2025:UHC:6557-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL HON’BLE MR. G. NARENDAR, C.J. HON’BLE MR. ASHISH NAITHANI, J WRIT PETITION (S/B) No.341 of 2023 The Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd. …Petitioner Versus State of Uttarakhand & others …Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner Counsel for State/ respondent nos.1 and 2 : : Mr. B.D. Upadhyay, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Maneesh Bisht, learned counsel. Mr. Amarendra Pratap Singh, learned Additional Advocate General. Counsel for Respondent No.3 : Mr. Aditya Singh, learned counsel. Counsel for the caveator : Mr. A.K. Tripathi, learned counsel through VC. JUDGMENT : (per HON’BLE MR. G. NARENDAR, C.J.) Heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Amarendra Pratap Singh, learned Additional Advocate General for the State and Mr. Aditya Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.3. 2. The case in a nutshell is that the services of the third respondent came to be terminated by the petitioner, on the premise that the respondent no.3 had tendered her resignation, and that the said resignation came to be accepted in terms of Rule 26 of The Kurmanchal Nagar Bank Ltd. Staff Service Rules 1993, (for short “The Rules”), produced at running Page No. 1 2025:UHC:6557-DB 292 of the paper-book. Rule 26 of the Rules reads as under:- “26. RESIGNATION: (a) A permanent employee who desires to leave the service of the Bank shall give three month's clear notice in writing of his intention to do so. In the absence of such notice, he shall be liable to pay three months salary in lieu of such notice. Provided that when an employee gives notice for leaving the service of the Bank, the Bank may at its discretion accept it with immediate effect or any time before expiry of the notice period, without paying wages for the remaining period of notice. Provided further that, an employee's resignation will not be effective during the pendency of disciplinary proceeding against him, unless accepted by the Bank in writing. (b) In case an employee leaves the service of the Bank without giving such notice or before the expiry of the notice period, the Bank will be entitled to recover from the employee, amount pertaining to the notice period or unexpired notice period, from any salary or provident fund or bonus or any other amount due to him, as the case may be. In case an employee who has been sent for any training/ course by the Bank, resigns within five years from the date on which he joins back his duties in the Bank, after his training, he shall be liable to refund the pay or allowance or both, if any drawn during the course of his training and also make good the training expenses. In case of any contract having been signed by the employee with the Bank before going on training, the terms and conditions of the contract shall prevail. The employee shall however be entitled for the pay for the period specified in the order of acceptance of resignation for making over charge of records, books and property of the Bank in his custody but if he makes delay in handing over complete charge he shall not be entitled to the pay for the excess period d) If any book or property of the Bank are found to have been detained by the employee he shall continue to be liable for the same in spite of the acceptance of his resignation Note: The expression 'month' used in this rule shall be period of thirty days commencing on the date immediately following the date on which the notice is received by the appointing authority.” 2 2025:UHC:6557-DB 3. We have extracted the Rule for a better and more convenient appreciation of the alleged letter of the resignation dated 15.07.2015, which reads as under:- “To, The Secretary, The Kurmanchal Sahkari Bank Ltd., HO, Tallital, Nainital Through: The Chairman Subject: Resignation from the Service of the Bank Dear Sir, This has reference to the subject It was my privilege to join this esteemed team and with great enthusiasm I joined in HR function to work through mutual learning and experience. However, as experienced the role that was expected was more in IR than HR and accordingly since my joining I was entrusted with the assignments related to IR with having very little opportunity to add value in HR function which questioned the function credibility in the system. The role delivered as per Management directives had further infuriated the team to the extent that I received derogatory letters from some of the employees, my personal credentials that were shared with the bank while taking employment were all made public throught press release which really harassed me personally and socially. However still as a professional, without getting deterred and in spite of my nascent tenure with the bank, I tried my best to put in all efforts towards resolving old employee related issues. But as observed since last 3-4 months the way I am being treated by you is not at all acceptable as it is against professional culture and dignity. I am even left confused about the job clarity as without even my knowledge employees are inducted and assigned task pertaining to HR and as HOD-HR. I have no clue to it. At the end, the job which is not even in my notice I am held accountable for the same for which then I am harassed by you in front of