JUDGMENT & ORDER : (S. K. Medhi, J.) The instant appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 10.08.2023 passed in WP(C) No. 33 (AP) of 2021. 2. The facts, as projected in the writ petition instituted by the present respondents as writ petitioners are that they were Casual employees of the Public Health Engineering and Water Supply Department in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. They were appointed during the period from 1996 to 2007 and were continuing in their services. Their prayer for regularisation of service was not acceded to. It was contended that though they were categorised as Contingent Staff, they were working as regular LDCs. It was also stated that some of the petitioners were working like regular LDC/typists but were not being paid equal wages as compared to ad hoc/regular LDCs. The petitioners had also challenged the appointments of respondent Nos. 4 to 7 in the writ petition, whom the petitioners allege to be junior to them and were, however, regularised in their services. 3. On the said backdrop, the writ petition was filed. The writ petition was contested by the State as well as by the private respondents and the claims were refuted. 4. The Hon’ble Single Judge, after hearing the parties, had framed three Issues for consideration, which read as follows: “12. In view of the contention made by the petitioners in the petition and by the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition and also in view of the submissions so advanced at the Bar, the issues, that have arisen for consideration before this Court is formulated as under:- (i) Whether the petitioners are entitled to regularization of their services in the post of LDC/LDC cum Typists, since they have completed more than 20 years in the Public Health Engineering and Water Supply Department, Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh? (ii) Whether the private respondent Nos.5 to 8 were appointed as Work Charge employees, without following the due procedure of law and on such count, their appointments are liable to be set aside and quashed? (iii) Whether the petitioners are entitled to minimum scale of pay and allowances like regular LDC/LDC cum Typists, since they have been discharging the same duty like the regular LDC/LDC cum Typists, on the basis of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work ?....” 5. So far as the Issue Nos. (iii) Whether the petitioners are entitled to minimum scale of pay and allowances like regular LDC/LDC cum Typists, since they have been discharging the same duty like the regular LDC/LDC cum Typists, on the basis of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work ?....” 5. So far as the Issue Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, the learned Single Judge negated the claims and rejected the same. However, so far as the Issue No. 3 is concerned, the learned Single Judge had answered the same in favour of the petitioners by directing that the petitioners would be entitled to the minimum scale of pay. For ready reference, the observations and directions, which are the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal are extracted hereinbelow: “30. As discussed herein above, the aforesaid contention of the petitioners have not been seriously disputed by the State respondents. Having considered above and also having considered the submissions of learned Advocates of both side, and also drawing premises from the proposition of law, so laid down in the case of Jagjit Singh (supra) and Umadevi (3), (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioners are entitled to at least minimum scale of pay in their present position, based on the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. Accordingly, it is provided that the State respondents shall provide minimum pay scale to the petitioners from the date of filing the present writ petition i.e. with effect from 03.02.2021….” 6. It is the correctness of the said observations and directions which is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. 7. We have heard Shri S. Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate for the appellants-State. We have also heard Ms. N. Anju, learned counsel for the writ petitioners/respondents. 8. It may be mentioned that when the writ petition was instituted, there were eight nos. of petitioners. However, one of the petitioners had got the benefit of regularisation during the pendency of the writ petition and accordingly, his name was deleted. Accordingly, in the present appeal, the same has been filed against the remaining seven nos. of writ petitioners. 9. Shri Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate has submitted that the petitioners were admittedly working in the Western Zone of the Public Health Engineering Department, whereas the respondents were working in the Eastern Zone. Accordingly, in the present appeal, the same has been filed against the remaining seven nos. of writ petitioners. 9. Shri Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate has submitted that the petitioners were admittedly working in the Western Zone of the Public Health Engineering Department, whereas the respondents were working in the Eastern Zone. It is submitted that it is the concerned Superintending Engineer of the respective Circle, who makes such appointment and seniority is also maintained circle-wise. He has submitted that the petitioners’ services cannot be equated or compared with those of the private respondents. The learned State Counsel has also submitted that there is no detail pleadings in the writ petition to show that the nature of work performed by the petitioners was at par with the regular LDC, typists or Computer Operators. He has submitted that only a bald statement was made in paragraphs 11 and 13, which could not have formed the basis for issuing the impugned direction. He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by respondent No. 4 in the writ petition, wherein it was categorically stated that the petitioners were engaged as Casual Workers and were not full-time employees. He has also submitted that there were no regular posts of Computer Operators and also, the aspect that there was no shortage of UDCs/LDCs, for which the services of the petitioners could have been utilised. On the issue of parity, the learned State Counsel has submitted that there are certain factors relevant to make such a claim which would include qualification, nature of work, and nature of responsibility, and none of these factors were been demonstrated to be fulfilled by the writ petitioners to make the present claim. 