2026:HHC:20058 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Criminal Revision No.303 of 2023 Date of Decision: 26.5.2026 _____________________________________________________________________ Het Ram ……...Petitioner Versus Lekh Raj Verma …....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the Petitioner: Mr. Jagat Pal, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr. Sumit Sharma, Advocate. ___________________________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral) Instant criminal revision petition, lays challenge to judgment dated 26.9.2022, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Shimla, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No. 36- S/10 of 2022, affirming the judgment of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.IV, Shimla District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh in Criminal Complaint No. 511-B of 2019/2014, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000/- to the complainant. 2026:HHC:20058 2 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that respondent/complainant lodged complaint under Section 138 of the Act before the competent court of law, alleging therein that he is owner of a five storied building known as Verma Niwas, Village Kamyana, P.O. Poabo, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. and accused approhced him for taking the accommodation of ten rooms i.e. six rooms in minor first floor and four rooms in first floor) on monthly rent of Rs. 15,000/- and agreement dated 23.9.2013 was executed inter-se parties, wherein the accused had agreed to pay rent in advance on or before 10th day of every third month, but since accused failed to comply with terms and conditions of the agreement, complainant asked the accused to vacate the accommodation and to pay arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 1,20,000/- w.e.f. 1.10.2013 to 31.5.2014, but accused with a view to discharge his liability issued cheque bearing No.646141 dated 1.6.2014, amounting to Rs.1,20,000/-, drown on the account maintained by him with UCO Bank, The Mall Shimla, in favour of the complainant, however cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned was dishonoured with remarks “Funds Insufficient” vide memo dated 14.6.2014. Immediately, after receipt of aforesaid memo, complainant served legal notice upon the accused on 23.6.2014, thereby calling upon him to make the payment good within stipulated time, but since despite receipt of notice, accused failed to make the payment, 2026:HHC:20058 3 complainant had no option but to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the competent court of law. 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 22.4.2022/9.5.2022, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per the description given herein above. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the court below, petitioner-accused preferred an appeal before the learned first appellate Court, but the same was dismissed vide judgment dated 26.9.2022. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set- aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the court below. 5. Vide order dated 25.5.2023/4.10.2023, this Court suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the court below, subject to petitioner’s depositing 50% of the compensation amount and furnishing personal bonds in the sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court. Though afore order was complied with, but thereafter, matter was repeatedly adjourned on the request of the petitioner, enabling him to deposit the balance amount, but nothing has 2026:HHC:20058 4 been done. Perusal of court file reveals that more than ten opportunities have been granted to the petitioner for doing the needful, but in vain, as such, this Court has no option but to decide the petition on merit. 6. Having carefully perused grounds taken in the revision vis-à- vis reasoning assigned by the learned Sessions Judge, thereby upholding the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court is fully convinced that both the courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously and there is no scope of interference. 7. In the case at hand, factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon never came to be disputed. Though accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC denied case of the complainant in entirety and pleaded his innocence, but pattern of cross-examination conducted upon the complainant clearly establishes factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon and as such, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the courts below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which clearly provide that there shall be presumption available in favour of the holder of the cheque that same was issued in discharge of the 2026:HHC:20058 5 lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but for that purpose, accused is/was under obligation to raise probable defence. Probable defence could be raised by the accused by referring to the documents as well as evidence adduced on record by the complainant or by leading some cogent and convincing evidence. However, in the case at hand, accused, despite sufficient opportunity, failed to raise probable defence. 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein: “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable 2026:HHC:20058 6 instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to 2026:HHC:20058 7 avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 9. Complainant with a view to prove his case, besides examining himself as CW4, also examined CW1 Sh. Aadarsh Head Cashier from UCO Bank, Kamyana, CW2 Sh. Dharam Prakash, Senior Manager, UCO Bank, Shimla, CW3 Sh. Vikas, MST Judicial Court Complex, Chakker Shimla. In his statement, complainant CW4 deposed that accused had approached him for renting him out ten rooms of his building, out of which, six rooms were on the ground floor and four on the first floor of his building, for an agreed rent of Rs. 15,000/- per month. The accused agreed to pay rent of three months before every 10th of each quarter and retained the accommodation from 1.10.2013 to 31.5.2014, but failed to pay the rent 2026:HHC:20058 