Judgment : R. Phukan, J. Heard Mr. P. Surien, learned counsel for the petitioner; Ms. Livika, learned Government Advocate for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3; and Mr. C. Phom, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. Yangerwati, learned CGSC for the respondent No. 4. 2. In this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of Habeas Corpus to quash and set aside the Detention Order, dated 30.05.2025, passed by the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, vide No. CON/PITNDPS/14/2025/139 and Confirmation Order, dated 02.09.2025, passed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland/State Government, vide No. CON/PITNDPS/14/2025/205, by which the detenu, namely Mukesh Kumar Sharma, is put under preventive detention, under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (PITNDPS herein after) Act, 1988. Background Facts:- 3. The background facts, leading to filing of the present petition, are adumbrated herein below:- “On 26.04.2025, the Officer In-charge of Sub-Urban (SBN) PS, had recorded a GD Entry, No. 06/2025 and instructed the complainant, Special Branch (INT), to lead a team along with SBN PS personnel and to proceed to the place, to conduct a surveillance to nab the drug peddler. Accordingly, a source was deployed to act as a customer and when the said source successfully purchased the contraband drugs, the suspected area/apartment was searched and during the search, the alleged contraband drugs were recovered from the staircase of the apartment/building and accordingly, the petitioner/detenu, namely Mukesh Kumar Sharma, was apprehended. Thereafter, the complainant lodged a written FIR with the SBN PS, upon which, Sub-Urban PS Case No. 0022/2025, under Section 22 (c) of the NDPS Act, had been registered and the petitioner/detenu was forwarded to the judicial custody. Thereafter, a proposal for detention of the petitioner/detenu was made to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Dimapur, by the Investigating Officer of the case, vide letter dated nil, for detaining the petitioner/detenu, under PITNDPS Act, 1988. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Dimapur had written a letter to the Superintendent of Police (Org. Crime), PHQ Kohima, Nagaland, for detention of the petitioner/detenu, vide letter dated 12.05.2025. Thereafter, the Additional Director General of Police (L&O) had written a letter on 22.05.2025, to the Special Secretary (Home) to the Government of Nagaland for detention of the petitioner/detenu. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Dimapur had written a letter to the Superintendent of Police (Org. Crime), PHQ Kohima, Nagaland, for detention of the petitioner/detenu, vide letter dated 12.05.2025. Thereafter, the Additional Director General of Police (L&O) had written a letter on 22.05.2025, to the Special Secretary (Home) to the Government of Nagaland for detention of the petitioner/detenu. Accordingly, the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland had passed an order for detention of the petitioner/detenu for a period of 3 (three) months, under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act, vide impugned Detention Order, dated 30.05.2025. Thereafter, the petitioner/detenu had preferred a representation, dated 12.06.2025, before the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland for revoking the said Detention order, dated 30.05.2025. But, the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, had rejected the said representation, vide order dated 13.06.2025 and consequently, the State Government had also rejected the said representation, in pursuance to the said order, dated 13.06.2025, vide order dated 17.06.2025, on the ground that the authority had found no valid grounds for revocation the said detention order, dated 30.05.2025. Thereafter, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland/State Government had confirmed the detention order of the petitioner/detenu, vide impugned Confirmation order dated 02.09.2025.” Being aggrieved, the petitioner/detenu has approached this Court by filing this present petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Submissions:- 4. Mr. Surien, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the impugned Detention Order and the Confirmation Order are liable to be interfered with as while causing arrest of the petitioner/detenu, the respondent authorities have not followed the mandatory provisions of the PITNDPS Act, 1988. He pointed out that the detaining authority had not produced any records or communication to prove that the Central Government was notified about the detention of the petitioner/detenu, within 10 days from date of passing of the Detention Order dated 30.05.2025. 4.1. Secondly, he pointed out that the detaining authority also did not reflect in the impugned Detention Order as well as in the impugned Confirmation Order, that the petitioner/detenu was already under judicial custody in connection with Sub-Urban (SBN) PS Case No. 0022/2025, under Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act. 4.2. Mr. 4.1. Secondly, he pointed out that the detaining authority also did not reflect in the impugned Detention Order as well as in the impugned Confirmation Order, that the petitioner/detenu was already under judicial custody in connection with Sub-Urban (SBN) PS Case No. 0022/2025, under Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act. 4.2. Mr. Surien, thirdly, pointed out that the petitioner/detenu knows and understands Hindi language only and while handing over the grounds of detention, the petitioner/detenu was not explained in detail in the language which he understands and the same was handed over to him in English language and hence, the order of Detention is vitiated and liable to be quashed. 