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2026 DAILYLAW 10093 (GAU)

Romawia Lungvar Veng Khawzawl v. State of Mizoram

2026-01-30

Mitali Thakuria

body2026
JUDGMENT : MITALI THAKURIA, J. Heard Mr. Lalfakwama, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant and Ms. Linda L Fambawl, learned PP, Mizoram for the respondent No.1. Also heard Mr. H. Zodingsanga, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the respondent No.2/informant. 2. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the convict Romawia through the Special Superintendent, District Jail, Champhai under Section 374 CrPC assailing his conviction and sentence awarded to him by the learned Fast Tract Special Court (Rape and POCSO Act, 2012), Champhai vide judgment dated 30.03.2023 passed in Criminal Trial No. 217/2022 for the offence under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 3. As per the judgment the accused appellant is convicted under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and thereby sentenced to undergo R.I. for 10 (ten) years along with fine of Rs.2000/-, in default S.I. for 15 (fifteen) days. 4. Aggrieved with the judgment passed by the learned Fast Tract Special Court, Champhai, Mizoram, this appeal from jail has been preferred through the Superintendent, District Jail, Champhai. 5. The brief facts of the case is that on 25.07.2022 an FIR was lodged by the father of the victim before the Officer-in-Charge of Khawzawl police station alleging that on the night of 28.03.2022, the daughter of the informant, who was 16 years old at the relevant time of incident was raped by the accused appellant, who is the husband of her paternal aunt. It is also stated in the FIR that he threatened to kill the victim and asked her not to disclose about the incident. 6. Mr. Lalfakwama, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant submitted that the accused appellant is in jail since the date of his arrest i.e., 30.03.2023. The prosecution has examined only 4 witnesses including the informant, victim, the Investigating Officer and the Medical Officer. 7. Mr. Lalfakwama, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant submitted that the present appeal has been filed basically on two grounds, i.e., the age of the victim was not proved and the delay in lodging he FIR is also not explained properly. 8. Mr. Lalfakwama, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant submitted that admittedly the occurrence took place on 28.03.2022 and the FIR of the case was lodged only on 25.07.2022 i.e., after four months from the date of occurrence without any explanation about the delay in lodging the FIR. 9. 8. Mr. Lalfakwama, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant submitted that admittedly the occurrence took place on 28.03.2022 and the FIR of the case was lodged only on 25.07.2022 i.e., after four months from the date of occurrence without any explanation about the delay in lodging the FIR. 9. Referring the deposition of PW-1, the learned Amicus Curiae submitted that from his deposition it is evident that the accused himself told him that he had sexually assaulted his daughter on the very same day when his daughter told about the incident to him. Thus, inspite of his knowledge about the rape of his daughter, the FIR was lodged after four months from the date of incident without further explanation. 10. The learned Amicus Curiae further submitted that though the FIR was lodged on 25.07.2022, but from the FIR form it is seen that the victim informed about the incident to her parents only in the last part of June, 2022. Thus, it is seen that even if it is considered that the matter was informed to her parents by the victim in the last part of June, 2022, the FIR was lodged again with a delay of one month even after coming to know about the incident by the PW-1 in the last part of month of June, 2022. 11. Mr. Lalfakwama, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant further submitted that there is no age prove document of the victim and in absence of the birth certificate, the I.O. also did not try to collect her School Certificate to prove the age of the victim that at the relevant time she was 16 years of age. The I.O. only took the help of Medical Officer for her age determination and the only determining rd factor of her is that there was no eruption of her 3 molar of the victim and on the basis of which her age was determined that she may be below 17 years of age at the time of incident. 12. Mr. Lalfakwama, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant submitted in this regard that the certificate was issued by a MBBS Doctor and he is not a dentist to determine the age of the victim on the basis of his study on dentistry. 12. Mr. Lalfakwama, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant submitted in this regard that the certificate was issued by a MBBS Doctor and he is not a dentist to determine the age of the victim on the basis of his study on dentistry. He further submitted that in most of the people has 3 rd molar is no developed and hence, on the basis of which the age cannot be determined. It is the duty of the prosecution to determine the age of the victim as the case was registered under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and accordingly investigated to it. 13. The learned Amicus Curiae further stressed on Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act wherein it is specifically stated that in absence of birth certificate or the school certificate, the age can be determined through medical evidence. But here in the instant case, there is no statement at all that the I.O. tried to collect her school certificate or birth certificate during the investigation. 