J UDGMENT : KAUSHIK GOSWAMI, J. Heard Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned Central Government Counsel, appearing for the petitioners. 2] By way of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ petitioners assails the legality and validity of various spot verification reports conducted in respect of land allegedly occupied by the security forces pursuant to the judgment and order dated 19.03.2015 passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 67/2013. The challenge includes the latest spot verification report dated 31.05.2023 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl District, as well as earlier spot verifications conducted on multiple occasions, which ultimately culminated in the final verification report. 3] The dispute traces its origin to WP(C) No. 67/2013 filed by respondent No. 2, namely SILURNAM, a registered association consisting of 53 landowners of the Bawngkawn Brigade area under Aizawl District. The association had approached this Court seeking payment of rental compensation in respect of private lands and buildings allegedly occupied by security forces including paramilitary forces, the army, and other defence units during the period of disturbance in the State of Mizoram. 4] The case of the association was founded on the Memorandum of Settlement executed in 1986 between the Government of India and the Mizo National Front (MNF), which formed the basis of the historic Peace Accord bringing an end to the period of insurgency in the State. Clause 13(b) of the said Memorandum of Settlement contemplated payment of rental compensation to owners of private lands and buildings which had been occupied by the security forces. 5] Upon hearing the parties, this Court disposed of WP(C) No. 67/2013 by judgment and order dated 19.03.2015 directing constitution of a Joint Spot Verification Committee consisting of representatives of the Government of India, the Government of Mizoram and the district administration, along with representatives of the petitioners. The committee was directed to verify whether the lands in question were under occupation of security forces during the period from 01.09.1986 to 09.09.2008 and, upon such verification, to assess the rental compensation payable to the landowners. 6] The directions issued by this Court clearly stipulated that once the verification was completed and compensation was assessed by the Deputy Commissioner, the same would be forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Mizoram and thereafter to the Ministry of Defence, Government of India for sanction and payment. 6] The directions issued by this Court clearly stipulated that once the verification was completed and compensation was assessed by the Deputy Commissioner, the same would be forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Mizoram and thereafter to the Ministry of Defence, Government of India for sanction and payment. 7] In compliance with the judgment dated 19.03.2015, the joint verification team conducted spot verifications and eventually submitted its report. Based on the verification process, the committee concluded that several of the landowners were entitled to rental compensation for the period during which their lands had been occupied by the security forces. 8] Subsequently, the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl assessed the rental compensation and forwarded the same to the Government of Mizoram. The Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Land Revenue and Settlement Department, in turn forwarded the proposal for sanction of the compensation to the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of India by letter dated 22.05.2018. 9] In the meanwhile, contempt proceedings were initiated before this Court by filing Cont. Cas (C) No. 33 of 2016 alleging willful deliberate non-compliance of the judgment dated 19.03.2015. 10] During the course of the contempt proceedings, this Court examined the status of compliance with the judgment dated 19.03.2015 and noted that the assessment had already been forwarded to the Government of India. The Court also expressed prima facie concern regarding the attempt to conduct fresh spot verification despite completion of the verification process pursuant to the judicial order. 11] By order dated 01.02.2019, the contempt court observed that once the verification process had culminated in a final report and the assessment had been forwarded to the concerned authorities for payment, there was no justification for conducting fresh verification. 12] The matter was subsequently taken up again by the contempt court, and by order dated 02.07.2025 the contempt court directed the respondent No. 11 (petitioner herein) to comply with the judgment and order dated 19.03.2015 by depositing the assessed rental compensation amounting to Rs. 2,16,81,261/- for payment to the landowners. The contempt court granted a final opportunity to the respondent to file a compliance report within four weeks. The order dated 02.07.2025 reads as under: - “02.07.2025 Heard Mr. Reuben Lalrinsanga, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned CGC for the newly impleaded respondent No. 11 and Mrs. 2,16,81,261/- for payment to the landowners. The contempt court granted a final opportunity to the respondent to file a compliance report within four weeks. The order dated 02.07.2025 reads as under: - “02.07.2025 Heard Mr. Reuben Lalrinsanga, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned CGC for the newly impleaded respondent No. 11 and Mrs. Mary L. Khiangte, learned counsel for the newly impleaded respondent No. 10 i.e. Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl. 2. Mr. Reuben Lalrinsanga, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that this Contempt Petition has been pending since 2016 for the compliance of the Judgment of this Court in WP(C) No. 67/2013 dated 19.03.2015, and till date the respondent No. 11/Defence State Officer, Guwahati Circle have failed to comply with the Judgment & Order of this Court. He submits that the other respondents i.e. the Deputy Commissioner have taken the necessary steps by having joint verification and they have also found that the particulars of the individuals are genuine. He therefore submits that there are no grounds for the respondent No. 11 not to pay the compensation in compliance with the Judgment of this Court dated 19.03.2015 in WP(C) No. 67/2013. 