10. By drawing attention of this Court to the impugned direction, the learned State counsel has submitted that though the learned Single Judge had relied upon the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Umadevi & Ors., reported in ( 2006) 4 SCC 1 and State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Jagjit Singh& Ors., reported in (2017) 1 SCC 148 , the impugned directions are not in sync with the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Vs. Umadevi & Ors., reported in ( 2006) 4 SCC 1 and State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Jagjit Singh& Ors., reported in (2017) 1 SCC 148 , the impugned directions are not in sync with the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He has submitted that while the aspect was to pay the wages minimum to the pay scale in the impugned direction, the State has been directed to pay the minimum scale of pay to the writ petitioners. He has submitted that both the aspects are completely different and a direction to pay the minimum pay scale would have wide ramification, which is not in sync with the principles governing a situation of the present kind. Specific attention of this Court has been drawn to the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 55 of the Umadevi (supra), which read as follows: “55. In cases relating to service in the Commercial Taxes Department, the High Court has directed that those engaged on daily wages, be paid wages equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in government service, with effect from the dates from which they were respectively appointed. The objection taken was to the direction for payment from the dates of engagement. We find that the High Court had clearly gone wrong in directing that these employees be paid salary equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in government service, with effect from the dates from which they were respectively engaged or appointed. It was not open to the High Court to impose such an obligation on the State when the very question before the High Court in the case was whether these employees were entitled to have equal pay for equal work so called and were entitled to any other benefit. They had also been engaged in the teeth of directions not to do so. We are, therefore, of the view that, at best, the Division Bench of the High Court should have directed that wages equal to the salary that are being paid to regular employees be paid to these daily wage employees with effect from the date of its judgment. We are, therefore, of the view that, at best, the Division Bench of the High Court should have directed that wages equal to the salary that are being paid to regular employees be paid to these daily wage employees with effect from the date of its judgment. Hence, that part of the direction of the Division Bench is modified and it is directed that these daily wage earners be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of their cadre in the Commercial Taxes Department in government service, from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Since, they are only daily wage earners, there would be no question of other allowances being paid to them. In view of our conclusion, that Courts are not expected to issue directions for making such persons permanent in service, we set aside that part of the direction of the High Court directing the Government to consider their cases for regularization. We also notice that the High Court has not adverted to the aspect as to whether it was regularization or it was giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court. In such a situation, the direction in that regard will stand deleted and the appeals filed by the State would stand allowed to that extent. If sanctioned posts are vacant (they are said to be vacant) the State will take immediate steps for filling those posts by a regular process of selection. But when regular recruitment is undertaken, the respondents in CAs Nos. 3595-3612 and those in the Commercial Taxes Department similarly situated, will be allowed to compete, waiving the age restriction imposed for the recruitment and giving some weightage for their having been engaged for work in the Department for a significant period of time. That would be the extent of the exercise of power by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to do justice to them.…” 11. Similarly, the relevant observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagjit Singh (supra) has been pressed into service, which read as follows: “55. In view of all our above conclusions, the decision rendered by the Full Bench of the High Court in Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, dated 11-11-2011, is liable to be set aside, and the same is hereby set aside. In view of all our above conclusions, the decision rendered by the Full Bench of the High Court in Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, dated 11-11-2011, is liable to be set aside, and the same is hereby set aside. The decision rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court in State of Punjab v. Rajinder Singh is also liable to be set aside, and the same is also hereby set aside. We affirm the decision rendered in State of Punjab v. Rajinder Kumar, with the modification that the employees concerned would be entitled to the minimum of the pay scale, of the category to which they belong, but would not be entitled to allowances attached to the posts held by them. 60. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, in relation to temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the employees concerned(before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities as were being discharged by regular employees, holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of “equal pay for equal work” summarised by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals, were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre/establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of their employment, the temporary employees concerned were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities which at some point in time were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts were also posted to discharge the same work which was assigned to temporary employees from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity on any of the principles summarised by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of “equal pay for equal work” would be applicable to all the temporary employees concerned, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages on a par with the minimum of the pay scale of regularly engaged Government employees holding the same post…” 12. The learned State Counsel has submitted that the impugned direction of the Hon’ble Single Judge is unsustainable in law and, at best, it is the wages, which is minimum of the pay scale, which could have been directed to be paid. He has also submitted that the State Government already has a policy which was initiated in the year 2019 for payment of minimum wages to the Contingent Staff and the amount was revised in the year 2023 vide notification dated 29.05.2023. He has also submitted that presently, there is further amendment vide notification dated 19.03.2025, whereby certain slabs have been laid down. As per the same, for a Contingent Staff working for 20–25 years, a minimum of Rs. 25,000/- per month has been fixed and for such a staff working for more than 25 years, the wages has been fixed as Rs.31,000/-. He has also made a calculation of the pay matrix and has placed before this Court that as per the same, the basic pay of an LDC, which could at best be directed to be paid, would be Rs.25,500/-. He has submitted that the policy of the State would be more beneficial to the writ petitioners than the impugned direction. 