JUDGMENT : PRANJAL DAS, J. 1. Heard Mr. B.M. Deka, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assisted by Mr. K. Thakur. Also heard Mr. R.G. Baruah, learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the State respondent. 2. The petitioner Amarnath Ashok Sawant , invoking section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973, (herein after Cr.P.C), as it existed then, is seeking quashing of the criminal proceeding, being PRC Case No. 624/2024 arising out of GRPS Case No. 200/2023 , and which is presently pending before the Court of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup(M), Guwahati. 3. The facts in brief are that on 08.10.2023, one Dhiren Mipum, ASI of Guwahati GRPS, lodged an FIR before the Officer-in-Charge of Guwahati GRPS, stating that during checking in train No. 15626DN Agartala to Deogar Express at about 8.30 a.m., standing on platform No. 4/5, they noticed a person in a suspicious manner, who was traveling in Coach No. B2, Berth No. 15 of the said train. That, on being asked, he disclosed his name as Amarnath Ashok Sawant and revealed that he was carrying 13 pieces of gold biscuits by tying around his waist without any documents. 4. He also stated that he carries gold regularly from Tripura to Maharashtra for smuggling purpose with the help of other members of the racket. Thereafter, he was de-boarded from the train and the said suspected gold were seized along with a cash of Rs. 64,500/- and other articles. That, upon being asked, he failed to produce any documents regarding the gold, nor he could furnish any satisfactory reply regarding the same. Hence, the person was apprehended and brought for further action. 5. It is alleged in the FIR that the said accused person was involved in smuggling of gold and that the seized suspected gold was found to be 1.523 Kgs and it is strongly suspected to be smuggled and illegally transported without paying any taxes and without paying any valid documents to serve their ill motive to gain unlawfully and illegally. 6. As mentioned, the case was registered at GRPS Case No. 200/2023 under section 120(B)/379/411/413 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 {herein after IPC}. 7. After completion of investigation, the I/O submitted a charge- sheet vide C.S. No. 24/2024 dated 28.02.2024 against the sole accused being the present petitioner under the same penal provisions, i.e., Sections 120(B)/379/411/413 IPC. 6. As mentioned, the case was registered at GRPS Case No. 200/2023 under section 120(B)/379/411/413 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 {herein after IPC}. 7. After completion of investigation, the I/O submitted a charge- sheet vide C.S. No. 24/2024 dated 28.02.2024 against the sole accused being the present petitioner under the same penal provisions, i.e., Sections 120(B)/379/411/413 IPC. The corresponding G.R. case was PRC No. 624/2024 and pending before the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup (M), Guwahati. 8. The proceedings before the said learned court are under an order of stay vide the order dated 06.05.2025 passed by this Court. The scanned case record of PRC No. 624/2024 was requisitioned and received. 9. Mr. Deka, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner is not involved in any illegal offences and that the allegations of his being involved in the alleged offences of this case are false. It is submitted that the seized gold has been purchased by the petitioner by paying the required amount of CGST and SGST at 1.5% and that the seized gold is not subject of smuggling purpose. 10. It is contended that the penal provisions given in this case at the time of registration of the case as well as in the charge-sheet are not made out in any manner and therefore, the petitioner is seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings arising out of the same. 11. It is contended and submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no element of conspiracy; that he is not involved in any theft of the gold; that, he has not received the gold by way of dishonestly receiving any stolen property. 12. It is submitted that the ingredients of Section 413 IPC pertaining to habitually dealing with stolen property are also not applicable. It is submitted that the Investigating Authority after completion of investigation has not stated anywhere that the gold was imported from another country and the matter has also not been referred to the Customs Authority. 13. Summing up his submissions, Mr. Deka, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the facts of this case are squarely covered by the parameters of quashing laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and hence, prays for allowing his petition. 14. 13. Summing up his submissions, Mr. Deka, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the facts of this case are squarely covered by the parameters of quashing laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and hence, prays for allowing his petition. 14. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the following decisions:- (i) RP KAPOOR VS STATE OF PUNJAB reported in AIR 1960SC 866. (ii) STATE OF HARYANA VS BHAJAN LAL reported in 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335 (relevant paragraph 102). (iii) M/S NEEHARIKA INFRASTRUCTURE PRIVATELIMITED VS STATE OF MAHARASTRA reported in ( 2021) 19 SCC 401 (relevant paragraph 23). 15. On the other hand, the prosecution represented by the learned Addl. P.P. Mr. R.J. Baruah, submits and contends that 13 nos. of gold biscuits were found in possession of the petitioner and that he was carrying the same on his body indicating doubtful credentials and antecedents of the gold. It is submitted that the petitioner could not show any papers in support of his possession of the gold. 16. It is submitted that the petitioner is involved in a racket of gold smuggling. Therefore, there may not be sufficient merit in quashing the criminal proceedings at this stage. 17. I have given my due consideration to the petition, the FIR, the charge- sheet and other relevant materials annexed with the petition and available in the scanned case record. 18. I have considered the submissions of the petitioner side and the prosecution. I have perused the decisions cited in the FIR and considered their applicability to the instant case. 19. Before proceeding further, the contents of Sections 379/411/413 IPC may be reproduced herein below: - “ 379. Punishment for Theft- Whoever commits theft shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 411. Dishonestly receiving stolen property -Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen property, knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 413. 