Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 339 of 2015 Reserved on: 22.08.2025 Decided on: 30.08.2025 _________________________________________________________ State of Himachal Pradesh …..Appellant Versus Pankaj Verma & others ……Respondents __________________________________________________________ Coram Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge 1 Whether approved for reporting? ______________________________________________________ For the appellant/State: Mr. J.S. Guleria, Deputy Advocate General. For respondents/accused No. 1 & 3: Mr. Varun Chauhan, Advocate. For respondent/accused No.2: Mr. Harsh Advocate, vice Mr. Manoj Pathak, Advocate. Sushil Kukreja, Judge The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant- State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) against the judgment of acquittal dated 03.12.2014, passed by learned Special Judge-I, Shimla, H.P., in Sessions Trial No.15-S/7 of 2013, whereby the accused persons (respondents herein) were acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 20 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, the ‘NDPS Act’). 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case, giving rise to instant appeal, as per the prosecution story, are that on 11.04.2013, around 10 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 2 p.m., at Mashobra road near HIPA gate, a police party, which was headed by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Shri Dinesh Sharma, was present on the spot on patrol and traffic checking duty in government vehicle, having registration No. HP-07A-0726. At the relevant time, Police party spotted the accused persons coming towards Mashobra side on foot and the accused persons, on seeing the police party, got perplexed and tried to flee. However, they were apprehended by the police. Accused Pankaj was carrying a white carry bag and accused persons Satya Nand Sharma and Govind were also carrying red carry bags. On the basis of suspicion, the carry bags of the accused persons were searched and during search of the carry bag of accused Pankaj Verma, charas weighing 1 kg 800 grams was recovered. Similarly, during the search of the carry bags of accused Satya Nand Sharma and Govind, charas weighing 1kg 570 grams and 1kg and 540 grams, respectively, was recovered. The recovered contraband in total was found to be 4 kgs and 910 grams. Thereafter, the police completed all the codal formalities, viz., had taken into possession the recovered contraband, NCB form, in triplicate was filled in, rukka was sent to the police station, whereupon FIR was registered against the accused persons, sample of seal impression was taken separately on a piece of cloth, spot map was prepared and the statements of the witnesses were recorded. The sample of the recovered contraband was sent for chemical analysis and as per the report of the chemical analysis, the exhibit stated to be sample of charas. After completion of the Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 3 investigation, the charge-sheet was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned trial Court, vide order dated 20.01.2014, framed charges against the accused persons under Section 20 of NDPS Act, to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined 11 witnesses. Statements of the accused persons under Section 313, Cr.PC were recorded, wherein they denied all set of incriminating evidence led by the prosecution against them, besides pleaded to be innocent and having been falsely implicated in the case. 5. The learned trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated 03.12.2014, acquitted the accused persons for commission of the offence punishable under Section 20 of NDPS Act, hence, the instant appeal preferred by the appellant-State. 6. The learned Deputy Advocate General contended that the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in its right perspective, but at the same time, has set unrealistic standards to evaluate the direct and cogent evidence. He further contended that the learned trial Court has wrongly given undue weightage to the minor contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses which do not go to the root of the case as the minor contradictions are bound to occur due to lapse of time. Hence, he submitted that the impugned judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside. 7. Conversely, the learned counsel for the Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 4 respondents/accused persons contended that the impugned judgment has been passed by the learned Trial Court after proper appreciation of both facts and law. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence in its true perspective and the impugned judgment does not require any interference by this Court. Therefore, he submitted that the instant appeal, which sans merits, be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant-State as well as learned counsel for the respondents/accused persons and also carefully examined the entire records. 9. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 10. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of appeal Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 5 against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another Vs. State of Karnatka reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730, which reads as under :- "10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup [1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years. 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: "7...........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan [20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court, (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal, (iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 6 as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471, observed as under:- “31.The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1.Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir] 31.2.However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows: 31.2.1.Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse; (a)Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 7 (1983) 1 SCC 393] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980) (c)Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393] (d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99] (f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610] (g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445] 31.2.2.Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice; (a)Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502] (b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610].” 12. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 8 Court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:- “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows: 8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2.The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3.The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4.If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5.The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible. 9.Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court’s view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken.” 13. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 9 that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court. 14. In the instant case, the accused persons have been tried for commission of the offence under Section 20 NDPS Act on the allegation that on 11.04.2013, around 10 p.m., at Mashobra road near HIPA gate, they were found in conscious and exclusive possession of 4 kgs and 910 grams of charas. 15. To substantiate the charge framed against the respondents- accused persons and to bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses. However, case of the prosecution mainly rests upon the statements of PW-1, HHC Ramesh Kumar, PW-8 ASI Manohar Lal, PW-9, Constable Tashi Negi, PW-10, HHC Govind Singh and PW-11 Dy. SP Dinesh Sharma, who have been examined primarily to prove the search, recovery and seizure of 4kgs and 910 grams of charas in question from the exclusive and conscious possession of the accused persons. 16. The statements of above police witnesses are akin. They have deposed that on 11.04.2013 Deputy Superindent of Police Dinesh Kumar (PW-11) alongwith SI Sandeep, PSI Babu Ram, ASI Manohar Lal, Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 10 HHC Jawahar, Constable Govind (PW-10), and driver of vehicle, bearing registration No. HP-07A-0726, Tashi Negi (PW-9) were on patrol and traffic checking duty in the area of Mashobra. They further deposed that around 10 p.m., when the police party reached near main gate of HIPA, on Mashobra road, they spotted three persons coming on foot from Mashobra towards Dhali and on seeing police they got perplexed and tried to escape from the spot. As per the version of these prosecution witnesses, they disclosed their identity as Pankaj, Satya Nand and Govind (accused persons) and they were carrying carry bags. It has come in their depositions that accused Pankaj was having a white carry bag, accused Satya Nand was having red bag and accused Govind was also having a red carry bag. These witnesses also deposed that on suspicion the carry bags of the accused persons were searched, but at that time no independent witness was available. During the search of white carry bag, it was found stuffed with some black substance and the same was found to be charas. It came in their depositions that Constable Tashi Negi was sent to bring electronic scale. Thereafter, the recovered charas from the carry bag of accused Pankaj was weighed and found to be 1kg 800 grams. Likewise, charas weighing 1kg 570 grams was found in the carry bag of accused Satya Nand and charas weighing 1 kg 540 grams was found in the carry bag of accused Govind. As per the testimonies of these police witnesses, the recovered charas was wrapped in a parcel, whereupon 6 seals, having impression of seal ‘P’ was affixed and the sample seal was handed over to HHC Ramesh Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 11 Kumar. Thereafter, NCB form, in triplicate, mark-A, B and C, were filled in on the spot by affixing seal having impression ‘P’. They have also deposed that seal impression ‘P’ was taken on a separate piece of cloth, which was Ex. PW-1/A and memo qua the recovery of charas Ex. PW- 1/B was also prepared, which was signed by HHC Ramesh Kumar and HHC Jawahar and by the accused persons. 17. It is well settled that the conviction can be based upon the testimony of the police officials, provided that such testimony is reliable, trustworthy and confidence inspiring. In Pramod Kumar Versus State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 588, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the Court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinizing the evidence, the Court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the Court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. Para-13 of the judgment reads as under:- “13. This Court, after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large show their disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that quality of the evidence weighs over the quantity of evidence.” Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 12 18. Similarly, in Baldev Singh Versus State of Haryana, (2015) 17 Supreme Court Cases 554, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Relevant para of the judgment reads as under:- “10. There is no legal proposition that evidence of police officials unless supported by independent evidence is unworthy of acceptance. Evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Prudence however requires that the evidence of police officials who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case needs to be carefully scrutinized and independently appreciated. Mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their creditworthiness.” 19. In Surinder Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 Supreme Court Cases 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. Para-16 of judgment reads as under:- “16. In State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Sunil it was held as under: (SCC p.655) “It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. The official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature”. 20. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid settled legal position, the testimony of police witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground of non- corroboration by independent witnesses, however such testimony needs Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 13 to be carefully scrutinized. The same must inspire confidence and should be consistent with the case set up by the prosecution. In case there are material contradictions, which goes to the root of the case and make the prosecution case highly doubtful, then this Court would obviously be circumspect while placing reliance on such testimony. 21. We have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on record especially the statements of police witnesses but from the close scrutiny of the same, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. 22. So far as the statements of PW-1 HHC Ramesh Kumar, PW- 8 ASI Manohar Lal, PW-9 Constable Tashi Negi, PW-10 HHC Govind Singh and PW-11 Dy.SP Dinesh Sharma are concerned, all these witnesses have portrayed different stories, which raise serious doubts qua the veracity of their testimonies. HHC Ramesh Kumar (PW-1) deposed that the police party traveled in the police jeep and reached near HIPA gate and when the police saw the accused persons, police jeep was moving. Thereafter, they stopped their vehicle and the accused persons were apprehended by him, Constable Govind (PW-10), ASI Babu Ram and SI Sandeep. As per this witness, when the accused persons were first seen coming from Mashobra side, no nakka was laid on the spot. The testimony of PW-1 is in contradiction to the testimony of PW-8 ASI Manohar Lal, who deposed that the police party was standing at HIPA gate and when the accused persons were seen by them, at that Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 14 time the official vehicle was parked. He further deposed that nakka was laid and they were checking the vehicles. Likewise, Constable Tashi Negi, who appeared in the witness-box as PW-9, deposed contrary to the testimony of PW-8 by stating that they were not standing on the road and they were traveling in the jeep and no nakka was laid on the spot. As per the version of this witness, they stopped their vehicle on seeing the accused persons and thereafter they were apprehended. PW-10 HHC Govind Singh also stated that no nakka was laid and the police party saw the accused persons while they were traveling in the jeep. PW-11 Deputy Superintendent of Police Dinesh Sharma, completely denied the depositions of the above police/official witnesses. He deposed that for the last 40 to 45 minutes the police party was checking vehicles at HIPA gate and during this time the official vehicle was parked. He further deposed that when the police were checking traffic for the last about 45 minutes, the accused persons were seen coming from Mashobra side. 23. HHC Jawahar, witness of recovery, who allegedly signed recovery memo Ex.PW-1/B, was not examined by the prosecution for the reasons best known it and there is no plausible explanation for his non- examination. Therefore, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution for his non-examination. 24. HHC Ramesh Kumar (PW-1) categorically deposed that signatures of the accused persons were obtained on the cloth parcels in his presence, but cloth parcels, Exts. P1, P4 and P7, which were produced in the Court, were not having the signatures of the accused Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 15 persons. This witness further deposed that he signed the piece of cloth, which bear sample seal impression, Ex. PW-1/A, but Ex. PW-1/A, when produced in the Court did not have the signatures of PW-1. PW-1 could not explain why his signatures were not on Ex.PW-1/A, when he himself stated that he had signed the same. Similarly, PW-8 ASI Manohar Lal, deposed that facsimile seal, which was prepared on the spot, was signed by the witnesses who were the witnesses of seizure memo, whereas the facsimile seal, Ex. PW-1/A, which was placed, did not have signatures of any of the witnesses. Thus, it cannot be said sample seal cloth, Ex. PW- 1/A, is the same, which was allegedly signed by marginal witnesses of seizure memo, i.e., PW-1 Ramesh Kumar and HHC Jawahar. HHC Govind singh (PW-10) deposed on oath that Ex. PW-1/A was signed by Constable Ramesh and HHC Jawahar in his presence, but facsimile seal, Ex. PW-1/A, did not bear signatures of PW-1 HHC Ramesh Kumar and HHC Jawahar. PW-11 admitted that Ex. PW-1/A was prepared on the spot, which was signed by him, witnesses and the accused persons, but Ex. PW-1/A, which was placed on record, did not have the signatures of witnesses and the accused persons. PW-11 could not offer any explanation as to why the signatures of witnesses and the accused persons were not appearing on Ex. PW-1/A. Therefore, Ex. PW-1/A, cannot be relied upon, as the police/official witnesses have stated