other employees for no fault of mine. This really makes me tensed and put in embarrassing situation and as a result I am not able to concentrate on my work. Given this attitude and the environment I feel that you do not want me continue in the Bank hence I am finding it very difficult to perform my job. With this I am left with no other option so regretfully it is to state that in the interest of my professional and personal dignity, it will be appropriate to resign from the services of the bank and prefer sitting at home till I had a suitable opportunity for myself. I am thankful to the Chairman 3 2025:UHC:6557-DB and Directors for having faith in me and giving me an opportunity and support to serve the Bank With Regards, (Seema Rehman) HOD-HR 15.07.2015 4. The concluding paragraph is relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner to contend that the same constitutes a desire to resign, and hence the invocation of Rule 26 is fully justified. 5. A reading of the above would show that there is neither a notice period mentioned, nor a categorical tendering of resignation. If the letter is read in toto, the impression it gives, is that, it is not a letter tendering resignation, but a letter complaining of the harassment the lady employee was facing in the workplace. The third respondent has stated that, if the situation does not improve, she would be better off, and it would also be in the interest of professional and personal dignity to resign from the bank, and it does not state that she is resigning from the services of the Bank. This opinion of ours is fortified by the reminder letter dated 06.11.2015. The said letter reads as under:- 4 2025:UHC:6557-DB 06/11/2015 To. The Secretary, The Kurmanchal Sahkari Bank Limited, HO, Tallital, Nainital Subject: Letter dated 15/07/2015 Dear Sir, This has reference to the subject please. Through the said letter, I had mentioned my grievances to your good self which still I am facing being employee of the bank and due to which I submitted my conditional resignation. As already mentioned in my said letter, there is no improvement and on the contrary the prevailing situations are further deteriorated which is detrimental to my professionalism and personal dignity and I strongly feel apprehensive for my professional safety and credibility. It is humbly reminded that even after lapse of more than three and a half months time period post submitting my said letter, I have not received your reply against it and same is still awaited please. Thanking you in anticipation please Kind Regards, (Seema Rehman) Manager-HR, The Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd. HO, Tallital, Nainital Enclosure - As mentioned above the said Letter dated 15/07/2015 6. Another reminder letter dated 21.11.2015 reads as under:- To, The Secretary, The Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd., HO, Nainital. 21-11-2015 Dear Sir, This has reference to the time period that the undersigned had spent till date in the Bank and the experience that I had undergone during the tenure. Sir, with due respect if is humbly submitted that basically as an employer you are also not only responsible to see your employees by way of payment of salary but also his/her welfare. The Human Relation aspect is also to be take in account in particular while dealing with a female 5 2025:UHC:6557-DB employee but it is unfortunate that in my case it did not happen so. The modesty of a lady which has got highest marks in the society has not been maintained by you which has given me irreparable losses. I had joined with you in January, 2015 and I was more or less all the times engaged in Industrial Relations work (though, it was not my job). As already brought in your kind notice from time to time, that at times the jobs to be done with the aspect of HR (which was my job) are being delivered without my notice and consent. Further, the jobs which were being performed by me in the interest of the employees and Bank towards streamlining the function in terms of legalities and legacies have not been appreciated and on the reverse my explanations had been called from time to time for no reasons therefor. Considering all these facts, I had tendered my resignation on 15-07-2015 and according to the service conditions a decision was a must on my letter on your part by 14-10-2015 but it was not done so because of the reasons best known to you. Hence vide my letter dated 06-11-2015 I had again requested you for an appropriate decision on my letter which is still awaited on your part. Atlast, I submit that till I am in the job I must be allowed to work peacefully on the HR aspect peacefully so that harmony is created and better results are delivered. Thanking you. Kind regards, (Seema Rehman) Manager- Human Resource The Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkarı Bank Limited HO, Nainital” 7. A plain reading of the above letter would state that there is no improvement in the condition, and in the concluding paragraph, the third respondent has stated that she is yet to receive a reply, and she has nowhere stated, nor asked for a letter of acceptance. A resignation is complete with tendering and acceptance. 6 2025:UHC:6557-DB 8. On the other hand, the letter speaks that the third respondent-employee is expecting a reply, i.e. regarding her statement/ complaint about the vitiated atmosphere and the environment in the work place. 