1 2026:CGHC:20376-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 2151 of 2026 M/s Shiv Shakti Construction Company Having Its Registered Office At Mig-80 Housing Board Colony, Boda Bagh, Rewa (M.P.), Through Its Partner Sanjay Singh Chauhan. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Public Works Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Engineer-In-Chief Public Works Department, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, (C.G.) 3 - Chief Engineer (Tender Cell) Public Works Department, National Highway Zone, Raipur (C.G.) 4 - Chief Engineer Public Works Department, National Highway Zone, Raipur (C.G.) 5 - Superintending Engineer National Highway Zone, Public Works Department, Bilaspur (C.G.) 6 - Executive Engineer National Highway Division, Public Works Department, Bilaspur (C.G.) 7 - Union Of India Through Regional Officer, Ministry Of Road, Transport And Highways, N.H. Campus, Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.05.05 10:26:46 +0530 2 For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Harshwardhan Agrawal, Advocate For State-respondents For Respondent No. 3 to 7 : : Dr. Sourabh Pandey, Dy. A.G. Mr. Neeraj Baghel on behalf of Mr. R. K. Mishra, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 01/05/2026 1. Heard Mr. Harshwardhan Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Dr. Sourabh Pandey, learned Dy. Advocate General, appearing for Respondent/State and Mr. Neeraj Baghel on behlaf of Mr. R. K. Mishra, learned counsel for the Respondent No.3 to 7. 2. The present petition has been filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India by the petitioner with the following relief:- “10.1 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records in respect of the present NIT and the grievance of the Petitioner kept in the possession of the Respondents, for its kind perusal. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to adjudicate and declare that denial of fair and reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to submit his online bids by the respondents is illegal and arbitrary in eyes of law. 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be 3 pleased to direct the respondents to permit the petitioner to submit his bid which shall be duly considered by the respondents along with other bids and thereafter tender be finalized in accordance with law. 10.4 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief which the Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 10.5 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant cost of the petition to the Petitioner.” 3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner, a reputed A-class contractor, has successfully executed multiple public works in the States of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh for departments such as the PWD, Water Resources, and Railways. Respondent No. 3 issued a Notice Inviting Tender dated 25.03.2026 for rehabilitation and upgradation of NH-43 (Pathalgaon to Kunkuri section) with an estimated value of ₹158.39 crores. As per the tender schedule, the pre-bid meeting was held on 10.04.2026 and the last date for submission of bids was 23.04.2026. The petitioner, intending to participate, raised queries regarding incomplete and unclear tender conditions through a representation dated 09.04.2026 and also during the pre-bid meeting. However, the respondents issued clarifications and a corrigendum, including crucial drawings and details, only on 20.04.2026, just three days prior to the bid submission deadline. Despite the substantial 4 changes and late disclosures, the respondents failed to extend the submission deadline, making it practically impossible for bidders to reassess the project scope, conduct site inspections, and submit a competitive bid. The petitioner, along with other bidders, requested extension of time through representations dated 22.04.2026, but the respondents proceeded with the tender process without granting any extension. It is alleged that such arbitrary and hurried action was malafide, aimed at favoring certain bidders, thereby defeating the very purpose of fair and competitive bidding. Consequently, the petitioner contends that he was denied a fair opportunity to participate in the tender process, prompting the filing of the present petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the impugned actions and inactions of the respondent authorities are wholly arbitrary, illegal, and malafide, being in blatant violation of the petitioner’s fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution of India. The respondents, being “State” within the meaning of Article 12, are under a constitutional obligation to act in a fair, transparent, and reasonable manner; however, in the present case, they have acted in undue haste and for extraneous considerations by issuing crucial clarifications and a corrigendum incorporating essential technical details and drawings only on 20.04.2026, without extending the bid submission deadline of 23.04.2026. This conduct effectively deprived the petitioner and other eligible bidders of a fair and meaningful opportunity to participate in the tender process, rendering the entire bidding exercise illusory and anti- 5 competitive. It is submitted that expecting bidders to reassess such a large-scale project, undertake site inspections, and submit responsive bids within an unreasonably short span is manifestly unjust and contrary to settled principles governing public procurement. The actions of the respondents not only frustrate the very object of competitive bidding but also promote favoritism and nepotism, thereby undermining transparency and causing potential loss to the public exchequer. Hence, the impugned tender process is liable to be set aside and appropriate directions deserve to be issued to ensure a fair, transparent, and competitive bidding process. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State- respondents submits that On behalf of the State, it is respectfully submitted that the present petition is misconceived and devoid of merit, as the tender process in question has been conducted strictly in accordance with the prescribed procedure, terms, and conditions of the Notice Inviting Tender. The petitioner, having participated in the pre-bid process and being fully aware of the tender conditions and schedule, cannot now challenge the same merely because the outcome is not favorable or due to self-assessed inconvenience. It is submitted that issuance of clarifications and corrigendum is a normal and integral part of the tender process to ensure transparency and to address queries raised by bidders, and the same was duly published within the tender framework without altering the essential conditions of the bid. There is no legal mandate requiring extension of the bid submission date in every such instance, and the decision not to extend the timeline falls 6 within the domain of administrative discretion, exercised in public interest and for timely execution of an important infrastructure project. The allegations of malafide, favoritism, and arbitrariness are vague, unsubstantiated, and unsupported by any cogent material. It is further submitted that the scope of judicial review in contractual matters is limited, and unless the process is shown to be patently arbitrary or discriminatory, interference is not warranted. In the present case, no such ground is made out, and therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 6. Learned counsel on behalf of the Union of India, would submit that the present petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed, as the tender process has been conducted in a fair, transparent, and non- discriminatory manner strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Notice Inviting Tender and the governing procurement guidelines. It is submitted that the issuance of clarifications and corrigendum forms an integral part of the tender process, intended to address queries of prospective bidders and to ensure clarity in execution, and the same does not ipso facto necessitate extension of the bid submission timeline unless such changes fundamentally alter the scope or nature of the work. The competent authority, upon due consideration, has exercised its administrative discretion in public interest to adhere to the prescribed schedule, keeping in view the urgency and importance of the infrastructure project. The petitioner, having participated in the pre-bid process and being aware of the tender conditions, cannot now seek to challenge the process on vague and 7 unsubstantiated allegations of arbitrariness or malafide, in absence of any cogent material. It is further submitted that the scope of judicial review in matters of contractual policy and tender conditions is limited, and unless the decision-making process is shown to be arbitrary, irrational, or in violation of statutory provisions, no interference is warranted. In the present case, no such ground is made out, and therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed in limine. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. 8. Upon consideration of the rival submissions and perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds no merit in the present petition. The scope of judicial review in contractual and tender matters is well settled to be limited, and the Court does not sit as an appellate authority to examine the commercial wisdom or administrative decisions of the tendering authority. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any patent arbitrariness, mala fide, or violation of statutory provisions in the tender process. The issuance of clarifications and corrigendum is a normal feature of tendering and, in absence of any fundamental alteration of the terms, does not mandate extension of time as a matter of right. The decision of the competent authority to proceed with the tender schedule falls within the realm of administrative discretion exercised in public interest, particularly in projects of public importance. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Tata Cellular vs. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651, had laid down certain 8 principles for the judicial review of administrative action. “94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. Based on these principles we will examine the facts of this case since they commend to us as the correct principles.” 10. In the case of “Jagdish Mandal Vs. State of Orissa and others” reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517, the Hon’ble Supreme Court 9 has held that :- 22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made “lawfully” and not to check whether choice or decision is “sound”. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or 10 Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached;” (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.” 11. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out any case warranting interference under writ jurisdiction. The allegations of mala fide and favoritism are vague and unsupported by cogent evidence, and the petitioner’s grievance essentially arises from non-extension of the bid submission date, which by itself cannot be a ground to invalidate the entire tender process. 12. Accordingly, the present petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice sagrika