differently qua the preparation of the same. 25. As per the story of the prosecution, Ex. PW-1/B, i.e., recovery memo, was prepared qua recovery of entire charas from all the Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 16 accused persons and no separate memos were prepared qua recovery of charas from each accused. However, Investigating Officer PW-11, deposed that it was the case of three separate recoveries, therefore, three separate memos were prepared qua the recoveries. This witness, in his cross-examination, admitted the entire charas was shown to be jointly taken in possession, vide memo Ex. PW-1/B. Thus, the statement of PW-11 demonstrates that he had prepared three separate recovery memos qua each recovery of charas, but recovery memo, Ex. PW-1/B, shows a different picture that joint recovery memo was prepared for the entire recovery of alleged charas. 26. The perusal of the record shows that PW-11 was the Investigating Officer, but he had no knowledge about the recovery memos, which is an imperative document, in recovery of any contraband. In fact, in the instant case there appears to be doubt as to who was the Investigating Officer. PW-11 admitted that he did not write any of the documents. Rukka, Ex. PW-5/A, was written by SI Babu Ram and SI Sandeep wrote recovery memo, Ex. PW-1/B. PW-11 also deposed that he did not record the statements of the witnesses. PW-1 HHC Ramesh Kumar specifically deposed in his cross-examination that police party was headed by Deputy Superintendent of Police Dinesh Sharma (PW-11) and Investigating Officer was SI Sandeep. The case of the prosecution is that the investigation was carried-out by PW-11, but the above contradictory testimonies of PW-1 and PW-11 clearly show that even the police/officials witnesses were not certain as to who was the Investigating Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 17 Officer of the case. It seems that PW-11 being superior to other police officials only posed himself as Investigating Officer, but surprisingly he did not write even a single word during the investigation and he simply signed the documents. SI Sandeep, who had actually prepared the important documents, was not cited as a witness and PSI Babu Ram, who was also one of the important witness, was not examined. Thus, the non-examination of important prosecution witnesses, creates a doubt about the veracity of the prosecution story. 27. It has come in the testimony of PW-11 that government vehicle, bearing registration No. HP-07-A-0726, remained with the police since 09:00 p.m. up to 12:55 a.m. during the night of 11.04.2013. He denied in his cross-examination that official vehicle, bearing registration No. HP-07A-0726, was not with him and the same was with PSI Babu Ram from 09:00 p.m. to 11:08 p.m. and subsequently it was used by SHO Madan Thakur on 12.04.2013 at 12:59 p.m.. As per the version of PW-11, Constable Tashi Negi (PW-9) was not with him as driver, when the police party returned back to police station from the spot, whereas, daily diary No. 4A, Ex. DX clearly demonstrates that he was reporting officer and even his arrival, alongwith vehicle, Constable Tashi Negi and other members at 12:55 p.m., was recorded. PW-11 deposed that at the time of the recovery there were street lights as well as lights of the vehicles, whereas, other prosecution witnesses stated that there was no street light on the spot. Hence, due to various contradictions, discrepancies and inconsistencies in the statements of police witnesses, Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 18 the same do not inspire confidence. 28. Therefore, after the close scrutiny of the statements of the above police/official witnesses, we are left with no other option, but to disbelieve their testimonies, as there are contradictions in their testimonies, which create a serious doubt qua the veracity of the prosecution story. 29. Law is well settled with regard to the fact that howsoever strong the suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722 on this aspect of the matter held as under:- “21. Suspicion, howsoever grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that `may be proved and `will be proved. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason, that the mental distance between `may be and `must be is quite large and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between `may be true and `must be true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between `may be true and `must be true, the court must maintain the vital distance between conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense.” 30. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has failed to Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29423 ) 19 prove its case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. The view taken by the learned Trial Court while acquitting the accused persons under Section 20 of NDPS Act is a reasonable view based on the evidence on record and the same cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record. Hence, no interference in the judgment of acquittal dated 03.12.2014, rendered by the learned Special Judge-I, Shimla, HP, in Sessions Trial No.15-S/7 of 2013, is required as the same is the result of proper appreciation of evidence and law. The appeal, which is devoid of merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged. 31. In view of the provisions of Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the respondents are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within a period of four weeks with the stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The appeal is accordingly disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. ( Vivek Singh Thakur ) Judge ( Sushil Kukreja ) Judge 30.08.2025 (virender)