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2026 DAILYLAW 10120 (HP)

MUKESH CHAUHAN v. STATE OF HP

CRMP/3311/2025 · 2026-05-29

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026

Judgment text

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2026:HHC:20401 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP No. 3311 of 2025 in Cr. Revision No. 4116 of 2013 Reserved on: 21.04.2026 Date of Decision: 29.05.2026. Mukesh Chauhan ...Appellant Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Arsh Chauhan, Advocate, for the petitioner. For the Respondent : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present application for taking on record the compromise effected between the parties and disposing of the revision in terms of the compromise. It has been asserted that the applicant/petitioner was tried, convicted and sentenced for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:20401 187 of the Motor Vehicle Act (M.V. Act) by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No. II, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court). The conviction and sentence were upheld by learned Sessions Judge (Forest), Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide judgment dated 19.082013. The accused approached this Court by filing a revision, which is pending disposal. The parties belong to neighbouring villages and have settled the dispute between themselves. Hence, the application. 2. The statement of victim Amin Chand was recorded on 07.08.2025, in which he stated that he had entered into a compromise voluntarily with the accused without any influence or coercion from any person and had no objection to quashing the FIR as per the compromise effected between the parties. 3. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramawatar v. State of M.P., (2022) 13 SCC 635: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 966 that the FIR can be quashed even after recording a conviction, provided the matter is pending before some Court. It was observed on page 640: 3 2026:HHC:20401 13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 CrPC are exercisable in post-conviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the other judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is sub judice before an appellate court. The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may be before the final Court, is sine qua non to involve the superior court's plenary powers to do complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings based on a compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fides. We have already clarified that the purpose of these extraordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow-hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s). 4. A similar view was taken in Ramgopal v. State of M.P., (2022) 14 SCC 531: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 834, wherein it was observed at page 539: “13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature can be annulled irrespective of the fact that the trial has already been concluded or the appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. The societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying that in cases where a compromise is struck post-conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the 4 2026:HHC:20401 circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and after the incident. The touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under Section 482CrPC would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard-and-fast line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482CrPC may lead to rigid or specious justice, which, in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, para 29 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] and Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, para 15 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706]. 5. This position was reiterated in Rajendra Bhagat v. State of Jharkhand, (2022) 18 SCC 465: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1882, wherein it was observed at page 468: “8. Having examined the matter in its totality, it appears that the High Court, while disposing of the revision petition with the application moved by the parties, did not pause to consider that maintaining of conviction of the appellant of the offence under Section 498-AIPC would not be securing the ends of justice and with such conviction being maintained and the appellant losing his job, the family would again land itself in financial distress which may ultimately operate adverse to the harmony and happy conjugal life of the parties. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Respondent 2 both have reiterated their stand that they have resolved 5 2026:HHC:20401 their disputes and are living together while leading a happy conjugal life. 11. In the aforesaid view of the matter, and taking note of the terms of settlement as stated in the application moved before the High Court which include the undertaking of the appellant that he would be nominating Respondent 2 as the nominee in his service record; and where the parties are said to be leading a happy conjugal life, we are clearly of the view that the High Court should have accepted the settlement and quashed all the proceedings with annulment of the orders against the appellant. The High Court having not done so, we are inclined to adopt this course to secure the ends of justice.” 6. In view of these binding precedents, the Court can exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings based on a compromise effected between the parties even after the conviction of the accused. 7. This Court had already quashed the F.I.R. registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC of M.V.Act in Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLC 531, Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009, Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384 and Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Law Cases 45 and others are based on the compromise. Further, this Court has already quashed the F.I.R. registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of M.V. Act in Suresh Kumar 6 2026:HHC:20401 v. State of H.P.2022(1) Him L.R. (HC) 81, Vijender Mehta and another vs. State of H.P. and another (2023) ACC 488 (HP) and Sandeep Kumar vs. State of H.P. and others II (2003) ACC 651 (H.P) and these judgments are binding upon this Court. 8. In view of these precedents, the present application is allowed, and F.I.R. No. 17 of 2007, dated 20.01.2007, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC and Section 184 of M.V.Act at Police Station Rohru, District Shimla, H.P., is ordered to be quashed. Consequent upon the quashing of FIR, criminal proceedings pending against the respondent/accused in pursuance thereof are also ordered to be quashed. 9 Application stands disposed of. Cr. Revision No. 4116 of 2012 10 The Court has quashed the F.I.R. No. 17 of 2007, dated 20.01.2007, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC and Section 184 of M.V.Act at Police Station Rohru, District Shimla, H.P., and the proceeding arising out of the said F.I.R. Hence, the present 7 2026:HHC:20401 revision has become infructuous and stands disposed of accordingly. 11. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 12. The record of the learned Trial Court be returned along with a copy of this order. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 29th May,2026. (ravinder)