JUDGEMENT& ORDER : MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA, J. 1) Heard Ms. Caroline K. Lungawipuii, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the appellants. Also heard Mr. L. H. Lianhrima, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Ruth Lalruatfeli, learned counsel for the respondent. 2) This appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been preferred by the State appellants, impugning the judgment and award dated 14.02.2025, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, in MACT Case No. 38/2022, whereby, the appellants were directed to pay acompensation amount of Rs. 23,30,000/- along with the interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till its realization. 3) The facts relevant for consideration of the instant appeal, in brief, are that the present respondent, as claimant, had filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, claiming compensation for death of her husband Late. K.Lalengmawia, who died in a vehicular accident, on 18.11.2011, at about 6:30 PM, involving a Mizoram State Transport Bus Bearing Registration No. MZ-01-D-2250 driven by one Shri K. Lallawmsanga. 4) The present appellant contested the claim by filing a written statement, wherein, amongst the general defense, which are usually taken by the opposite parties in claims cases, a plea was also raised that the claim is barred by the law of limitation. 5) Upon pleadings of the parties, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl framed following issued in the aforesaid claim case- i. Whether the present claim application is maintainable in its present form and style? ii. Whether there was fault on the part of the driver or owner of the accident vehicle? iii. Whether the claimant is entitled to get compensation, if so, who is liable to pay and to what extent? 6) The claimant examined 5 (five) witnesses, including herself, to prove her case, whereas, the present appellants as opposite partieshad examined 2 (two) witnesses, namely, the driver of the ill-fated vehicle, Shri. K. Lallawmsanga as opposite party witness No. 1, and the conductor of the ill-fated vehicle namely, Shri. Lalhmangaiha, as opposite party witness No. 2. However, after conclusion of the enquiry, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, by the judgment and award, which has been impugned in this appeal, directed the present appellant to pay a compensation of Rs. However, after conclusion of the enquiry, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, by the judgment and award, which has been impugned in this appeal, directed the present appellant to pay a compensation of Rs. 23,30,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Three Lakh Thirty Thousand) along with an interest @ 7 % per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till its realization. 7) Ms. Caroline K. Lungawipuii, learned counsel for the appellants, hassubmitted that the accident in which the husband of the respondent died, occurred on 18.11.2011, whereas, the respondent/claimant filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, after a lapse of more than ten years from the date of the said accident, i.e., on 11.10.2022, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl. She further submitted that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had miserably failed to apply its judicial mind by entertaining such a stale claim. 8) She submits that though Section 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which earlier provided for the limitation period for filing a claim petition, has been deleted from the statute book, however, the inordinate delay in filing a claim petition in motor accident cases still remains a relevant factor. According to her, this aspect has been completely ignored by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 9) She has further submitted that the explanation furnished by the respondent/claimant for approaching the Tribunal belatedly, after a lapse of more than ten years, does not absolve the claimant/respondent of the obligation to show due diligence on her part. She further submits that the Tribunal failed to properly consider and discuss the issue of delay raised by the appellants in the impugned judgment. 10) She submitted that the claimant sought to shift the entire burden for the belated approach to the tribunal on the counsel allegedly engaged by her; however, the said counsel was neither examined as a witness for the claimant nor as a court witness. Consequently, the Tribunal, according to her, has erred in accepting the explanation offered by the respondent/claimant for the inordinate delay in filing the claim petition. 11) The learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that the Tribunal, while allowing the claim petition filed by the respondent/claimant, erred in arriving at the conclusion that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. 11) The learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that the Tribunal, while allowing the claim petition filed by the respondent/claimant, erred in arriving at the conclusion that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. She submits that the driver of the offending vehicle was not even impleaded as a party in the said MACT case and, as such, the claim petition suffered from the vice of non-joinder of necessary parties. 12) She has further submitted that the finding regarding negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle was based entirely on the testimony of the Investigating Officer, who had acted as the complainant, the enquiry officer, as well as the Investigating Officer in the criminal case, which was registered after the accident. She submits that, the allegation that the driver of the offending vehicle was in a drunken condition while he was driving the said vehicle could not be corroborated by any medical evidence or by the examination of any doctor. She submits that no documentary proof for intoxication could be produced by the claimant during the enquiry. 