3. The learned counsel for the newly impleaded for respondent No. 11 submits that they have filed their affidavit-in-reply on 30.06.2025, wherein they had stated as follows: ‘It is submitted that although the committee had come to a conclusion that the documents submitted by Sh. Chalhmingthanga S/o Hrangkunga, Bawngkawn, Aizawl (F.15012/1/93/loose/DC(A) /333) are genuine as issued by the D.C. Aizawl dated 08.04.1997. But the fact cannot be denied that The Hon'ble High Court has also directed to verify the petitioner's land vide order dated 27.01.2020 in Cont. case No.33/2016. Accordingly, the joint verification team had produced a report dated 13.03.2020 where it is seen that the petitioners' lands are not within the Blue Print Map of Bawnkawn area and land of the claimant falls outside the bule print area occupied by the Army dated 04-05.03.2020. As per the affidavit submitted by the petitioners it is seen that the Notice issued by DC, Aizawl dated 08.04.1997 was addressed particularly to Chalhmingthanga S/O Hrangkhuna, Bawngkawn. However, as per record available in Defence Estates Office, Guwahati Circle, the DC Aizawl issued notice dated 07.04.1997 without addressing any particular persons/individuals. As per the affidavit submitted by the petitioners it is seen that the Notice issued by DC, Aizawl dated 08.04.1997 was addressed particularly to Chalhmingthanga S/O Hrangkhuna, Bawngkawn. However, as per record available in Defence Estates Office, Guwahati Circle, the DC Aizawl issued notice dated 07.04.1997 without addressing any particular persons/individuals. Whereas, it is noticed that both the letters were exact in nature only the difference traced out is their dates as both are different and not matching with the letter received by the Defence Estates Office, Guwahati Circle. After examining/ crosschecking these two documents, it is seen that the office of DC Aizawl had issued general Notice to all individuals who were using the land for cultivation inside the Army occupied area (Blue Print Area) as requested by the Station HQ Aizawl vide letter No. 7150/Aizawl/15 dated 26.03.1997 and not to any particular person in concerned.’ 4. Mrs. Mary L. Khiangte, learned counsel for the newly impleaded for respondent No. 10 submits that the Deputy Commissioner in compliance with the Judgment & Order of this Court dated 19.03.2015 passed in WP(C) No. 67/2013, had taken the necessary steps and after the joint verification of the land of the petitioners, had come to a conclusion that the documents submitted by Sh. Chalhmingthanga, s/o Hrangkunga, Bawngkawn, Aizawl was in fact issued by the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl after careful perusal of the letter received from Station Officer vide letter No. 7150/Aizawl/15 dated 26.03.1997. She also submits that the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl had issued notice dated 07.04.1997 without addressing any particular persons/individuals and also issued notice dated 08.04.1997 addressed to particular person. There is therefore no grounds for non-compliance with the Judgment of this Court in WP(C) No. 67/2013 dated 19.03.2015 by the newly impleaded respondent No. 11. She further submits that they have also made the necessary assessment after joint verification and had assessed the compensation amount liable to be paid to the petitioners which is amounting to Rs. 2,16,81,261/- vide the letter dated 8th August, 2016. 5. Considering the above submissions, this Court finds it fit at this stage to reproduce and refer to the order of this Court which was passed on 01.02.2019 which is as follows: ‘2. This Court disposed of WP(C) No. 67/2013 vide order dated 19.03.2015. The relevant portion of the order dated 19.03.2015, which is at paragraph No. 10 is reproduced below: ‘10. This Court disposed of WP(C) No. 67/2013 vide order dated 19.03.2015. The relevant portion of the order dated 19.03.2015, which is at paragraph No. 10 is reproduced below: ‘10. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and as agreed by the parties to the petition, this writ petition is disposed of with the following directions that – (i) the members consisting of (a) the Director (NE-II), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (NE Division-NEDC) or his authorised representative; (b) the Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Department of Land, Revenue and Settlement or his authorised representative not below the rank of Joint/Under Secretary; (c) the Deputy Commissioner and District Collector of the Aizawl District, Aizawl or his authorised representative in the Revenue Section/Branch and (d) the petitioners or their duly authorised representatives shall conduct a Joint Spot Verification of the land of the petitioners in question with regard to the issue of determination as to whether petitioners' said land was under occupation of Security Forces/Army/Defence Units from 01.09.1986 to 09.09.2008, l.e. the date of de-hiring the said land. (ii) If during such spot verification, it is found that the Security Forces/Army/Defence Units were in occupation of petitioners' land in question during the period from 01.09.1986 to 09.09.2008, beyond the area figured in the Blue Map as prepared by the Board of Officers during 1992-1993; the said Joint Verification team shall then verify the private land holdings of the petitioners individually, like the LSCS, Village Council Passes, Periodic Pattas, District Council Passes, etc. for those parcels of land under private holdings that were found to be under occupation of Security Forces/Army/Defence Units after 01.09.1986. (iii) After such verification, the said Joint Verification team within a period of 6 (six) months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order to be furnished by the petitioners on or before 10th April, 2015 before the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl; shall furnish its report before the said Deputy Commissioner and District Collector of Aizawl District. In the present case, the Deputy Commissioner and District Collector of Aizawl District, Aizawl shall be the Coordinating authority for the aforesaid task. In the present case, the Deputy Commissioner and District Collector of Aizawl District, Aizawl shall be the Coordinating authority for the aforesaid task. (iv) As per the said report of the Joint Verification team, if any additional land under private land holding is found to be occupied by the Security Forces/Army/Defence Units from 01.09.1986 to 09.09.2008 beyond the 6.991 Acres (22.15 Bighas) under private holdings at Bawngkawn Brigade area that was determined by the Board of Officers as per Blue Print/Map, (for which rental compensation for the period from 01.09.1986 to 09.09.2008 was already paid), then within 2 (two) months from the receipt of said Joint Verification Report, the concerned Deputy Commissioner and District Collector, Aizawl shall determine the total rental compensation to be paid to each of such private land owner for the period from 01.09.1986 to 09.09.2008 and shall place the same before the Secretary to the Government of Mizoram in the Land Revenue & Settlement Department for its approval. (v) The Secretary to the Government of Mizoram in