9. In support of our view, we draw sustenance from the ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Union of India and others v. Gopal Chandra Misra and others, reported in (1978) 2 SCC 301”, wherein at paragraph nos. 23 to 26 & 33, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under : “23. Well then, what is the correct connotation of the expression “resign his office” used by the founding fathers in proviso (a) to Article 217(1)? 24. “Resignation” in the dictionary sense, means the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right. This is conveyed by the maxim : Resionatio est juris propii spontanea refutatio (See Earl Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law). In relation to an office, it connotes the act of giving up or relinquishing the office. To “relinquish an office” means to “cease to hold” the office, or to “loose hold of the office (cf. Shorter Oxford Dictionary); and to “loose hold of office”, implies to “detach”, “unfasten”, “undo or untie the binding knot or link” which holds one to the office and the obligations and privileges that go with it. 25. In the general juristic sense, also, the meaning of “resigning office” is not different. There also, as a rule, both, the intention to give up or relinquish the office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment, are necessary to constitute a complete and operative resignation (see, e.g. American Jurisprudence, Second Edn., Vol. 15-A, p. 80), although the act of relinquishment may take different forms or assume a unilateral or bilateral character, depending on the nature of the office and the conditions governing it. Thus, resigning office necessarily involves relinquishment of the office, which implies cessation or termination of, or cutting as under from the office. Indeed, the completion of the resignation 7 2025:UHC:6557-DB and the vacation of the office, are the causal and effectual aspects of one and the same event. 26. From the above dissertation, it emerges that a complete and effective act of resigning office is, one which severs the link of the resignor with his office and terminates its tenure. In the context of Article 217(1), this test assumes the character of a decisive test, because the expression “resign his office” — the construction of which is under consideration — occurs in a proviso which excepts or qualifies the substantive clause fixing the office-tenure of a Judge up to the age of 62 years. 33. Thus considered, it is clear that merely by writing the letter to the President on May 7, 1977, proposing to resign with effect from August 1, 1977, the Judge had not done all which he was required to do to determine his tenure, of his own volition, under proviso (a) to Article 217(1). He had not, as yet, resigned his office on May 7, 1977, itself, he had not done everything which was necessary to complete the requirement of the expression “resign his office”. He had not relinquished his office and thus delinked himself from it. He had not — as the learned Judges of the High Court have erroneously assumed — crossed the Rubicon — Rubicon was still afar, 85 days away in the hazy future. At any time, before that deadline (August 1, 1977) was reached, the Judge could change his mind and choose not to resign, and withdraw the communication dated May 7, 1977. 10. In the case on hand also, it is apparent that the employee intended to resign, if the workplace atmosphere and environment did not improve, and if the harassment, she was suffering at the workplace, did not stop. In fact, in the letter dated 06.11.2015, she categorically speaks about her “conditional resignation”, indicating thereby that she would be left with no option, but to resign from her post, if the harassment at the workplace did not stop. Further, in the letter dated 21.11.2015, she goes to the extent of complaining of her modesty not being regarded and respected. In other 8 2025:UHC:6557-DB words, she is complaining of sexual harassment at the workplace. From a reading of the abovementioned paragraphs of the citation referred to supra, it is apparent that a resignation should be voluntary, and out of the person’s own free will. The above letters, if appreciated in the backdrop of the complaints narrated therein would only go to demonstrate that it is not a letter of resignation, but a threat to resign, if the environment in the workplace did not alter. 11. The above reminder letter/representation is followed by the letter dated 09.05.2016, by the petitioner’s Management. The letter is signed by the Secretary of the petitioner-bank, and the same reads as under:- Date 09/05/2016 Smt. Seema Rehman Manager HR, The Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd. HO Tallital, Nainital Ref: Resignation dated 15/07/2015 and reminder dated 06/11/2015 and 21/11/2015 Your letter of resignation along with the reminders was perused by the competent authority. The allegation made by you in your letter of resignation dated 15/07/2015 was considered and after due diligence, it was observed that the allegations leveled by you have lost relevance for 9 2025:UHC:6557-DB the reasons that during various communications, you have in writing accepted that you want to withdraw