IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (The High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh) PRINCIPAL SEAT AT GUWAHATI CRP(I/O) 123/2025. 1. Sri Biraj Moni Bordoloi, S/o Shri Tarun Chandra Bordoloi, Resident of Rudram Bordoloi Road, Mouza-Town, PO-Haibargaon, PS-Sadar, Dist.-Nagaon, Assam, Pin-782002. President, “Sri Sri Batadrava Than Parichalana Samittee” (ADHOC), Batadrava (Alipukhuri) Mouza-Batadrava, PS-Batadrava, Dist.-Nagaon, Assam, Pin-782122. 2. Shri Sailen Saikia, Secretary, “Sri Sri Batadrava Than Parichalana Samittee” (ADHOC), Batadrava (Alipukhuri) Mouza-Batadrava, PS-Batadrava, Dist.-Nagaon, Assam, Pin-782122. …… Petitioners. -Versus- 1. Sri Sri Batadrava Than Parichalana Samittee”, Batadrava (Alipukhuri), GAHC010064762025 Office-Sri Sri Batadrava Than, Mouza-Batadrava, PO-Batadrava, PS-Batadrava, District-Nagaon. Represented by Sri Jogendra Narayan Dev Mahanta, President, “Sri Sri Batadrava Than Parichalana Samittee”, Batadrava (Alipukhuri), Dist.-Nagaon, Pin-782122. 2. Shri Prabhat Chandra Kalita, S/o Late Badan Chandra Kalita, Executive President, “Sri Sri Batadrava Than Parichalana Samittee”, Office-Sri Sri Batadrava Than, Batadrava (Alipukhuri), PO & Mouza-Batadrava, PS-Batadrava, Dist.-Nagaon, Pin-782122. …… Respondents. BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN Advocates for the appellants :- Mr. K.K. Mahanta, Senior Counsel, Mr. K.M. Mahanta. Advocate for the respondent :- Mr. K.N. Choudhury, Senior Counsel, Mr. N. Gautam Mr. R. Das. Date of Hearing :- 25.04.2025. Page 3 of 20 Date of Judgment & Order :- 25.04.2025. JUDGEMENT & ORDER Heard Mr. K.K. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. K. M. Mahanta, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. N. Gautam, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This civil revision petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.), is directed against the order, dated 03.03.2025, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagaon in Misc. Appeal No. 24 of 2024. 3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned order, dated 03.03.2025, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagaon had dismissed the appeal preferred by the present petitioner challenging the correctness or otherwise of the order dated 23.09.2024 in Misc.(J) Case No.84/2024, in Title Suit No.172/2024, by which the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.1, Nagaon, had restrained the petitioners/opposite parties from interfering in the daily works as well as performing the duties of the „Sri Sri Batadrava Than Parichalana Samittee‟ till disposal of the suit. Besides, the petitioners/opposite parties, their men, agents etc. also restrained from interfering with the cash transaction of „Sri Sri Batadrava Than Parichalana Samittee‟. Further, the petitioners/opposite parties are prevented, till disposal of the suit from doing any activities, that would harm the reputation of „Sri Sri Batadrava Than‟. Background Facts:- 4. The background facts, leading to filing of the present appeal, are adumbrated herein below:- “The case of the respondents is that „Sri Sri Batadrava Than Parichalana Samittee‟ headed by the respondents, was a duly elected body in the triennial annual general meeting, held in the month of May, 2022 for a term of three years. As per the constitution of Sri Sri Batadrava Than the tenure of the said committee would come to an end on 15th May, 2025. The said committee was duly performing its responsibilities and all the daily activities and religious rituals of the „Than‟ has been looked after by the said committee. On 09.06.2024, while biennial annual general meeting of the „Than‟ was held at about 11.00 am, at Ai Kherkuti Sanskritik Mancha, under the presidentship of respondent No.2 and attended by more than 200 members, then some members had created noisy situation, as a result it became difficult for the respondent no.2 to conduct the meeting and therefore, he adjourned the meeting and left the place. But, after sometime some members threatened him and compelled to come again and to proceed with the meeting. Then the respondent No.2 was proceeding with the meeting and then again some members created ruckus and made it difficult to proceed with the meeting, and accordingly, he adjourned the meeting. At the time of adjournment, only discussion on agenda No.4 was over and there was 10 other agenda also. While the meeting was adjourned for 2nd time, only 30-35 members were present and the rest already left. Then few members forcibly obtained signature of the respondent No.2 over a piece of paper and it has been shown that the biennial annual general meeting resolved that the committee headed by the respondent No.2 was dissolved and a new committee in the name and style of „Sri Sri Batadrava Than Management Samittee (Ad-hoc)‟ was formed in its place with the petitioner No.1 as President and the petitioner No.2 as the General Secretary. It is the contention of the respondents that in the biennial annual general meeting, held on 09.06.2024, the committee of the respondent‟s was neither