1 2026:HHC:20655 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. FAO (MV) No. 99 of 2018 Reserved on : 19.5.2026 Decided on : 30.5.2026 National Insurance Company Ltd. .......Appellant Versus Manmohan Sharma & others ...Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 yes __________________________________________________________________ For the appellant: Ms. Shilpa Sood, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Sunny Moudgill, Advocate (through Video Conferencing) and Ms. Ananya Verma, Advocate, for respondent No. 1. Ms. Shrutika Chauhan, Advocate vice Mr. Dheeraj K. Vashishta, Advocate, for respondents No. 2 and 3. Virender Singh, Judge The National Insurance Company Limited has filed the present appeal, under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the M.V.Act’) against the award 1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:20655 dated 24.11.2017, passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (III) Una, District Una, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’), in MAC Claim Petition No. 140 of 2014, titled as, ‘Manmohan Sharma versus Tarun Garg & others’. 2. By way of award dated 24.11.2017, the learned Tribunal has allowed the claim petition filed by respondent No. 1 by awarding a sum of Rs. 9,20,900/-, as compensation, along with interest @ 9% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition, till deposit. The ultimate liability to pay the compensation has been fastened upon the Insurance Company (appellant). 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present lis are, hereinafter, referred to, in the same manner, as were, referred to, by the learned Tribunal. 4. Brief facts, leading to filing of present appeal, before this Court, may be summed up, as under:- Petitioner Manmohan Sharma has filed the petition, under Section 166 of M.V. Act, seeking compensation on account of injuries/disability sustained/ suffered by him, in a Motor vehicle accident, which according to him, had taken place on 19.4.2014 at about 5:00 p.m. at village Sidh Chalehar, near Kailash Hotel, Tehsil Amb, 3 2026:HHC:20655 District Una, H.P., involving vehicle No. UA-07Q-0063 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the offending vehicle’), being driven by respondent No. 1, owned by respondent No. 2 and insured with respondent No.3. 4.1 Elaborating his stand, it has been pleaded that on 19.4.2014, petitioner, alongwith his friend, was on the way to attend a marriage in village Kinnu, on his motor cycle No. PB02V-8727. When, they reached near Kailash Hotel in village Sidh Chalehar, then, the offending vehicle came there from Chintpurni side, being driven by respondent No.1 in a rash and negligent manner and hit his motorcyle. Consequently, the petitioner sustained multiple injuries, particularly on his right leg and shoulder. 4.2 After the accident, he was taken to PHC Amb, where he was examined by Doctor and first aid was given to him. In view of his serious condition, the Doctor advised that he should be shifted to a better hospital, as such, he was shifted to Purewal Hospital, Hoshiarpur (Pb). He remained admit in the said hospital w.e.f. 19.4.2014 to 27.4.2014. 4.3 The matter regarding the accident was reported to the Police of Police Station, Amb and FIR No. 59 of 2014, dated 19.4.2014, under Sections 279, 337, 201 of IPC and Section 187 of M.V. Act, was registered, against respondent No. 1. 4 2026:HHC:20655 4.4 It is the further case of the petitioner that due to injuries, sustained by him, he has become disabled and he was forced to spend a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-, on his treatment. 4.5 Asserting his bright past and bleak future, the petitioner has sought compensation of Rs. 20,00,000/- alongwith interest @ 12% per annum, from the respondents. 5. When put to notice, the claim petition has been contested by the respondents, by filing reply(ies). 6. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have filed joint reply, in which, they have admitted the factum of accident, however, according to them, the accident in question had taken place, due to negligence of the petitioner himself in driving the motorcycle. Rest of the contents of the claim petition have been denied. 7. Insurance Company of the vehicle, i.e. respondent No. 3 has filed separate reply by taking preliminary objections that the claim petition is not maintainable. According to the Insurance Company, the driver of the offending vehicle was not having valid and effective driving license, at the time of accident. As such, the offending vehicle is being permitted to ply, in violation of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy. 5 2026:HHC:20655 9. On merits, the contents of the claim petition have mainly been denied for want of knowledge. 10. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made by the respondents to dismiss the claim petition. 11. The petitioner filed rejoinder to the replies, filed by the respondents, denying preliminary objections, as well as, the contents of the replies, by virtue of which, the claim petition has been contested, by re-asserting that of the claim petition. 12. From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed, by the learned Tribunal, vide order dated 15.6.2016:- 1. Whether petitioner suffered injuries on account of rash or negligent driving of respondent No.1(driver), as alleged? OPP 2. Whether petitioner is entitled for compensation, to what extent and from whom? OPP. 3. Whether petitioner himself was rash or negligent as alleged, if so its effect? OPR-1&2. 4. Whether respondent No.1 was not having a valid and effective driving licence to drive the vehicle in question at the time of event? OPR-3. 5. Whether the vehicle in question was being plied by respondent No.1 in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, if so its effect? OPR-3. 6. Relief 13. Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, the claim petition was allowed, as referred to above. 6 2026:HHC:20655 14. Feeling aggrieved from the said award, the Insurance Company has filed the present appeal on the ground that the learned Tribunal has awarded an exorbitant amount, as compensation, whereas, petitioner could not lead any evidence to demonstrate that he was earning a sum of Rs. 500/- per day. 15. The award has been assailed further on the ground that the learned Tribunal has wrongly discarded the evidence, adduced by the Insurance Company. It has further been pleaded that the learned Tribunal has wrongly calculated the monthly income of the petitioner as Rs. 15,000/-, without there being any proof on the record. 16. On the basis of above facts, Ms. Shilpa Sood, Advocate, appearing on behalf of appellant-Insurance Company has prayed that the appeal may kindly be allowed and the amount of compensation may kindly be reduced. 17. The prayer, so made, has been opposed by Mr. Sunny Moudgill, Advocate, appearing for respondent No. 1- claimant on the ground that learned Tribunal has wrongly taken the income of the petitioner as Rs. 15,000/-, per month and prayed that the amount of compensation may kindly be enhanced, so that the same may fall within the purview of ‘just compensation’. 