13. Per contra, Ms. N. Anju, learned counsel for the writ petitioners/respondents has submitted that adequate pleadings were made with regard to the similar nature of work and responsibilities discharged by the petitioners. He has submitted that the policy of the State would be more beneficial to the writ petitioners than the impugned direction. 13. Per contra, Ms. N. Anju, learned counsel for the writ petitioners/respondents has submitted that adequate pleadings were made with regard to the similar nature of work and responsibilities discharged by the petitioners. She has drawn the attention to the averments made in paragraph 8 of the writ petition, which read as follows: “8. That the petitioners begs to state that although they are working as regular LDC Typist they are not getting the pay equal to that of Ad-hoc/regular LDC but of contingency LDC/ Computer Operator. It is pertinent to mention that although they are performing same and equal duty as that of regular employee to the extent of doing the duty of regular employees in their absence or in presence of regular employees such as putting up file, prepare pay bill, issue and dispatch and any other computer typing works regularly but they are not paid salary equivalent to their work. To say their salary is ranging from Rs. 15,000/-to Rs. 17,000/- whereas the so-called Ad-hoc employees are getting salary of Rs. 33,000/- (Matrix level-4) and also they are getting other service benefits like Earned Leave, more casual leaves and increments etc., It is stated here that the petitioners have been deprived of equal pay for equal work. They are paid pay lesser than the work performed by them. The action of the authority is violative of Article 14 of the constitution of India and denial of principle of Natural Justice and Administrative Fair play….” 14. Ms. Anju, learned counsel has also submitted that a rejoinder affidavit was filed by the writ petitioners to the affidavit-in-opposition of the State, which, however, was not annexed to the memo of appeal. She has submitted that on this ground itself, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 15. The rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties have been duly considered and the materials placed on record have been carefully examined. 16. As noted above, the learned Single Judge had formulated three issues, out of which the first two issues were decided against the petitioners. So far as the third issue is concerned, the same has been decided by directing to pay the petitioners the minimum scale of pay. 17. 16. As noted above, the learned Single Judge had formulated three issues, out of which the first two issues were decided against the petitioners. So far as the third issue is concerned, the same has been decided by directing to pay the petitioners the minimum scale of pay. 17. A reading of the aforesaid judgment would show that such a direction has been issued purportedly in terms of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Umadevi (supra) and Jagjit Singh (supra). The learned State Counsel has emphasised that there is no adequate pleadings in the writ petition to show that there is parity of the work of the responsibility to charge. This Court, has, however, noticed that pleadings were there in the writ petition. At the same time, the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the State has refuted such averments and has contended that the engagement of the petitioners was casual in nature and not full-time, and there was no shortage of the UDC/LDC. 18. Be that as it may, for the contingent workers who have been working for a long time, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid cases of Umadevi (supra) and Jagjit Singh (supra), after being alive to the practical realities, has laid down a guideline for payment of the minimum of the pay scale for the said post. The learned Single Judge, however, appears to have used the expression “minimum scale of pay.” This Court finds force in the contentions advanced by the learned State Counsel that there is a vast difference between the two expressions, and the expression used by the learned Single Judge would mean that it is the scale of pay which is to be afforded to the writ petitioner and the same would have other consequences. The observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which have been carefully perused and extracted above and it is with regard to payment of minimum of the pay scale which has been directed to be given. 19. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of State of Assam Vs. Upen Das & Ors. , reported in 2020 (5) GLT 605 , dealt with a similar situation. 19. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of State of Assam Vs. Upen Das & Ors. , reported in 2020 (5) GLT 605 , dealt with a similar situation. In that case, while the aspect of regularization of the work charged and muster workers was declined, a direction was given to pay the minimum of the pay scale in terms of the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagjit Singh (supra). 20. We have also noted that the State has a policy for payment of minimum wages and, presently, vide notification dated 19.03.2025, the slab for a worker working for 20–25 years is Rs. 25,000/- per month, and for those working for more than 25 years, it is Rs. 31,000/- per month. On the other hand, the minimum of the pay scale to which the writ petitioners may be entitled, by following the principles laid down in Jagjit Singh (supra), would be Rs. 25,500/- per month. 21. In view of the foregoing discussions and in the interest of justice, we are of the opinion that the impugned direction of the learned Single Judge is liable to be interfered with, which we accordingly do. However, we make it clear that the writ petitioners would be entitled to the minimum of the pay scale in terms of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagjit Singh (supra). We also make it clear that the direction is only with regard to the payment of wages minimum of the pay scale or as per the notification dated 19.03.2025, whichever is higher. Such payment, however, will not vest any right to the writ petitioners to any other benefit. 22. The appeal accordingly stands disposed of. 23. No order as to cost(s).