1 2026:CGHC:20800-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 350 of 2026 Rakesh Kashyap Son Of Late Prabhuram Kashyap Aged About 30 Years Resident Of Rogadihi (Vishrampuri), Kondagaon, District-Kondagaon(C.G.) ..Appellant(s) Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Home Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Nawa Raipur, District-Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Director General Of Police Police Headquarter, Raipur, District-Raipur (C.G.) 3 - The Superintendent Of Police, Korba, District-Korba (C.G.) 4 - Reserve Inspector (Rakshit Nirikshak) Korba, District-Korba (C.G.) Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. K.P. Sahu, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Dy. AG Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 05/05/2026 1. The present writ appeal has been preferred by the appellant challenging the legality and correctness of the order dated 04.08.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 7504 of 2025, whereby the writ petition filed by RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2026.05.05 14:50:19 +0530 2 the petitioner/appellant questioning the rejection of his claim for compassionate appointment has been dismissed. 2. In the present writ appeal, the appellant has prayed as under: I. The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the records of case of petitioner. II. The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order dated 04.08.2025 passed in W.P.(S) No. 7504 of 2025 passed by the learned Hon’ble Single Bench of this Hon’ble High Court. III. The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to set- aside/quash the impugned order dated 28.10.2024 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Korba. IV. The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to re-consider the application of petitioner for grant of compassionate appointment. V That, any other relief/order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award of the costs of the appeal may be given. 3. Before adverting to the merits of the controversy, it would be appropriate to first deal with the issue of limitation, as the present appeal has been filed with a delay of 193 days. 4. An application seeking condonation of delay has been filed by the appellant (I.A. No. 01/2026). 3 5. We have carefully gone through the averments made in the said application. The explanation offered for the delay is general, vague and lacking in material particulars. The appellant has not disclosed any specific dates, events or circumstances which prevented him from approaching this Court within the prescribed period of limitation. 6. It is well settled that the law of limitation is not a mere technicality, but a substantive provision based on sound principles of public policy. The object of the law is to ensure certainty and finality in litigation and to prevent parties from resorting to dilatory tactics. 7. Though the Courts adopt a liberal approach while considering applications for condonation of delay, such liberal approach cannot be equated with a license to condone delay in a routine manner. The concept of “sufficient cause” cannot be stretched to cover cases of gross negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides. 8. In the present case, the delay is not marginal but substantial, i.e., 193 days, which cannot be brushed aside lightly. The appellant has failed to explain the delay on a day-to-day basis or even broadly in a manner which may satisfy the judicial conscience of this Court. 9. No material has been placed on record to show that the appellant was pursuing any remedy with due diligence or that there existed any unavoidable circumstance beyond his control which prevented him from filing the appeal in time. The explanation, being bereft of particulars, does not constitute sufficient cause. 10. At this juncture, it is apposite to observe that while doing substantial 4 justice, the Court cannot altogether ignore the rights accrued to the opposite party on account of lapse of limitation. The discretionary power to condone delay has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. 11. In absence of any satisfactory explanation, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant has failed to make out a case for condonation of delay. The delay of 193 days, therefore, cannot be condoned. 12. Even otherwise, since arguments were advanced touching upon the merits of the case, we have deemed it appropriate to examine the matter on merits as well, though briefly. 13. The facts, in brief, are that the father of the appellant, who was working as a Sub-Inspector in the Police Department, died in harness on 24.08.2023. The appellant thereafter applied for compassionate appointment. The competent authority, however, rejected the claim of the appellant vide order dated 28.10.2024 on the ground that two daughters of the deceased employee are already in Government service and, therefore, in view of Clause 2.7 of the policy dated 15.04.2024, the appellant is not entitled to compassionate appointment. 14. The principal contention of the appellant before the learned Single Judge, as well as before us, is that the said daughters were already married prior to the death of the deceased employee and were residing separately, and therefore, they ought not to have been treated as members of the family for the purpose of denying compassionate appointment. 15. The learned Single Judge, after considering the submissions and the material available on record, has rejected the claim of the appellant by placing 5 reliance on Clause 2.7 of the policy dated 15.04.2024 and also on the binding precedents rendered by the Division Bench and the Full Bench of this Court. 16. Clause 2.7 of the policy clearly stipulates that if any member of the family of the deceased Government servant is already in Government service, whether married or unmarried, no other member of the family shall be entitled to compassionate appointment. 17. The issue as to whether dependency or financial support can be examined in such cases is no longer res integra. The Full Bench of this Court has categorically held that when the policy itself creates a bar, the Court cannot direct an inquiry into dependency, as that would amount to re-writing the terms of the policy, which is impermissible in law. 18. Further, the Division Bench in W.A. No. 478 of 2024 (Chandrakant Dewangan vs. State of Chhattisgarh & others) has reiterated the same principle and has upheld the validity of such rejection orders. 19. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, the contention of the appellant that married daughters should be excluded from the definition of family members cannot be accepted, particularly when the policy itself does not make any such distinction. 20. The learned Single Judge has rightly applied the law laid down by the Full Bench and the Division Bench and has dismissed the writ petition. We do not find any perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 21. Thus, even on merits, the appellant has failed to make out any case for 6 interference in this intra-court appeal. 22. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the writ appeal being barred by limitation and also devoid of merits, is dismissed at the motion stage itself. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Rahul/Gowri