1 2026:CGHC:19821 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ARBA No. 70 of 2025 1. Prabodh Kumar Rathore S/o Shri Dhansai Rathore Aged About 41 Years R/o Saragaon, Tahsil Champa, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 2. Lakheswar Singh S/o Shri Dhansai Rathore Aged About 39 Years R/o Saragaon, Tahsil Champa, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 3. Chhabilal Rathore S/o Shri Dhansai Rathore Aged About 36 Years R/o Saragaon, Tahsil Champa, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Executive Engineer Public Work Department, National Highway Bilaspur, Division Bilaspur, District Bilapur (C.G.) 2. Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) And Competent Authority Land Acquisition Champa, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 3. Additional Commissioner Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) (The cause title is as per the Memo of Appeal) For Appellant(s) : Mr. P.K. Patel, Advocate For Respondent No. 1/ UoI : Ms. Shweta Rai, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Ramakant Mishra, DSG For Respondents/ State : Mr. Jay Prakash Tiwari, P.L. Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2026.04.29 16:54:22 +0530 2 Order on Board 29/04/2026 1. Heard on I.A. No. 1 of 2025, application for condonation of delay of 235 days in filing this arbitration appeal filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the land of the appellant was acquired for widening of the National Highway and an award was passed on 30.07.2016. Being dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation, the appellant referred the matter under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1996 to the Arbitrator, who passed an award on 10.11.2017, directing re-evaluation of compensation in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Central Valuation Board, Raipur (C.G.) for the year 2015-16. Aggrieved by the said arbitral award, respondent No.1 filed an application under Section 34 of the Madhyastha Evam Sulah Adhiniyam, 1996, registered as Misc. Civil Suit No.10/2019, which was allowed by the learned Third District Judge, Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.), thereby setting aside the arbitral award dated 10.11.2017. Hence this appeal, assailing the impugned order as illegal, erroneous, and contrary to law. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the present appeal has been filed along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 235 days in filing the appeal. It is contended that the impugned order was passed 3 earlier and the appeal came to be filed on 13.08.2025, beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The delay has occurred on account of paucity of funds, lack of procedural knowledge, and certain personal difficulties faced by the appellant, due to which he could not approach this Court within the stipulated time. It is further submitted that the appellant is a lay person and was dependent upon legal advice, and the delay has neither been caused deliberately nor with any malafide intention. Learned counsel submits that the mistake, if any, is bonafide in nature and that the appellant has a good case on merits. It is also argued that no prejudice would be caused to the respondents if the delay is condoned and, therefore, the delay deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice. 4. (a) Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/ UoI, by filing reply of the delay application, opposes the application and submits that the delay of 235 days has not been satisfactorily explained and the grounds urged are vague and general in nature, which do not constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is contended that the appellant has been grossly negligent in prosecuting the matter and the application has been filed only to overcome the statutory bar of limitation. (b) In support of his contention, he would place reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Government of Maharasthra (Water Resources Department) vs. Borse 4 Borthers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460. In the said decision, the Supreme Court held that even where sufficient cause is shown, there is no vested right in the appellant to have the delay condoned, and that condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. In the case at hand, except the lack of legal knowledge and on account of paucity, the appellant could not file the appeal within the stipulated period as prescribed under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In fact, there was a long delay of 235 days beyond the prescribed period. The explanation feel woefully short of making out any sufficient cause. It is also evident that there was no sufficient cause whatsoever to condone such a long delay. It is also noteworthy to mention here that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no vested right in the appellant to have delay condoned. 7. The Supreme Court in the matter of Government of Maharasthra (Water Resources Department) (supra) held thus at para 62, 63 & 68 : “62. Also, it must be remembered that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the appellant to have delay 5 condoned. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. as follows: (SCR p. 771: AIR p. 365, para 12) "12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under Section 6 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14." 63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches. 7 68. This explanation falls woefully short of making out any sufficient cause. This appeal is therefore allowed and the condonation of delay is set aside on this score also.” 8. In the absence of any sufficient cause and explanations, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be entertained as a matter of routine, particularly, when the delay in filing of the instant appeal is for a period of 235 days. 9. Applying the well settled principles of law laid down by the Apex Court and for the reasons mentioned in the application, I.A. No. 1, for condonation of delay of 235 days in filing the appeal is hereby rejected. 10. Consequently, the instant arbitration appeal is also dismissed on this score alone. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) JUDGE Jyoti