2026:HHC:20065 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 4122 of 2013 Reserved on: 01.04.2026 Decided on: 26.05.2026 Gian Chand ...…. Petitioner Versus State of H.P. …. Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Ms Ragini Dogra, Advocate, Legal Aid Counsel. For the Respondent : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 29.05.2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (camp at Bilaspur) (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 30.04.2011 and order of sentence dated 04.05.2011 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes. 2 2026:HHC:20065 referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 184 and 187 of the Motor Vehicle Act (MV Act). It was asserted that the informant Rajeev Kumar (PW1), Mahinder Kumar (PW4) and Devender Kumar @ Vicky (since deceased) were grazing the cattle on 12.06.2000 near Bhambrari road. Devender Kumar was going towards Raj Ghati at about 5:45 PM. A truck bearing registration No. HIB-0351 came from Darlaghat at a high speed and crushed Devender Kumar under its rear tyre. The truck driver sped away from the spot. He parked the truck at a distance of about 700 meters and ran away from the spot. Gian Chand (the accused) was driving the truck at the time of the accident. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused and the high speed of the truck. An intimation was given to the police, and an entry (Ext.PW9/C) was recorded in the Police Station. ASI Bhoop Singh (PW9), Constable Raj Kumar, Constable Kunnu Ram, HHG Nand Lal and HHC Ram 3 2026:HHC:20065 Kishan were sent for verification. ASI Bhoop Singh (PW9) recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW9/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW9/B) was registered. ASI Bhoop Singh (PW9) prepared the site plan (Ext.PW9/D) and took the photographs (Ext.P1 to Ext.P11) whose negatives are Ext.P12 to Ext.P22. A pair of slippers was found on the spot, which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW9/E). ASI Bhoop Singh (PW9) seized the truck vide memo (Ext.PW6/A). The accused was apprehended at Namhol Bazar. He produced his driving licence, which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW6/B). Documents of the vehicle were seized vide memo (Ext.PW8/A). Mechanical examination of the truck was conducted, and the report (Ext.PW9/F) was issued. The dead body was sent to Zonal Hospital, Bilaspur. An inquest on the dead body was conducted, and the report (Ex.PW9/H) was issued. Doctor Ashok Kumar Mehta (PW7) conducted the post-mortem examination of the dead body. He found that the skull was crushed and there were multiple injuries. The cause of death was a severe head injury. He issued the report (Ext.PW7/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the 4 2026:HHC:20065 investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 & 304A of the IPC and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicle Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Rajeev (PW1) is the informant and an eyewitness. Kailash Chand (PW2), Hari Singh (PW3), Tilak Raj (PW6), and Jyoti Ram (PW8) witnessed the recoveries. Mahinder Kumar (PW4) is an eyewitness. Surender Kumar (PW5) reached the spot after the accident. Dr Ashok Kumar Mehta (PW7) conducted the post- mortem examination of the deceased. ASI Bhoop Singh (PW9) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He stated that he was not aware 5 2026:HHC:20065 of why the witnesses had deposed against him. He claimed that he was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the prosecution's evidence duly proved that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. The plea taken by the accused that the deceased had put his hands on the rear tyre and was crushed under the rear tyre was not proved on the balance of probability. The prosecution witnesses had consistently deposed that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle, and his negligence led to the accident, causing the death of Devender Kumar. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as follows: Sections Sentences 279 of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 304A of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo 6 2026:HHC:20065 simple imprisonment for two months. Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was negligently driving the truck. The defence taken by the accused that the deceased had tried to touch the spare tyre of the truck leading to the accident was not believable. Learned Trial Court had properly appreciated the evidence and rightly convicted the accused. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was adequate, and no interference was required with it. Consequently, the appeal preferred by the accused was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material on record. The prosecution 7 2026:HHC:20065 witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars. It was admitted by them that the truck was loaded with cement and was moving at a slow speed. The deceased was crushed under the rear tyre of the truck, and the accused could not have been held guilty of negligently driving the truck. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Ms Ragini Dogra, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Ms Ragini Dogra, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The prosecution has not specified the precise negligence of the accused. The learned courts below relied upon the testimonies of the witnesses that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle. This was not sufficient, and the prosecution was required to prove the breach of duty committed by the accused. The learned Trial Court had imposed a harsh sentence, and the learned Appellate Court had mechanically confirmed it. Therefore, she prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed 8 2026:HHC:20065 by the learned Courts below be set aside. She relied upon the judgment of this Court in State of H.P. vs. Abhishek Kumar 2025:HHC:44350 in support of her submission. 11. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that both the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle, and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the learned Courts below. The accused had failed to avoid any harm to the pedestrians moving on the road, and this constituted negligence on his part. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent 9 2026:HHC:20065 defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 10 2026:HHC:20065 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. 11 2026:HHC:20065 Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to re- appreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding 12 2026:HHC:20065 that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with 13 2026:HHC:20065 the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 14 2026:HHC:20065 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. The informant Rajeev (PW1) stated that he was going towards Raj Ghati on the left side of the road on 12.06.2000 at about 5 PM. A truck bearing registration No. HIB-0351 came from Darlaghat and crushed Devender under the rear tyre. The driver sped away from the spot and stopped after half a kilometre. The accused was driving the truck, and the accident occurred due to his negligence and the high speed of the truck. 20. Mahinder Kumar (PW4) stated that he, Devender Kumar and Rajeev (PW1) were going to Raj Ghati on 12.06.2000. They were walking towards their own side. A truck bearing registration No. HIB-0351 came from Bilaspur, and its rear tyre crushed Devender Kumar. The driver sped away from the spot. However, it was stopped after some distance. The accident occurred because of the high speed of the truck and the negligence of the accused. 15 2026:HHC:20065 21. These are the only witnesses to the incident. They have not mentioned the precise negligence of the accused leading to the accident. Learned Courts below also relied upon their testimonies that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle. This was not sufficient. Negligence is an inference from the fact. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 22. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis 16 2026:HHC:20065 of evidence led before the Court.” 23. Therefore, the accused could not have been convicted because the witnesses had attributed negligence to him. 24. The witnesses also asserted that the accused was driving the truck at a high speed. However, they have not mentioned the approximate speed of the vehicle. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 17 2026:HHC:20065 25. This Court also took a similar view in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1989 SCC OnLine HP 18: 1990 ACJ 598, wherein it was observed at page 600: “14. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving at high speed, but it has not been said as to what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle was moving in a high speed is neither a proper and legal evidence on high speed nor in any way indicates thereby the rashness on the part of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect as the speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in a case under section 304-A of the Penal Code, 1860. Further, there are no skid marks, which eliminates the evidence of high speed of the vehicle…” 26. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, and it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" 18 2026:HHC:20065 could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 27. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 228. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 29. Thus, the accused could not have been held guilty because the witnesses had used the term high speed. 30. Mahinder Kumar (PW4) admitted in his cross- examination that the truck was loaded with cement. He also admitted that the truck was going uphill from Bharari Ghat to Raj Ghati. Rajiv (PW1) also admitted in his cross-examination that 19 2026:HHC:20065 the truck was loaded with cement and it was going uphill. He also admitted that a loaded vehicle moves slowly. These admissions make the prosecution's case doubtful that the accused was driving the truck at a high speed. 31. It is an admitted case of the prosecution that the deceased was crushed under the rear tyre of the truck. No witness has explained how the rear tyre of the truck could have crushed the deceased. The accused, being a driver of the vehicle, was supposed to look ahead, and no one explained as to what was the precise negligence of the accused when a person was crushed under the rear tyre. It was laid down by this Court in State of H.P. versus Dogra Ram 2008 (1) Curr. LJ (HP) 366 that when a person was crushed under the rear tyre of the vehicle, and the precise manner of the accident was not brought on record, the accused could not have been convicted of driving the vehicle negligently. It was observed: “6. PW-1 has not actually seen how Sriniwas came under the rear left tyres of the truck. He has stated that on his signal, the respondent turned the truck towards the left side, and in the meantime, he heard noise from the shops. He noticed that a person had come under the left rear tyres of the truck. The prosecution has not examined any independent eyewitness. The accident has taken place in a crowded place. It is not understandable why the 20 2026:HHC:20065 prosecution has not associated with an examination any witness from the shops where Sriniwas came under the truck. PW-5 Mohan Lal has not stated in his statement that he has a shop