the Land Revenue & Settlement Department, within two month's time from the date of receipt of the aforesaid determination of rental compensation, if any from the concerned Deputy Commissioner; on verification, shall approve it and shall forward the same to the Secretary of Defence, Union of India, New Delhi for necessary sanction of the amount of rental compensation. (vi) The Secretary of Defence, Union of India, New Delhi within two month's time from the date of receipt of such proposal/ assessment of rental compensation from the Secretary to the Government of Mizoram in the Land Revenue & Settlement Department, shall sanction the said amount and shall place the same a the disposal of the Deputy Commissioner and District Collector, Aizawl District, Aizawl for necessary disbursement to the petitioners who are found to be entitled for the same. (vii) The Deputy Commissioner and District Collector, Aizawk District, Aizawl on receipt of such amount as stated above, shall disburse the rental compensation to the petitioner(s) concerned forthwith (without any delay) as per their due entitlement, subject to their proper identification by the authority concerned (by obtaining proper receipt from them).’ 3. In pursuance to the above order, verification of sites of the various land owners was done by the Verification Team, constituted by this Court. 4. In pursuance to the above order, verification of sites of the various land owners was done by the Verification Team, constituted by this Court. 4. On the basis of the verification made by the Verification Team, a final report was made by the Joint Verification Team vide its meeting minutes dated 25.04.2018, which is reproduced below: ‘The Chairman, Asst. Commissioner, Aizawl welcomed the members present. He appraised the meeting that the meeting was called to pursuit the judgment & order of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court de 19.3.2015. The meeting deliberately discussed and perused para No. 10 (ii) of the judgment & order of the Gauhati High Court and decided as follows: 1. The team of joint spot verification conducted on 21.09.2015 and on 26.04.2016 found the following petitioners land were found occupied by Army (1) Petitioner No. 1 - C. Ngura (2) Petitioner No. 2- Blakchungnunga (3) Petitioner No. 3- Kapthanga (4) Petitioner No. 4 - Lengsangzuali (5) Petitioner No. 5 - Kawlkunga (6) Petitioner No. 6 - Lallianzual (7) Petitioner No. 7 - Lalzarluala (8) Petitioner No. 8- Zapari (9) Petitioner No. 9 - Sangluri (10) Petitioner No.10 - Doluaia (11) Petitioner No. 11 - Vanlalzara (12) Petitioner No. 12 - Lalzara Colney (13) Petitioner No. 13 - Vanhnuaithanga (14) Petitioner No. 14 - Liankhuma (15) Petitioner No. 15 - Vanlalduha Sailo (16) Petitioner No. 16 - Lalthlamuana (17) Petitioner No. 17 - K. Thansiami (18) Petitioner No. 18 - R. Chaldailov (19) Petitioner No. 19-Chalhmingthanga 2. The joint spot verification team members verified the private and holdings of the above petitioners individually in this meeting and found that the land passes of the above petitioners, except petitioner No. 11 and 18, were genuine.’ 5. As the Joint Verification Team had taken a final decision, which was to the effect that 18 land owners who find mention in the meeting minutes held on 25.04.2018, were entitled to rental compensation for the period from 01.09.1986 to 09.09.2008, the assessment for payment of rental compensation was made. Only Serial No. 4 of the meeting minutes dated 25.04.2018 and the petitioner No. 18 l.e. Rualkhumi were not found eligible for payment of rental compensation. 6. The Deputy Commissioner thereafter sent the verification report, along with the rental assessment, to the Secretary to the Govt. Only Serial No. 4 of the meeting minutes dated 25.04.2018 and the petitioner No. 18 l.e. Rualkhumi were not found eligible for payment of rental compensation. 6. The Deputy Commissioner thereafter sent the verification report, along with the rental assessment, to the Secretary to the Govt. of Mizoram, Land Revenue & Settlement Department, who in turn sent the same to the Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Defence vide letter dated 22.05.2018 for payment of rent. 7. That the respondents have not made the payment of rental compensation to the petitioners till date. In the meantime, as there was some in consistency with regard to the meeting minutes dated 25.04.2018, this Court had directed the counsel for the respondent No. 6 to clarify the matter. The same has been clarified by way of a letter dated 23.01.2019, issued by the Addl. Deputy Commissioner, which is the following effect: OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AIZAWL DISTRICT AIZAWL (LANDS & BUILDING BRANCH) No. F. 15012/5/2015-DC(A)/554 : Dated Aizawl, 23 January, 2019 To, Ms. Mary Lalruatkimi Khlangte, Govt. Advocate Subj: Contempt Case No. 33 of 2016 (Silumam r/b Peter Laichhuantiinga –vs- DC Aizawl & Ors) Ref: Your No. Cont. Case (C) No. 33/2016-AG(M) dated 17/1/2019. Madam, With reference to your letter No. cited above, I am to state that due to inadvertent error, the name of petitioner No. 18-Rualkhumi has not been included in the meeting minutes dated 25.4.2018, wherein the genuineness of her land documents could not be established by Director, Land Revenue & Settlement Department. Therefore, her name may be included in the minutes of the meeting dated 25.4.2018. Further, it may be stated that name of petitioner No. 22 was mentioned as Lalzarluala which may be corrected as Petitioner No. 22-Lalthanchhungi. Yours faithfully Sd/ (JOHN LT SANGA) Addl. Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl District, Aizawl." The Addl. Deputy Commissioner's letter dated 23.01.2019 clarifies that due to an advertent error, the name of the petitioner No. 18, I.e. Rualkhumi was not included in the meeting minutes dated 25.04.2018 and that her name should be included in the said meeting minutes. 8. Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 & 4 submits that a meeting was held in the office chamber of the Secretary to the Land Revenue & Settlement Department, Govt. 8. Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 & 4 submits that a meeting was held in the office chamber of the Secretary to the Land Revenue & Settlement Department, Govt. of Mizoram on 10.08.2018, wherein it was decided to conduct another joint survey of Bawngkawn area on 04.10.2018, in connection with WP(C) No. 67/2013. She submits that the above instruction had been received by her on the basis of a letter dated 05.10.2018, issued by the respondent No. 2. 