13) She has further submitted that the tribunal has also failed to consider the evidence of opposite party witness No. 1, i.e., the driver of the offending vehicle, who denied the fact that he was intoxicated while driving the vehicle. She further submits that no requisition was made to the motor vehicle inspector for mechanical examination of the offending vehicle. She submits that considering the circumstances in which the accident is claimed to have occurred, non-examination of the offending vehicle by the Motor Vehicle Inspector is fatal to the case of the claimant. 14) The learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had also erred in, not considering the fact that in the connected criminal case, i.e., Criminal Trial No. 2622/2011, which was registered after the said accident,the driver of the offending vehicle was discharged by the st Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1 Class, Aizawl exonerating him from the charges of rash and negligent driving. She submits that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had erred in attributing negligence to the driver of the offending vehicle for the aforesaid accident. She submits that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had erred in attributing negligence to the driver of the offending vehicle for the aforesaid accident. 15) Learned counsel for the applicant has also submitted that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has erred in relying on the certificate, which was exhibited as Exhibit-C8, issued by the Young Mizo Association (YMA), Chanmari West Branch, to assess the income of the deceased at Rs. 16,900/- for month. She submits that the aforesaid certificate was issued almost after 11 years of the date of the accident, and was not accompanied by any supporting pay slips, account book or financial records of Young Mizo Association to show that such a remuneration was ever paid or recorded. As such, she submits that the tribunal erred in giving undue reliance to the certificate of income issued by the Young Mizo Association. 16) The learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has also erred in applying the principles regarding computation of the quantum of award in a motor accident claims case as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of “ National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors.,” reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680 , in as much as the aforesaid judgment was delivered on 31.10.2017, whereas, the accident had occurred on 18.11.2011, i.e., about 6 years prior to the date of the judgment in the aforesaid case. She submits that as the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of “ Pranay Sethi &Ors.” (supra) is governed by the doctrine of prospective over ruling, the said principles cannot be retrospectively applied in connection with a case where the accident occurred almost 6 years prior to the delivery of the judgment in the case of “ Pranay Sethi & Ors.” (supra). 17) She further submits that the trial court had also erred in regarding all the sons and daughters of the deceased as his dependent, in as much as, on the date of the accident 4 out of 5 children of the deceased had already attained the age of majority and therefore, they may be presumed to be financially independent. 17) She further submits that the trial court had also erred in regarding all the sons and daughters of the deceased as his dependent, in as much as, on the date of the accident 4 out of 5 children of the deceased had already attained the age of majority and therefore, they may be presumed to be financially independent. 18) She further submits that the tribunal had also erred in accepting the age of the deceased as 47 years at the time of his death and mechanically applying the multiplier of 13 without arriving at a clear finding as regards the age of the deceased based on the evidence on record. She submits that the marriage certificate of the deceased, which has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the claim nd petition, clearly shows that the date of birth of the deceased was 22 May, 1959.She has further submitted that during cross-examination, she has also stated that in the charge sheet, arrest intimation, enquiry report and postmortem examination report annexed along with the claim petition, the age of deceased was reflected as 52 years. 19) The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the tribunal has failed to take into consideration of all these aspects while coming to the findings regarding the date of birth of the deceased and erroneously considered the age of the deceased as 47 years for the purpose of using a higher multiplier for computation of the quantum of the compensation. She therefore, submits that the impugned judgment & award is liable to be set aside and also makes an alternative submission that in the event the Court is not inclined to set aside the impugned judgment and award, the quantum of the compensation awarded may be reduced as per the applicable laws. In support of her submission, the learned counsel for the appellant has cited following rulings: - a) “ The Branch Manager Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Saphnuni & Another” (Judgment dated 19/09/2018 in MAC App. No. 41/2017.) b) “ New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. KawllianThanga ” reported in (2007) GLJ 332 20) On the other hand, Mr. L. H. Lianhrima, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that the delay in filing the claim case, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, by the claimant, has been properly explained. No. 41/2017.) b) “ New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. KawllianThanga ” reported in (2007) GLJ 332 20) On the other hand, Mr. L. H. Lianhrima, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that the delay in filing the claim case, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, by the claimant, has been properly explained. He submits that the claimant has adduced evidence to show that she has engaged Mr. J. Lalremruata to pursue her claim case before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. However, the papers submitted by her to the said counsel were misplaced by him. He further submits that the said fact has been established by the certificate to that effect given by her earlier engaged counsel, J. Lalremruata, which is exhibited as Exhibit-C9. Wherein he had also mentioned that whenever the claimant enquired about the matter, he used to always assure the claimant of a fruitful result. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/claimant has submitted that the claimant cannot be made liable for the mistake committed by her engaged counsel. He has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Lala Mata Din Vs. A. Narayanam ”, reported in 1969 (2) SCC 770 . 21) The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent further submits that when the alleged accident had occurred, there was no period of limitation in the MV Act, 1988 for filing claim petitions under Section 166 of the said Act.He submits that as such the law prevailing on the date of accident has to be applied in this case. In support of his submissions learned counsel for the respondent has cited the ruling of the Apex Court in the Case of “ Matri Koley & Another Vs. New India Assurance Co. and Others” reported in 2003 (8) SCC 718 . In support of his submissions learned counsel for the respondent has cited the ruling of the Apex Court in the Case of “ Matri Koley & Another Vs. New India Assurance Co. and Others” reported in 2003 (8) SCC 718 . 22) The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has also submitted that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly not given much importance to the fact that the driver of the offending vehicle was discharged in the criminal case arising out of the said accident, in as much as the order of discharge of the driver of the offending vehicle was passed by the concerned Judicial Magistrate not on merit of the case as no observation that the driver was not negligent while driving the offending vehicle has been made by the learned Judicial Magistrate Frist Class, Aizawl. He submits that otherwise also, the standard of prove in a criminal trial is much higher than what is applicable in a Claims case before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Where the standard of prove is on the basis of preponderance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable doubt. He, therefore, submits that the fact that the driver of the offending vehicle was discharged by criminal court does not have much implication in the outcome of the claims case filed by the respondent and the tribunal has rightly not given much importance to the said factor. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Anita Sharma & Others Vs. New India Assurance Company and Another” reported in ( 2021) 1 SCC 171. 23) The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has submitted that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, while arriving at the finding that the driver of the offending vehicle was negligent and rash in driving the offending vehicle rightly took into consideration, the testimony of the claimant’s witness namely, H. Lalchawimawia, SI of Police, who conducted the enquiry immediately after the accident and found that the driver of the offending vehicle drove the bus rashly and negligently. He also found that the driver of the bus had consumed liquor at the time of driving. 24) He submits that the claims tribunal also took into consideration, the testimony of the eye witness to the accident Smti. He also found that the driver of the bus had consumed liquor at the time of driving. 24) He submits that the claims tribunal also took into consideration, the testimony of the eye witness to the accident Smti. K. Sanghluni who was one of the passengers of the offending vehicle and who has categorically stated that the vehicle was driven in a rash and negligent manner, which resulted in the ill- fated accident in which the husband of the claimant sustained injury and ultimately died.He submits that the said testimony of the eye witness as well as the Enquiry Officer could not be demolished by the present appellants during their cross examination. 25) Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has also submitted that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly relied on the income certificate of the deceased issued by the YMA, as it was the YMA, who had engaged the husband of the respondent to do the work of “head mistry” (mason)in the construction work of Chanmari west branch of Young Mizo Association. He submits that the said income certificate was exhibited by the Vice President of YMA, Chanmari Branch, Shri. Lalmuanakima Chawhte and during his cross-examination the present appellants had failed to demolished his testimony. No question was posed as regards the income certificate i.e., Exhibit C8, which was issued by the said witness as president of YMA branch. He, therefore, submits that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly relied upon the income certificate of the deceased husband of the claimant issued by the president of YMA, Chanmari West Branch. 