7 2026:HHC:20655 18. Ms. Shrutika Chauhan, learned vice counsel appearing for respondents No. 2 and 3 (driver and owner) has supported the award passed by the learned Tribunal and prayed that the appeal may kindly be dismissed. 19. It is worthwhile to mention here that the Insurance Company has assailed the award only on account of quantum, not on account of liability. In such situation, the only question, which arises for determination, before this Court, is with regard to the fact as to whether amount of compensation, which has been awarded to the claimant, by the learned Tribunal, falls within the definition of ‘just compensation’ or not? 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Mohd. Nasir and another, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri.) 987 has held that the provisions of M.V. Act are beneficial piece of legislation and the endeavour of the Court/Tribunal should be to provide “just compensation”. The relevant paras 23 and 24 of the judgment are reproduced as under:- “23. Both, the 1923 Act and 1988 Act are beneficent legislation insofar as they provide for pay- ment of compensation to the workmen employed by the employers and/or by use of motor vehicle by the owner thereof and/or the insurer to the petitioners suffering permanent disability. The amount of compensation is to be deter- mined in terms of the provisions of the respective Acts. Whereas in terms of the 1923 Act, the 8 2026:HHC:20655 Commissioner who is a quasi judicial authority, is bound to apply the principles and the fac- tors laid down in the Act for the purpose of determin- ing the compensation, Section 168 of the 1988 Act en- joins the Tribunal to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to be just. 24. Both the Acts aim at providing for expeditious relief to the victims of accident. In these cases, the accidents took place by reason of use of motor vehicles. Both the statutes are beneficial ones for the workmen as also the third par- ties. The benefits thereof are available only to the per- sons specified under the Act besides under the Contract of Insurance. The statutes, therefore, deserve liberal construction. The legislative intent contained therein is required to be interpreted with a view to give effect thereto.” (self emphasis supplied) 21. This view has again been reiterated by Hon’ble Apex Court in Govind Yadav versus The New India Assurance Co. Ltd., reported in 2012 ACJ 28 (SC). Relevant paragraphs 12 to 15 of the judgment are reproduced as under: 12. In Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan (2009) 13 SCC 422, this Court reiterated that the compensation awarded under the Act should be just and also identified the factors which should be kept in mind while determining the amount of compensation. The relevant portions of the judgment are extracted below: "The compensation which is required to be determined must be just. While the claimants are required to be compensated for the loss of their dependency, the same should not be considered to be a windfall. Unjust enrichment should be discouraged. This Court cannot also lose sight of the fact that in given cases, as for example death of the only son to a mother, she can never be compensated in monetary terms. The question 9 2026:HHC:20655 as to the methodology required to be applied for determination of compensation as regards prospective loss of future earnings, however, as far as possible should be based on certain principles. A person may have a bright future prospect; he might have become eligible to promotion immediately; there might have been chances of an immediate pay revision, whereas in another (sic situation) the nature of employment was such that he might not have continued in service; his chance of promotion, having regard to the nature of employment may be distant or remote. It is, therefore, difficult for any court to lay down rigid tests which should be applied in all situations. There are divergent views. In some cases it has been suggested that some sort of hypotheses or guess work may be inevitable. That may be so. In the Indian context several other factors should be taken into consideration including education of the dependants and the nature of job. In the wake of changed societal conditions and global scenario, future prospects may have to be taken into consideration not only having regard to the status of the employee, his educational qualification; his past performance but also other relevant factors, namely, the higher salaries and perks which are being offered by the private companies these days. In fact while determining the m ultiplicand this Court in O riental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jas huben held that even dearness allowance and perks with regard thereto from which the family would have derived monthly benefit, must be taken into consideration. One of the incidental issues which has also to be taken into consideration is inflation. Is the practice of taking inflation into consideration wholly incorrect? Unfortunately, unlike other developed countries in 10 2026:HHC:20655 India there has been no scientific study. It is expected that with the rising inflation the rate of interest would go up. In India it does not happen. It, therefore, may be a relevant factor which may be taken into consideration for determining the actual ground reality. No hard-and- fast rule, however, can be laid down therefor." (emphasis supplied) 13. In Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Company Limited (2010) 10 SCC 254, the Court considered the plea for enhancement of compensation made by the appellant, who was a student of final year of engineering and had suffered 70% disablement in a motor accident. After noticing factual matrix of the case, the Court observed: "We do not intend to review in detail state of authorities in relation to assessment of all damages for personal injury. Suffice it to say that the basis of assessment of all damages for personal injury is compensation. The whole idea is to put the claimant in the same position as he was insofar as money can. Perfect compensation is hardly possible but one has to keep in mind that the victim has done no wrong; he has suffered at the hands of the wrongdoer and the court must take care to give him full and fair compensation for that he had suffered." (emphasis supplied) 14. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343, the Court considered some of the precedents and held: "The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ("the Act", for short) makes it clear that the award must be just, which means that compensation should, to the extent possible, fully and adequately restore the claimant to the position prior to the accident. The 11 2026:HHC:20655 object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a result of  wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. The court or the Tribunal shall have to assess the damages objectively and exclude from consideration any speculation or fancy, though some conjecture with reference to the nature of disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. This means that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following: Pecuniary damages (Special damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure. (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising: (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. 