JUDGMENT : MANISH CHOUDHURY, J. This review petition under Section 114 read with Order XLVII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [‘CPC’ or ‘the Code’, for short] is preferred seeking review of a Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025 passed in a writ petition, W.P.[C] no. 4705/2013. 2. The petitioners had instituted the writ petition, W.P.[C] no. 4705/2013 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking inter alia a direction to declare that the demolition exercise carried out in the business premises of the petitioner/review petitioner no. 1 firm was illegal and unauthorized. The petitioners had also sought for a direction to the respondent authorities to pay adequate compensation to the petitioners to the extent of Rupees Two Crores for the alleged arbitrary and unauthorized action of the respondent authorities towards demolition of the petitioner/review petitioner no. 1 firm’s business premises. A direction was also sought for to register a case against the respondents, named as accused, in a First Information Report [FIR] lodged by the petitioner/review petitioner no. 2 before the respondent no. 7. 3. After consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and upon going through the materials brought on record by the parties through their pleadings, the writ petition was disposed of by the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025. 4. In the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025, a finding was recorded to the effect that the act of demolition of the coke manufacturing unit installed at the subject-plot, carried out on 26.07.2013, was without following due procedure and was in violation of the principle of natural justice as no prior opportunity was afforded to the petitioners prior to 26.07.2013. It has been further recorded that the liability, however, cannot be affixed specifically on any of the respondent authorities in the District Administration, Tinsukia and M/s Coal India Limited, arraigned as party-respondents in the writ petition, as those respondents had taken stands which were at variance to each other, shifting the liability of demolition from them. It was further observed that no direction could be made for making payment of any amount as losses suffered by the petitioners, for the reasons recorded. In the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025, it was observed that from the materials on record, it had emerged that on 26.07.2013, no exercise for eviction of the petitioners from the subject-plot was carried out. 5. In the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025, it was observed that from the materials on record, it had emerged that on 26.07.2013, no exercise for eviction of the petitioners from the subject-plot was carried out. 5. The subject-plot is a plot of land measuring 2 Bighas 1 Katha 4 Lessas, covered by Dag no. 160 & Periodic Patta no. 2 [new], situate at Village – Ledo Tikok, No. 2 NLR, Mouza – Makum, Sub-Division – Margherita, District – Tinsukia, Assam. The petitioners had claimed that a coke manufacturing unit was installed on the subject-plot by the petitioners and a demolition drive carried out on 26.07.2013 by the respondent authorities in M/s Coal India Limited with the assistance of the respondent authorities in the District Administration, Tinsukia. 6. In the present review petition, the review petitioners have stated that the petitioners’ business premises situated within the subject-plot was unauthorizedly demolished by the respondent nos. 8, 9, 10, 11 & 13, who are authorities in M/s Coal India Limited. It has been asserted that on 09.07.2013, a Meeting was held at Dehing Guests House, Margherita and the said Meeting was presided over by the Minister of Power, Industries and Commerce, Assam. In that Meeting, it was proposed and decided to carry out the demolition exercise by the respondent authorities in M/s Coal India Limited. After a request of the respondent no. 8, the respondent no. 2 vide an Office Order dated 18.07.2013 informed the respondent no. 8 about detailment of an Executive Magistrate, Margherita for law and order duty during the proposed demolition exercise. It is further stated that the demolition exercise was carried out as per an Office Order dated 23.07.2013 of the respondent no. 2 and accordingly, Police personnel assisted to maintain law and order and to provide security. The review petitioners have further asserted that the Management of M/s Coal India Limited provided the machineries required during the process of demolition and their personnels were present on 26.07.2013 to ensure safe and proper functioning of the machineries and the operators so deployed. 7. With the above projections, the review petitioners have stated that the afore-stated documents and the events had clearly amplified the objectives sought to be achieved and it was evident that those communications were exchanged prior to undertaking the demolition exercise on 26.07.2013 in the premises of the petitioners at the subject-plot. 7. With the above projections, the review petitioners have stated that the afore-stated documents and the events had clearly amplified the objectives sought to be achieved and it was evident that those communications were exchanged prior to undertaking the demolition exercise on 26.07.2013 in the premises of the petitioners at the subject-plot. The review petitioners have stated that it was an admitted fact that the demolition was carried out on 26.07.2013. 8. In the present review petition, the review petitioners have canvassed that in view of such admitted fact situation, there could not have been a different conclusion of the events preceding and occurring on 26.07.2013, as observed in the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025, to the effect that the liability could not be affixed specifically on any of the respondent authorities in the District Administration, Tinsukia and M/s Coal India Limited. Rather, the liability could be affixed based on the facts and circumstances emerged from the materials on record. 9. In this review petition, the review petitioners have specifically referred to the Meeting held on 09.07.2013 and two Office Orders, dated 18.07.2013 & dated 23.07.2013, issued subsequent to the Meeting and prior to the demolition exercise which was carried out on 26.07.2013. By making reference to them, the review petitioners have sought recall of the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025 by asserting that from such materials on record, a finding can be conclusively arrived at to the effect that the demolition exercise was initiated and carried out by the authorities of M/s Coal India Limited to oust the petitioners from the subject-plot belonging to M/s Coal India Limited. 