26) The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has also submitted that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly assessed the age of the deceased husband of the claimant as 47 years at the time of his death, and as much as, it relied upon the best document as regards the age of the deceased i.e., Exhibit- C2, which is the birth certificate of the deceased issued by the competent authority, i.e., Government of Mizoram, Department of Economic & Statistic. He submits that the reliability of the said birth certificate could not be demolished by the present appellant by cross-examining the witness, who had exhibited the same. He submits that the reliability of the said birth certificate could not be demolished by the present appellant by cross-examining the witness, who had exhibited the same. 27) The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has further submitted that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was correct in applying the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of “ National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors .” (supra) as there is no indication in the said judgment that it would have prospective effect only. He submits that any judgment by a court of law has the retrospective effect, if the contrary is not specifically stated. He has cited the ruling of the Apex Court in the Case of “ P. V. George &Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.” reported in (2007) 3 SCC 557 in support of his submission. 28) The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has further submitted that it is well settled that in motor accident claims cases, the tribunal cannot be adopt a hyper technical approach, but it has to discharge the role of Parens patriae.In support of his submissions, he has cited a ruling in the Apex Court in the case of “ Mohar Sai & Another Vs. Gayatri Devi & Ors.” (2018) 16 SCC 210 . 29) The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the deceased husband of the appellant was the sole bread earner of the family and due to his death in the vehicular accident, the respondent and her family had to pass their days in a severe financial constrain. He submits that the MV Act, 1988 being a beneficial legislation should be interpreted and implemented in a manner so as to give relief to the persons (claimant) who are made to suffer because of untimely death of the sole bread earner of the family, in a vehicular accident for no fault of them. He, therefore, prays for dismissing the instant appeal. 30) I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the sides and have gone through the materials available on record. I have also gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for both sides in support of their respective submissions. He, therefore, prays for dismissing the instant appeal. 30) I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the sides and have gone through the materials available on record. I have also gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for both sides in support of their respective submissions. 31) As regards the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants regarding delay in approaching the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by the claimant for filing the claim application under Section 166 of the MV Act, 1988 is concerned, it appears that the accident in question had occurred on 18.11.2011 i.e., the date before which the limitation of 6 months for filing the claim application was introduced under (3) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 in the year 2019, which was made effective from 25th February 2022. It has been settled by the Apex Court in the catena of judgments [viz., “Maitri Koley & Another Vs. New India Assurance Company & Others” (supra)] that the law prevailing on the date of accident has to be applied in claims cases. As such, since there was no bar of limitation in filing an application under of the MV Act, 1988 belatedly, the contention raised by the appellants does not have much force. Moreover, the clarification given by the respondent/claimant for approaching the tribunal belatedly can not be totally brushed aside. Hence, the plea that the claimant approached the Court after 10 years of the accident in which her husband expired is not sufficient to discard the case of the claimant. 32) As regards the contention of the appellants that the claim case filed by the respondent is bad for non-joinder of the driver of the offending vehicle, as he was the necessary party in the said claim case, it appears that the evidence on record shows that the offending vehicle i.e., the mini bus bearing registration No. MZ 01D 2250 was a government vehicle (Mizoram State Transport Bus).It also appears that driver of the said bus was a government employee and the accident occurred when the said driver was driving the vehicle in course of his employment. It also appears that though the driver K. Lallawmsanga was not impleaded as a party in the claim case, however, he appeared before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl and deposed as the witness for the opposite party. It also appears that though the driver K. Lallawmsanga was not impleaded as a party in the claim case, however, he appeared before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl and deposed as the witness for the opposite party. Hence, he was able to place his version of the incident before the tribunal. 33) Though, the said driver is the prime tort-feasor in this case, however, he was a government employee and the accident occurred during the course of his employment. The state respondents are vicariously liable for any damage caused to any third party due to negligence of the driver committed during the course of his employment. 