dissolved nor there is any provision in the constitution of the „Sri Sri Batadrava Than‟, to dissolve a committee in the biennial general meeting. But, there is a provision for forming a new elected body only in its triennial annual general meeting and that too after the end of the tenure of the previous elected body. It is provided in the constitution of the „Than‟ that the tenure of a duly elected body is three years and the term of the body, headed by the respondents, will come to an end in the month of May of 2025. It is also provided in the constitution that „Sri Sri Batadrava Than Parichalana Samittee‟ would be appointed from the Satradhikars of Sri Sri Narua Satra and Sri Sri Salguri Satra alternatively, after every three years. And with the dissolution of the duly elected body headed by the respondent No.2, before expiry of the tenure, has not only violated the constitution of the „Than‟, but also harmed the reputation of the „Than‟. Being aggrieved the respondents/plaintiffs had instituted a title suit, being Title Suit No. 172/2024, before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.1, Nagaon, with the following prayers:- (a) A decree, declaring that „Sri Sri Batadrava Than Management Committee‟ headed by the plaintiffs will continue to discharge its duties and function till its tenure comes to an end on 15th May, 2025; (b) A decree, dissolving the „Sri Sri Batadrava Than Management Committee (adhoc) constituted by the defendants, illegal and invalid; (c) A decree, of permanent injunction against the members/office bearers of „Sri Sri Batadrava Than Management Committee (ad-hoc)‟ constituted by the defendants debarring them from entering Batadraba Than, Ai-Khersuti Cultural Project, Sankardev Research Centre, Library, Nat-Ghar, Daula Mandir and from illegally entering and interring in all places including offices, guesthouses, programs, Nam-kirtan and all other works which are under the control and management of the committee headed by the plaintiffs; (d) A permanent injunction debarring any person engaged by the defendants from doing anything which creates trouble to the plaintiffs in the management of the Than; (e) Cost of the suit and any other relief(s) the plaintiffs are entitles to under the law, justice, equity and good conscience. Along with the said Title Suit the respondents herein had also filed one application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for temporary injunction, upon which the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.1, Nagaon had registered a misc. case, being Misc. Case No. 84 of 2024 and issued notice to the defendants. The defendants/petitioners, entered appearance and filed their written objection, stating that „Sri Sri Batadrava Than Management Committee (ad-hoc)‟ is a legally constituted body, on 09.06.2024 and the old committee, headed by the plaintiffs/respondents was dissolved on the charge of corruption and misappropriation of money and mismanagement of the fund. It is also stated that the petitioner No.2 was not authorized to file any suit by the „Than Parichalana Sammittee‟ and the suit has been filed without authority. It is also stated that the suit has been filed neither in representative capacity nor by an authorized person. Then after hearing both sides, the learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division) No.1, Nagaon, vide order dated 23.09.2024, had restrained the petitioners/opposite parties from interfering in the daily works as well as performing the duties of the „Sri Sri Batadrava Than Parisalana Samittee‟ till disposal of the suit. Besides, the petitioners/opposite parties, their men, agents etc. are also restrained from interfering with the cash transaction of „Sri Sri Batadrava Than Parichalana Samittee‟. Further, the petitioners/opposite parties are prevented, till disposal of the suit from doing any activities that would harm the reputation of „Sri Sri Batadrava Than‟. Being highly aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid injunction order, the respondent/defendants have preferred an appeal, being Misc Appeal No. 24 of 2024 before the court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagaon. Then hearing learned counsel for both the parties, vide impugned order, dated 03.03.2025, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagaon had dismissed the appeal preferred by the present petitioners challenging the order dated 23.09.2024, by which the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.1, Nagaon had granted temporary injunction.” Grounds:- 5. The petitioners, being highly aggrieved approached this Court on the following grounds:- (a) That, the learned appellate court had failed to consider the objections and documents filed by the petitioners, in its proper perspective; (b) That, the finding so arrived at is not based on pleadings and documents filed thereon and as such the finding, so recorded by both the learned courts below, are perverse and that the learned trial court had granted injunction till disposal of the suit though the prayer was till 15.05.2025, when the tenure