near the place of the accident. In any case, he has not supported the prosecution. It is unfortunate that a person has died, but the prosecution has not placed the necessary facts on record to prove the rash or negligent driving on the part of the respondent for causing the accident and death of Sriniwas. PW-1 has stated that when the respondent turned the truck at that time, there was no person on the road. It appears that during the process of turning, somehow, the deceased came in contact with the rear left tyres of the truck and was crushed, but how he came in contact with the tyres has not been stated by any witness. The left rear tyres of the truck are not visible from the driver side. On the basis of material on record and after scrutinising the evidence, the learned Sessions Judge has come to a conclusion that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, rash or negligent driving on the part of the respondent has not been established. If two views are possible from the material on record, then this Court, while sitting in appeal, will not take another view. The prosecution has failed to make out any case for interference. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds, furnished by the respondent, are discharged.” 32. It was held in State of H.P. versus Desh Raj, Latest HLJ 2010(1) 112 (HP), that the prosecution has to prove the precise negligence of the accused to secure his conviction. It was observed: “8 PW-4 Ram Dulara on material point has contradicted PW-1 Jaswinder Singh regarding the manner in which the accident took place: The learned trial Court had given repeated opportunities to the prosecution for examining the witnesses, but ultimately on 24 8.2001, the evidence of 21 2026:HHC:20065 the prosecution was closed by the order of the Court. The fact remains that Rikhi Ram, who conducted the investigation partly and a material witness was not examined. In Ambalal D. Bhatt Vs. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1972, S.C. 1150, the Apex Court has held that in a prosecution for an offence under Section 304-A, the mere fact that an accused contravenes certain rules or regulations in the doing of an act which causes death of another, does not establish that the death was the result of a rash or negligent act or that any such act was the proximate and efficient cause of the death. The act causing the deaths "must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine qua non." The Supreme Court in Suleman Rahiman Mulani and another Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968, S.C, 829, while interpreting Section 304-A IPC, has held that the requirements of this section are that the death of any person must have been caused by the accused by doing any rash or negligent act. In other words, there must be proof that the rash or negligent act of the accused was the proximate cause of the death. There must be a direct nexus between the death of a person and the rash or negligent act of the accused. It is unfortunate that Kumari Pooja has died, but the prosecution has failed to establish that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the respondent. The post-mortem report and other medical evidence of deceased Pooja are of no help to the prosecution in the absence of proof of rash or negligent driving of the respondent, causing the death of Kumari Pooja. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate has rightly appreciated the material on record in acquitting the respondent. There is no perversity in the impugned judgment. The prosecution has failed to make out any case for interference, and the appeal is liable to be dismissed.” 33. In the present case, there is also no explanation for the accident, and hence, the accused could not have been 22 2026:HHC:20065 convicted when the accident occurred with the left rear tyre of the truck. 34. Both the learned Courts below had not adverted to the question of precise negligence, and they accepted the inadmissible statements of the witnesses that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle. Therefore, the judgments passed by the learned Trial Court and learned Appellate Court convicting the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC cannot be sustained. 35. The learned Trial Court had put the notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of the MV Act. However, the learned Trial Court did not convict the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of the MV Act. The State did not file any appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Trial Court, which means that the order passed by the learned trial Court has attained finality. Therefore, the prosecution’s evidence for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of the MV Act is not required to be discussed. 23 2026:HHC:20065 36. No other point was urged. 37. In view of the above, the present revision is allowed, and the judgment of conviction dated 30.04.2011 and order of sentence dated 04.05.2011 passed by the learned Trial Court, as affirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur (camp at Bilaspur) on 29.05.2013, are ordered to be set aside. The accused is acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 and 304-A of the IPC. The fine/compensation amount, if deposited by the petitioner/accused be refunded to him after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case of no further appeal, and in case of appeal, it shall be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 38. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the 24 2026:HHC:20065 leave, the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 39. The present revision stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 40. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 26th May, 2026 (Nikita)