34) Whether the said driver is a necessary party or a proper party is a question, which may be determined only in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case. A necessary party is a person, who ought to be joined as a party in the case and in whose absence and effective decree cannot be passed by the Court. Whereas a proper party is a person whose present would enable the court to completely and effectively and properly adjudicate upon matters and issues, though he may not be a person against whom a decree is to be made.In the instant case, the state respondents (appellants) being the employer of the offending driver are vicariously liable for the negligence committed by the driver during the course of his employment and it is they (the appellants), who are required to pay compensation to the claimants/ respondents, as the vehicle involved was a government vehicle and the offending driver was their employee.In the instant case, under the facts and circumstances discussed above, this court is of the considered opinion that since in the absence of the driver also and effective award may be passed against the appellants (employer of the driver). More so, when they have not disowned the fact that the driver of the offending vehicle was a government employee. As such though the driver appears to be a proper party, he may not be regarded as the necessary party for whose absence the entire claim proceeding may get vitiated. More so, when they have not disowned the fact that the driver of the offending vehicle was a government employee. As such though the driver appears to be a proper party, he may not be regarded as the necessary party for whose absence the entire claim proceeding may get vitiated. More so, as the Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, empowers the claims tribunal to specify while making the award, as to whether the same shall be paid by the employer, the owner or the driver of the vehicle involving the accident or by all or any of them as the case may be.Since the driver of the offending vehicle has been examined by the appellants as witness and he was thoroughly cross-examined by the claimant side, and the driver was able to put forth his version of the story, this case may not be regarded as a case wherethere is denial of the principles of natural justice to the respondents who were ultimately directed to pay the compensation to the claimant.This case is also not a case where the tribunal was not aware about the version of the driver about the alleged accident. Hence, under such circumstances, this court is of the considered opinion that though the driver of the offending vehicle under the aforesaid circumstances appears to be a proper party, he may not be regarded as a necessary party so as to vitiate the claim case due to his not impleadment. 35) As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that as the driver was exonerated in the criminal case and as such the tribunal was wrong in attributing the negligence on him due to which, the alleged accident occurred, this court is of the considered opinion that in the discharge order of the criminal court has not discussed the evidence collected by the investigating officer in detail. More over, adopting an approach that when criminal case has ended in acquittal of the offending driver, the civil suit (in the instant case the claim case) must follow the suit, was rejected by the Apex Court in the case of “ N. K. V. Brothers. (P) Ltd. Vs. M. Karumai Annal” reported in (2009) 13 SCC 530 . More over, adopting an approach that when criminal case has ended in acquittal of the offending driver, the civil suit (in the instant case the claim case) must follow the suit, was rejected by the Apex Court in the case of “ N. K. V. Brothers. (P) Ltd. Vs. M. Karumai Annal” reported in (2009) 13 SCC 530 . It was observed in the said case that culpable rashness under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code is more drastic than negligence under the law of torts to create civil liability. The Apex Court in the case of “ Bimala Devei Vs. Himachal RTC ” reported in 2009 (13) SCC 530 has observed that in a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the tribunal has to determined the amount of just compensation to be given to the claimant in the event an accident has been take by the reasons of negligence of driver of the motor vehicle. In a motor accident claims case, the claimant has to established his or her case on the touch-stone of preponderance of probabilities, the standard of prove beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering an application under of the MV Act, 1988 seeking compensation on account of death or injury in a road traffic accident. 36) In the instant case, the claimant’s witness No. 2 who is the Enquiry Officer who conducted the enquiry immediately after the accident, found that the driver of the offending vehicle had consumed liquor at the time of driving the offending vehicle when the accident occurred.Even the driver of the offending vehicle, who was examined as one of the opposite party witnesses has admitted during the cross-examination that after the accident he was taken to civil hospital by the police for examination as to whether he had consumed any liquor or alcohol and the medical doctor was of the view that he had consumed alcohol at the time of examination. 37) In view of the said testimony of the driver of the offending vehicle, there remains no doubt that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the offending vehicle was driven in a rash and negligent manner by the driver of the said vehicle. 37) In view of the said testimony of the driver of the offending vehicle, there remains no doubt that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the offending vehicle was driven in a rash and negligent manner by the driver of the said vehicle. The mere fact that the driver of the vehicle was discharged in the connected criminal trial arising out of the same accident, as well as the fact that he was also exonerated in the departmental proceedings conducted by the state respondents, in itself, may not be sufficient to absolve the appellants who being the employer of the driver because of whose fault the accident occurred from the liability of paying just compensation to the claimant. 