would come to an end; (c) That, the petitioners herein were arrayed as President and Secretary of the „Sri Sri Batadrava Than Management Committee (ad-hoc)‟ in the suit and in the injunction application and thereby they admitted that the earlier committee was dissolved, and as such there is no prima facie case in their favour; (d) That, Sri Sri Batadraba Than is not made party in the suit and that the mandate of Section 92 of CPC was not followed and as such it is barred by law; (e) That, as Sri Batadrava Than is not made a party in the title suit, Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC is not attracted inasmuch as, neither any property is involved nor there is any breach of contract nor other injury of any kind, as its relates to pious and voluntary service of the „Than‟. (f) That, it is well settled that before granting injunction the Court must be satisfied that a strong prima-facie case is there along with the balance of convenience and irreparable loss. However, in the case in hand, neither prima facie case nor irreparable loss was discussed by the learned Courts below and as such, impugned order is liable to set aside. (g) That, both the learned Courts below failed to consider that the meeting where in the plaintiffs committee was elected/constituted and the date of assuming charge of office by the said committee having not been disclosed by the plaintiffs there is no bona fide claim/prima facie case for injunction. (h) That, the learned trial Court have not discussed while granting temporary injunction the irreparable loss and the prima facie case and as such, the order passed by the first appellate Court is perverse and also the learned appellate Court had not dealt with the issue of maintainability of the suit. (i) That, the resolution dated 09.06.2024, in dissolving the earlier Than Committee, and constituting a new Than Sammittee (Adhoc) was done under the presidentship of the Plaintiff/Petitioner No.2, and he put his signatures thereon. And in the instant suit, he challenged the aforesaid resolution and thereby challenged his own action, and sworn the affidavit himself. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court as well as Appellate Court is not sustainable. (j) That, the learned Appellate Court and also the learned trial Court has failed to consider that at the time of filing the suit, there was no registration of the „Than‟ under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, as the earlier registration was elapsed due to non- renewal. (k) That, granting of injunction would not preserve the sanctity of the „Than‟ and restraining the appellants/opposite parties from interfering with the daily work as well as performing duties of “Sri Sri Batadrava Than Parichalana Sammittee” would serve the interest only if the issue involved therein would have been rightly been decided. (l) That, the learned Appellate Court erred in affirming and upholding the injunction order passed by the learned trial Court by going beyond the settle principle of law, governing the granting and refusing the order of injunction. (m) That, the learned Appellate Court referred to a decision of this Court in Radhabari Tea Company (P) Ltd. Vs. Mridul Kumar Bhattacharjee and ors, reported in (2010) 2 GLR 231, and there is no dispute regarding the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid case, but the learned Appellate Court had erred in applying the aforesaid principle to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand and as such, the finding of the learned Appellate Court is perverse and liable to be set aside and quashed. Submissions:- 6. Mr. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, while reiterating the grounds mentioned above, laid much emphasis on the requirement of discussion as well as recording satisfaction, about the existence of three golden principles of granting temporary injunction i.e. (i) prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience and (iii) irreparable loss, before granting temporary injunction. Taking this Court through the order of the learned trial Court, Mr. Mahanta submits that the learned trial Court had only discussed about the balance of convenience, but does not whispered any word about the other two ingredients i.e. prima facie case and irreparable loss and as such, the order passed by the learned trial Court granting injunction is perverse and the learned Appellate Court had also failed to consider that aspect and blindly affirm the decision of the learned trial Court. According to Mr. Mahanta, even a prima-facie case was also not existed at the time of filing the suit, as there was no registration of the „Than‟ and the earlier registration was elapsed and both the courts below had failed to consider the aforementioned aspect. 