4.3. Fourthly, he pointed out that the detaining authority has vaguely leveled the allegation of illicit trafficking of the NDPS, against the petitioner/detenu and the allegations of illicit trafficking in NDPS against the petitioner/detenu can be tried under the ordinary or special criminal laws of the land, i.e. under NDPS Act and that the alleged act of the petitioner/detenu cannot be said to disturb even the tempo of the society, warranting the detention of the petitioner/detenu, under the Preventive Detention Law and that the alleged activities of the petitioner/detenu are matters of law and order and not public order, as concluded by the detaining authority. 4.4. Fifthly, Mr. Surien has pointed out that there was violation of Section 9(b) of the PITNDPS Act as the record does not show whether the detaining authority referred the matter before the Advisory Board within the prescribed period of 5 (five) weeks from the date of detention or not. It is also being pointed out that the alleged recovery was made in a rented house, allegedly under the staircase, where the petitioner/detenu was residing as a tenant and therefore, it was not within the knowledge of the petitioner/detenu about the seized contraband drugs. 4.5. Sixthly, Mr. Surien has pointed out that the particulars in the Detention Order, grounds of detention and the proposal for the detention of the petitioner/detenu are nothing, but inferential conclusions based on no cogent materials, whatsoever and as such, satisfaction is not a satisfaction in the eye of law and therefore, the Order of Detention based on the purported satisfaction, is vitiated for non-application of judicious mind. 4.6. Mr. 4.6. Mr. Surien further submits that it is stated in the Detention Order that the petitioner/detenu is strongly suspected to be engaged in illicit traffic in NDPS and the said allegation is vague and not at all sufficient to detain the petitioner/detenu under the PITNDPS Act and that there is no specific allegation or cogent material or compelling reason pointing to the involvement of the petitioner/detenu in illicit traffic in NDPS activities. 4.7. Further submission of Mr. Surien is that there is a violation of Articles 21 and 22(5) of the Constitution of India as due process of law was not complied with while extending the petitioner’s/detenu's detention. 4.8. Mr. Surien also pointed out that the rejection of the representation of the petitioner/detenu by the detaining authority, merely on the ground that the authority had found no valid grounds for revocation the Detention Order and without assigning any specific reason, has vitiated the detention of the petitioner/detenu and as such, the impugned Detention Order as well as the Confirmation Order are illegal. 4.9. Lastly, Mr. Surien submits that it appears from the impugned Detention Order has been passed against the petitioner/detenu for security of the State of Nagaland and maintenance of public order, without specifying as to how the petitioner’s/detenu's activities caused prejudice to the security of the State of Nagaland and maintenance of public order and as such, the impugned Detention order has been passed in a mechanical manner and without application of judicious mind. 4.10. Under the above mentioned grounds, Mr. Surien submits that the impugned Detention Order is liable to be interfered with. Mr. Surien has pointed out that nothing was recovered from the possession of the petitioner/detenu. 5. Per-contra, Ms. Livika, learned Government Advocate for the State respondents, submits that in paragraph No. 8 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3, it has been clearly stated that within the period of limitation, the Detention Order was forwarded to the Central Government/Ministry of Finance by Email, on 30.05.2025 and also by speed post, vide tracking ID No. EE4677596901N, on 02.06.2025. Ms. 1, 2 & 3, it has been clearly stated that within the period of limitation, the Detention Order was forwarded to the Central Government/Ministry of Finance by Email, on 30.05.2025 and also by speed post, vide tracking ID No. EE4677596901N, on 02.06.2025. Ms. Livika also submits that in paragraph No. 7 of the said affidavit, it has also been stated that the detaining authority was in the knowledge that the petitioner/detenu is in judicial custody and if out on bail/kept at large, the petitioner/detenu will indulge in similar prejudicial activities and therefore, there is a requirement of the preventive detention under PITNDPS Act, 1988. 5.1. Ms. Livika further submits that though the ground of detention was forwarded to the petitioner/detenu in English language, yet the same was explained to him in Hindi and Nagamese language, which he understands very well and the same has clearly been mentioned in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3. 5.2. It is also being pointed out by Ms. Livika that the petitioner/detenu was heard in person on 28.06.2025, by the Advisory Board and the entire proceeding was carried out in Nagaland. Ms. Livika further submits that the petitioner/detenu had admitted his involvement and during interrogation, he disclosed the storage location of the drugs which was under the staircase of a building. Ms. Livika also submits that during search, 180 boxes containing 25,920 Tramadol Capsules (SAMPLFX+); 15 boxes containing 9000 tablets of Alprazolam Tablets; and 21 boxes containing 5250 tablets of Nitrazepam Tablets were recovered and the same was seized in presence of independent witnesses and as such, detention of the petitioner/detenu was required to maintain public order. 