10. In order to appreciate such grounds advanced by the review petitioners seeking review, a revisit at the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025 is ineluctable to find out whether during the course of deliberation the Court had taken note of the Meeting held on 09.07.2013 and the Office Orders dated 18.07.2013 & dated 23.07.2013 and the events associated with them or not. 11. Upon perusal of the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025, it is noticed that during the course of deliberation, the same were taken into consideration in the following manner :- 21. In the affidavits-in-opposition filed by the respondent no. 2 and the respondent no. 3 respectively, it is stated that a Letter detailing one Magistrate was issued to the respondent no. Upon perusal of the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025, it is noticed that during the course of deliberation, the same were taken into consideration in the following manner :- 21. In the affidavits-in-opposition filed by the respondent no. 2 and the respondent no. 3 respectively, it is stated that a Letter detailing one Magistrate was issued to the respondent no. 8 in response to his request for providing the service of a Magistrate during demolition operation contemplated by the NEC, CIL in the leasehold area of Tirap Colliery, NEC, Margherita. The respondent no. 2 by an Office Order dated 18.07.2013 detailed an Executive Magistrate, Margherita for maintaining law and order during the time of demolition exercise of two coke manufacturing units including the one belonging to the petitioners, on 26.07.2013. On the basis of the Order dated 18.07.2013 of the respondent no. 2, the respondent no. 3 issued an Office Order dated 23.07.2013 detailing the same Executive Magistrate, Margherita to maintain law and order during the time of operation on 26.07.2013 and also requested the Sub-Divisional Police Officer [SDPO], Margherita for deployment of adequate force. It is averred that the demolition was proposed and carried out by the NEC, CIL authorities as decided in a Meeting presided over by the Hon’ble Minister of Power, Industries & Commerce, Assam on 09.07.2013. It has been averred that the Magistrate was detailed from Civil Administration only for maintaining law and order during the time of demolition of coke manufacturing units. 22. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent nos. 8–12, it is asserted that the subject-plot belongs to the respondent M/s Coal India Limited authorities as per the provisions of the Act, 1973. It is averred that as the subject-plot was in unauthorised occupation of the petitioner no. 2 and he had constructed a coke manufacturing unit on it, an FIR was lodged at Ledo Out Post on 22.05.2012. Subsequently on 26.09.2012, a Legal Notice was also issued to the petitioner no. 2 to vacate the subject-plot and the said legal notice was duly received by the petitioner no. 2 on 01.10.2012. The copies of the FIR dated 22.05.2012, the Legal Notice dated 26.09.2012 and the Acknowledgement Card have been annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition as Annexure - E 1 , E 2 and E 3 respectively. But the petitioner no. 2 to vacate the subject-plot and the said legal notice was duly received by the petitioner no. 2 on 01.10.2012. The copies of the FIR dated 22.05.2012, the Legal Notice dated 26.09.2012 and the Acknowledgement Card have been annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition as Annexure - E 1 , E 2 and E 3 respectively. But the petitioner no. 2 did not show any intention to vacate the subject-plot despite his illegal/unauthorized occupation. 23. The respondent nos. 8–12 have taken a stand in the affidavit-in-opposition that a Meeting was held on 09.07.2013 at Margherita between the officials of the District Administration, District Police and other departments of the State Government with the officials of the respondent M/s Coal India Limited. In the Meeting, which was presided over by the Hon’ble Minister of Power, Industries & Commerce, Assam, a decision was arrived at to demolish two coke manufacturing units operating from leasehold areas exclusively belonging to the respondent M/s Coal India Limited. A stand has been taken that pursuant to the decision taken in the Meeting dated 09.07.2013, the Management of M/s Coal India Limited provided the machineries required during the process of demolition and its personnel were present there to ensure safe and proper functioning of the machineries and the operators of the machineries so deployed. The respondent nos. 8–12 have, thus, denied that the demolition of the coke manufacturing unit was carried out by them. 24. A copy of the Judgment delivered by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Margherita on 08.10.2018 in G.R. Case no. 555 of 2013 has been placed before the Court. From the Judgment dated 08.10.2018, it is noticed that G.R. Case no. 555 of 2013 arose out of the FIR, lodged by the petitioner no. 2, registered as Margherita Police Station Case no. 181 of 2013. After completing investigation into the case, Margherita Police Station Case no. 181 of 2013, the Investigating Officer [I.O.] of the case submitted a charge- sheet against four nos. of accused persons, who were officials of M/s Coal India Limited, finding a prima facie case of committing the offences under Section 447 and Section 427 of the IPC read with Section 34, IPC. After hearing the parties, the Trial Court framed charges under Section 447, Section 427 and Section 384 of the IPC against the accused persons. During the trial, the prosecution side examined seven nos. After hearing the parties, the Trial Court framed charges under Section 447, Section 427 and Section 384 of the IPC against the accused persons. During the trial, the prosecution side examined seven nos. of prosecution witnesses. Before the Trial Court, points arose for determination inter-alia were : [i] whether the accused persons on 26.07.2013 at about 08-30 a.m. criminally trespassed into the campus of the informant with intent to commit an offence?; [ii] whether the accused persons on the same date, time and place committed mischief by destroying the factory of the informant? After evaluation