the letter of complaint against the employees leveling derogatory remarks against you as such the issue raised by you no longer subsists. That taking into consideration the letters dated 15/07/2015, 06/11/2015 and 21/11/2015 submitted by you, we are of the firm opinion that you are no more interested in rendering the services to the bank. That keeping the interest of the bank, your resignation is accepted w.e.f. 09/05/2016. That in view of acceptance of you resignation your lien in the bank as Manager HR ceases w.e.f. 09/05/2016. Signature Secretary” 12. In the un-numbered first paragraph of Annexure No.13, it is stated that the letter of resignation, along with reminders, were perused by the Competent Authority. The reference is to the letters of resignation dated 15.07.2015 and the reminder letter dated 06.11.2015 and 21.11.2015, which have been reproduced above. 13. By the said statement, the Secretary accepts that he is not the competent authority to terminate the services of an employee. In the second un-numbered paragraph, it is stated that the third respondent had submitted her resignation under the letter dated 15.07.2015. It is further stated that the allegations 10 2025:UHC:6557-DB leveled by her in the letter dated 15.07.2015 have lost relevance because subsequently she has accepted to withdraw the allegations. In the un-numbered third paragraph, it is stated that, after taking into consideration letters dated 15.07.2015, 06.11.2015 and 21.11.2015, it is recorded that “we are of the firm opinion that you are no more interested in rendering the services to the bank”. The letter is not counter signed by anybody else, other than the Secretary, and it is further stated in the un-numbered fourth paragraph that in the interest of the bank, the resignation dated 09.05.2016 is accepted with effect from 09.05.2016. 14. A plain reading of the letter would disclose that there is no reference to any resolution of the governing body or of the staff service committee, which the learned Senior Counsel would contend is invested with the powers to appoint and terminate the services of the bank employees. The letter is as bald as one could be. No provision - neither in the by-laws, nor in the Act, or Rules is pointed out, which enables or empowers the Secretary to terminate the services by accepting a letter of resignation. 11 2025:UHC:6557-DB 15. Learned Senior Counsel has not been able to point out any provision, which vests any such powers or authority in the Secretary to determine the services of any employee. Be that as it may, as pointed out above, the alleged letter of resignation, in our opinion, does not constitute an offer to resign. Resignation is contractual, and is in two parts: (i) an offer of the employee to resign and (ii) acceptance of that offer and termination of the services of the employee. 16. In the instant case, the letter of resignation is not addressed to the Competent Authority, nor is the acceptance of the competent authority placed on record. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel, that notwithstanding the fact that the acceptance of resignation was illegal or irregular, the same could not have been intervened by the Registrar, and that no authority is vested under the Act in the Registrar to intervene with the orders of the bank, be it either rightly or wrongly passed, and set aside the same. He would take the Court through the provisions of Sections 99(C) and 126 of the Uttarakhand Cooperative Societies Act, and would also place reliance on the judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court rendered in Special 12 2025:UHC:6557-DB Appeal No.47 of 2013, “The Uttarakhand Co- operative Bank Limited Versus State of Uttaranchal and others”, wherein it has been held that the Registrar cannot invoke the provisions of Section 126 to determine and annul any proceedings of the bank, on the premise that by-laws or regulations have not been framed. 17. We have no quarrel with the said proposition, though we are constrained to disagree with the reasoning set out therein. Be that as it may, a reading of Section 70 would clearly negate the stand adopted by the learned Senior Counsel. Sub-section (1) (c) of Section 70, reads as under:- “70. Dispute which may be referred to arbitration.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force. If any dispute relating to the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken against a paid servant of a society arises – (a)……. (b)……. (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heir or legal representative of any deceased office, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society; or a.” 18. The dispute between the management and an officer or employee, or a past employee, is arbitrable by the Registrar under Section 70. The exception to sub- 13 2025:UHC:6557-DB section (1) of Section 70, is that the dispute should not relate to a disciplinary action. The disputes arising out of the disciplinary action have been taken out of the ambit of Section 70. 