p. 1 A.F.R. IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK LAA No. 34 of 2014 ----------------------- An appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Sarbeswar Patra and others … … Appellants -Versus- Special L.A.O., Angul-Duburi- Sukinda Road, New Broad Gauge Rail Link Project … … Respondent For Appellants : Mr. Niranjan Panda-1, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Sanjib Swain, AGA for State Mr. S. K. Dash, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. P. Dash, Advocate (for Intervenor) P R E S E N T: THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE M.S. SAHOO Dates of hearing : 21.04.2025 and 05.05.2025 Date of judgment : 05.05.2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ M.S.SAHOO, J. Present LAA is listed and taken up along with LAA Nos.33 and 35 of 2014. All the parties to the respective appeals are represented by the same learned counsel. The facts of the appeals are identical. They arise from one land p. 2 acquisition process, that is for construction of Angul- Duburi-Sukinda Road, New Broad Gauge Railway Line. Issues are also similar and identical. The question of law is also the same to be decided by this Court. LAA No.33 of 2014 was heard as the lead case. For effective utilization of available time all the appeals were taken up and heard together. The learned counsel for the parties who represented the parties in all the cases were heard at length. This appeal is disposed of by noting the contentions and arguments urged in all the appeals taken together. 1. The appeal U/s.54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been filed by the appellants challenging judgment dated 05.08.2014 passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Kamakshyanagar in L.A. Misc. Case No. 125 of 2013. Appellants were claimant-petitioners before the Court below in a reference that was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer U/s.18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as dispute arose regarding the actual market price of the acquired land for determination of p. 3 compensation. The Court, learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Kamakshyanagar answered the reference by judgment dated 05.08.2014. 2. The land acquisition proceeding was pursuant to notification dated 07.07.2010 published in the Gazette on 05.08.2011. Land of the appellants of an area Ac. 0.69 decimals, pertaining to Plot No.1894 Khata No.2(iv) of ‘Sarada-III kisam’ Mouza-Kamakshyanagar, District- Dhenkanal was acquired for the Angul-Duburi-Sukinda Road, New Broad Gauge (B.G.) Rail Link Project, Dhenkanal. The Land Acquisition Officer determined the compensation amount at ₹25,00,000/- per acre i.e. ₹25,000/- per decimal. 3. Before the referral Court the awarded compensation of ₹28,18,409/-as intimated to the appellants by notice u/s. 12(2) of the L.A. Act was disputed by the appellants stating that their land should be valued at a higher rate. The appellants had objected before the L.A. Collector by written objection and they received with protest compensation p. 4 amount. Their written objection was forwarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer leading to adjudication by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division). The referral Court enhanced the compensation amount, to be determined at Rs.56,41,905/- (Rupees fiftysix lakh fortyone thousand nine hundred five) per acre. The appellants still dissatisfied have approached this Court in the present appeal. 4. It is noticed by this Court that the proceeding u/s.18 of the Act before the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) has some peculiar features as far as impletion of parties. Certified copy of the judgment has been enclosed and is also available in the lower court records which indicates that the Special LAO, Angul- Duburi-Sukinda Road, New B.G. Rail Link Project forwarded the claim of appellants and was the only opposite party to answer the claim of enhancement of compensation amount. What is more peculiar is that the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) has neither framed any issue nor answered as to who were the Project Proponents, who had deposited/paid the amount of compensation as determined p. 5 by the LA Collector in the first instance and would pay/deposit the enhanced amount as directed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division). The learned Court has not at all gone to the issue how the enhanced amount awarded will be satisfied i.e. whether opp. Party in the lis is to pay the amount or any one else will pay it. 5. The issues framed by the learned court below is reflected in paragraph-5 of the judgment which is reproduced below : “5. The point that needs for determination is : Whether the petitioners are entitled to have an amount of higher compensation than the amount settled by the O.P. ?” 6. The “order” of the learned Civil Judge(Sr. Division) indicates the following : “The reference U/s.18 of L.A. Act is answered as follows:- The market price of acquired land is determined at Rs.56,41,905/- (fifty six lacs forty one thousand nine hundred and five) per acre, as on the date of notification. The petitioners are entitled to get compensation at such higher rate for the acquired land. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Angul- Duburi-Sukinda Road New B.G. Rail Link Project, Dhenkanal is directed to re-assess the compensation p. 6 at such higher rate for the acquired land measuring Ac.0.55 dec bearing plot no. 1893 under khata no.375/81 and to pay the same to the petitioners after deducting the amount which has already been paid to him. The petitioners are also entitled to all the statutory benefits on such enhanced compensation as admissible under the L.A. Act. The petitioners are also at liberty to put-forth their grievance for proper rehabilitation and resettlement before the competent authority as per the provisions of Orissa Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy, 2006.” 7. By the above order the amount of compensation awarded in the L.A. proceeding, ₹28,18,409/- (Rupees twenty eight lakh eighteen thousand four hundred nine only) was enhanced by the learned court to be calculated at ₹56,41,905/-(Rupees fifty six lakh forty-one thousand nine hundred five) per acre as on the date of notification. The Special LAO, Angul-Duburi-Sukinda Road, New B.G. Rail link Project was directed to re-assess and pay the same to the petitioners after deducting the amount which has already been paid to him. 8. Somehow, the judgment in its ordering portion or any of its paragraphs does not refer to who will deposit the enhanced amount before the LAO Collector. The list of p. 7 witnesses examined indicates that no witness was examined on behalf of opposite parties Special LAO nor any written statement was filed on behalf of the Special LAO. ‘Working sheet of the acquired land’ was produced on behalf of Opp. Paty-L.A. Collector marked as Ext.A. Apparently, contest to the enhanced amount claimed or any contest to the basis of determination of enhanced amount has not been disclosed in the judgment. 9. Being dissatisfied by the determination of the compensation amount ₹56,41,905/- per acre of land on the date of notification as held by the referral Court the appellants have challenged the same by filing the present appeal for further enhancement. By order dated 13.07.2015 payment of court fee was exempted in Misc. Case No.186 of 2014. The matter was then referred to the National Lok Adalat held by this Court. By order dated 09.12.2017 it is observed by the learned Judge, Lok Adalat that “It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the dispute involved in this case, this matter cannot be settle in the Lok Adalat.” p. 8 10. As indicated above Misc. Case No.140 of 2016 has been filed by the Company for intervention. The said I.A. has been contested to the hilt as the matter is kept pending before this Court. The I.A. is contested by the appellant without any further progress in the adjudication of appeal. The respondent, Special LAO represented in the present appeal through the learned AGA also objects the intervention application. On consent of the parties the matter is taken up for hearing and disposal. The Misc. Case seeking inervention is also taken up and disposed of by the order recorded below along with the judgment. Misc. Case No.140 of 2016 11. Petitioner Angul-Sukinda Railway Company has filed the application under sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the LA Act, 1894 read with Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for intervention. It is contended that no notice was issued either to the East Coast Railway (Project Proponent) on whose behalf the land was acquired or to the intending-intervenor Company by entering into a p. 9 concession agreement with the Govt. of India, Ministry of Railways, has undertaken the liability to pay the compensation amount in respect of the land acquired for the project. Though the award has not been challenged separately in any connected land acquisition appeal but it is contended in the I.A. that in absence of statutory notice to East Coast Railway or the intervenor-Company the award has to be held as a nullity as it suffers from gross violation of the principle of natural justice, i.e. the affected party must be heard by the adjudicating Court. 12. In the background facts as noted above and in view of the procedure adopted in the proceedings before the Special LAO as well as in the reference U/s.18 that was decided by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Kamakshyanagar, the contention that neither the East Coast Railway nor the Company were made parties or were heard remains unrebutted. Further, no material is brought to the notice of this Court by appellants or the respondent-opposite party LAO p. 10 to show that East Coast Railway and the Company were made parties or were heard in the proceeding u/s.18 of the Act before the Court below. It is also neither pleaded nor demonstrated before this Court if impletion of East Coast Railway and/or the intending intervenor Company in the proceeding u/s18 would have prejudiced the appellants or the O.P.-Spl. Land Acquisition Officer in any manner. The Special Land Acquisition Officer opposing the intervention by the intervener company is rather baffling as the Special LAO is not an affected party who would pay the compensation if it is enhanced. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants Mr. Panda was heard at length. There is serious opposition on behalf of the appellants to the intervention application but on the face of the records it is fairly conceded that neither the East Coast Railway nor the intervenor-Company were made parties or heard before the referral Court. Obviously there is no reference to any written statement or any other response from Railways or the intending intervenor in the LA case before the referral Court. LAA No. 34 of 2014 Page 11 of 48 14. Order dated 21.04.2025 was passed earlier after hearing the learned counsel for appellants. Said order is reproduced herein : Misc. Case No.140 of 2016 “1. The matter has been listed for orders. I.A. has been filed for intervention by the intending intervener-petitioner stating at Paragraphs- 2 and 3 the following. “2. That it transpires from the impugned Award that no notice was issued to either the East Coast Railways, on whose behalf the land was acquired or the Intervener-Company who has undertaken the liability to pay the compensation amount in respect of the land acquired for the project, by virtue of an agreement or MoU with the Ministry of Railways. It is submitted that in absence of the statutory notice as aforesaid, the Award has always been held as a nullity. 3. That due to want of notice, the Intervenor- Company did not have any opportunity to adduce evidence before the Court and that the compensation amount has been enhanced by the Court at the instance of the appellants alone. There has been a clear-cut violation of the principles of natural justice. Intervener- Company is likely to be saddled with the liability to pay the compensation amount at a higher rate without an opportunity of hearing. Therefore, the impugned Award cannot be allowed to stand.” 2. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants-opposite parties have filed objection to the petition for intervention. p. 12 3. Learned counsel for the appellants on being asked whether the appellants have stated in the objection that the intending intervener is neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the matter, submits that in absence of his learned senior the matter may be adjourned. 4. Perusal of the objection filed by the land oustee- appellants does not show any response to the specific averments made in paragraphs-2 and 3 of the petition as indicated above. 5. As prayed for, list on 05.05.2025. Liberty to mention for listing before the assigned Bench. LAA No.34 of 2014 6. List on 05.05.2025.” 15. Learned counsel Mr. Niranjan Panda appearing on behalf of appellants in response to the above order dated 21.4.2025 makes his submissions : In response to observations made in paragraphs 3 & 4 of the order he submits that the objection dated 30th September, 2022 filed by the appellants through the appellant no.3 paragraph-2 is the answer to the issues raised in paragraphs 3 and 4. Paragraphs-2 and 10 of the objection are relied upon and are quoted herein : “2. That the Misc. Case is not tenable in the eyes of law and fact as the intervener is neither a necessary nor a proper party. The land in question was p. 13 acquired for East Coast Railway on requisition for public purpose u/section-4(1) of L.A. Act, 1894. The land in question was never acquired for Company- ASR Ltd for which the Intervener never appeared in below. 10. That the law is well settled that only the beneficiary/person interested for whose purpose the land is required may be heard under Section 50(2) of L.A. Act if the beneficiary so likes. In the present case at the time of reference, the copy of reference application has been forwarded to the East Coast Railway as is available in the case record. But the petitioner is in no way concerned in the matter in the garb of agreement with Railway Department for Execution of the project work under PPP mode.” 16. Having gone through the paragraphs 3 & 11 of the objection, it was pointed out to the learned counsel that the appellants admit that the acquisition was as per requisition of the Ministry of Railways who have entered into concession agreement with the intending-intervener company. Learned counsel does not dispute that the East Coast Railway has not been arrayed as party in the petition. The authority i.e. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Angul-Duburi-Sukinda Road, New B.G. Rail Link Project has been made the only opposite party who was neither authorized in his official capacity nor he could have p. 14 represented East Coast Railway/Ministry of Railway Union of India/Company. 17. It is noticed that the judgment in the opening paragraph refers to the Special LAO referring the matter u/s. 18 as indicated herein : “This is a reference U/s.18 of the Land Acquisition Act made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Angul-Duburi-Sukinda Road New B.G. Rail Link Project, Dhenkanal for determination of the actual market price of the acquired land.” Further, it is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the decretal dues have been paid by the East Coast Railway though they are not parties in the reference i.e. LA Misc. Case No. 125 of 2013. The affidavit of the appellants dated 30.09.2022 (objection to the intervention) does not state whether any amount was deposited/paid towards enhancement. The affidavit does not disclose the reasons for an authority who is not a party to a reference u/s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act would satisfy the decree. No indication is there when the amount, if any, was deposited. The direction of the p. 15 learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) was to the Special Land Acquisition Officer to reassess the compensation, as such there is no direction to any other entity to deposit and/or for payment of such compensation so that the Special Land Acquisition Officer can release the enhanced amount in favour of the appellants. 18. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that though not made party the referral court issued notice to the East Coast Railway. On being asked by which order the said notice was issued by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kamakshyanagar in L.A. Misc. Case No.125 of 2013, the learned counsel submits that the Special LAO while referring the matter under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act by letter intimated the East Coast Railway. Such submission is also contrary to the materials on record i.e. the record of the lower Court (LCR). The judgment as well as the reference on the face of it does not indicate that the requisitioning authority-East Coast Railway was ever made a party, much less noticed by the p. 16 learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kamakhyanagar as is being suggested by the learned counsel for the Appellants. 19. Assuming that the opposite party in the L.A. case, Spl. LAO issued letter to another authority which is not made party, proposition that such letter has to be treated as notice issued by the court below is beyond scope of law. When the Special LAO himself was the opposite party in the adjudication he could not have issued letter to another authority to be treated as notice to appear before the Court. The LAO was not competent in his official capacity to place before the referral Court the version of the Railways or the Company. 20. Relying on the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in Satish Kumar Gupta and others v. State of Haryana and others: (2017) 4 SCC 760 and Gregory Patrao v. Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd.: (2022) 10 SCC 461, it is submitted by the learned counsel, Mr. Panda for the appellants that the intending intervenor is neither necessary nor proper party to be impleaded before the LA referral court and he has no locus p. 17 standi in view of the notification dated 07.07.2010 issued under S.4(1) of the LA Act, annexed to the objection marked as Annexure-1/1. It is further submitted that Ministry of Railways is not a necessary party. Such submission of the learned counsel is on the face of the fact that the requisitioning authority is Union of India through Ministry of Railways as per the orders of the Excellency the President of India under Article 256(1) of the Constitution of India. 21. Mr. Swain, learned Additional Government Advocate referring to the judgment in Satish Kumar Gupta (supra) and Gregory Patrao (supra) submits that in view of the MoU having been subsequently executed between the Ministry of Railways and the Special Purpose Vehicle Angul-Sukinda Railways Company Limited (ASRL Ltd.), they are not necessary or proper parties in the proceeding before the LAO or the referral Court U/s.18 of the LA Act. But the learned AGA again submits that the East Coast Railway, the Project Proponent was not made a party or heard in any manner in the reference. He submits that if p. 18 the matter is restored back to the referral Court, East Coast Railway should be made a party and heard. 22. Learned Senior Counsel for the intending intervenors Mr. S.K. Dash appearing along with Mr. P. Dash, learned counsel, to substantiate his arguments relies on the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikash Parishad v. Gyan Devi: AIR 1995 SC 724: (1995) 2 SCC 326 particularly paragraphs 48 to 56 of SCC where the Supreme Court has given its conclusions. It is submitted that the facts and the issue involved in Gregory Patrao (supra) and Satish Kumar Sharma (supra) are different and distinguishable as far as their applicability to the present case is concerned. In those cases the subsequent purchaser/beneficiary of the land acquisition wanted to be parties in the LA proceeding or the reference before the Civil Court. Answering that question it was held in Satish Kumar Sharma (supra) and in Gregory Patrao (supra) that post acquisition beneficiaries p. 19 are not necessary or required to be made party in the LA proceeding or the reference. 23. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the decision of this Court rendered by a coordinate Bench in Pitambar Sahoo v. Angul-Sukinda Railway Limited : 2016(II) ILR- CUTT 212 : 2016(II) OLR 27 (Manupatra print). Referring to the said decision it is submitted that after the authoritative determination by this Court in Pitambar Sahoo (supra) it is no more res integra that Angul-Sukinda Railway Company Limited, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act is a person interested as defined U/s.3(b) of the Act and appeal/petition for intervention filed by the said Company U/s.54 of the Act or petition U/s. 50(2) of the Act read with Order I Rule 10 of the CPC is maintainable. Learned Senior Counsel relies on paragraphs-11 and 12 of Pitamber Sahoo (supra), which are quoted herein: “11. From a conjoint reading of the aforesaid terms and conditions of the agreement it is manifest that the compensation for land acquisition has to be paid by the opposite party. Neither the Ministry of p. 20 Railways nor the East Coast Railways for whose benefit the land has been acquired has shouldered any liability for the same. In view of the above, the submission of Mr. Panda to the effect that the opposite party was only a lessee under the lease agreement and has no say in the matter of determination of the compensation, cannot be accepted. The lease agreement was executed between the parties to work out the terms and conditions of the Concession Agreement. Thus, the opposite party has a right more than that of a lessee or a contractor as alleged by Mr. Panda. In view of te above, it necessitates the Court to have a close reading of the case of P.H. Harijan (supra). In the said case, the land was acquired under the poriviions of KIAD Act. The land was acquired by the State Government at the instance of KIADB under Section 28(1) of the Act, 1966. The said provision is pari materia to Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act. Section 30 of the said Act provides that the provision of L.A. Act shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of holding enquiry and to pass award determining the compensation for acquisition of land by the Deputy Commissioner. In paragraph-33 of the P.H. Harijan (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “33….. In view of the above statutory provisions of the KIAD Act, the provisions of Sections 11, 18 and 30 of the LA Act are applicable for the purpose of determination of just and reasonable compensation of the acquired land payable to the landowners either by the Deputy Commissioner or Reference Court.” 12. … … Thus, the status of the opposite party in the instant case cannot be equated with that of the lessee (M/s. Rajshree Cement) as the opposite party is under obligation liable to raise funds, p. 21 execute the project work, pay the compensation to the land owners and to execute all other things as agreed upon by it in the Concession Agreement…” [Underlined to supply emphasis] 24. Having heard in detail the learned counsel and in view of the above discussions and by applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court as well as this High Court as noted above, the petition seeking leave to intervene is allowed and disposed of. Leave granted. The petitioners shall be heard in the appeal. LAA No. 34 of 2014. 25. The LAA has been kept pending for the last 11 years. After issuance of notice, application for intervention was filed in the year 2016, which has been allowed by the above order. The intervention application was contested all through without delving into the merits of the appeal. 26. Heard learned counsel Mr. Niranjan Panda for the appellants, learned Additional Government Advocate Mr. Swain for the respondents and Mr. Dash, learned Senior Counsel for the intervenors. p. 22 The learned counsel reiterate their respective submissions as noted above. 27. Learned AGA further submits that the present respondent i.e. Special LAO has limited role. As the Land Acquisition Act provides he is an authority under the statute which undertakes the process of acquisition, at the most he can facilitate deposit and disbursal of such compensation as determined under the statute and also any amount awarded by the referral court. The compensation/enhanced amount has to be deposited by the project proponent/beneficiary with the LA authority to be disbursed to the appellants-claimants. 28. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the intervenor submits that as far as the prayer for enhancement is concerned the order passed by the referral Court shows that the contentions of the project proponent-Railway or the Special Purpose Vehicle which entered into MoU concession agreement with Ministry of Railways were not considered as they were not made parties. After the pronouncement in Pitambar Sahoo p. 23 (supra) the SPV is a person interested under Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The referral court has to hear the railway and/or the SPV for arriving at a decision whether to enhance the award. 29. In U.P. Awas Evam Vikash Parishad v. Gyan Devi: AIR 1995 SC 724: (1995) 2 SCC 326, Constitution Bench of five Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court held as quoted herein (at paragraphs-48 to 56 of SCC) : “48. Section 50(2) of the L.A. Act confers on a local authority for whom land is being acquired a right to appear in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector and the reference court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. 49. The said right carries with it the right to be given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the reference court before whom acquisition proceedings are pending on the date on which the matter of determination of compensation will be taken up. 50. The proviso to Section 50(2) only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector or by the reference court to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the L.A. Act. 51. In the event of denial of the right conferred by Section 50(2) on account of failure of the Collector to serve notice of the acquisition proceedings the local p. 24 authority can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 52. Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226. 53. The local authority is a proper party in the proceedings before the reference court and is entitled to be impleaded as a party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector and oppose enhancement of the said amount and also adduce evidence in that regard. 54. In the event of enhancement of the amount of compensation by the reference court if the Government does not file an appeal the local authority can file an appeal against the award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the court. 55. In an appeal by the person having an interest in land seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the reference court the local authority should be impleaded as a party and is entitled to be served notice of the said appeal. This would apply to an appeal in the High Court as well as in this Court. 56. Since a company for whom land is being acquired has the same right as a local authority under Section 50(2), whatever has been said with regard to a local authority would apply to a company too.” [Underlined to supply emphasis] p. 25 30. In Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neyvely : (1995) 1 SCC 221 : AIR 1995 SC 1004 a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court had the occasion to decide and lay down who can be ‘persons interested’ in terms of section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and also in the context of the sections 18, 26, 50(2) and 54 of the Act. Upon discussing the law as laid down in the earlier decisions rendered by the Supreme Court it was held (SCC-paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15) : “11. Shri Sanghi placed a strong reliance on Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corpn. [(1986) 2 SCC 343 : (1986) 1 SCR 603] The facts therein were that the award made under Section 11 was challenged in the writ petition contending that the Corporation is the affected person by determination of the compensation and without impleading it, the award made was illegal. The High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution reduced the compensation. On an appeal, this Court had held that when the acquisition was made on behalf of the Corporation, the Collector had acted as an agent on behalf of the Government. The award is only an offer. When the Government itself cannot seek a reference under Section 18, the beneficiary also cannot seek a reference. In those circumstances, it was held that the award made by the Collector could not be questioned except when the award was vitiated by fraud, corruption or collusion. The ratio is clearly consistent with the view taken by this Court p. 26 in Harish Chandra v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer [(1962) 1 SCR 676 : AIR 1961 SC 1500] . It is well settled law laid in Ezra v. Secretary of State for India in Council [ILR 32 Cal 605 : 32 IA 93 (PC)] and catena of precedents that the award made by the Collector is only an offer made on behalf of the State and that, therefore, the State is bound by the offer made by the Collector. If the owner accepts it without protest no further proceedings were required to be pursued. But if the owner received it under protest and made a valid application for reference, the amount determined by the civil court under Section 26 binds the parties and concludes the proceedings subject to appeal. In that view, there is no inconsistency with the view taken in Himalayan Tiles case [(1980) 3 SCC 223 : (1980) 3 SCR 235] with the view in Santosh Kumar case [(1986) 2 SCC 343 : (1986) 1 SCR 603] . The facts therein do not touch the controversy now in this case. Under these circumstances, the ratio in Santosh Kumar case [(1986) 2 SCC 343 : (1986) 1 SCR 603] renders little assistance to the respondents. However, the Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. case [(1971) 3 SCC 821] is not a good law. In this view it is hardly necessary to burden the order with copious citations of contra view in plethora of precedents of the High Courts. 12. It is true that Section 50(2) of the Act gives to the local authority or the company right to adduce evidence before the Collector or in the reference under Section 18 as it was specifically stated that in any proceedings held before the Collector or the Court, the local authority or the company may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. However, it has no right to seek reference. Based thereon, the contention is that the limited right of adduction of evidence for the purpose of determining the compensation does not carry with it the right to participate in the proceedings p. 27 or right to be heard or to file an appeal under Section 54. We cannot limit the operation of Section 3(b) in conjunction with sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act within a narrow compass. The right given under sub-section (2) of Section 50 is in addition to and not in substitution of