9. Prima facie, this Court does not see the necessity or basis for having a fresh spot verification on the basis of the meeting held on 10.08.2018 in the office chamber of the Secretary to the Land Revenue & Settlement Department, Govt. of Mizoram. Once the final report has been made by the Government and sent to the concerned respondents for payment of rent, the same should be complied with. If the respondents are aggrieved by the order dated 19.03.2015, passed in WP(C) No. 67/2013 or with the final report or assessment made in pursuance to the order dated 19.03.2015, the respondents could have always have made a challenge to the same. The same has however not been done. 10. Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 & 4 shall obtain instructions as to why the rental compensation payable to the petitioners has not been paid even after the Secretary to the Govt. of Mizoram had requested the Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Defence to pay the rent to the land owners as per his letter dated 22.05.2018. 11. List the matter on 25.02.2019. 12. Ms. Zairemsangpuil, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 & 4 shall obtain instructions from the respondent No. 2 in this regard. She is also informed that in the event she does not get instructions by the next date, the personal appearance of the respondent Nos. 2 & 4 may be called for.’ 6. List the matter on 25.02.2019. 12. Ms. Zairemsangpuil, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 & 4 shall obtain instructions from the respondent No. 2 in this regard. She is also informed that in the event she does not get instructions by the next date, the personal appearance of the respondent Nos. 2 & 4 may be called for.’ 6. Thus, this Court considering the above order of this Court dated 01.02.2019 and also the Judgment dated 19.03.2015 wherein that para-10 of he Judgment & Order of this Court in WP(C) No. 67/2013 dated 19.03.2015, this Court has also taken care of the occupation of the petitioner?s land in question during the period from 01.09.1986 – 09.09.2008, beyond the area figured in the Blue Map as prepared by the both officers during 1992 – 1993, for which the joint verification date was constituted. 7. In view of the above, this Court finds that the respondent No. 11 is liable to comply with the Judgment & Order of this Court in WP(C) No. 67/2013 dated 19.03.2015 by depositing the assessed compensation amounting to Rs. 2,16,81,261/- (Rupees two crore, sixteen lakhs, eighty one thousand, two hundred and sixty one) only to be paid to the petitioners. 8. List this matter after four (4) weeks before the respondent No. 11 to file a compliance report failing which, this Court will be compelled to take necessary steps in accordance with law. 13] It is at this stage that the present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking, inter alia, quashing of the spot verification reports and a declaration that the order dated 02.07.2025 passed in the contempt proceedings has become infructuous. 14] Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and having perused the materials available on record, this Court finds that the maintainability of the present writ petition itself is highly questionable. 15] The chronology of events clearly indicates that: (i) The judgment dated 19.03.2015 has attained finality; (ii) The verification process directed by this Court was duly carried out; (iii) The rental compensation was duly assessed and forwarded to the Ministry of Defence on 22.05.2018; (iv) The petitioners did not challenge either the said judgment or the assessment of rental compensation at any point of time. 16] It was only after the contempt court, by order dated 02.07.2025, directed compliance by deposit of the assessed compensation that the present writ petition has been filed. The timing of the present writ petition unmistakably reveals that the same has been instituted solely with the object of avoiding compliance with the judicial orders passed by this Court and to frustrate the proceedings pending before the contempt court. Permitting such a course of action would effectively enable a litigant to circumvent binding judicial orders by initiating collateral proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17] The Apex Court has repeatedly cautioned that courts must remain vigilant against litigants who attempt to misuse the judicial process by filing frivolous or belated proceedings after allowing judicial orders to attain finality. In other words, courts must guard against abuse of judicial process by litigants who attempt to circumvent or frustrate judicial orders. In Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 , the Apex Court observed that a new breed of litigants has emerged who do not hesitate to resort to falsehood and procedural manoeuvres in order to defeat the administration of justice, and that courts must deal with such litigants with a firm hand. Similarly, in Kalyaneshwari v. Union of India , reported in (2011) 3 SCC 287 , the Apex Court reiterated that the extraordinary jurisdiction of constitutional courts cannot be permitted to become a tool in the hands of unscrupulous litigants seeking to delay or obstruct lawful processes. The Apex Court further emphasised that imposition of realistic costs is necessary to discourage abuse of judicial process. The principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments squarely apply to the facts of the present case where the petitioners, after allowing the judgment of this Court to attain finality and after remaining silent for several years during the execution of the verification process, have approached this Court only when the contempt court directed compliance with the judicial orders. The principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments squarely apply to the facts of the present case where the petitioners, after allowing the judgment of this Court to attain finality and after remaining silent for several years during the execution of the verification process, have approached this Court only when the contempt court directed compliance with the judicial orders. 18] It is apt to refer, in this regard, to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath , reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 , Manohar Lal v. Ugrasen , reported in (2010) 11 SCC 557 , Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. reported in (2013) 2 SCC 398 , which clearly establish that a litigant who approaches a court of equity must do so with clean hands, a clean mind, a clean heart, and a clean objective. 