12 2026:HHC:20655 (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage). (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity). In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life." (emphasis supplied) 15. In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. (supra) and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (supra) must be followed by all the Tribunals and the High Courts in determining the quantum of compensation payable to the victims of accident, who are disabled either permanently or temporarily. If the victim of the accident suffers permanent disability, then efforts should always be made to award adequate compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment, but also for the loss of earning and his inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the disability caused due to the accident. 22. Similar view has again been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled as, Sidram versus Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited & anr., reported in (2023) 3 Supreme Court Cases 13 2026:HHC:20655 439. Relevant paragraphs 29 to 40 of the judgment are reproduced as under: 29. The process of determining the compensation by the court is essentially a very difficult task and can never be an exact science. Perfect compensation is hardly possible, more so in claims of injury and disability. As rightly pointed out in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, 1958-65 ACJ 504 (HL, England): “…money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered.” 30. The principle consistently followed by this court in assessing motor vehicle compensation claims, is to place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in before the accident, with other compensatory directions for loss of amenities and other payments. These general principles have been stated and reiterated in several decisions. [Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 683.] 31. It is now a well settled position of law that even in cases of permanent disablement incurred as a result of a motor- accident, the claimant can seek, apart from compensation for future loss of income, amounts for future prospects as well. We have come across many orders of different tribunals and unfortunately affirmed by different High Courts, taking the view that the claimant is not entitled to compensation for future prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries resulting in permanent disablement. That is not a correct position of law. There is no justification to exclude the possibility of compensation for future prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries resulting in permanent disablement. Such a narrow reading is illogical because it denies altogether the possibility of the living victim progressing further in life in 14 2026:HHC:20655 accident cases – and admits such possibility of future prospects, in case of the victim’s death. 32. This Court has emphasised time and again that “just compensation” should include all elements that would go to place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in, before the occurrence of the accident. Whilst no amount of money or other material compensation can erase the trauma, pain and suffering that a victim undergoes after a serious accident, (or replace the loss of a loved one), monetary compensation is the manner known to law, whereby society assures some measure of restitution to those who survive, and the victims who have to face their lives. 33. In Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited and Others, (2012) 6 SCC 421, this Court held that: “14. We find it extremely difficult to fathom any rationale for the observation made in paragraph 24 of the judgment in Sarla Verma case [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121] that where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., the Courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death and a departure from this rule should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances. In our view, it will be nave to say that the wages or total emoluments/income of a person who is self-employed or who is employed on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., would remain the same throughout his life. 15. The rise in the cost of living affects everyone across the board. It does not make any distinction between rich and poor. 15 2026:HHC:20655 As a matter of fact, the effect of rise in prices which directly impacts the cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximum on those who are self-employed or who get fixed income/emoluments. They are the worst affected people. Therefore, they put in extra efforts to generate additional income necessary for sustaining their families. 16. The salaries of those employed under the Central and State Governments and their agencies/instrumentalities have been revised from time to time to provide a cushion against the rising prices and provisions have been made for providing security to the families of the deceased employees. The salaries of those employed in private sectors have also increased manifold. Till about two decades ago, nobody could have imagined that salary of Class IV employee of the Government would be in five figures and total emoluments of those in higher echelons of service will cross the figure of rupees one lakh. 17. Although the wages/income of those employed in unorganised sectors has not registered a corresponding increase and has not kept pace with the increase in the salaries of the government employees and those employed in private sectors, but it cannot be denied that there has been incremental enhancement in the income of those who are self- employed and even those engaged on daily basis, monthly basis or even seasonal basis. We can take judicial notice of the fact that with a view to meet the challenges posed by high cost of living, the persons falling in the latter category periodically increase the cost of their labour. In this context, it may be useful to give an example of a tailor who earns his livelihood by stitching cloths. If the cost of living increases and the prices of essentials go up, it is but natural for him to increase the cost of his 16 2026:HHC:20655 labour. So will be the cases of ordinary skilled and unskilled labour, like, barber, blacksmith, cobbler, mason etc. 18. Therefore, we do not think that while making the observations in the last three lines of para 24 of Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121] judgment, the Court had intended to lay down an absolute rule that there will be no addition in the income of a person who is self-employed or who is paid fixed wages. Rather, it would be reasonable to say that a person who is self-employed or is engaged on fixed wages will also get 30% increase in his total income over a period of time and if he/she becomes the victim of an accident then the same formula deserves to be applied for calculating the amount of compensation.” 