/­. Thus, the total tax component comes to Rs.16253/­. Hence, the total established income of the deceased comes to Rs.4,57,800/­ minus Rs.16253/­ = Rs.4,41,546/­. 29. The learned Tribunal has deducted ¼th amount, out of the income of the deceased, towards his personal expenses, had Thakur Dass been alive. Deceased Thakur Dass, was retired as Block Ayurvedic Medical Officer. The petitioners are sons, widow and widowed mother of Thakur Dass. Petitioner No.2, Rajinder Singh when appeared in the witness­box as PW­1, in the year 2017, has given his age as 41 years. His affidavit, which has been filed in his examination­in­chief is totally silent about the   fact   whether   he   and   his   brother   petitioner   No.1,   was dependent upon the pension of their father Thakur Dass. 30. In such situation, it cannot be expected from a retired officer that he will spent only ¼th amount on his personal expenses. In such situation, this Court is of the view that 1/3rd 20 2026:HHC:20653 amount is required to be deducted on account of his personal expenses, had he been alive. Thus, by deducting 1/3rd amount from his annual income of Rs. 4,41,546/­, i.e., Rs.1,47,182/­, his contribution   towards   the   family   comes   to   Rs.2,94,364/­,   per annum. 31. Learned Tribunal has applied the multiplier of ‘7’ and in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in  Sarla Verma  versus  Delhi   Transport   Corporation   and   Another, (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121, the same does not require any interference. 32. As such, the amount of compensation awarded to the   petitioners   on   account   of   loss   of   dependency,   comes   to Rs.2,94,364/­ x 7 = Rs.20,60,548/­. 33. In view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company  Limited versus Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130, all the petitioners are held entitled for the amount under the head ‘loss of consortium’. Relevant paragraphs 21 to 24, are reproduced, as under:­ 21. A  Constitution  Bench  of this Court in Pranay Sethi (supra) dealt with the various heads  under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is Loss of Consortium. In legal parlance,“consortium” is a compendious term 21 2026:HHC:20653 which   encompasses   ‘spousal consortium’, ‘parental   consortium’,   and  ‘filial  consortium’.The right to  consortium  would  include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect   to   a   spouse,   it   would   include   sexual relations with the deceased spouse. 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband­ wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of “company society, corporation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation. 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental   aid,   protection,   affection,   society, discipline guidance and training. 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for   a   parent   is   to   lose   their   child   during   their lifetime. Children   are   valued   for   their   love, affection,   companionship   and   their   role   in   the family unit. 22. Consortium   is   a   special   prism   reflecting changing norms about the status   and worth of actual   relationships. Modern   jurisdictions   world over  have recognized that the  value of  a  child’s consortium far exceeds  the economic  value of  the compensation awarded in  the  case of the death of   a     child. Most  jurisdictions   therefore  permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to  the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. 23. The   Motor   Vehicles   Act   is   a   beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In case where a parents has lost their minor child, or unmarried   son   of   daughter,   the   parents   are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under 22 2026:HHC:20653 the head of filial consortium. Parental consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Act. A fe High Courts have awarded compensation on this count. However, there was no clarity with respect to the principles   on   which   compensation   could   be awarded on loss of filial consortium. 24. The amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding   compensation   under   “loss   of consortium”. As laid down in Pranay Sethi. In the preset case, we deem it appropriate to award the father and sister of the deceased, as amount of Rs.40,000/­ each for loss of filial consortium. 34. In addition to this, petitioners are also entitled for compensation under conventional heads i.e. loss of estate, loss of   consortium   and   funeral   expenses. The   entitlement   of   the petitioners, thus, is ascertained as under:­ 1.Loss of contribution=Rs.20,60,548/­ 2.Loss of estate = Rs.19,500/­(Rs.15,000/­+Rs.4500­) 3.Funeral expenses  = Rs.19,500/­(Rs.15,000/­+Rs.4500/­) 4.Loss of consortium= Rs.2,08,000/­ (Rs.40,000/­ x 4 =1,60,000/­+48,000/­) Total=      Rs.23,07,548/­ 35. Thus, the petitioners are held entitled for a sum of Rs.23,09,760/­, as compensation. 36. In view of the above, the amount of compensation is liable to be reduced from 24,74,000/­ to Rs.23,07,548/­. 23 2026:HHC:20653 37. The learned Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 9% per annum, which is also liable to be reduced to 7.5% per   annum,   in   view   of   the   prevailing   rate   of   interest   of   the nationalized banks. 38. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed. The awarded  amount is reduced, in the above terms. The petitioners are held entitled for the amount of Rs.23,07,548/­, along with interest @ 7.5%, from the date of filing of the petition. 39. The   amount   of   compensation   is   ordered   to   be apportioned amongst the petitioners, as under:­ Petitioners No.1 and 2 (sons) =  20% each. Petitioner No.3 (Widow) =  50% Petitioner No.4 (widowed mother)  = 10% 40. The   award   passed   by   the   learned   Tribunal   is modified in the above terms. 41. Memo of costs be prepared. 42. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of. Record be sent back. (Virender Singh) Judge May 30, 2026 (ps/subhash)