19] The relevant paragraphs of Manohar Lal v. Ugrasen (supra) read as under: - 48. The present appellants had also not disclosed that land allotted to them falls in commercial area When a person approaches a court of equity in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, he should approach the court not only with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and clean-objective Equally, the judicial process should never become an instrument of oppression or abuse ora means in the process of the court to subvert justice Who seeks equity must do equity The legal maxim "Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem", means that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another (Vide Ramjas Foundation v Union of India 25, KR Srinivas RM Premchand 26 and Noorduddin v Dr KL Anand at SCC p. 249, para 9) 49. Similarly, in Ramniklal N Bhutta v State of Maharashtra's this Court observed as under (SCC p. 140, para 10) ?10… The power under Article 226 is discretionary It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce They are very often one and the same have to weigh the public interest vis-à-vis the private interest while The courts exercising any of their discretionary powers." (emphasis added) 50. In Tilokchand Motichand v HB. In Tilokchand Motichand v HB. Munshi 29, State of Haryana v Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd 30 and Sabia Khan v State of UP 31 this Court held that filing a totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process of the court Such a litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly as a petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement if filed to achieve an ulterior purpose amounts to abuse of the process of the court A litigant is a bound to make „full and true disclosure of facts? 51. In Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai 32, SJS Business Enterprises (P) Ltd v State of Bihar 33 and Oswal Fats & Oils Ltd v Commr (Admn this Court held that whenever the court comes to the conclusion that the process of the court is being abused, the court would be justified in refusing to proceed further and refuse relief to the party This rule has been evolved out of need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of the court by deceiving it.” 20] The relevant paragraphs of Kishore Samrite (supra) read as under: - “31. Now, we shall deal with the question whether both or any of the petitioners in Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 111 of 2011 and 125 of 2011 are guilty of suppression of material facts not approaching the court with clean hands and thereby abusing the process of court Before we dwell upon the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, let us refer to some case law which would help us in dealing with the present situation with greater precision. 32. The cases of abuse of process of court and such allied matters have been arising before the courts consistently This Court has had many occasions where it dealt with the cases of this kind and it has clearly stated the principles that would govern the obligations of a litigant while approaching the court for redressal of any grievance and the consequences of abuse of process of court. We may recapitulate and state some of the principles It is difficult to state such principles exhaustively and with such accuracy that would uniformly apply to a variety of cases These are 32.1. We may recapitulate and state some of the principles It is difficult to state such principles exhaustively and with such accuracy that would uniformly apply to a variety of cases These are 32.1. Courts have, over the centuries, frowned upon litigants who, with intent to deceive and mislead the courts, initiated proceedings without full disclosure of facts and came to the courts with "unclean hands" Courts have held that such litigants are neither entitled to be heard on the merits of the case nor are entitled to any relief. 32.2. The people who approach the court for relief on an ex parte statement are under a contract with the court that they would state the whole case fully and fairly to the court and where the litigant has broken such faith. the discretion of the court cannot be exercised in favour of such a litigant. 32.3. The obligation to approach the court with clean hands is an absolute obligation and has repeatedly been reiterated by this Court. 32.4. Quests for personal gains have become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood and misrepresent and suppress facts in the court proceedings Materialism, opportunism and malicious intent have overshadowed the old ethos of litigative values for small gains. 32.5. A litigant who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands is not entitled to any relief, interim or final. 32.6. The court must ensure that its process is not abused and in order to prevent abuse of process of court, it would be justified even in insisting on furnishing of security and in cases of serious abuse, the court would be duty-bound to impose heavy costs. 32.7. Wherever a public interest is invoked, the court must examine the petition carefully to ensure that there is genuine public interest involved The stream of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants. 32.8. 32.7. Wherever a public interest is invoked, the court must examine the petition carefully to ensure that there is genuine public interest involved The stream of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants. 32.8. The court, especially the Supreme Court has to maintain the strictest vigilance over the abuse of process of court and ordinarily meddlesome bystanders should not be granted "visa" Many societal a pollutants create new problems of unredressed grievances and the court should endure to take cases where the justice of the lis well justifies it (Refer Dalip Singh v State of U P8, Amar Singh v Union of India and State of Uttaranchal v Balwant Singh Chaufal10) 33. Access jurisprudence requires courts to deal with the legitimate litigation whatever be its form but decline to exercise jurisdiction, if such b litigation is an abuse of process of court In PSR Sadhanantham v Arunachalam the Court held (SCC p. 148. paras 15-16) "15 The crucial significance of access jurisprudence has been best expressed by Cappelletti : 'The right of effective access to justice has emerged with the new social rights. Indeed, it is of paramount importance among these new rights since, clearly, the enjoyment of traditional as well as new social rights presupposes mechanisms for their effective protection Such protection, moreover, is best assured to be a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system. Effective access to justice can thus be seen as the most basic requirement the most basic "human- right" of a system which purports to guarantee legal rights. 16. We are thus satisfied that the bogey of busybodies blackmailing adversaries through frivolous invocation of Article 136 is chimerical Access to justice to every bona fide seeker is a democratic dimension of remedial jurisprudence even as public interest litigation, class action, pro bono proceedings, are We cannot dwell in the home of processual obsolescence when our Constitution highlights social justice as a goal We hold that there is no merit in the contentions of the writ petitioner and dismiss the petition.? 