14. Accordingly, it is submitted by the learned Amicus Curiae that the matter may be remanded back to the learned Fast Tract Special Court (Rape and POCSO Act, 2012), Champhai for age determination of the victim and to dispose of the matter afresh after giving opportunity to both the parties for hearing. 15. Ms. Linda L. Fambawl, learned PP submitted in this regard that here is no mistake or error committed by the learned Trial Court and the judgment is passed considering the evidences on record, taking into account all the aspects and hence, there is no reason to make any interference in the judgment passed by the learned Fast Tract Special Court. 16. Ms. Linda L. Fambawl, learned PP further submitted that admittedly there was delay of four months in lodging the FIR, but from the cross examination of evidence of PW-1 it also reveals that even after lodging of the FIR the informant wanted to withdraw the same as the accused appellant is his neighbour as well as his relative. Thus in such a circumstance, there may be delay in lodging the FIR which has already been explained at the time of lodging the FIR. It is clearly stated in the FIR that accused appellant threatened the victim to kill her, if she discloses the matter to her parents. Thus in such a circumstance, there may be delay in lodging the FIR which has already been explained at the time of lodging the FIR. It is clearly stated in the FIR that accused appellant threatened the victim to kill her, if she discloses the matter to her parents. Considering the circumstances of this case, the reasons which have been explained in the FIR cannot be disbelieved nor can be out rightly rejected. Accordingly, she submitted the delay is properly explained in the FIR and the circumstances also support the case of the victim regarding the delay in lodging the FIR. 17. Coming to another issue raised by the learned counsel for the appellant it is submitted by her that from the evidence of PW-2/victim, it is seen that she was taken care of by the friend of her father since she was 1 and ½ year old and she is staying in a very remote area at Khawzawl and hence, the probability of attending school by the victim is also cannot be expected, who was under care and protection of the friend of her father. She came to stay with her parents only in the year 2022 and hence, the probability of collecting her school certificate is also less and hence in view of absence of the birth certificate as well as school certificate, the I.O. had rightly obtained the medical documents on the basis of which the age of the victim was determined. The medical document exhibited by the I.O. also reveals that there was no eruption of 3rd molar at the relevant time of incident. 18. Ms. Linda L. Fambawl, learned PP further submitted that the evidence of the victim and her 164 CrPC statement is consistent and there is nothing to disbelieve the victim and her sole testimony is sufficient to pass the order of conviction against the accused appellant. More so, there is no material to show that there was enmity between the informant and the accused appellant to lodge a false case against the accused appellant, rather, from the evidence of PW-1 it is seen that he was even reluctant to file the FIR as the accused appellant was not only his neighbour but also his relative. The accused appellant also did not take any specific plea while recording his statement under Section 313 CrPC except the plea of denial. 19. Ms. The accused appellant also did not take any specific plea while recording his statement under Section 313 CrPC except the plea of denial. 19. Ms. Linda L. Fambawl, learned PP further submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly passed the order after properly scrutinizing the evidence on record and hence, there is no need to interfere with the judgment of conviction passed by the learned Fast Tract Special Court (Rape and POCSO Act, 2012) and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 20. Mr. H. Zodinsanga, learned Legal Aid Counsel appearing for the informant/respondent No.2 also submitted that the learned Fast Tract Special Court (Rape and POCSO Act, 2012) had rightly passed the judgment and order by considering the evidence on record and also the age of the victim at the relevant time of incident. 21. He also pointed out that from the medical documents of the accused appellant it is also seen that he is HIV patient and prior to the incident, he was suffering from HIV and from this aspect also it can be held that the commission of rape with the minor victim may also create some other problem to the victim, as he was HIV+ve patient at the time of the incident. Accordingly, he submitted that there is no need of interference and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 22. The learned Legal Aid Counsel also submitted that conviction can be based on sole testimony of the victim and in that context he also relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lok Mal alias Loku Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2025) 4 SCC 470 , wherein in paragraphs 16 and 17 it has been held as under:- “16. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the evidence of a prosecutrix in a case of rape is of the same value as that of an injured witness and conviction can be made on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the evidence of a prosecutrix in a case of rape is of the same value as that of an injured witness and conviction can be made on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. In the case of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384 , the Supreme Court observed as under: “21… The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.” 