JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI, J. 1. The instant application for review has been filed qua a judgment and order dated 28.08.2024 passed by this Court in WP(C)/4254/2024. Since there has been a substantial delay in presenting the application for review, the accompanying I.A.(Civil)/1944/2025 has been filed for condonation of delay. 2. For better understanding of the issue involved, a brief background of the case may be stated. 3. The writ petition WP(C)/4254/2024 was filed with a prayer for appointment on compassionate ground. It was projected that the father of the writ petitioner was working as a Grade-IV employee in the Assam Secretariat and had died on 01.04.2014. The petitioner had made an application for appointment on compassionate ground which was stated to be considered by the State Level Committee on 18.05.2016 and thereafter, the matter was forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner for further examination. The petitioner had filed subsequent representation in the year, 2023 and the writ petition was instituted thereafter in the year 2024. 4. This Court, after hearing the parties had passed the aforesaid judgment and order dated 28.08.2024 and the primary consideration for the decision was the undisputed fact that the government employee had died in the year 2014 and in the meantime, more than a decade had passed. This Court had also relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Debabrata Tiwari & Ors . AIR 2023 SC 1467 . The writ petition was accordingly dismissed. 5. Long after the judgment was delivered on 28.08.2024, the present application for review was filed on 03.04.2025 along with the I.A. (Civil)/1944/2025 for condonation of delay. 6. It is no longer res integra that a Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India exercises plenary jurisdiction in which the power of review is inbuilt. In this regard, one may gainfully refer to the case of M.M. Thomas vs. State of Kerala and Ors. (2000) 1 SCC 666 wherein the following observations were made: “ 14. The High Court as a court of record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records. A court of record envelops all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual memorial and testimony. (2000) 1 SCC 666 wherein the following observations were made: “ 14. The High Court as a court of record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records. A court of record envelops all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual memorial and testimony. A court of record is undoubtedly a superior court which is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. Hence, if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in respect of any orders passed by it the High Court has not only power, but a duty to correct it. The High Court’s power in that regard is plenary. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra a nine-Judge Bench of this Court has recognised the aforesaid superior status of the High Court as a court of plenary jurisdiction being a court of record.” In a subsequent case of Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai & Anr. v. Pratibha Industries Ltd. & Ors. (2019) 3 SCC 203 , similar views were expressed. 7. Since the High Court Rules prescribe for a period of limitation of a month for preferring a review, the accompanying I.A. has been filed. 8. I have heard Ms. D. Ghosh, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Shri G. Bokolial, learned State Counsel. 9. Ms. Ghosh, the learned counsel has submitted that there are sufficient reasons for which the review petition could not be filed in time and therefore, the delay is required to be condoned. On the merits of the review, it has been argued that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Debabrata Tiwari (supra) is distinguishable on facts and further that the petitioner had submitted representations. 10. On the other hand, the learned State Counsel has opposed the prayer, both for condonation of delay as well as review. It is submitted that the delay has not been explained at all and no grounds of review have been made out. 11. To appreciate the rival contentions, it would be proper to take into consideration the relevant pleadings for condonation of delay. In the I.A, the following averments have been made to explain the delay: “4. It is submitted that the delay has not been explained at all and no grounds of review have been made out. 11. To appreciate the rival contentions, it would be proper to take into consideration the relevant pleadings for condonation of delay. In the I.A, the following averments have been made to explain the delay: “4. That the petitioner most humbly states that after he was informed of the order dated 28.08.2024 passed by the Hon’ble Court in WP(C) No. 4254 of 2024, the petitioner became depressed. It took the petitioner some time to come to terms with the dismissal order and explore further remedies. 5. That thereafter, the counsel of the petitioner fell ill, thereafter the counsel also took time to draft the aforesaid review petition. Therefore, it took some time for the counsel to prefer this review. Hence, the delay, the delay so caused was neither wilful nor deliberate, it was only the circumstances for such delay.” 12. The reasons, as cited above are not only absolutely vague but are also incomplete and half-hearted. The aspect that the petitioner allegedly became “depressed” after the order does not inspire any confidence at all. The other aspect that the counsel of the petitioner fell ill and thereafter, took time to draft and file the review is also difficult to be accepted for more than one reason. Firstly, the aspect of ailment is absolutely vague and more importantly, it is not specified as to which of the counsel had fallen ill. The aforesaid aspect attains significance inasmuch as, the counsel who had appeared for the petitioner in the writ petition is not the counsel who has preferred the review petition. Though Ms. Ghosh, the learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to submit that it is the same set of counsel, the said submission is not supported by the records. This Court has carefully examined the records and while the counsel who moved the writ petition was one Ms. A. Hussain, the counsel in the Review Petition are different. 13. As discussed above, the grounds urged for condonation of delay do not inspire any confidence. However, taking a lenient view, even if the delay is condoned and the powers of review are invoked, this Court is of the opinion that no grounds at all have been made to review the judgment. 13. As discussed above, the grounds urged for condonation of delay do not inspire any confidence. However, taking a lenient view, even if the delay is condoned and the powers of review are invoked, this Court is of the opinion that no grounds at all have been made to review the judgment. As noted above, the fact of elapse of more than a decade from the date of the death of the government servant till the writ petition was filed is not in dispute. This Court, while deliberating the issue had relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Debabrata Tiwari (supra), the relevant extracts of which were given in the judgment are once again extracted: “7.2. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles emerge: (i) That a provision for compassionate appointment makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment to a post by following a particular procedure of recruitment. Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions and must be resorted to only in order to achieve the stated objectives, i.e. to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. (ii) Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. The reason for making such a benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector undertaking is to see that the dependants of the deceased are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. (iii) Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. (iv) That compassionate appointment should be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years. (v) In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind including the income of the family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits if any, received by the family, the age, dependency and marital status of its members together with the income from any other source. 14. (v) In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind including the income of the family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits if any, received by the family, the age, dependency and marital status of its members together with the income from any other source. 14. This Court had noticed that on the aspect of delay, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case while examining the said aspect from the context of the scheme has also laid down that even if the delay is on account of the authorities, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. The relevant part as observed in paragraph 7.5 of the aforesaid judgment is extracted herein below:- 7.5. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment from some other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, an noted by this Court in Hakim Singh would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as thought it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the dependents of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee.” 15. In the aforesaid case of Debabrata (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the principles governing a claim for appointment on compassionate ground and therefore, the plea that the facts are distinguishable cannot be countenanced. 16. In the aforesaid case of Debabrata (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the principles governing a claim for appointment on compassionate ground and therefore, the plea that the facts are distinguishable cannot be countenanced. 16. This Court has also noted that the review has been filed by changing the counsel. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Anr. vs. N. Raju Reddiar and Anr. (1997) 9 SCC 736 deprecated such practice and had observed as follows: “ 1. It is a sad spectacle that a new practice unbecoming and not worthy of or conducive to the profession is cropping up. Mr Mariaputham, Advocate-on-Record had filed vakalatnama for the petitioner-respondent when the special leave petition was filed. After the matter was disposed of, Mr V. Balachandran, Advocate had filed a petition for review. That was also dismissed by this Court on 24-4-1996. Yet another advocate, Mr S.U.K. Sagar, has now been engaged to file the present application styled as “application for clarification”, on the specious plea that the order is not clear and unambiguous. When an appeal/special leave petition is dismissed, except in rare cases where error of law or fact is apparent on the record, no review can be filed; that too by the Advocate-on-Record who neither appeared nor was party in the main case. It is salutary to note that the court spends valuable time in deciding a case. Review petition is not, and should not be, an attempt for hearing the matter again on merits. Unfortunately, it has become, in recent time, a practice to file such review petitions as a routine; that too, with change of counsel, without obtaining consent of the Advocate-on-Record at earlier stage. This is not conducive to healthy practice of the Bar which has the responsibility to maintain the salutary practice of profession. In Review Petition No. 2670 of 1996 in CA No. 1867 of 1992, a Bench of three Judges to which one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J., was a member, had held as under: “The record of the appeal indicates that Shri Sudarsh Menon was the Advocate-on-Record when the appeal was heard and decided on merits. The review petition has been filed by Shri Prabir Chowdhury who was neither an arguing counsel when the appeal was heard nor was he present at the time of arguments. The review petition has been filed by Shri Prabir Chowdhury who was neither an arguing counsel when the appeal was heard nor was he present at the time of arguments. It is unknown on what basis he has written the grounds in the review petition as if it is a rehearing of an appeal against our order. He did not confine to the scope of review. It would not be in the interest of the profession to permit such practice. That apart, he has not obtained ‘No Objection Certificate’ from the Advocate-on-Record in the appeal, in spite of the fact that Registry had informed him of the requirement for doing so. Filing of the ‘No Objection Certificate’ would be the basis for him to come on record. Otherwise, the Advocate-on-Record is answerable to the Court. The failure to obtain the ‘No Objection Certificate’ from the erstwhile counsel has disentitled him to file the review petition. Even otherwise, the review petition has no merits. It is an attempt to reargue the matter on merits. On these grounds, we dismiss the review petition.” 2. Once the petition for review is dismissed, no application for clarification should be filed, much less with the change of the Advocate-on-Record. This practice of changing the advocates and filing repeated petitions should be deprecated with a heavy hand for purity of administration of law and salutary and healthy practice.” 17. The powers of review are to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where there is error apparent on the face of the records, where new materials are discovered which were not within the knowledge of the applicant and for sufficient reasons. None of the conditions are present in the instant case. 18. This Court is of the opinion that the present move by the applicant clearly appears to be an abuse of the process. In view of the same, both the I.A. and the Review Petition stand dismissed with exemplary cost of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) only to be paid in favour of Gauhati High Court Bar Association Welfare Fund Account No. 34778155050.