34. In Jagdish v. Mohan and Others, (2018) 4 SCC 571, the victim, a carpenter, suffered permanent disablement, and his claim for compensation including for loss of future prospects was considered by a three- Judge Bench which included, incidentally, the judges who had decided National Insurance Company (supra). This Court held that: “13. In the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680], this Court has held that the benefit of future prospects should not be confined only to those who have a permanent job and would extend to self-employed individuals. In the case of a self- employed person, an addition of 40% of the established income should be made where the age of the victim at the time of the accident was below 40 years. Hence, in the present case, the appellant would be entitled to an enhancement of Rs. 2400 towards loss of future prospects. 17 2026:HHC:20655 14. In making the computation in the present case, the court must be mindful of the fact that the appellant has suffered a serious disability in which he has suffered a loss of the use of both his hands. For a person engaged in manual activities, it requires no stretch of imagination to understand that a loss of hands is a complete deprivation of the ability to earn. Nothing —at least in the facts of this case—can restore lost hands. But the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards of compensation are not law's doles. In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law. Our conversations about law must shift from a paternalistic subordination of the individual to an assertion of enforceable rights as intrinsic to human dignity. 15. The Tribunal has noted that the appellant is unable to even eat or to attend to a visit to the toilet without the assistance of an attendant. In this background, it would be a denial of justice to compute the disability at 90%. The disability is indeed total. Having regard to the age of the appellant, the Tribunal applied a multiplier of 18. In the circumstances, the compensation payable to the appellant on account of the loss of income, including future prospects, would be Rs 18,14,400. In addition to this amount, the appellant should be granted an amount of Rs 2 lakhs on account of pain, suffering and loss of amenities. The amount awarded by the Tribunal towards medical expenses (Rs 98,908); for extra nourishment (Rs 25,000) and for attendant's expenses (Rs 1 lakh) is 18 2026:HHC:20655 maintained. The Tribunal has declined to award any amount towards future treatment. The appellant should be allowed an amount of Rs 3 lakhs towards future medical expenses. The appellant is thus awarded a total sum of Rs 25,38,308 by way of compensation. The appellant would be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% p.a. on the compensation from the date of the filing of the claim petition. The liability to pay compensation has been fastened by the Tribunal and by the High Court on the insurer, owner and driver jointly and severally which is affirmed. The amount shall be deposited before the Tribunal within a period of 6 weeks from today and shall be paid over to the appellant upon proper identification.” 35. The case of Parminder Singh v. New India Assurance Company Limited and Others, (2019) 7 SCC 217, involved an accident victim, who underwent surgery for hemiplegia (weakness of one half of the body on the left side; in this case, caused by an accident). According to the treating medic, the victim could not work as a labourer or perform any agricultural work, or work as a driver (as he was wont to); the assessment of his disability was at 75%, and of a permanent nature. The Court held that: “5.1. The appellant has however, produced an affidavit by his employer in this Court. As per the said affidavit, the appellant was earning Rs 10,000 p.m. at the time of the accident. 5.2. On the basis of the affidavit filed by the employer of the appellant, we accept that the income of the appellant was Rs 10,000 p.m. at the time of the accident, for the purpose of computing the compensation payable to him. 5.3. Taking the income of the appellant as Rs 10,000 p.m., with future prospects @ 50% as awarded by the High Court, the total income of the appellant would come to Rs 15,000 p.m. 5.4. The appellant was 23 19 2026:HHC:20655 years old at the time when the accident occurred. Applying the multiplier of 18, the loss of future earnings suffered by the appellant would work out to Rs 15,000 × 12 × 18 = Rs 32,40,000. ********* ********* ********* 5.7. In K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2012) 12 SCC 274, this Court held that: (SCC p. 279, para 10) “10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicating authority, while determining the quantum of compensation, has to keep in view the sufferings of the injured person which would include his inability to lead a full life, his incapacity to enjoy the normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries and his ability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. Hence, while computing compensation the approach of the Tribunal or a court has to be broad-based. Needless to say, it would involve some guesswork as there cannot be any mathematical exactitude or a precise formula to determine the quantum of compensation. In determination of compensation the fundamental criterion of “just compensation” should be inhered.” ******** ********* ******** 5.9. In the present case, it is an admitted position that it is not possible for the appellant to get employed as a driver, or do any kind of manual labour, or engage in any agricultural operations whatsoever, for his sustenance. In such circumstances, the High Court has rightly assessed the appellant's functional disability at 100% insofar as his loss of earning capacity is concerned. The appellant is, therefore, awarded Rs 32,40,000 towards loss of earning capacity.” 36. Yet later and in near past, in an accident case, which tragically left in its wake a young girl in a life-long state of 20 2026:HHC:20655 paraplegia, this Court, in Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Others, (2020) 4 SCC 413, reiterated that in addition to loss of earnings, compensation for future prospects too could be factored in, and observed that: “14. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [ (1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996 : 1980 ACJ 55], this Court held : (SCC p. 366, para 2) “2. … the determination of the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in a free country in generous scales.” 15. In R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. [(1995) 1 SCC 551 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 250], dealing with the different heads of compensation in injury cases this Court held thus: “9. Broadly speaking while fixing the amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far as non- pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include: (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in the future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for loss of expectation of life i.e. on account 21 2026:HHC:20655 of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.” 16. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [(2011) 1 SCC 343 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 164 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1161], this Court laid down the heads under which compensation is to be awarded for personal injuries: (SCC p. 348, para 6) “6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following: Pecuniary damages (Special damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure. (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising: (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage). (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity). 22 2026:HHC:20655 In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii) (b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life.” 17. In K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 12 SCC 274 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 279 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 638, this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 276, para 2) “2. … There cannot be actual compensation for anguish of the heart or for mental tribulations. The quintessentiality lies in the pragmatic computation of the loss sustained which has to be in the realm of realistic approximation. Therefore, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity “the Act”) stipulates that there should be grant of “just compensation”. Thus, it becomes a challenge for a court of law to determine “just compensation” which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall, and simultaneously, should not be a pittance. 20. Both the courts below have held that since the girl was a young child of 12 years only notional income of Rs 15,000 p.a. can be taken into consideration. We do not think this is a proper way of assessing the future loss of income. This young girl after studying could have worked and would have earned much more than Rs 15,000 p.a. Each case has to be decided on its own evidence but taking notional income to be Rs 15,000 p.a. is not at all justified. The appellant has placed before us material to show that the minimum wages payable to a skilled workman is Rs 4846 per month. In 23 2026:HHC:20655 our opinion, this would be the minimum amount which she would have earned on becoming a major. Adding 40% for the future prospects, it works to be Rs 6784.40 per month i.e. 81,412.80 p.a. Applying the multiplier of 18, it works out to Rs 14,65,430.40, which is rounded off to Rs 14,66,000.” 37. In Neerupam Mohan Mathur v. New India Assurance Company, (2013) 14 SCC 15, this Court considered the case of a victim, whose injury was assessed to 70% as loss of earning capacity for amputation of the arm; he was a postgraduate diploma holder in mechanical engineering, 32 years of age and earning about Rs. 3000/- per month. This Court held, approving the High Court's order (which had adopted the formula from the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 to determine 70% for the purpose of deciding loss of earning capacity) as follows: “12. In the present case, the percentage of permanent disability has not been expressed by the doctors with reference to the full body or with reference to a particular limb. However, it is not in dispute that the claimant suffered such a permanent disability as a result of injuries that he is not in a position of doing the specialised job of designing, refrigeration and air conditioning. For the said reason, the claimant's services were terminated by his employer but that does not mean that the claimant is not capable to do any other job including the desk job. Having qualification of BSc degree and postgraduate diploma in Mechanical Engineering, he can perform any job where application of mind is required than any physical work. 13. In view of the forgoing discussion we find no grounds made out to interfere with the finding of the High Court which determined the percentage of loss of earning capacity to 70% adopting the percentage of 24 2026:HHC:20655 loss of earning capacity as per the Workmen's Compensation Act. The total loss of income was thus rightly calculated by the High Court at Rs 6,04,800.” 38. However, making a monetary assessment of the injury suffered is the only process devised to compensate the victim. The process of making such an assessment, whether in case of death or injury, is provided in Section 168 of the Act which requires that the tribunals constituted under the Act determine compensation, which appears to be ‘just’. Thus, the Act vests a wide discretion upon the tribunals. The decision of this Court in Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and Another, (2003) 7 SCC 197, needs mention here (para 15): “15. ……It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. Bodily injury is nothing but a deprivation which entitles the claimant to damages. The quantum of damages fixed should be in accordance with the injury. An injury may bring about many consequences like loss of earning capacity, loss of mental pleasure and many such consequential losses. A person becomes entitled to damages for mental and physical loss, his or her life may have been shortened or that he or she cannot enjoy life, which has been curtailed because of physical handicap. The normal expectation of life is impaired. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be “just” and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit but the same should not be a pittance. The courts and tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be “just” compensation is a vexed 25 2026:HHC:20655 question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for  assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of “just” compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression “which appears to it to be just”, a wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness.. …” 39. This Court in R.D. Hattangadi (supra), posited certain principles to be followed: “9.……while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i.e., on 26 2026:HHC:20655 account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.” 40. In the case of Raj Kumar (supra) this Court has explained in the following terms the general principles relating to compensation in injury cases and assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent disability: “General principles relating to compensation in injury cases 5. The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“the Act”, for short) makes it clear that the award must be just, which means that compensation should, to the extent possible, fully and adequately restore the claimant to the position prior to the accident. The object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a result of wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. The court or the Tribunal shall have to assess the damages objectively and exclude from consideration any speculation or fancy, though some conjecture with reference to the nature of disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. This means that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. [See C.K. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair [(1969) 3 SCC 64 : AIR 1970 SC 376] , R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest 27 2026:HHC:20655 Control (India) (P) Ltd. [(1995) 1 SCC 551 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 250] and Baker v. Willoughby [1970 AC 467 : (1970) 2 WLR 50 : (1969) 3 All ER 1528 (HL)] .] 6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following: Pecuniary damages (Special damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure. (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising: (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage). (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity). In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is 28 2026:HHC:20655 only in serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life. 7. Assessment of pecuniary damages under Item (i) and under Item (ii)(a) do not pose much difficulty as they involve reimbursement of actuals and are easily ascertainable from the evidence. Award under the head of future medical expenses—Item (iii)—depends upon specific medical evidence regarding need for further treatment and cost thereof. Assessment of non-pecuniary damages—Items (iv), (v) and (vi)—involves determination of lump sum amounts with reference to circumstances such as age, nature of injury/deprivation/disability suffered by the claimant and the effect thereof on the future life of the claimant. Decisions of this Court and the High Courts contain necessary guidelines for award under these heads, if necessary. What usually poses some difficulty is the assessment of the loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability—Item (ii) (a). We are concerned with that assessment in this case. Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent disability 8. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a human being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of 29 2026:HHC:20655 the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident, though he is able to perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity. Total permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform any avocation or employment related activities as a result of the accident. The permanent disabilities that may arise from motor accident injuries, are of a much wider range when compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (“the Disabilities Act”, for short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated in Section 2(i) of the Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained in a motor accident, they can be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claiming compensation. 9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot 30 2026:HHC:20655 be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body cannot obviously exceed 100%. 10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, the  percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. 11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of 31 2026:HHC:20655 earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation. (See for example, the decisions of this Court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [(2010) 10 SCC 254 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1258 : (2010) 10 Scale 298] and Yadava Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2010) 10 SCC 341 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1285 : (2010) 8 Scale 567] ) 12. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and, if so, the extent of such permanent disability. This means that the Tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence: (i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary; (ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement; (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is, the permanent disability suffered 32 2026:HHC:20655 by the person. If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is no question of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity. 13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood. 14. For example, if the left hand of a claimant is amputated, the permanent physical or functional disablement may be assessed around 60%. If the claimant was a driver or a carpenter, the actual loss of earning capacity may virtually be hundred per 33 2026:HHC:20655 cent, if he is neither able to drive or do carpentry. On the other hand, if the claimant was a clerk in government service, the loss of his left hand may not result in loss of employment and he may still be continued as a clerk as he could perform his clerical functions; and in that event the loss of earning capacity will not be 100% as in the case of a driver or carpenter, nor 60% which is the actual physical disability, but far less. In fact, there may not be any need to award any compensation under the head of “loss of future earnings”, if the claimant continues in government service, though he may be awarded compensation under the head of loss of amenities as a consequence of losing his hand. Sometimes the injured claimant may be continued in service, but may not be found suitable for discharging the duties attached to the post or job which he was earlier holding, on account of his disability, and may therefore be shifted to some other suitable but lesser post with lesser emoluments, in which case there should be a limited award under the head of loss of future earning capacity, taking note of the reduced earning capacity. 15. It may be noted that when compensation is awarded by treating the loss of future earning capacity as 100% (or even anything more than 50%), the need to award compensation separately under the head of loss of amenities or loss of expectation of life may disappear and as a result, only a token or nominal amount may have to be awarded under the head of loss of amenities or loss of expectation of life, as otherwise there may be a duplication in the award of compensation. Be that as it may. 16. The Tribunal should not be a silent spectator when medical evidence is tendered in regard to the 34 2026:HHC:20655 injuries and their effect, in particular, the extent of permanent disability. Sections 168 and 169 of the Act make it evident that the Tribunal does not function as a neutral umpire as in a civil suit, but as an active explorer and seeker of truth who is required to “hold an enquiry into the claim” for determining the “just compensation”. The Tribunal should therefore take an active role to ascertain the true and correct position so that it can assess the “just compensation”. While dealing with personal injury cases, the Tribunal should preferably equip itself with a medical dictionary and a handbook for evaluation of permanent physical impairment (for example, Manual for Evaluation of Permanent Physical Impairment for Orthopaedic Surgeons, prepared by American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons or its Indian equivalent or other authorised texts) for understanding the medical evidence and assessing the physical and functional disability. The Tribunal may also keep in view the First Schedule to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 which gives some indication about the extent of permanent disability in different types of injuries, in the case of workmen. 