34. It has been consistently stated by this Court that the entire journey of a Judge is to discern the truth from the pleadings, documents and arguments f of the parties, as truth is the basis of the justice-delivery system. 35. 34. It has been consistently stated by this Court that the entire journey of a Judge is to discern the truth from the pleadings, documents and arguments f of the parties, as truth is the basis of the justice-delivery system. 35. With the passage of time, it has been realised that people used to feel proud to tell the truth in the courts, irrespective of the consequences but that practice no longer proves true, in all cases. The court does not sit simply as an umpire in a contest between two parties and declare at the end of the combat as to who has won and who has lost but it has a legal duty of its own. independent of parties, to take active role in the proceedings and reach at the truth. which is the foundation of administration of justice Therefore, the truth should become the ideal to inspire the courts to pursue. This can be achieved by statutorily mandating the courts to become active seekers of truth. To enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehood, must be appropriately dealt with. The parties must state forthwith sufficient factual details to the extent that it reduces the ability to put forward false and exaggerated claims and a litigant must approach the court with clean hands. It is the bounden duty of the court to ensure that dishonesty and any attempt to surpass the legal process must be effectively curbed and the court must ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorised or unjust gain to anyone as a result of abuse of process of court. One way to curb this tendency is to impose realistic or punitive costs. 36. The party not approaching the court with clean hands would be liable to be non-suited and such party, who has also succeeded in polluting the stream of justice by making patently false statements, cannot claim relief, especially under Article 136 of the Constitution. While approaching the court, a litigant must state correct facts and come with clean hands. Where such statement of facts is based on some information, the source of such information must also be disclosed. While approaching the court, a litigant must state correct facts and come with clean hands. Where such statement of facts is based on some information, the source of such information must also be disclosed. Totally misconceived petition amounts to an abuse of process of court and such a litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly, as a petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement, if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose amounts to an abuse of process of court. A litigant is bound to make "full and true disclosure of facts". (Refer: Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi 12, A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam 13, Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma14, Abhyudya Sanstha v. Union of India 15, State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan 16, Kalyaneshwari v. Union of India 17.) 37. The person seeking equity must do equity. It is not just the clean hands, but also clean mind, clean heart and clean objective that are the equi-fundamentals of judicious litigation. The legal maxim jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem, which means that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another, is the percept for courts. Wide jurisdiction of the court should not become a source of abuse of process of law by the disgruntled litigant. Careful exercise is also necessary to ensure that the litigation is genuine, not motivated by extraneous considerations and imposes an obligation upon the litigant to disclose the true facts and approach the court with clean hands. 38. No litigant can play "hide and seek" with the courts or adopt "pick and choose". True facts ought to be disclosed as the court knows law, but not facts. One, who does not come with candid facts and clean breast cannot hold a writ of the court with soiled hands Suppression or concealment of material facts is impermissible to a litigant or even as a technique of advocacy In such a cases, the court is duty-bound to discharge rule nisi and such applicant is required to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of court (KD. Sharma v SAIL18) 39. Sharma v SAIL18) 39. Another settled canon of administration of justice is that no litigant should be permitted to misuse the judicial process by filing frivolous petitions No litigant has a right to unlimited drought upon the court time and b public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes Easy access to justice should not be used as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions (Buddhi Kota Subbarao v K Parasaran19)” 21] It is also apt to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Israr Ahmad Khan v. Amarnath Prasad , reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 322, wherein the Apex Court has reiterated that once an order of a competent court has attained finality, it must be obeyed in letter and spirit. The Apex Court has further held that difficulties in implementation cannot justify non-compliance, and that parties must approach the appropriate court in a timely manner if any clarification or modification is required. It was also emphasized that even persons who were not parties to the original proceedings may be proceeded against by the contempt court if, being aware of the order, they act in a manner that frustrates its implementation or aid and abet its breach. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “9. While we have no doubt, been proponents of justice being tempered with mercy, incidents like this seriously make us question whether the 'liberal' jurisprudence on contempt requires a serious re-look Such issue, having come to our attention, will definitely be gone into, in detail, in a more appropriate case. 10. Drastic measures, hence, are called for. This Court will not permit, much less tolerate, any alleged contemnors to, at this stage, raise any question on their respective capacity(ies) to comply with the Order dated 20.05 2025 The Order, of which contempt is alleged, was passed on 20.05 2025 and was to be complied with in three months, ie, on/or before 20.08.2025 The Review Petition (noted supra) has been filed against the said Order, inter alia, on the ground that it was beyond the competence of the officers to comply with the order and that is why a request was made to the Government to do the needful. 11. Any apparent defence of a pending Review Petition also vanishes. 