of the materials/evidence on record, the Trial Court reached a view in the Judgment dated 08.10.2018 that the prosecution side failed to prove the guilt of the accused persons beyond all reasonable doubt. Answering the points in negative, the accused persons were acquitted from the charges. On a query made by this Court, the learned counsel for the parties have submitted that no appeal has been preferred against the Judgment dated 08.10.2018, meaning thereby, the Judgment dated 08.10.2018 resulting in acquittal of the accused persons had attained finality. Such subsequent events can be definitely looked at to advance the cause, more so, when such events have a bearing on the nature of the relief, as originally sought for. 25. In the affidavits-in-opposition of the respondent authorities in the Tinsukia District Administration and of the respondent authorities in M/s Coal India Limited, it has been admitted that on 26.07.2013, demolition of the coke manufacturing unit installed on the subject-plot was carried out. However, the respondent authorities in the Tinsukia District Administration and the respondent authorities in M/s Coal India Limited in their respective affidavit-in-opposition have made denial of their involvement in the demolition by attributing the act on each other. As the officials of the respondent M/s Coal India Limited authorities were already acquitted by the Trial Court vide the Judgment dated 08.10.2018 and the Judgment having attained finality, it is difficult to affix the liability to any of these respondents for the act of demolition of the coke manufacturing unit on 26.07.2013 in the present writ proceedings where the adjudication is made only on the basis of the pleadings of the parties. 35. In so far as the direction to register a case against the respondents, named as accused, in the First Information Report [FIR] lodged by the petitioner no. 35. In so far as the direction to register a case against the respondents, named as accused, in the First Information Report [FIR] lodged by the petitioner no. 2 is concerned, it is already found from the discussion made above that the FIR was registered as Margherita Police Station Case no. 181/2013 and the same resulted in a charge-sheet against a nos. of officials of M/s Coal India Limited. The charge-sheeted accused persons faced the trial and the Trial Court had acquitted them from the charges vide its Judgment dated 08.10.2018. The relief so sought for by the petitioner has, therefore, become obsolete. 36. Summing up, it has emerged from the discussion that the act of demolition of the coke manufacturing unit installed at the subject-plot, carried out on 26.07.2013, was without following due procedure and was in violation of the principle of natural justice as no prior opportunity was afforded to the petitioners prior to 26.07.2013. But the liability cannot be affixed specifically on any of the respondent authorities in the Tinsukia District Administration and M/s Coal India Limited in the instant writ proceedings, as these respondents have taken stands which are at variance to each other, shifting the liability of demolition from them. No direction can be made for making payment of any amount as losses suffered by the petitioners, for the reasons recorded. It has also emerged that on 26.07.2013, no exercise for eviction of the petitioners from the subject-plot was carried out. The petitioners have themselves admitted that as on date, they are operating the coke manufacturing unit from the subject-plot. 37. Resultantly, the writ petition is disposed of with the observation that the petitioners can only be evicted from the subject-plot only after following due procedure and in compliance of the principles of natural justice, that is, by affording a prior and reasonable opportunity of being heard. There shall, however, be no order as to cost. 12. Mr. A.K. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the review petitioners has submitted that the findings recorded in the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025 could not have been reached in the manner it had been reached. There shall, however, be no order as to cost. 12. Mr. A.K. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the review petitioners has submitted that the findings recorded in the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025 could not have been reached in the manner it had been reached. There were ample materials on record to draw a conclusion different from the conclusion drawn by the court that no liability could be affixed specifically on any of the respondent authorities in the District Administration, Tinsukia and M/s Coal India Limited for the act of demolition. Absolving the respondent authorities in the District Administration, Tinsukia and M/s Coal India Limited is in conflict with the pleaded stand of the respondent authorities and thus situated, the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025 is liable to be reviewed and recalled in the interest of justice. 13. Ms. U. Das, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam appearing for the State respondents has, on the other hand, contended that the petitioners have failed to create any ground for review. The grounds on which review is sought for do not come within the scope and ambit of review jurisdiction. By pointing to the grounds urged in the review petition, it is contended that the petitioners are trying to reagitate the grounds which were urged earlier during the writ proceedings, by merely rephrasing them. It is submitted that the review petitioners have thereby, tried to do a rehearing. It is contended that the issues which were already heard and decided during the writ proceedings, cannot be reagitated again in the name of seeking review. 14. The learned counsel for the parties have referred to the decisions in Shivdev Singh & others vs. State of Punjab & others, AIR 1963 SC 1909 ; Meera Bhanja [Smt] vs. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [Smt], [1995] 1 SCC 170 ; and S. Madhusudhan Reddy vs. V. Narayana Reddy and others , [2022] 11 SCR 42 . 15. It has been observed in Shivdev Singh [supra] that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. 16. 15. It has been observed in Shivdev Singh [supra] that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. 