6.1. Mr. Mahanta, further submits that the Sri Sri Batadrava „Than‟ has not been arraigned as a party in the title suit and the suit was filed by two persons only, without there being any authorization and this aspect has not been considered by the learned trial Courts and also by the learned appellate Court. Page 13 of 20 6.2. Mr. Mahanta, further submits that it is a fact that the granting of injunction is an equitable and discretionary relief, but this discretion has to be exercised in accordance with law, and it should not be allowed to run like an unruly horse and exactly the same had happened in the case in hand and under such circumstances, Mr. Mahanta, submits that both the Courts below had misdirected themselves and as such, the impugned order fails to withstand the legal scrutiny and therefore, it is contended to set it aside . 7. Per Contra, Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, submits that the petitioners herein have not challenged the order of granting injunction passed by the learned trial Court. What the petitioners have challenged is the order of the Appellate Court and as such, the petition is not maintainable. Referring to a decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Dalpat Kumar and another Vs. Prahlad Singh and others, reported in (1992) 2 SCC 719, Mr. Choudhury, submits that in paragraph No.5, of the aforementioned decision, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has dealt with the principles of granting injunction and the said principle appears to be taken note of by the learned trial Court in the penultimate paragraphs of the order, though, not explicitly, but, in substance. And as such, Mr. Choudhury submits, no fault can be found with the finding of the learned trial Court in granting the injunction and the learned First Appellate Court also having relied upon two decisions of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Radhabari Tea Company (P) Ltd (supra) and also in the case of Ajendraprasadji Narendraprasadji Pandey Vs. Swamy K. Narayandasji and Ors., reported in (2005) 10 SCC 11, affirmed the decision of the learned trial Court and the same warrants no interference of this Court. 7.1. Mr. Choudhury, further submits that after all, granting or refusal to grant injunction, is a discretionary relief and if the trial Court has decided to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular way, the appellate Court or the revisional Court shall not interfere with the same merely because another view is possible in the given facts and circumstances on the record. 7.2. Mr. Choudhury also submits that the „Than‟ is registered under the Societies Registration Act and if any wrong is done by the Management Committee then the Registrar will take care of it. Under such circumstances, Mr. Choudhury, submits that there is no merit in this petition and therefore, it is contended to dismiss this petition. 8. In reply to the submission of Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, Mr. K. K. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submits that in this petition the order of the learned trial Court has not been challenged but, in view of the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala, reported in 2000 6 SCC 359, the decision of the trial Court stands merged with the decision of the Appellate Court and since the decision of the Appellate Court is under challenge in this petition, in view of the doctrine of merger, the order of the trial Court need not be challenged. Page 15 of 20 8.1 Further, Mr. 8.1 Further, Mr. Mahanta, submits that though the „Than‟ is now registered under the Societies Act, yet the Registrar of the society, being not an adjudicatory authority, cannot take care of any dispute in the society. Again, Mr. Mahanta pointed out that at the time of filing the suit registration was elapsed and it was subsequently renewed on 17.03.2025, and that the management committee has not been made a party and there is no prima facie case, no irreparable loss and the balance of convenience was in favour of the respondents and both the Courts below misdirected themselves, and therefore, it is contended to allow this petition. 9. Having heard the submission of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record, and also perused the decisions referred by learned Advocates of both the parties. 10. It is to be noted here that, the petitioner herein has not challenged the order of the learned trial Court, by which temporary injunction was granted. But, they have challenged the order of the Appellate Court, with whom the order of the trial Court stands merged in view of the proposition of law laid down in the case of Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala (supra) and that being so, the same cannot be a ground for dismissing the present petition. 