8 amount. Afore witness categorically stated that though accused vacated the accommodation on 31.5.2014, but with a view to clear rent issued cheque Ext.Dx to him for a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/- in discharge of lawful liability qua arrears of rent. He stated that cheque was presented by him in his UCO Bank Account, but same was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds in the account of the accused vide return memo Ext.CW1/C. He also proved that before initiation of proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, he issued legal notice Ext.CW1/B vide postal receipt Ext.CW4/A to the accused on his correct address, but despite receipt of notice, the accused failed to make the payment of the cheque amount. Cross-examination conducted upon afore witness nowhere suggests that accused was able to extract something contrary to what this witness stated in examination-in-chief. In his cross-examination, this witness admitted that rent agreement was executed with Naari Saman Sakti, whose President is one Monika and Secretary is the accused. While stating that agreement was signed by Monika as well as the accused, afore witness admitted that he had not annexed the copy of agreement with his complaint. While denying that he had only rented out only three rooms to the accused, he categorically stated that he had rented ten rooms to the accused. He denied that accused has paid rent of two months to him in cash. He also denied that cheque in question was issued by the accused as security. 2026:HHC:20058 9 Aforesaid suggestion with regard to issuance of security cheque virtually establishes factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon and as such, court below rightly invoked powers under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act. 10. Defence with regard to issuance of cheque as security never came to be probablised. DW1 Sh. Siddarth Sharma deposed that he was member of Ashiana Group, which took rooms on rent from the complainant. While admitting that agreement in his behalf was executed as Ext.DW1/A, this witness identified his signatures in circle-A of the same and that of Het Ram in circle–B. He stated that he had issued one cheque as security to Lekh Raj as he demanded the same as security from some independent person and therefore, he had issued the cheque of Het Ram to him. While stating that there was no deal between the Ashiana Group and Het Ram regarding the payment of rent. He stated that they had paid the entire rent amount to the complainant and when the asked them to return the security cheque, he refused to return the same on the ground that the same has been lost. 11. In his cross-examination, afore witness admitted that he had not signed over cheque Ext.Dx. He stated Ext. Dx. bears the signatures of Het Ram in circle-A. He further stated that Ext.DW1/A bears his signatures as Secretary. While stating that Het Ram had signed the 2026:HHC:20058 10 Ext.DW1/A in circle-C merely as a witness, he admitted that as per Ext.DW1/A, they had obtained the accommodation of ten rooms from the complainant on a monthly rent of Rs. 15,000/-. While admitting that they had taken possession of the same as tenants, he denied that they had authorized the accused to issue cheque on their behalf. He further denied that afore ten rooms were kept under the supervision of the accused. While stating that he cannot furnish any receipt qua the payment of afore rent amount, he admitted that he had not placed on record any such document showing that they had made payment of rent amount to the complainant. He also admitted that they had also not lodged any complaint regarding the fact that that complainant had obtained a security cheque from the accused. He admitted that they had not instructed the bank to stop payment qua the cheque in question. Afore statement made by the accused, clearly establishes factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon. 12. By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued as security can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on 28.10.2021, has held as under: “16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every 2026:HHC:20058 11 circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow. 13. Needless to say, expression “Security Cheque” is not a statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a “security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138 of the Act in case of its dishonour. 14. During arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners attempted to argue that complaint was filed beyond prescribed period of limitation. He submitted that complaint was filed on 6.8.2014, whereas 2026:HHC:20058 12 legal notice was issued on 23.6.2014. He submitted that complaint came to be filed after 61 days that too without filing any application for condonation of delay, however, this court is not impressed with afore submission of Mr. Jagat Pal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, for the reason that since it stands duly proved on record that legal notice was sent to the correct address of the accused through registered post, it is deemed that same has been received by the accused on or before 28.6.2014. Despite receipt of notice, accused failed to make the payment and as such, complainant filed complaint on 7.8.2014, within a statutory period, as required under Section142 (b) of the Act. 15. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be 2026:HHC:20058 13 equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 16. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 17. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no 2026:HHC:20058 14 reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 18. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. 19. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court within thirty days to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. Learned court below is also directed to release the amount, if any, deposited before it by the accused, on filing appropriate application by the complainant within one week. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. May 26, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma), (manjit) Judge