5.3. Further, Ms. Livika has produced the relevant file before this Court in support of her submission, and under the above mentioned facts and circumstances, she submits that there is no merit in the petition and therefore, she has contended to dismiss the same. 6. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, we have carefully gone through the petition as well as the documents placed on record and also gone through the impugned Orders of Detention and Confirmation, dated 30.05.2025 and 02.09.2025, respectively and also the Suo Motu FIR, dated 26.04.2025. Issue before this Court:- 7. 6. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, we have carefully gone through the petition as well as the documents placed on record and also gone through the impugned Orders of Detention and Confirmation, dated 30.05.2025 and 02.09.2025, respectively and also the Suo Motu FIR, dated 26.04.2025. Issue before this Court:- 7. In view of the submissions, so advanced by learned counsel for both the parties and also the contentions being made in their pleadings, the issue to be decided in this petition is formulated as under:- (i) Whether the impugned Detention Order, dated 30.05.2025 and the Confirmation Order, dated 02.09.2025, withstand the legal scrutiny? Discussion and Analysis:- 8. In order to appreciate the submissions, so advanced by learned counsel for both the parties, this Court deems it appropriate to extract below the impugned Detention order, dated 30.05.2025:- GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND HOME DEPARTMENT POLITICAL BRANCH ORDER Dated Kohima, the 30th May, 2025. NO. CON/PITNDPS/14/2025/139 :: Whereas, the Addl. DGP (L&O), Nagaland has sent a proposal for detention of Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma (38 yrs) S/o: Ram Niwas Sharma, Whereas, the Addl. DGP (L&O), Nagaland has sent V/o-Roobgarh; Present/Add H/No. 42, Jain Temple Road, Marawari Patti, Dimapur under PITNDPS Act, 1988 along with records under Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. And whereas, on perusal of records as submitted by the Addi. DGP (L&O), Nagaland, it appears that Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma (38 yrs) S/o: Ram Niwas Sharma, V/o-Roobgarh; Present/Add- H/No. 42, Jain Temple Road, Marawari Patti, Dimapur was involved in the following case: (i) SBN PS Case no. 0022/25 U/S 22(c) NDPS Act And whereas, the Addl. DGP (L&O), Nagaland has proposed to prevent Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma (38 yrs) S/o: - Ram Niwas Sharma, V/o-Roobgarh; Present/Add- 11/No. 42, Jain Temple Road, Marawari Patti, Dimapur, under PITNDPS Act, 1988 from continuing his harmful and prejudicial activity by engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which poses a serious threat to people's health and welfare as his activities in such illegal traffic has a deleterious effect on the national economy. And whereas, I, Limasunep Jamir, Special Secretary (Home), Nagaland, specially empowered under Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (as amended), am satisfied on careful examination of the proposal of the Addl. And whereas, I, Limasunep Jamir, Special Secretary (Home), Nagaland, specially empowered under Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (as amended), am satisfied on careful examination of the proposal of the Addl. DGP (L&O), Nagaland and other supporting documents, found sufficient grounds for detention of Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma (38 yrs) S/o: Ram Niwas Sharma, V/o Roobgarh, Present/Add- 11/No. 42, Jain Temple Road, Marawari Patti, Dimapur, and being satisfied that with a view of preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in NDPS, it is necessary to detain him. Now, therefore, the undersigned, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 do hereby issue this order directing Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma (38 yrs) S/o: - Ram Niwas Sharma, Vio-Roobgarh; Present/Add- H/No. 42, Jain Temple Road, Marawari Patti, Dimapur, be detained and kept in Central Jail, Dimapur for an initial period of three months. (LIMASUNEPSTANIR) IPS Special Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland. 8.1. Further, this Court deems it appropriate to extract below the impugned Confirmation order also, dated 02.09.2025:- GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND HOME DEPARTMENT : POLITICAL BRANCH CONFIRMATION ORDER Dated Kohima, the 2nd September, 2025. NO. CON/PITNDPS/14/2025/205 :: Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma (38 yrs) S/o - Ram Niwas Sharma, Vo-Roebgal, Prescat/Add- H/No. 42, Jain Temple Rood, Marawari Patti. Dimapur, has been detained under the PINDPS Act. 1988 by the Special Secretary Home), Nagaland vide order NO.CON/PITNOPS/14/2025/139 dated 30.05.2025 for an initial period of 3 (Three) months till 02.09.2025. Whereas, the detention of the said detenu Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma (38 yes) Sto: - Ram Niwas Sharma, Vo-Roobgarh: Present/Add-11/No, 42, Jain Temple Road, Marawari Patti, Dimapur was referred to the PINDPS Advisory Board constituted by the Government of Nagaland under Section 9 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. And whereas, the Advisory Board is of the opinion that there is sufficient cause for detention of