16. In Meera Bhanja [supra], it has been observed, following Shivdev Singh [supra], that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC. A review petition has to be entertained only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. An error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-dawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. The limitation of powers of the court under Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC is similar to the jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking review of the orders under Article 226. 17. With regard to the scope and ambit of review jurisdiction, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Madhusudhan Reddy vs. V. Narayana Reddy and others , [2022] 11 SCR 42 , has observed in the following manner :- 19. After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and Others , [2013] 8 SCC 320 , this Court observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below: 20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute : 20.1. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below: 20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute : 20.1. When the review will be maintainable : [i] Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; [ii] Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; [iii] Any other sufficient reason. The words ‘any other sufficient reason’ has been interpreted in Chajju Ram vs. Neki , AIR 1922 PC 112 , and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors. , 1955 SCR 520 , to mean ‘a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule’. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors., [2013] 8 SCC 337 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: - [i] A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. [ii] Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. [iii] Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. [iv] Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. [v] A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. [vi] The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. [vii] The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. [viii] The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. [ix] Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived. 18. It is well settled that there are limits to the exercise of the power of review. [ix] Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived. 18. It is well settled that there are limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised to the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistakes or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, the power of review is not to be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. A review is not an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected. A power of review is not to be confused with the powers of an appellate court. An appellate court can correct all manners or errors. It is also settled that an error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. 19. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, is not to be termed an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. Under Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC, a judgment may be open to review inter-alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. The term, ‘mistake or error apparent’ means an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If a mistake or an error is not self-evident, it cannot be treated as a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. In exercise of review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. 20. If a mistake or an error is not self-evident, it cannot be treated as a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. In exercise of review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. 20. In the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025, the Court in Paragraph 21 to Paragraph 23, as extracted above, had considered the events arising out of the Meeting held on 09.07.2013 and the actions taken thereafter vide Office Orders, dated 18.07.2013 & dated 23.07.2013. After taking notice of such events and the Judgment dated 08.10.2018 passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Margherita in G.R. Case no. 555 of 2013, as extracted in Paragraph 24, the Court had arrived at a finding for the reasons assigned in Paragraph 25 that in the obtaining facts and circumstances, it would be difficult for the writ court to affix the liability to any of the respondents in the District Administration, Tinsukia and M/s Coal India Limited for the act of demolition of the coke manufacturing unit on 26.07.2013 as in a writ proceeding the adjudication can be made only on the basis of the pleadings of the parties. The Court in a writ proceeding does not embark on a fact-finding exercise and if the facts are disputed disabling the writ court to arrive at a definite finding, then the writ court would not decide such question of fact. If out the materials on record, it was possible to arrive at two different opinions and the court had taken one of the two possible views, then also review is not permissible on a plea that the other possible view ought to have been taken. The Court had, thereafter, summed up in Paragraph 36 its falling within the scope and ambit of review jurisdiction. 21. From the discussion made above, it has emerged that the review petitioners have sought to urge and repeat the same grounds, as already urged in the writ petition. The review petitioners on the pretext of filing a review petition, cannot be permitted to re-agitate and re-urge the same grounds for which conclusions were already arrived at. 21. From the discussion made above, it has emerged that the review petitioners have sought to urge and repeat the same grounds, as already urged in the writ petition. The review petitioners on the pretext of filing a review petition, cannot be permitted to re-agitate and re-urge the same grounds for which conclusions were already arrived at. A repetition of the very same grounds, which were earlier urged in the writ petition culminating in the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025, are not permissible in a review petition. Thus, the grounds which are urged for review are found not sustainable. 22. Resultantly, this Court does not find any reason, not to speak of any good and sufficient reason, to hold that the review petitioners have made out any case to review the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2025 passed in the writ petition, W.P.[C] no. 4705/2013. The review petition is therefore, devoid of any merit. Consequently, the review petition is dismissed.