1 ( 2025:HHC:10203 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMP(M) No.312 of 2023 Date of Decision : 10.04.2025 Janardhan Dass …… applicant/appellant Versus Kirnesh Jung ……Respondent Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge Whether approved for reporting?1 For the applicant : Mr. Bimal Gupta, Senior Advocate with Ms. Kusum Chaudhary, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. Vivek Singh Attri, Advocate. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral) The present application has been filed seeking condonation of delay in filing the present regular second appeal. The delay, in the case at hand, is 03 years and 03 days. The judgment and decree was passed by the First Appellate Court on 31.12.2019. As per the averments made by the applicant in the application for condonation of delay, the applicant became aware of the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 31.12.2019 in the month of September, 2022, when the respondent started interfering in the suit land. On objecting to such interference, it is averred in the 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2025:HHC:10203 ) application that the present applicant was informed of the dismissal of his appeal. Thereafter, immediately on 06.09.2022, the present applicant applied for the certified copy which was delivered on 20.09.2022. Subsequent thereto, the applicant could not come to Shimla to file the present appeal as he was bitten by a dog. The medical record in this respect has been appended along-with present application seeking condonation of delay. The benefit of COVID restriction from 31.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 in terms of the Apex Court judgment are being sought in the case at hand. 2. Per contra, the respondent submit that insofar as the First Appellate Court is concerned, on 07.12.2019, the respondent was present in person. The said fact is evident from the zimini order-sheet of the said date placed on record. On the said date, the matter had been listed before the First Appellate Court for pronouncement of judgment. However, the judgment could not be pronounced on the said date. Thereafter, the matter was listed on 24.12.2019 and finally the judgment was pronounced on 31.12.2019. 3. In the reply, other than the aforesaid, it has been averred that qua registration of sale deeds in February, 2021, June 2022 and November 2022, after passing of the judgment in the case at hand, the applicant had appeared in the Office of the Sub Registrar at Paonta Sahib for registration of the sale deeds. 3 ( 2025:HHC:10203 ) 4. Besides the aforesaid, in the reply filed it was averred that in March, 2021 and October, 2022, the applicant had appeared before the concerned Judicial Magistrate at Paonta Sahib with respect to prosecution of complaints. In order to demonstrate the same, copies of the registered sale deeds and order-sheets qua the pendency of the prosecutions attended to by the applicant at Paonta Sahib, have been placed on record. 5. In the aforesaid backdrop, issue with respect to condonation of delay was framed on 07.05.2024. Vide the same order, two weeks’ time was granted to the applicant to take steps for summoning the witnesses. In the order, it was made clear that if steps are not taken within two weeks, then no assistance from the Court would be given to the defaulting party. From perusal of the zimini order-sheets, it is evident that steps were not taken within the time. The same were taken on 16.10.2024. Vide order dated 16.10.2024, the applicant was directed to produce his witnesses on self responsibility and the matter was posted for 02.04.2025. On 02.04.2025, no witnesses were produced. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Admittedly, in the case at hand, the appeal was decided on 31.12.2019 and till September, 2022, the applicant did not know 4 ( 2025:HHC:10203 ) the fate of his appeal. Before the Appellate Court, regular and periodical dates of hearing are fixed. The process is called ‘adjournment of hearing. A party or his counsel is expected to appear on those dates and keep track of the case. If a litigant does not keep track of his case than ‘want of diligence’ or ‘inaction’ can be attributed to such a litigant. With respect to the aspect of ‘want of diligence’ or inaction attributed to the applicant in the case at hand, it would be appropriate to refer to Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321 : “14. Let us next also refer to some of the special factors which have a bearing on what constitutes sufficient cause, with reference to delay in applications for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal representatives on record. 15. The first is whether the appeal is pending in a court where regular and periodical dates of hearing are fixed. There is a significant difference between an appeal pending in a subordinate court and an appeal pending in a High Court. In lower courts, dates of hearing are periodically fixed and a party or his counsel is expected to appear on those dates and keep track of the case. The process is known as “adjournment of hearing”. 8. In what cases can Want of ‘diligence’ or ‘inaction’ be attributed to an applicant it would be appropriate to refer to Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao, (2009) 11 SCC 183: 5 ( 2025:HHC:10203 ) “Want of ‘diligence’ or ‘inaction’ can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent.” 9. Admittedly, the delay in the case at hand is of 03 years and 03 days. The length of delay is immaterial. The condonation of delay is a discretionary power. Exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of cause shown and the degree of its acceptability thereof. The expression “sufficient cause” is to be duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part (Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81). 10. The Court must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’. In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer a judgment reported as Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives & Others v. Union of India and Another, 2023 (10) SCC 531. The relevant extract of the same are as under: “…...Of course, the courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the 6 ( 2025:HHC:10203 ) person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an ‘explanation’ from an ‘excuse’. Although people tend to see ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’ as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an ‘excuse’ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.” 11. Admittedly, in the case at hand, from a perusal of the order-sheets, passed by the Trial Court, it is evident that on 07.12.2019, the present applicant had appeared in person before the First Appellate Court. On the said date, the matter had been listed for pronouncement of judgment. However, the judgment could not be pronounced and the matter thereafter was posted for 24.12.2019. On 24.12.2019, yet again, the judgment was not be 7 ( 2025:HHC:10203 ) pronounced and neither the applicant was present before the First Appellate Court on the said date. The judgment was finally pronounced on 31.12.2019. After having put in appearance on 07.12.2019, no explanation is forthcoming in the application as to why the applicant did not keep track of his matter before the Trial Court. Rather to the contrary, the excuse forthcoming is that only when the respondent started interfering in the suit land in September, 2022, did the applicant became aware of the passing of the judgment. Negligence on the part of the applicant is writ large. 12. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy. An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty. Even if the law of limitation applies harshly to the parties, it has to be applied with all its rigours. “The law is hard but it is the law”. In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer to case reported as Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 for the legal propositions laid therein qua law of limitation. “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause 8 ( 2025:HHC:10203 ) hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project). 9 ( 2025:HHC:10203 ) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.” 13. For the forgoing reasons, the present application is dismissed, being devoid of merit. 9. (Bipin Chander Negi) April 10, 2025 (KS) Judge