the detenu under the PITNDPS Act, 1988 and that the continued detention of the detenu Mr. Mukesh Kumar Siruma (38 yrs) S/o. Ram Niwas Sharma, Vio-Roobgarh; Present/Add- H/No. 42. Jain Temple Road. And whereas, the Advisory Board is of the opinion that there is sufficient cause for detention of the detenu under the PITNDPS Act, 1988 and that the continued detention of the detenu Mr. Mukesh Kumar Siruma (38 yrs) S/o. Ram Niwas Sharma, Vio-Roobgarh; Present/Add- H/No. 42. Jain Temple Road. Marawan Patti, Dimapur, will be necessary in order to prevent him from further indulging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances warranting his detention under the preventive law. Now, therefore, the State Government in exercise of powers conferred by Clause (1) of Section 9 of the PITNDPS Act, 1988, hereby confirm the detention order issued in respect of the said detenu Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma (38 yrs) S/o: Ram Niwas Sharma, Vo-Roobgarh; Present/Add-H/No. 42. Jain Temple Road, Marawari Patti, Dimapur, and further order that he shall be detained for another period of 3 (Three) months w.e.f. 03.09.2025 till 02.12.2028 within which period his detention will be reviewed as required under the provisions of the PITNDPS Act, 1988. Sd/- SENTIYANGER IMCHEN, IAS Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland. Dated Kohima, the 2nd September, 2025. Legal Trajectory:- 9. Before a discussion is directed into the factual aspect of the case, we deemed it appropriate to briefly refer to the relevant provision of law. The relevant legal framework here in this case is PITNDPS Act, 1988, under which the impugned Detention Order was passed. 9.1. Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act empowers the authorized officers, either of the Central Government or of a State Government, to detain any person with a view to prevent him/her from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 9.2. Section 3(2) requires a State Government that passes such a detention order to forward a report of the same to the Central Government within ten days. 9.3. Section 3(3) mandates communication of the grounds on which the detention order has been made to the detenu as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of detention. 9.4. Sub-Section records that this requirement is for the purposes of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, which mandates such communication as soon as may be. 9.5. 9.4. Sub-Section records that this requirement is for the purposes of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, which mandates such communication as soon as may be. 9.5. Section 6 provides that the grounds of detention are severable and an order of detention shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative, merely because one or some of the grounds is either found to be vague, non-existent, irrelevant or not connected with such persons or is invalid for any other reason. Section 6 specifically records that where a person has been detained pursuant to an order of detention, under Section 3(1), which has been made on two or more grounds, such order shall be deemed to have been made separately on each ground. This indicates that the order of detention must be accompanied by the 'grounds of detention' made by the detaining authority itself. 9.6. Section 11 speaks of the maximum period of detention and states that the same may be extended up to 2 (two) years from the date of detention. Precedents:- 10. We also deemed it appropriate to have a look to the proposition of law, laid down in some of the precedents, which are:- (i) Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India , reported in (1991) 1 SCC 128 In this case, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the detenus were already in judicial custody at the time, the orders of preventive detention were passed against them. Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed that detention orders could be validly passed against detenus who were in jail, provided the officers passing the orders were alive to the factum of the detenus being in custody and there was material on record to justify the conclusion that they would indulge in similar activities, if set at liberty. (ii) Binod Singh vs. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, Bihar , reported in (1986) 4 SCC 416 In this case, it has been held that there must be cogent material before the officer passing the detention order to infer that the detenu was likely to be released on bail and such an inference must be drawn from the material on record and must not be the ipse dixit of the officer passing such order. Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasized that before passing the detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy himself and such satisfaction must be reached on the basis of cogent material that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and, further, if released on bail, the material on record must reveal that he/she would indulge in prejudicial activity again, if not detained. (iii) Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu , reported in (2011) 5 SCC 244 In this case, a 3-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has affirmed that where a detention order is passed against a person already in jail, there should be a real possibility of the release of that person on bail, that is, he must have moved a bail application which is pending. It was observed that if no bail application is pending, it logically followed that there is no likelihood of the person in