11. Any apparent defence of a pending Review Petition also vanishes. We may state, and authoritatively so, that if any of the alleged contemnors actually believed that due compliance of the Order dated 20.05.2025 was beyond their respective competence and/or required the authority of the Government, it was their duty to approach this Court well in time by way of an appropriate application. Moreover, it was incumbent on such alleged contemnors to bring to the notice of this Court any real difficulties faced by them, while also identifying the concerned individuals, who in their view, would need to be made parties and/or directions against whom would be necessitated Nothing of the sort has been done The pending Review Petition could not have been used for the purpose as aforesaid. 12. We have, once again, heard the alleged contemnors as also their learned counsel. We have no shadow of doubt in our mind that a clear-cut case of contempt is made out. Thus, the Court proposed to take the next logical step i.e., frame Charge(s) LAST CHANCE: 13. At this juncture, the alleged contemnors and their learned counsel requested, in unison, that the cases be adjourned for 15 days so as to provide them a last and final opportunity to ensure that the Order dated 20.05.2025 is complied with fully, without any ifs and buts 14. Having regard to the afore-submission, purely by way of extraordinary indulgence, basis the afore- undertaking given to this Court by the alleged contemnors-in-person of their own accord, the present Contempt Petitions (Civil) be listed on 24.03 2026 at the Top of the Board as part-heard 15. If by that date, affidavit(s) showing full compliance of the Order dated 20.05.2025 passed in Civil Appeals No. 7023/2025 and 7024/2025 is/are filed, the alleged contemnors (as substituted infra) shall not be required to appear in person. Upon failure so to do, they shall be present in Court on 24.03.2026, whereupon this Court would proceed to frame Charge(s) against them. BELATED/DELAYED APPEALS TO DELAY/DEFEAT IMPLEMENTATION: 27. Delayed filing of appeals should be the exception, but in recent times, the exception has practically evolved to become the rule. Orders passed by the Courts are not complied with for a long time, and when Contempt Petitions are filed, belated appeals, with tremendous delay, are preferred. 28. BELATED/DELAYED APPEALS TO DELAY/DEFEAT IMPLEMENTATION: 27. Delayed filing of appeals should be the exception, but in recent times, the exception has practically evolved to become the rule. Orders passed by the Courts are not complied with for a long time, and when Contempt Petitions are filed, belated appeals, with tremendous delay, are preferred. 28. The (alleged) continuing contumacious conduct of the defaulting party is sought to be justified on the mere production of a Diary/Filing/Stamp Reporting Number showing that an appeal has been preferred, so as to obtain multiple adjournments in contempt matters. 29. We, in no uncertain terms, deprecate these practices. It is felt that by such modus operandi, disobedient litigants act brazenly which has the further effect of bringing down the authority and majesty of the Courts and the rule of law, interfering in the administration of justice. The same may well, in certain situations, border on criminal contempt. 30. The High Courts should deal with such unscrupulous litigants, moreso when they happen to be „State?, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, or like bodies, with an iron hand. Unless the High Courts, so also this Court deal with these aspects firmly, we run the clear risk of erosion of the unflinching faith that the ordinary litigants of this country repose in the Judiciary at all levels. It is the solemn duty of all of us manning the Courts across the hierarchy to ensure that the public faith never wavers.” 22] Thus, it is beyond gainsaying that litigation must attain finality at some stage. The doctrine of finality of litigation is essential to the administration of justice, for otherwise judicial determinations would remain perpetually vulnerable to collateral challenges. Once a competent court has adjudicated the rights of the parties and the said determination has attained finality, the same cannot be permitted to be reopened indirectly through subsequent proceedings. In the present case, the judgment and order dated 19.03.2015 passed in WP(C) No. 67/2013 was never challenged by the petitioners and has therefore attained finality. The verification process directed by the said judgment was carried out and culminated in a final assessment which was forwarded to the competent authority for payment. In such circumstances, the petitioners cannot be permitted, at this belated stage and particularly after initiation of contempt proceedings, to reopen issues which stood concluded by the judgment of this Court. The verification process directed by the said judgment was carried out and culminated in a final assessment which was forwarded to the competent authority for payment. In such circumstances, the petitioners cannot be permitted, at this belated stage and particularly after initiation of contempt proceedings, to reopen issues which stood concluded by the judgment of this Court. Permitting such an exercise would not only defeat the doctrine of finality but would also render judicial orders uncertain and ineffective. 23] Another aspect which deserves specific mention is that at no point of time during the relevant period did the petitioners approach this Court in the original writ proceedings expressing any reservation or objection with regard to the spot verification process undertaken pursuant to the judgment and order dated 19.03.2015. The record clearly reveals that multiple spot verifications were conducted in the presence of the concerned authorities and the verification process eventually culminated in a final report on the basis of which the rental compensation was assessed and forwarded to the competent authority on 22.05.2018. Despite being fully aware of the verification process and the consequential assessment, the petitioners did not file any application before this Court either questioning the correctness of the spot verification reports or seeking any clarification or modification of the directions issued in the judgment dated 19.03.2015. Equally, no application was filed bringing to the notice of this Court any alleged impossibility or difficulty in complying with the directions contained in the said judgment. Having remained completely silent during the entire period when the verification process was carried out and the assessment was finalized, the petitioners cannot now be permitted, particularly after the contempt court has directed compliance, to reopen issues which they themselves chose not to raise at the appropriate stage. The conduct of the petitioners leaves no manner of doubt that the present writ petition is a belated and engineered afterthought, instituted only after the contempt court directed compliance, with the manifest object of circumventing, delaying and ultimately frustrating the implementation of the binding judicial orders passed by this court. 