14. A profitable reference can also be made to the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 where the Supreme Court observed as under: “9..In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion.” 23. I have heard the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties and I have also perused the case record and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court vis-à-vis the evidence on record. 24. The prosecution has examined only four witnesses in support of its case, the informant, the victim, the I.O. and the Medical Officer. 25. From the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 it is seen that both are corroborative in nature and the PW-2 the victim of this case had explained as to how she was subjected to penetrative sexual assault. 24. The prosecution has examined only four witnesses in support of its case, the informant, the victim, the I.O. and the Medical Officer. 25. From the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 it is seen that both are corroborative in nature and the PW-2 the victim of this case had explained as to how she was subjected to penetrative sexual assault. From her evidence it also reveals that on the date of the incident her parents went to another place and at that time she was taking bath and after her bath, the accused had committed rape on her and she had explained as to how it had occurred. Her evidence also could not be rebutted by the defence by cross examining her in respect of the incident which she explained in her evidence in chief. It also reveals that her evidence also corroborates her statement under Section 164 CrPC. 26. It is a fact that there was no eye witness to the prosecution case and the entire case is based on the evidence of the victim. From the evidence of the I.O. also it is seen that she made a statement before the I.O. and at the same time it is also seen that the accused also stated before him that on the date of incident he committed the said offence. However, as per him the action of the victim was very tempting and only to fulfill her desire, he committed the said offence. But surprisingly, PW-3, the I.O. was not cross examined to that aspect and the entire evidence of the I.O. also goes un-rebutted. The defence counsel only cross examined to the extent that the birth certificate of the victim was not produced by the victim before him and the FIR was received on 25.07.2022. That apart there is no other cross examination to the other aspect of the case. Thus, from the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 it reveals that there is no rebuttal evidence or their evidences could not be rebutted by cross examining both PWs 2 and 3 in respect of the said incident. 27. The medical evidence of the Doctor also reveals that the hymen of the victim was found ruptured at the time examining the victim, however, there was no bruise/laceration of external genitalia area of the victim. 27. The medical evidence of the Doctor also reveals that the hymen of the victim was found ruptured at the time examining the victim, however, there was no bruise/laceration of external genitalia area of the victim. It is very obvious that at the time of the examination already four months had elapsed from the date of incident and hence the probability of any bruise or laceration or any other injury marks on the private part of the victim is less, however, from the evidence of Doctor it is seen that the hymen was found ruptured at the time of her examination. More so, from the medical certificate issued by the doctor, it also reveals that the victim was stated to be less than 17 years of age considering her dentistry rd study which reveals that her 3 molar is not erupted at the time of the incident. Thus, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of victim as well as the informant of this case. However, in the present appeal, the counsel for the appellant basically raised two issues, i.e., the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR as well as the age of the victim. 28. It is a fact that the I.O. could not procure any document like birth certificate or school certificate and for which the I.O. had to go for medical examination to determine the age of the victim and considering non eruption of the 3 rd molar, the medical officer had issued the certificate stating that the age of the victim was less than 17 years of age at the time of her examination. 29. As per Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act in absence of any school certificate or birth certificate, age has to be determined through medical test. In the present case, there was no ossification test of the victim, however, considering the structure of her teeth the doctor had opined that she was below 17 years of age at the time of the incident. 30. During the entire trial the age of the victim was also not challenged by the defence and there is no such suggestion also put to the informant and the victim in regards to age of the victim at the time of incident. 30. During the entire trial the age of the victim was also not challenged by the defence and there is no such suggestion also put to the informant and the victim in regards to age of the victim at the time of incident. The defence also adduced the evidence of wife of the accused appellant as DW-1, who during her evidence also have not challenged the age of the victim, rather it is admitted that the her husband/appellant went to the house of the informant to take bath which otherwise supports the case of the prosecution that the accused was present in the house of the informant on the day of the incident while the victim was taking bath. 31. Coming to the issue of delay in lodging the FIR it is seen that there is explanation in the FIR itself, as to why there is delay in lodging the FIR. The FIR reveals that the victim remain silent as she was threatened to kill by the appellant, but subsequently the matter was disclosed to her parents in the last part of June, 2022 and thereafter, only the FIR was lodged by the father of the victim. 