jail being released on bail. The Bench, however, pointed out that the exception to this Rule would be where a co-accused, whose case stood on the same footing, was granted bail. The Bench cautioned that details in this regard have to be recorded, otherwise the statement would be mere ipse dixit and cannot be relied upon. (iv) The above mentioned proposition in the case Rekha (supra) is also reiterated and followed in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh vs. State of Manipur and others reported in (2012) 7 SCC 181 (v) Union of India vs. Paul Manickam and another reported in (2003) 8 SCC 342 In this case, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that where detention orders are passed against persons who are already in jail, the detaining authority should apply its mind and show awareness in the grounds of detention of the chances of release of such persons on bail. It has been further observed that the detaining authority must be reasonably satisfied, on the basis of cogent material, that there is a likelihood of the detenu's release and in view of his/her antecedent activities, which are proximate in point of time, he/she must be detained in order to prevent him/her from indulging in such prejudicial activities. It has been further observed that the detaining authority must be reasonably satisfied, on the basis of cogent material, that there is a likelihood of the detenu's release and in view of his/her antecedent activities, which are proximate in point of time, he/she must be detained in order to prevent him/her from indulging in such prejudicial activities. It is also been held that an order of detention would be valid in such circumstances only, if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that the detenu is actually in custody; the authority has a reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material, that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail; and that, upon such release, he/she would, in all probability, indulge in prejudicial activities; and it is felt essential to detain him/her to prevent him/her from so doing. (vi) Harikisan vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in AIR 1962 SC 911 In this case, Hon’ble Supreme Court (Constitutional Bench) has held that in the context of proper communication of the grounds of detention to the detenu so as to protect his/her right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India making an effective representation against such detention. In that case, the grounds of detention were in English and the authorities asserted that the same were explained to the detenu in Hindi, a language known to the detenu, and that it would amount to satisfactory compliance. However, such plea was not accepted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Relevant observations of the Bench in this regard are extracted herein below:- "In our opinion, this was not sufficient compliance in this case with the requirements of the Constitution, as laid down in clause (5) of Article 22. To a person, who is not conversant with the English language, service of the Order and the grounds of detention in English, with their oral translation or explanation by the police officer serving them does not fulfil the requirements of the law. To a person, who is not conversant with the English language, service of the Order and the grounds of detention in English, with their oral translation or explanation by the police officer serving them does not fulfil the requirements of the law. As has been explained by this Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya [1951 SCC 43: (1951) SCR 167 ] clause (5) of Article 22 requires that the grounds of his detention should be made available to the detenu as soon as may be, and that the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the Order should also be afforded to him. In order that the detenu should have that opportunity, it is not sufficient that he has been physically delivered the means of knowledge with which to make his representation. In order that the detenu should be in a position effectively to make his representation against the Order, he should have knowledge of the grounds of detention, which are in the nature of the charge against him setting out the kinds of prejudicial acts which the authorities attribute to him. Communication, in this context, must, therefore, mean imparting sufficient knowledge of all the grounds on which the Order of Detention is based. In this case the grounds are several, and are based on numerous speeches said to have been made by the appellant himself on different occasions and different dates. Naturally, therefore, any oral translation or explanation given by the police officer serving those on the detenu would not amount to communicating the grounds. Communication, in this context, must mean bringing home to the detenu effective knowledge of the facts and circumstances on which the Order of Detention is based." In the aforesaid case it has further been held that if the detenu is not conversant with the English language, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution, the detenu must be given the grounds in a language which he/she can understand and in a script which he/she can read, if he/she is a literate person. 11. From the aforesaid decisions, the proposition of law, relating to preventive detention, under the PITNDPS Act, can be constituted as under:- (i) The Officer, passing the detention order, must be alive to the factum of the detenu being in custody. 