411. Dishonestly receiving stolen property -Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen property, knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 413. Habitually dealing in stolen property -Whoever habitually receives or deals in property which he knows or has reason to believe to be stolen property, shall be punished with 1 [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 20. Theft is defined in Section 378 IPC as follows: -whoever, intending to take dishonestly any movable property out of the possession of any person without that person's consent, moves that property in order to such taking, is said to commit theft. 21. Stolen property is defined in Section 410 IPC as follows: -Property, the possession whereof has been transferred by theft, or by extortion, or by robbery, and property which has been criminally misappropriated or in respect of which 1 *** 2 ***criminal breach of trust has been committed, is designated as "stolen property", 3 [whether the transfer has been made, or the misappropriation or breach of trust has been committed, within or without 4 [India]]. But, if such property subsequently comes into the possession of a person legally entitled to the possession thereof, it then ceases to be stolen property.” 22. One of the penal provisions given in the charge-sheet against the petitioner is the offence of conspiracy punishable under Section 120(B) IPC. It is well settled that conspiracy being a criminal agreement, requires at least two persons, known or unknown. 23. In this case, the petitioner is the sole accused, sent up for trial and there is no mention about any unknown others against whom investigation is continued. Therefore, clearly, the offence of conspiracy cannot be made out against the petitioner. 24. Regarding the offence of theft, there are no materials revealed by the investigation that the gold in question has been stolen from someone, nor any such complaint is revealed from the materials lodged by any person or any statement on those lines regarding theft of gold. 25. Rather, it is the contention of the petitioner that he had purchased the gold for his business purpose. 25. Rather, it is the contention of the petitioner that he had purchased the gold for his business purpose. As there are no materials regarding theft of the gold in question from any person - therefore, it would not be correct in law and facts to prosecute the petitioner for the offence of theft. 26. Similarly, there are no materials in support of any finding or conclusion that the petitioner was in receipt of any stolen gold, knowing it to be stolen. 27. As already stated and discussed above, the ingredients of theft are not found in the instant case and therefore, it cannot be said that there are any materials to indicate that the gold biscuits found with the petitioner were a subject of theft. Therefore, the question of the petitioner receiving stolen property dishonestly would not arise as one of the essential conditions to constitute that offence punishable under Section 411 IPC is that the said that the property in question has to be inter-alia a subject of theft. 28. Though the I/O has contended and also stated in the FIR that the petitioner is involved in regularly dealing with such kind of gold, but the Investigating Authority has not for revealed the details of any other criminal cases regarding dealing with any stolen property. 29. As already discussed, the ingredients of theft or dishonestly receiving stolen property with regard to the gold in question in the instant case have been found to be not available. Therefore, coupled with the fact that there are no other materials or case particulars regarding dealing with stolen property, it would be correct to say that the ingredients of Section 413 IPC punishing the offence of habitually dealing with stolen property - could not be attracted. 30. Though contention has been made on behalf of the Investigating Authority and prosecution that the gold in question could be a subject of smuggling, but no any provisions of the Customs Act pertaining to any criminal liability there under, have been given either in the FIR or in the charge sheet. The case has not also been sent to the Customs Authority for any investigation regarding criminal liability under the Customs Act. 31. The case has not also been sent to the Customs Authority for any investigation regarding criminal liability under the Customs Act. 31. Regarding the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel petitioner, R.P.KAPOOR ( supra ) is one of the earliest decisions governing the scope and ambit of the power of quashing under section 482 Cr.P.C. Bhajan Lal ( supra ) is of course the leading and foundational authority on quashing and exercise of inherent powers. para-102 thereof may be reproduced herein below:- “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law c enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the d process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or com-plaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no pru-dent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing effica-cious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 32. M/S Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited ( supra ) also deals with the subject of quashing, especially with regard to an FIR and lays down the parameters. Para-23 may be reproduced herein below:- “23. M/S Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited ( supra ) also deals with the subject of quashing, especially with regard to an FIR and lays down the parameters. Para-23 may be reproduced herein below:- “23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/charge-sheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. xii) The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied." 33. Coming back to the facts of this case, on the basis of materials available at this stage, I come to the considered opinion that the materials do not make out the ingredients of the penal provisions given in the charge-sheet under Section 120(B)/379/411/413 IPC. 34. Therefore, it would be correct to hold that the Investigating Officer was not justified to send up the petitioner for trial under these penal provisions and hence, in exercise of inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C (now, section 528 BNSS), the said unjustified charge-sheet and the concomitant criminal proceeding should be quashed 35. Resultantly, the GRPS Case No. 200/2023 , charge-sheet No. 24/2024 dated 28.02.2024 and PRC Case No. 624/2024 stands set aside and quashed 36. The criminal petition stands allowed and disposed of on the aforesaid terms.