38) Similarly, the failure on the part of the claimants to adduce any evidence as regards the examination of the offending vehicle by the Motor Vehicular Inspector (MVI) does not weakens the case of claimant. In as much as if the contention of the appellant is that the accident occurred due to some mechanical failure of the vehicle, which was beyond the control of the driver, it was for the appellants to prove their stand in the claims proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. However, in the written statement filed by them, no such plea of mechanical failure of the vehicle involved in the accident was taken, neither any evidence was adduced by them to show the same, hence, the fact that the claimant has failed to exhibit any MVI report would not affect the case of the claimant in any manner. 39) As regards the ascertaining of income of the deceased at the time of his death is concerned,the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl relied on the Exhibit -C8, issued by the President of Young Mizo Association as well as the testimony of Shri. LalmuankimaChawte, who issued the said certificate as the President of YMA, Chanmari West Branch. During cross-examination of the PW2, his testimony could not be demolished by the appellant. Merely, because of the fact that the Exhibit- C8 was issued after 11 years of the date of accident, same may not,in itself, diminish the probative value of the Exhibit- C8 as well as the testimony of the aforesaid witness. It is obvious that the necessity of the income certificate arose for the claimant only when the claim case was filed. It is obvious that the necessity of the income certificate arose for the claimant only when the claim case was filed. As such the mere fact of delay in granting of the said certificate in itself would not diminish its reliability. More so, when the evidence of the CW-4 Shri. Lalmuankima Chawte, clearly show that it was the Young Mizo Association, Chanmari, West Branch, who had engaged the deceased husband of the respondent/ claimant as mason for their construction work. 40) The evidentiary value of a document after the said document is admitted in evidence is to be ascertained after proper scrutiny of their documents in the instant case.In the instant case, though, the Exhibit-C8 was issued after 11 years of the death of the deceased husband of the claimant, however, the fact remains the said exhibit has been issued by the president of the Young Mizo Association, Chanmari, West Branch, who had engaged him for construction work could not be demolished and as such, the mere fact that it was issued after such a long period of the death of the husband of the claimant, in itself, may not be a reason for discarding the reliability of the said document. 41) As regards the contention of the learned Government counsel that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had erred in applying the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of “ National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors.” (supra) to this case, it appears that the judgment of the co-ordinate bench of this Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, i.e., the case of “ Raj Manager Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Saphnuni& Another” (supra) was in respect of a judgment and award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, which was delivered on 12.10.2017, i.e., much before the date when the judgment in the case of “ National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors.” was delivered by the Apex Court on 31.10.2017. As such the co-ordinate bench was correct that the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal could not have applied the principles laid down in the “ Pranay Sethi & Ors.” as when the judgment and award impugned in the aforesaid appeal was passed by the tribunal, the judgment in the case of “ Pranay Sethi & Ors.” was not in existence. As such the co-ordinate bench was correct that the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal could not have applied the principles laid down in the “ Pranay Sethi & Ors.” as when the judgment and award impugned in the aforesaid appeal was passed by the tribunal, the judgment in the case of “ Pranay Sethi & Ors.” was not in existence. However, in the instant case the impugned judgment has been passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl on 14.02.2025, therefore, the law as clarified by the Apex Court in the case of “ National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors.” is applicable in the instant case and the Motors Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly applied the principles of laid down by the Apex Court in the case of “ Pranay Sethi & Ors.” (supra) in the instant case. 42) Regarding the question of dependency of the children of the deceased husband of the claimant’s respondent is concerned, it appears that the claimant in her evidence on affidavit, in para-No. 5, has categorically stated that all the children of her husband were dependent on his income and this testimony has not been contradicted by the appellant during her cross-examination and as such there was no reason for the claims tribunal to disbelieved the testimony of the claimant. 43) This Court is of considered opinion that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl, under the facts and circumstances of the present case, has awarded just compensation to the claimant. 44) In view of he above discussions made and reason stated in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the impugned judgment and award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl in MACT Case No.38/2022. 45) Accordingly, this appeal stands dismissed.