11. From the aforesaid decisions, the proposition of law, relating to preventive detention, under the PITNDPS Act, can be constituted as under:- (i) The Officer, passing the detention order, must be alive to the factum of the detenu being in custody. (ii) There must be material on the record to justify the conclusion that they would indulge in similar activities if set at liberty. (iii) There must be cogent material before the Officer passing the detention order, to infer that the detenu is likely to be released on bail, i.e. he must have moved a bail application which is pending. (iv) If no bail application is pending, it logically follows that there is no likelihood of the detenu being released on bail. (v) Such inference must be drawn from the materials on the record and must not be the ipse-dixit of the Officer passing such order. (vi) The ground of detention to be furnished to the detenu in the language in which he is conversant with, in compliance with the requirement of Clause 5 of Article 22 of the Constitution of India, so that he can make representation against the detention order. 12. Now, adverting to the facts herein this case, we find that it is not in dispute that the ground of detention was communicated to the detenu in English language. The learned Government Advocate submits that though the ground of detention was communicated to the petitioner/detenu, in English language, yet the same was explained to him in Hindi language and in Nagamese, in which he is conversant with. But, the said submission of learned Government Advocate left this Court un-impressed, in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Harikisan (supra) , which requires that the ground of detention must be communicated to the detenu in the language which he/she is conversant with. Thus, the requirement of Clause 5 of Article 22 of the Constitution of India cannot be said to be satisfied with, as because on account of language a detenu cannot make a representation against the detention order, at the earliest opportunity. 13. Thus, the requirement of Clause 5 of Article 22 of the Constitution of India cannot be said to be satisfied with, as because on account of language a detenu cannot make a representation against the detention order, at the earliest opportunity. 13. Further, having perused the impugned Detention Order, dated 30.05.2025, we find that nowhere in the said Order, the detaining authority has mentioned that it had the knowledge that the detenu is in judicial custody and that there is probability of his releasing on bail and in the event of his release on bail, he would indulge in similar prejudicial activities. 14. Nothing is placed on the record to show that the detaining authority had applied its mind and show awareness on the chances of the petitioner/detenu being released on bail. There is no such reference in the impugned Detention Order. Further, the detaining authority had failed to record its satisfaction on the basis of cogent material that there is likelihood of the detenu’s released and in view of his/her release and in view of his antecedent activities, which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities. 15. Thus, in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Kamarunnissa (supra) , Binod Singh (supra) , Rekha (supra) and Paul Manickam (supra) , the impugned Detention Order, to our considered opinion, cannot be sustained. 16. We have noticed that what the detaining authority had recorded in the impugned order is that the Addl. DGP (L&O), Nagaland, had sent a proposal to prevent Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma (the detenu herein) under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act, 1988, from continuing his harmful and prejudicial activity by engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which poses a serious threat to people's health and welfare as his activities in such illegal traffic has a deleterious effect on the national economy. 16.1. But, we find that the said observation is not based on any materials on the record and that being so, the said statement would be a mere ipse dixit of the detaining authority and the same cannot be relied upon, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rekha (supra) Conclusion:- 17. 16.1. But, we find that the said observation is not based on any materials on the record and that being so, the said statement would be a mere ipse dixit of the detaining authority and the same cannot be relied upon, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rekha (supra) Conclusion:- 17. Under the given factual and legal matrix, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned Detention Order, dated 30.05.2025 and all subsequent orders passed by the Advisory Board and also the Confirmation Order, dated 02.09.2025, passed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, fail to withstand the legal scrutiny and on such count, the same are liable to be interfered with. 18. In the result, we find sufficient merit in this petition and accordingly, the same stands allowed. The impugned Detention Order, dated 30.05.2025, as well as the Confirmation Order, dated 02.09.2025 and all subsequent orders extending the period of detention of the petitioner/detenu stands set aside and quashed. 19. Consequent upon, it is provided that the petitioner/detenu shall be released from the custody, if not warranted in any other cases. 20. In terms of above, this criminal writ petition stands disposed of, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 21. The records produced by Ms. Livika, learned Government Advocate, shall be returned back.