11. Further, a perusal of the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court, it appears that the learned trial Court has not discussed the two golden principals, i.e. prima facie case and irreparable loss, though it had discussed one principle i.e. balance of convenience, to some extent in the impugned order. It is well settled in catena of decisions of Hon‟ble Supreme Court that to grant temporary injunction the Courts must be satisfied with existence of three golden principles i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss, in favour of the applicant. Reference in this context can be made to following decisions:- 11.1 In the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi, reported in (1993) 3 SCC 161, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has dealt with the principle as under:- TEMPORARY INJUNCTION “30. It need not be said that primary object of filing a suit challenging the validity of the order of demolition is to restrain such demolition with the intervention of the court. In such a suit the plaintiff is more interested in getting an order of interim injunction. It has been pointed out repeatedly that a party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a matter of right or course. Grant of injunction is within the discretion of the court and such discretion is to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff only if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that unless the defendant is restrained by an order of injunction, an irreparable loss or damage will be caused to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of temporary injunction is, thus, to maintain the status quo. The court grants such relief according to the legal principles — ex debito justitiae. Before any such order is passed the court must be satisfied that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff including on the question of maintainability of the suit and the balance of convenience is in his favour and refusal of injunction would cause irreparable injury to him.” 11.2. In the case of Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.” 12. Admittedly and as stated herein above, the learned trial Court had not discussed two golden principles in granting injunction, i.e. prima facie case and irreparable loss, though it has discussed balance of convenience in the impugned order. Though Mr. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that while granting injunction, the learned trial Court in the penultimate paragraph of the order, though, not explicitly, but, in substance, discussed all the three principles, yet, having gone through the same carefully, this Court is unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Choudhury. 13. The requirement of discussion about existence of a prima-facie case and also about irreparable injury and a clear finding to that effect, along with balance of convenience is „sine qua non’ for granting temporary injunction and the said proposition is well settled by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in its various pronouncement, including the decisions discussed herein above. 14. It also appears from the impugned order of the learned appellate Court that it had recorded satisfaction about discussion about all the three golden principles in granting injunction by the learned trial court. But, in view of the finding of this Court recorded in para No.12 above, the finding so recorded by the learned appellate Court, appears to be perverse as there was no discussion about prima facie case and irreparable loss in the order of the learned trial Court. Mr. Mahanta, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, has rightly pointed this out and also rightly submitted that the learned appellate Court had though discussed two case laws in the impugned order, yet, failed to apply the law laid down therein to the facts of the case in hand. 15. It is well settled that the power to grant or refusal of injunction is a discretionary power. Usually the appellate court will not interfere with it. But, when the discretion is exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely ignoring the settled principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of injunctions, the appellate court can interfere with such order of granting injunction. Reference in this context can be made to a decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd (supra). In the case of Wander Limited and Another (supra) also Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that unless it has been shown to have exercised the discretion arbitrarily by the learned trial Court, the appellate court would not interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Court. Page 20 of 20 16. It also appears that at the time of filing the suit, there was no registration as earlier registration elapsed. Besides, the committee was not arrayed as a party and the „Than‟ has also not been arrayed as party. Also there was no authorization to the respondent to file a suit by the committee and besides the respondent No.2 himself was the President of the earlier committee. All these aspect also not been taken note of by the learned Courts below. FINDING:- 17. In the result, this Court find sufficient merit in this revision petition and accordingly, the same stands allowed. The impugned order dated 03.03.2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagaon, in Misc. Appeal No.24/2024 and the order dated 23.09.2024, in Misc.(J) Case No.84/2024 in the Title Suit No.172/2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.1, Nagaon, stand set aside and quashed. The parties have to bear their own cost. JUDGE Comparing Assistant