17. If a doctor giving evidence uses technical medical terms, the Tribunal should instruct him to state in addition, in simple non-medical terms, the nature and the effect of the injury. If a doctor gives evidence about the percentage of permanent disability, the Tribunal has to seek clarification as to whether such percentage of disability is the functional disability with reference to the whole body or whether it is only with reference to a limb. If the percentage of permanent disability is stated with reference to a limb, the Tribunal will have to seek the doctor's opinion as to 35 2026:HHC:20655 whether it is possible to deduce the corresponding functional permanent disability with reference to the whole body and, if so, the percentage. 18. The Tribunal should also act with caution, if it proposed to accept the expert evidence of doctors who did not treat the injured but who give “ready to use” disability certificates, without proper medical assessment. There are several instances of unscrupulous doctors who without treating the injured, readily give liberal disability certificates to help the claimants. But where the disability certificates are given by duly constituted Medical Boards, they may be accepted subject to evidence regarding the genuineness of such certificates. The Tribunal may invariably make it a point to require the evidence of the doctor who treated the injured or who assessed the permanent disability. Mere production of a disability certificate or discharge certificate will not be proof of the extent of disability stated therein unless the doctor who treated the claimant or who medically examined and assessed the extent of disability of the claimant, is tendered for cross- examination with reference to the certificate. If the Tribunal is not satisfied with the medical evidence produced by the claimant, it can constitute a Medical Board (from a panel maintained by it in consultation with reputed local hospitals/medical colleges) and refer the claimant to such Medical Board for assessment of the disability. 19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above: (i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity. (ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be 36 2026:HHC:20655 assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that the percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as the percentage of permanent disability). (iii) The doctor who treated an injured claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard to the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety. (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors.” 23. Similar view has also been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sushila & Others versus Sudhakar & Another, 2026 Live Law (SC) 343. Relevant paragraphs 19 and 20 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:- “19. In our considered opinion, although the High Court had enhanced the compensation, it was on the lower side. The cardinal principle of awarding compensation in the cases of motor accidents is to provide a “just compensation” to the victim and/or the distressed dependents of the deceased. The term “just” implies that the compensation must be fair, reasonable, and equitable as per the applicable legal standards. The 37 2026:HHC:20655 compensation should not be too meagre, nor should it be excessive. The sole foundation of providing monetary compensation is to make efforts to put the dependents of the deceased at the same financial position that they were in, had the accident not occurred. [See also: Reshma Kumari and others vs. Madan Mohan and another, reported in (2013) 9 SCC 65; National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Indira Srivastava & Ors, reported in (2008) 2 SCC 763; and Divisional Controller, KSRTC vs. Mahadeva Shetty and another, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 197] 20) Thus, in the light of the settled principle that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “M.V. Act”) is a beneficial legislation and the compensation should be just and equitable, let us deal with the issues for determination in the present appeal.” 24. Being guided by the above decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court would proceed further to determine as to whether the amount of compensation awarded by the learned MACT to the claimants falls within the definition of ‘just compensation’ or not? 25. Perusal of the record shows that the learned Tribunal has awarded the amount under the various heads. However, for awarding the compensation, under various heads, evidence is required to be discussed. 26. After framing of issues, the petitioner has examined PW-2 Dr. Usha Daroch, SMO Amb, who has proved 38 2026:HHC:20655 the MLC of the petitioner. She has declared injuries No. 2, 3 and 4 as grievous in nature and has referred the petitioner to Regional Hospital, Una, for further treatment. 27. The petitioner has examined PW-5 Dr. J.S. Purewal, Orthopedic Surgeon, who has deposed that on 19.4.2014, Manmohan Sharma (petitioner) was admitted in his hospital with the fracture of right thigh and double fracture of right tibia. He was operated on 23.4.2014 for fracture of thigh and on 25.4.2014, for fracture of right tibia. He was discharged from the hospital on 27.4.2014. He has proved the discharge slip Ext. P-47 and bills Exts. P1 to P-41 and P-44. 28. PW-6 Dr. Vivek, M.O. Regional Hospital, Hamirpur has issued the disability certificate Ext. PW6/A, in which, it has been mentioned that the petitioner is 40% permanently disabled. 29. Petitioner Manmohan Sharma, while appearing in the witness box as PW-4, deposed about the fact that after the accident, he was firstly taken to PHC Amb, where first aid was given to him and thereafter, he was advised to go for better treatment in some better hospital. Consequently, he was shifted to Purewal Hospital, where he remained admit w.e.f. 19.4.2014 to 25.4.2014. During that period, he was 39 2026:HHC:20655 operated upon twice and according to him, he is still visiting the said hospital for follow ups. Apart from this, he has deposed that his treatment is still going on and he is still bed ridden. The statement of the petitioner is totally silent about his income, at the relevant time. 30. In view of the evidence, this Court would proceed further to determine the amount of compensation, for which, the petitioner is entitled for, under the various heads. NON PECUNIARY DAMAGES Pain and Sufferings 31. The period of hospitalization of the petitioner, as per the statement of Dr. J.S. Purewal is nine days, i.e. w.e.f. 19.4.2024 to 27.4.2024. During the period of hospitalization, he was also operated upon twice. The learned Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 50,000/- under the head ‘Pain and Sufferings’. The said amount is liable to be reduced and according to the considered opinion of this Court, the claimant is held entitled for a sum of Rs. 18,000/- (9 x 2000). The said amount is reduced keeping in view the fact that while assessing the amount of Rs. 50,000/- under the aforesaid head, no reasons have been assigned by the learned Tribunal. Reasons should be the hallmark of any decision by the Court, determining the rights of the parties. 