Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:20677 ) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr. MP No. 1063 of 2025 in Cr. Appeal No. 402 of 2024 Decided on: 30.06.2025 _____________________________________________________ Pawan Kumar …..Appellant/applicant. Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ……Respondent/non-applicant. _____________________________________________________ Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge. 1 Whether approved for reporting? No. _____________________________________________________ For the applicant: Dr. Rajesh Kumar Parmar, Advocate. For the non-applicant/State: Mr. I.N. Mehta, Senior Additional Advocate General, with Mr. Navlesh Verma, Mr. Sushant Kaprate, Additional Advocates General, and Mr. Raj Negi, Deputy Advocate General. Sushil Kukreja, Judge. (Oral) This order shall dispose of an application filed by the applicant/appellant under Section 430 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short “BNSS”) seeking suspension of sentence awarded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (RAPE/POCSO), Shimla, H.P., vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence, dated 30.05.2024, passed in Case No. 14-S/7 of 2022, for the commission of offence punishable under Section 376 2(n) of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”) and releasing him on bail. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:20677 ) 2 2. The learned Counsel for the appellant/applicant contended that the appellant/applicant has got a very good arguable case on merits, as the evidence relied upon by the learned Trial Court is shaky, thus not tenable in the eyes of law. He also contended that there are material contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, which the learned Trial Court has lightly brushed aside. He also submitted that as the applicant has already undergone sentence of more than one year, as against the total sentence of ten years awarded to him and the appeal is not likely to be decided in near future, therefore, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence imposed upon the appellant/applicant by the learned Trial Court be suspended in the interest of justice and fair play. 3. Per contra the learned Senior Additional Advocate General contended that the appellant/applicant is not entitled for suspension of sentence, as the learned Trial Court had found him guilty. It is further contended that after the judgment of conviction, there is no presumption of innocence in favour of the appellant/applicant and the instant application, being devoid of merits, deserves to be dismissed. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the applicant/appellant as well as learned Additional Advocate General Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:20677 ) 3 and have also gone through the material available on record. 5. The perusal of the record reveals that learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (RAPE/POCSO), Shimla, H.P., vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence, dated 30.05.2024, convicted the appellant/applicant under Section 376 2(n) IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and to pay fine of Rs.25,000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. 6. Before adverting to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/applicant as well as learned Additional Advocate General for the non-applicant/State, it would be beneficial to refer to the settled legal position, to the effect that when the appellant/applicant accused is convicted by the competent Criminal Court, the initial presumption of innocence is no more available to him. 7. In State of Maharashtra vs. Madhukar Wamanrao Smarth, (2008) 5 SCC 721, the Hon'ble apex Court referred to the parameters delineated in Kishori Lal vs. Rupa & others, (2004) 7 SCC 638 to be observed by the High Court while dealing with an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail and reiterated the view taken in Vasant Tukaram Pawar vs. State of Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:20677 ) 4 Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 281. The relevant part runs as under: “10. The parameters to be observed by the High Court while dealing with an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail have been highlighted by this Court in many cases. In Kishori Lal v. Rupa it was observed as follows: "4. Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed against. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine. The above position was reiterated in Vasant Tukaram Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2005 (5) SCC 281)" 8. In Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P. & Anr. reported in (2020) 8 SCC 645, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that in case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. The relevant para of the aforesaid judgments reads as under: "35. There is a difference between grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC and grant of bail, post conviction. In the earlier case, there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. (2018 3 SCC 22). However, in case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:20677 ) 5 finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) CrPC.” 9. In (NCT of Delhi) v. Lokesh Chadha, (2021) 5 SCC 724, it was held that the principle of bail being the rule and jail being an exception cannot be attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. The relevant para of the aforesaid judgment reads as under: "10. At this stage, we will refer to the decision of a two- judge Bench of this Court in Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P. [Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (2020) 8 SCC 645 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 897] where Indira Banerjee, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows : (SCC p. 655, para 35) "35. There is a difference between the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC in case of pre- trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC and the grant of bail, post- conviction. In the earlier case there may be a presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. [Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 675] However, in case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:20677 ) 6 compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) CrPC.” 10. It has further been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary, (2023) 6 SCC 123 that while deciding the application for suspension of the sentence, the Court should consider whether the applicant has a fair chance of acquittal. The relevant para of the aforesaid judgment is extracted hereunder: "“23. The principle underlying the theory of criminal jurisprudence in our country is that an accused is presumed to be innocent till he is held guilty by a court of the competent jurisdiction. Once the accused is held guilty, the presumption of innocence gets erased. In the same manner, if the accused is acquitted, then the presumption of innocence gets further fortified. 24. From perusal of Section 389 of the Cr. PC, it is evident that save and except the matter falling under the category of sub-Section 3 neither any specific principle of law is laid down nor any criteria has been fixed for consideration of the prayer of the convict and further, having a judgment of conviction erasing the presumption leaning in favour of the accused regarding innocence till contrary recorded by the court of the competent jurisdiction, and in the aforesaid background, there happens to be a fine distinction between the prayer for bail at the pre- conviction as well as the post-conviction stage, viz Sections 437, 438, 439 and 389(1) of the Cr. PC. 25 to 32 xxx 33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the endeavour on the part of the Court, therefore, should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If the answer to the above said question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that, if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually take very long for decision and disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words, something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the record, on the basis of which, the Court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable. The Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the Cr. PC and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach.” Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:20677 ) 7 11. Taking into consideration the position of law, as can be gathered from various judgments of the Supreme Court, it is very clear that discretion at the time of considering the plea of the accused for suspension of sentence pending final hearing of appeal has to be exercised judiciously and not as a matter of course as once the conviction is recorded, the presumption of innocence is no longer available to the appellant. A perusal of Section 430 of BNSS would show that suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal is not the absolute right of the convict. The discretion to suspend the sentence vests in the court and it is required to be exercised judicially keeping in view all facts and circumstances and the nature of offence. The Court has to exercise this discretion with utmost care and caution, balancing one's right and liberty on one hand and the interest of the society on the other. 12. In the instant case, the nature of the allegations against the accused are serious, as he was held guilty for committing repeated sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix on the false pretext of marriage due to which she became pregnant and delivered a baby at Civil Hospital on 31.03.2021. As per the SFSL report and the opinion of the Medical Officer, the prosecutrix was the biological mother and the accused was the biological father of Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:20677 ) 8 the newly born baby. The learned counsel for the appellant/applicant highlighted some contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses. However, such contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, as highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant/applicant, cannot be looked into at this stage, as the same cannot be gone into in detail at the stage of deciding the present application for suspension of sentence. Whether these contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are so glaring to affect the core of the prosecution case, can only be examined at the stage of final hearing. In Om Prakash Sahni’s case (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the Appellate Court should not re- appreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the Cr.PC and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution, which would not be a correct approach. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion and keeping in mind, the nature of conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court, that too, after a full-fledged trial, we feel our self persuaded to hold that the appellant/convict, at this stage, has miserably failed to carve out a strong case for suspension of sentence and his release on bail. The application for suspension of sentence and release of appellant/convict on bail, therefore being Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:20677 ) 9 misconceived, is dismissed and stands disposed of accordingly. 14. Since the appeal pertains to the year 2024 and already stands admitted, the appellant/applicant is at liberty to move appropriate application for early hearing of the appeal. 15. Be it stated that any expression of opinion given in this order does not mean an expression of opinion on the merits of the case and the same has been given only for the purpose of deciding the present application. The application stands disposed of. ( Tarlok Singh Chauhan ) Judge ( Sushil Kukreja ) Judge 30th June, 2025 (virender)