2025:JHHC:18002 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (L) No. 4476 of 2012 --------- Koyla Ispat Mazdoor Panchayat, through its Secretary Shib Sadhan De, having its office at Jharia, P.O. and P.S.- Jharia, District- Dhanbad and resident of Kusum Vihar, P.O. BCCL Township, P.S.- Saraidhela, District-Dhanbad. ......Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India. 2. Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India through its Secretary, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi. 3. Desk Officer, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi. 4. Section Officer, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi. 5. Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India, Shram Shakti Bhawan, at P.O. and P.S.- Jagjivan Nagar, District-Dhanbad. 6. Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India, Shram Shakti Bhawan, at P.O. and P.S.- Jagjivan Nagar, District-Dhanbad. 7. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd through its Chief Managing Director, Koyla Bhawan, Koyla Nagar, P.O.-Dhanbad, P.S.- Saraidhela, District-Dhanbad. 8. Director Personal, M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, Koyla Bhawan, Koyla Nagar, P.O.-Dhanbad, P.S.-Saraidhela, District-Dhanbad. 9. General Manager, Lodna Area of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., P.O. and P.S.- Khas Jeenagora, District-Dhanbad. 10. Project Officer, Jayrampur Collery, Lodna Area of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., P.O. and P.S.- Khas Jeenagora, District- Dhanbad. .....Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN --------- For the Petitioner : M/s. Sanjoy Piprawall, Prince Kumar, Rakesh Ranjan, Jay Prakash, Advocates For the Resp.-BCCL : Mr. Anup Kumar Mehta, Advocate For the Resp.-UOI : Mr. Prabhat Kr. Sinha, Sr. Panel Counsel --------- C.A.V. ON:-16.06.2025 PRONOUNCED ON:-02/07/2025 1. Heard learned counsels for the parties. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the Petitioner-Union praying therein for quashing the letter dated 2025:JHHC:18002 2 02.08.2010 issued by the 4th respondent as contained in Annexure-9; whereby he has been informed to the effect that the matter cannot be referred for adjudication in view of the fact that the dispute has been raised belatedly. The Petitioner has further prayed for a direction upon the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to refer the matter for adjudication before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad for adjudication of claim of employment of Sri Kalyan Bhuiya and 35 others. 3. The brief facts of the case are that Sri Kalyan Bhuiya and 35 others were working in Jayrampur Colliery at Dhanbad under BCCL since 1973. All of a sudden, the concerned workmen were delisted by the Respondent Nos. 8 and 9 in the light of circular dated 24.05.1978 issued by the Colliery Management. Pursuant thereto; the Petitioner filed representation in 1995 (Annexure-1). The Petitioner Union again made representation on 11.05.2002 for consideration and thereafter repeated their request vide representation dated 05.01.2004 (Annexure-2 & 2/1). Thereafter, the Petitioner-Union raised the dispute before the 6th Respondent for engagement of concerned workmen on 20.11.2008. Pursuant thereto, the 6th Respondent started conciliation proceeding which ended in failure and vide letter dated 01.09.2009, the 6th respondent sent the failure report. 4. The fact further reveals that the 3rd Respondent 2025:JHHC:18002 3 informed the Petitioner-Union that the failure report of the conciliation proceeding was considered by the Ministry and the same was declined for reference of the matter to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. 5. The grievance of the Petitioner-Union is that from perusal of Annexure-9, the 2nd Respondent declined to refer the matter for adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad on the ground that dispute has been raised belatedly after 22 years of the cause of action. He contended that on the ground of delay, the concerned respondent cannot refuse to refer the matter for adjudication and he was legally bound to look into the merits of the case. He further submits that as per the Industrial Disputes Act, Central Government has no power to decline to refer dispute for adjudication on the ground of delay. Learned counsel further referred to several representations and submits that there was no delay on the part of the workmen. In support of his contention, he relied upon Para- 30 of the judgment referred in the case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. General Manager, Instrument Design Development and Facilities Centre and Another reported in (2010) 14 SCC 176 and submits that the action of the concerned respondent is against the dictum of the aforesaid judgment. For brevity, the same is extracted hereinbelow: “30. In view of the above, law can be summarised that there is no prescribed time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is more so in view of the language used, namely, if any 2025:JHHC:18002 4 industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate Government "at any time" refer the dispute to a board or court for enquiry. The reference sought for by the workman cannot be said to be delayed or suffering from a lapse when law does not prescribe any period of limitation for raising a dispute under Section 10 of the Act. The real test for making a reference is whether at the time of the reference dispute exists or not and when it is made it is presumed that the State Government is satisfied with the ingredients of the provision, hence the Labour Court cannot go behind the reference.” Emphasis Supplied 6. He further submits that in a similar matter, High court of Himachal Pradesh in the case of Bhupinder Singh Vs. State of H.P. and Others in CWP No.610 of 2019 at Para-5, has categorically held that delay and laches by itself cannot be a ground for refusing to make reference. If a person is guilty of delay and laches, it may be a ground for the Labour Court either to refuse to grant relief or to refuse to grant relief of backwages and the government cannot take up the role of adjudicating authority. Relying upon the aforesaid judgments Mr. Piprawall submits that the impugned order be quashed and the concerned respondent may be directed to refer the dispute of the workmen who were terminated by the colliery management. 7. Learned counsel for the Respondents opposed the prayer and submits that the Petitioner-Union is representing the workers who worked for only three years from 1973 to 1976 and for the first time, the Petitioner-Union addressed a letter to the colliery management vide letter dated 07.08.1995 i.e., after a period of 19 years. Thereafter, the Union kept silent for another seven years and addressed a second letter to the colliery management on 11.05.2002 and subsequently, in the year 2004. Only in the year 2008, the Petitioner-Union raised the 2025:JHHC:18002 5 industrial dispute on 20.11.2008 though, the cause of action arose in the year 1976 itself. 8. Mr. Mehta submits that lack of diligence on the part of the Petitioner-Union is apparent in this Case, inasmuch as, the cause of action arose in the year 1976. The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of judgments has held that the word ‘anytime’ mentioned in this provision does not mean that it should be unreasonable. Moreover, the legislature has specifically used the word ‘existing dispute’, therefore, it can be presumed that with the delay and laches for over 25 years, there does not remain an existing dispute. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Secretary, Indian Tea Association Vs. Ajit Kumar Barat and others reported in (2000) 3 SCC 93, wherein at para 6 and 7 the law has been summarized. 9. Having heard learned counsels for the parties and after going through the documents available on record including the impugned Order and the averments made in respective affidavits following questions of law arise for consideration: (I) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the State is empowered to refuse to refer the industrial dispute on the ground of delay ? (II) Whether a trade union has got a birthright to raise a stale dispute even after 32 years ? 10. The Petitioner-Union is representing the case of concerned workmen who worked for only three years from 1973 to 1976 and for the first time, the Union addressed a letter to the 2025:JHHC:18002 6 colliery company on 07.08.1995 i.e., after 19 years. It has not been demonstrated by the Union that why it first raised the claim before the colliery management after such a long period. It further transpires from record that after giving the first representation, the Union kept silence and on 11.05.2002 it made the second representation and finally they raised an industrial dispute on 20.11.2008 (Annexure-3). 11. Thus, it is evident that the cause of action arose in the year 1976; whereas the industrial dispute has been raised on 20.11.2008 after a period of 32 years. From bare perusal of the impugned order (Annexure-9), it transpires that the claim to refer the dispute to the Tribunal was rejected on the ground of delay. For brevity, the relevant portion of the letter dated 02.08.2010 is extracted hereinbelow: “The claim for employment to Sri Kalyan Bhuiya and 35 others has been raised belatedly over 22 years of cause of action without any justification for such delay and is, therefore, not deemed fit for adjudication”. 12. In the case of Sultan Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in (1996) 2 SCC 66, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that an order issued under Section 10 of the Act is an administrative order and the government is entitled to go into the question whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and it will be only a subjective satisfaction on the basis of the material on record and being an administrative order no lis is involved. As a matter of fact, in the case of Secretary, Indian 2025:JHHC:18002 7 Tea Association (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has summarized on this issue. For brevity para 7 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: “7. The law on the point may briefly be summarised as follows: 1. The appropriate Government would not be justified in making a reference under Section 10 of the Act without satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and if such a reference is made it is desirable wherever possible, for the Government to indicate the nature of dispute in the order of reference. 2. The order of the appropriate Government making a reference under Section 10 of the Act is an administrative order and not a judicial or quasi- judicial one and the court, therefore, cannot canvass the order of the reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial order. 3. An order made by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the Act being an administrative order no lis is involved, as such an order is made on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. 4. If it appears from the reasons given that the appropriate Government took into account any consideration irrelevant or foreign material, the court may in a given case consider the case for a writ of mandamus. 5. It would, however, be open to a party to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act.” 13. It is true that law does not describe any time limit for the appropriate government to exercise its power under Section 10 of the Act, but it cannot be said that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. In other words, this power has to be exercised reasonably and in rational manner. In this regard, reference may be made to the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 wherein at para 6 the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down the law as under:- “6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could 2025:JHHC:18002 8 be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent.” Emphasis Supplied 14. Looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, admittedly, the concerned workmen for whom the Petitioner- Union has raised the dispute worked for only three years and they were terminated in the light of circular No. BCCL/IR/78/21581- 831 dated 24.05.1978 and for the first time the Union made representation after 19 years i.e., in the year 1995. From entire record it does not transpire that there was any reasonable cause for such delay. 15. At this stage, it is also pertinent to mention here that though the power of the Central Government to refer the dispute under Section 10 of I.D. Act has been dealt in detail in the aforesaid cases; however, since learned counsel for the Petitioner has raised two judgments, one is Kuldeep Singh (supra) and another is Bhupinder Singh (Supra); it is necessary to peruse the same. From bare perusal of the order passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the Bhupinder Singh (Supra), it appears that the Court has not considered the judgments referred to hereinabove; especially the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (supra); as such, the same will not be applicable. From the order passed in Bhupinder Singh (supra) it is also not clear as to when the dispute was raised before the competent authority and what was the nature of refusal. 2025:JHHC:18002 9 16. So far as the judgment cited by the Petitioner-Union rendered in Kuldeep Singh (supra), it appears that even in the said case the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-30, has categorically held that the real test for making a reference is whether at the time of the reference, dispute exists or not and when it is made it is presumed that the State Government is satisfied with the ingredients of the provision. The very words used by the Hon’ble Apex Court that “at the time of reference the dispute exists or not”; is crux of the issue involved in the instant case. 17. As aforesaid, in the instant case, since no dispute was raised either by the workmen or by the Union for such a long period then it can be safely presumed that no dispute existed on the day of reference. This is a peculiar case that for the cause of action of 1976, the dispute has been raised in 2008 i.e., after 32 years and in this background, this Court is having no hesitation in holding that a trade union has got no birthright to raise a stale dispute after 32 years and take the system for granted; as such, this question goes in favour of the management and having regard to the aforesaid discussions, even question No. (I) goes in favour of the management and no relief could be granted to the Petitioner and this Court holds that the Central Government has not committed any error in not referring the dispute being a stale claim. 18. Accordingly, the instant writ application stands 2025:JHHC:18002 10 dismissed. However, there is no order to cost. Pending I.A., if any, also stands closed. (Deepak Roshan, J.) vikas/- AFR