40 2026:HHC:20655 Loss of Enjoyment of Life 32. The learned Tribunal has not awarded any amount under the head ‘Loss of Enjoyment of Life’. The period of hospitalization is held to be 9 days. Keeping in view the nature of injuries, i.e. fracture, he might have taken at least four months for convalescence. Although, the Doctor has assessed 40% permanent disability, however, the said disability is liable to be considered under the head ‘Loss of earnings and earning capacity’. As such, the same is not liable to be taken into consideration, at this stage, as double enrichment is prohibited under the law. 33. Considering the period of hospitalization and convalescence, this Court is of the view that interest of justice would be met, if a sum of Rs. 50,000/- is awarded to the petitioner, under the head ‘Loss of Enjoyment of Life’, as he could not enjoy the life of a normal human being, during the convalescence. Shorten Expectancy of Life: 34. There is no evidence on the record to prove or to suggest that due to disability, suffered and injuries sustained, the life span of the petitioner has been shortened. As such, no amount of compensation is being awarded, under this head. 41 2026:HHC:20655 PECUNIARY DAMAGES 35. Loss of Earnings and Earning Capacity The claimant/petitioner in the claim petition, has pleaded that at the relevant time, he was earning a sum of Rs. 30,000/- In column-5 of the claim petition, he has pleaded that he was running a business of Handicraft furniture and also doing the work of agriculture. Interestingly, the learned Tribunal has taken the income of petitioner as Rs. 15,000/- per month. The age of the petitioner, at the relevant time, has been proved to be 38 years. 36. Highlighting this point, it has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the conclusion that the income of the petitioner, at the relevant time, was Rs. 15,000/- per month, is not based upon any evidence, as the petitioner, while appearing in the witness box, remained silent, qua his earnings, as well as, his business. 37. Although, it has been pleaded in the petition, that the monthly income of the petitioner is Rs. 30,000/-, but, without any evidence, it cannot be concluded that he was earning a sum of Rs. 15,000/- per month. It is a case where this Court can say that there is no evidence with regard to the income of the petitioner. 42 2026:HHC:20655 38. When, there is no evidence with regard to the income of the petitioner, then, the safest course for this Court is to adopt the minimum wages, prevalent at that time. The accident in question had taken place on 19.4.2014. Accepting the plea of the petitioner that he was running a carpenter shop, as the daily wages can be said to be Rs. 214.17/-, or to say a sum of Rs. 6425/- per month, as per notification No. Shram(A) 4-8/2006 Part File, dated 28.5.2014, as required under Article 348 of the Constitution of India, issued by the Department of Labour and Employment, Government of Himachal Pradesh, which has come into effect from 1.4.2014. The period of hospitalization and convalescence is held to be 4 months and 9 days. Meaning thereby, the petitioner could not contribute anything towards his family, for a period of 5 months, for which he is entitled for a sum of Rs. 6425 x 5 = Rs. 32,125/-. 39. So far as loss of earning capacity is concerned, as per disability certificate, petitioner is found 40% permanently disabled, as he is held to be skilled carpenter, and the injury has been assessed, in view of fracture of right thigh and double fracture of right tibia. 40. Considering the nature of job of the petitioner, this Court is of the view that now it is not possible for him to 43 2026:HHC:20655 work as Carpenter and due to the disability, assessed by the Doctor, he has to take some other profession. Thus, his functional disability can be said to be 50%. Thus, the learned Tribunal has fallen into error while concluding that disability of 40% is functional disability. The same has to be assessed, keeping in view the profession/occupation of the injured. 41. The monthly income of petitioner, at the time of accident, is held to be Rs. 6425/- per month. The permanent disability is 40% and functional disability is also held to be 50%, on account of the fact that petitioner was carpenter and with 40% disability, now he cannot work as carpenter and he has to choose some other work to earn his livelihood. 42. In view of the law, laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Pranay Sethi’s case, 40% amount is liable to be added in the monthly income of petitioner. Thus, his monthly income for the purpose of assessing the compensation, under the head ‘Loss of Earning Capacity’ comes to Rs. 6425+40% (Rs. 2570/-)= Rs. 8995/-. His functional disability has been held to be 50%. Thus, loss on account of earning capacity per month comes to Rs. 4497/- (50% of 8995/-). 44. Considering the age of the petitioner, which is held to be 38 years, multiplier of 15 is to be applied, in the present case. Thus, the entitlement of the petitioner on 44 2026:HHC:20655 account of loss of earning capacity comes to Rs. 4497 x 12x 15 = Rs. 8,09,460/-. Medical Expenses 45. The learned Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.1,10,900/- under the head ‘Medical Expenses and Transportation Charges’. The said findings do not require any interference by this Court. Special Diet and Attendant Charges 46. Considering the period of hospitalization and convalescence, this Court is of the view that the applicant is entitled for a sum of Rs. 129 x 200 = Rs. 25,800/-, under the head ‘Special Diet and Attendant Charges’, whereas, the learned Tribunal has only awarded a sum of Rs. 7500/-. The petitioner has specifically deposed in his examination-in-chief that during that period, he had hired services of attendant, as such, the amount, which has been given, under the head of ‘Special Diet and Attendant Charges’ is liable to be enhanced from Rs. 7500/- to Rs. 25,800/-. 47. Considering all these facts, the petitioner is held entitled to a sum of Rs. Rs. 18,000 + Rs. 50,000/- + Rs. 32,125/- + Rs. 8,09,460/- + Rs. 1,10,900/- + Rs. 25,800/- = Rs. 10,46,285/-. 45 2026:HHC:20655 48. However, rate of interest, which has been awarded by the learned Tribunal, as 9% per annum, is liable to be reduced, keeping in view the prevailing rate of interest of the nationalized banks and the same is assessed @ 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole amount. 49. In view of the above discussions, the appeal is partly allowed. However, the award passed by the learned Tribunal is modified and the amount of compensation is enhanced from Rs. 9,20,900/- to Rs. 10,46,285/-. 50. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order so as to costs. 51. Memo of costs be prepared. 52. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of. 53. Record be sent back. (Virender Singh) 30.5.2026 Judge (kalpana)