19. Here, in the instant case, admittedly it is not a case of any disciplinary action having been initiated against the employee. Even according to the bank, it is a case of voluntary resignation. In that view, the contention that the employee could not have approached the Registrar and ought to have approached the Civil Court, is without foundation. In fact, Section 71 enables the Registrar to refer the disputes under Section 70 for adjudication by arbitration. Further, sub-Section (3) of Section 70 places an embargo on the dispute being called in question in any Court. In view of Sub-Section (1) of Section 70, read with Sub-Section (3) of Section 70, the contention that the Registrar has no authority to adjudicate the issue or the claim of the employee/ past employee is unsustainable. It is not in dispute that third respondent has relied upon on other provisions and preferred a revision before the State Government and it is the case of the petitioner that no sufficient opportunity was given to them but it is fairly admitted that notices 14 2025:UHC:6557-DB were issued; the records were summoned and the Government after looking into the records was pleased to set aside the purported letter of acceptance. 20. The question is whether lack of sufficient opportunity would be ground enough for this Court to intervene and set aside the order. From the facts narrated above, and as demonstrated by the records at hand, it is clear as daylight that the third respondent never intended to resign. Rather, it is more in the nature of a complaint and a threat that if her complaints are not addressed, she may be forced to explore the option of a resignation. 21. A reading of Rule 26 of the Rules, as extracted supra, would demonstrate that a person desiring to leave the services of the bank is required to convey the intention, with clear three months’ notice. None of the letters even speak of putting the bank on notice, much less a clear three months’ notice. The option to dispense with the waiting period, or the notice period of three months, is only conferred on the bank under the first proviso to Rule 26(a). 15 2025:UHC:6557-DB 22. In that view, we are unable to comprehend, as to how the Secretary has construed the same as a letter of resignation. That apart, as recorded above, we find that no authority under the Rules is invested in the Secretary to terminate the services of any employee, much less accept the alleged letter of acceptance. 23. In that view, the entire proceedings smacks of gross abuse of power by an individual and by a person, who was incompetent to exercise such authority. If the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel that the order impugned is vitiated on account of lack of proper opportunity is accepted and the same is set aside, the same would result in the revival of an order, which, by itself, has no legs to stand. In other words, an illegal order - an order without competence and jurisdiction, would stand revived, which in our considered opinion is impressible. 24. In this regard, we place reliance on the ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1966 SC 828, “Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others”. Paragraph 17 of the same reads as under: 16 2025:UHC:6557-DB “17. The result of the discussion may be stated thus: The Primary Health Centre was not permanently located at Dharmaji gudem. The representatives of the said village did not comply with the necessary conditions for such location. The Panchayat Samithi finally cancelled its earlier resolutions which they were entitled to do and passed a resolution for locating the Primary Health Centre permanently at Lingapalem. Both the orders of the Government, namely, the order dated March 7, 1962, and that dated April 18, 1963, were not legally passed: the former, because it was made without giving notice to the Panchayat Samithi, and the latter, because the Government had no power under S. 72 of the Act to review an order made under S. 62 of the Act and also because it did not give notice to the representatives of Dharmajigudem village. In those circumstances, was it a case for the High Court to interfere in its discretion and quash the order of the Government dated April 18, 1963? If the High Court had quashed the said order, it would have restored an illegal order - it would have given the Health Centre to a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat Samithi. The High Court, therefore, in our view, rightly refused to exercise its extra-ordinary discretionary power in the circum-stances of the case.” (underlining by this Court) 25. This position in law has further been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “State of Uttaranchal Vs. Ajit Singh Bhola and another” reported in 2004 6 SCC 800 in paragraph 9, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold in the last sentence of the above paragraph as under : 17 2025:UHC:6557-DB “…….it is well settled that this Court will not exercise its discretion and quash an order which appears to be illegal, if its effect is to revive another illegal order”. 26. In that view of the matter, the writ petition stands rejected. There shall be no order as to costs. G. NARENDAR, C.J. ASHISH NAITHANI, J. Dt:24th July, 2025 NR/ 18 NITESH RAWAT Digitally signed by NITESH RAWAT DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=bea38a9cb7bca67cc3988ad93d563d9 5c70eb77fa0ea4758e401cf436bdce9fb, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=F691686B3C447434E89897BCDC 0B6567DCE4B7108B324FFED3C8A159F3BDD03 C, cn=NITESH RAWAT Date: 2025.08.08 14:45:37 +05'30'