32. The learned Addl. PP also rightly raised the point that Pw-1 himself stated in his evidence that he was about to withdraw the FIR as the appellant is not only his neighbour but also his relative. So, considering the entire circumstances of this case, it is seen that there may be delay in lodging the FIR, particularly in cases, where such kind of offence is committed by a person relative to the victim or the informant. 33. In the same time it also seen that there is no evidence or suggestion from the appellant that there was any previous enmity for which a false case has been instituted against the appellant. Rather, from the evidence, it is seen that the appellant is in relation and the victim is his own niece. Thus, it is also not a case that out of previous enmity a false case has been instituted by the informant. 34. Rather, from the evidence, it is seen that the appellant is in relation and the victim is his own niece. Thus, it is also not a case that out of previous enmity a false case has been instituted by the informant. 34. From the evidence of DW-1 it is seen that on the date of the incident, her husband was present in the house of the informant who went there to take bath and thus, the presence of the accused in the house of the informant is also otherwise admitted by the DW-1. 35. So considering all these aspects of the case, it is seen that the case of the prosecution is well established and only for the fact of delay in lodging the FIR, the prosecution case cannot be disbelieved and at the same time, it is also seen that the I.O. had rightly took the option of age determination through medical evidence in absence of birth certificate as well as school certificate. 36. It is seen that there is no disbelievable statement made by the victim, rather she explained as to how she was subjected to sexual assault b her own uncle on the day of incident and her statement also goes unrebutted, which is also found consistent in every stage. 37. So, from the entire discussions made above, it is seen that there is no reason to disbelieve the prosecutrix, whose evidence goes un-rebutted and remain consistent in every stages. It is a settled law that the victim of a sexual assault is not to be treated as accomplished and as such, her evidence does not require corroboration from any other evidence if her sole testimony inspires confidence and trustworthy. 38. Here in the instant case, from the discussion made above, it is seen that the prosecution has been able to prove the foundational facts of the case to discharge the burden. The accused only took the plea of denial while recording his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Thus, the accused/appellant could not disprove the prosecution case by adducing any evidence in his support. 39. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Moti Lal Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2008 0 AIR (SC) 882 , has held in paragraph Nos. 9 as under: “9. A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. 39. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Moti Lal Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2008 0 AIR (SC) 882 , has held in paragraph Nos. 9 as under: “9. A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge leveled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix. There is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short Evidence Act) similar to illustration (b) of Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is own to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash kewalchand Jain (1990 91) scc 550).” 40. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash kewalchand Jain (1990 91) scc 550).” 40. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh , (1993) 2 SCC 622; 1993 SCC (Cri) 674 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by the honourable Supreme Court in Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 9 ; AIR 2010 SC 1 , placing reliance an earlier judgment in Rameshwar S/o kalian Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 Sc 54 . Thus the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The Court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. 41. So, from the entire discussions made above, it is seen that the prosecution has been able to prove that the accused/ appellant had committed the offence of sexual assault on the victim/prosecutrix, at the relevant time of incident. 42. Thus, considering the entire facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that the learned Fast Tract Special Court (Rape and POCSO Act, 2012), Champhai had rightly passed the order of conviction and sentence against the accused/appellant is justified and hence, I find that the judgment dated 30.03.2023 passed, passed by the learned Fast Tract Special Court (Rape and POCSO Act, 2012), Champhai, in Criminal Trial No. 217/2022, requires no interference of this Court and accordingly, the same stands upheld. 43. With the above observation, the criminal appeal stands disposed of. 44. The Court also appreciates the assistance rendered by the Mr. Lalfakwama, learned Amicus Curiae as well as Mr. 43. With the above observation, the criminal appeal stands disposed of. 44. The Court also appreciates the assistance rendered by the Mr. Lalfakwama, learned Amicus Curiae as well as Mr. H. Zodingsanga, learned Legal Aid Counsel in disposing of this matter and High Court Legal Services Committee, Aizawl Bench is directed to pay the remunerations to both the learned Amicus Curiae as well as learned Legal Aid Counsel as per their entitlement. 45. Return the TCR forthwith.