24] It is also necessary for this Court to take note of the consequences of the conduct of the petitioners. 24] It is also necessary for this Court to take note of the consequences of the conduct of the petitioners. The present case concerns payment of rental compensation to landowners whose lands were occupied by security forces during the period of disturbance in the State of Mizoram and whose entitlement to compensation arises both from the judicial determination made by this Court and from the commitments flowing from the Memorandum of Settlement executed pursuant to the Peace Accord of 1986. 25] Despite the completion of the verification process and the forwarding of the final assessment on 22.05.2018, the compensation has not been paid to the affected landowners. Thus, the petitioners have allowed the matter to remain unresolved for more than seven years after the assessment was finalized. The result of such prolonged inaction is that landowners, who have already waited for decades since the period of occupation of their lands, have been further deprived of the fruits of the judicial determination. Such conduct cannot be characterized as a mere administrative delay. Rather, it reflects a continued disregard for the binding nature of judicial orders and undermines the rule of law. 26] Apart from the above, the relief sought in the present writ petition itself demonstrates its inherent non- maintainability. The petitioners have essentially sought to render the order dated 02.07.2025 passed by the contempt court infructuous and to stay its operation. Proceedings under Article 226 cannot be invoked as a collateral mechanism to interfere with or neutralize directions issued by a contempt court of the same High Court. If the petitioners were aggrieved by the directions issued in the contempt proceedings, the appropriate remedy lay elsewhere in accordance with law. Invocation of writ jurisdiction in the present circumstances amounts to an impermissible attempt to circumvent the judicial process. 27] This Court is also of the view that the present case is a fit one for the imposition of exemplary costs. The petitioners, despite being instrumentalities of the State, have allowed the matter to remain pending for several years in complete disregard of the binding judgment dated 19.03.2015. Even after the final assessment was forwarded on 22.05.2018, the petitioners neither complied with the directions contained therein nor challenged the same before the appropriate forum. Instead, the present writ petition has been instituted only after the contempt court directed compliance. Even after the final assessment was forwarded on 22.05.2018, the petitioners neither complied with the directions contained therein nor challenged the same before the appropriate forum. Instead, the present writ petition has been instituted only after the contempt court directed compliance. Such conduct not only delays the administration of justice but also imposes avoidable litigation upon private citizens who have already succeeded in obtaining a judicial determination of their rights. Courts must impose realistic costs to deter abuse of the judicial process and to uphold the authority of judicial orders. This Court cannot permit its orders to be rendered ineffective by such procedural manoeuvres, particularly when the beneficiaries of the judgment have already been waiting for several years to receive the compensation determined in their favour. 28] In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the present writ petition is a frivolous and misconceived attempt to avoid compliance with the judgment and order dated 19.03.2015 and to frustrate the order dated 02.07.2025 passed in the contempt proceedings. Entertaining the writ petition would amount to permitting abuse of the judicial process. 29] This Court is also of the considered view that a litigant, who attempts to mislead the court, suppresses material facts or institute proceedings with the object of frustrating compliance with binding judicial orders cannot claim the discretionary and equitable relief of this court. The writ jurisdiction is not meant to provide a forum for such abuse of process. At the cost of repetition, it must be stated that if a litigant approaches the court with tainted hands, the doors of the writ court must remain firmly closed. This principle applies with equal force even at the threshold stage of the proceedings. In the present case, the conduct of the petitioners clearly disentitles them to any indulgence from this court. Accordingly, this court finds no reason to issue notice in the matter. 30] Resultantly, the writ petition stands dismissed at the motion stage itself. 31] Before parting with the matter, this Court deems it necessary to reiterate that the judicial process cannot be permitted to be converted into a device for avoiding compliance with binding orders of constitutional courts. The power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction intended to advance justice, and not to facilitate the frustration of orders already passed by the Court. The power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction intended to advance justice, and not to facilitate the frustration of orders already passed by the Court. The present case discloses a clear attempt by the petitioners to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court in order to delay and defeat compliance with the judgment and order dated 19.03.2015 and the directions subsequently issued by the contempt court on 02.07.2025. Such an attempt strikes at the very foundation of the rule of law, for the authority of courts would stand seriously undermined if parties were permitted to evade compliance with judicial orders by initiating collateral proceedings before the same court. The authority of constitutional courts rests not merely upon the power to pronounce judgments but equally upon the expectation that such judgments will be obeyed in letter and spirit. Constitutional courts must therefore remain vigilant to ensure that their processes are not misused in a manner that obstructs or interferes with the administration of justice. 32] The petitioners are directed to deposit costs of Rs. 50,000/- (rupees fifty thousand) with the High Court Legal Services Committee within 10 (ten) days. It is further clarified that the said cost shall be reimbursed by petitioner No. 1 from the salary of the erring official petitioner No. 2, namely Vilas H. Pawar, DEO, Guwahati Circle, Narangi Military Station, Guwahati.