or in derogation to all the incidental, logical and consequential rights flowing from the concept of fair and just procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice. The consistent thread that runs through all the decisions of this Court starting from Himalayan Tiles case [(1980) 3 SCC 223 : (1980) 3 SCR 235] is that the beneficiary, i.e., local authority or company, a cooperative society registered under the relevant State law, or statutory authority is a person interested to determine just and proper compensation for the acquired land and is an aggrieved person. It flows from it that the beneficiary has the right to be heard by the Collector or the Court. If the compensation is enhanced it is entitled to canvass its correctness by filing an appeal or defend the award of the Collector. If it is not made a party, it is entitled to seek leave of the court and file the appeal against the enhanced award and decree of the Civil Court under Section 26 or of the judgment and decree under Section 54 or is entitled to xxx xxx xxx Moreover in the language of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, in the absence of the beneficiary who ultimately is to bear the higher compensation, no complete and effectual determination of binding just and proper compensation to the acquired land would be made. So it is concomitantly a proper party if not a necessary party to the proceedings under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. The denial of the right to a person interested is in negation of fair and just procedure offending Article 14 of the Constitution. 13. The reasons are not far to seek. It is notorious that though the stakes involved are heavy, the Government plead or the instructing officer do not generally adduce, much less proper and relevant, p. 28 evidence to rebut the claims for higher compensation. Even the cross-examination will be formal, halting and ineffective. Generally, if not invariably the governmental agencies involved in the process take their own time and many a time in collusion, file the appeals after abnormal or inordinate delay. They remain insensitive even if the States (sic Stakes) involved run into several crores of public money. The courts insist upon proper explanation of every day's delay. In this attitudinal situation it would be difficult to meet strict standards to fill the unbridgeable gaps of the delay in filing the appeals and generally entails dismissal of the appeals at the threshold without adverting to the merits of the hike in the compensation. On other hand if the notice is issued to the local authority etc. it/they would participate in the award proceedings under Sections 11 and 18, adduce necessary and relevant evidence and be heard before the Collector and the court before determining compensation. For instance that without considering the evidence in the proper perspective, the court determined the compensation. 14. If there is no right of hearing or appeal given to the beneficiary and if the State does not file the appeal or if filed with delay and it was dismissed, is it not the beneficiary who undoubtedly bears the burden of the compensation, who would be the affected person? Is it not interested to see that the appellate court would reassess the evidence and fix the proper and just compensation as per law? For instance the reference court determined market value at Rs 1,00,000 while the prevailing market value of the land is only Rs 10,000. Who is to bear the burden? Suppose State appeal was dismissed due to refusal to condone the delay, is it not an unjust and illegal award? Many an instance can be multiplied. But suffice it to state that when the beneficiary for whose benefit the land is acquired is served with the notice and brought on record at the stage of enquiry p. 29 by the Collector and reference court under Section 18 or in an appeal under Section 54, it/they would be interested to defend the award under Section 11 or Section 26 or would file an appeal independently under Section 54 etc. against the enhanced compensation. As a necessary or proper party affected by the determination of higher compensation, the beneficiary must have a right to challenge the correctness of the award made by the reference court under Section 18 or in appeal under Section 54 etc. Considered from this perspective we are of the considered view that the appellant-Company is an interested person within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act and is also a proper party, if not a necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC. The High Court had committed manifest error of law in holding that the appellant is not a person interested. The orders of the High Court are accordingly set aside. 15. Since the writ petitions filed by the appellants were dismissed, we set aside the orders and direct the High Court to treat them as appeals properly filed under Section 54 of the Act and be dealt with along with the appeals filed by the State pending disposal in the High Court. In the pending references under Section 18, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, it is directed to order impleading the appellant as a party-respondent and would give reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the witness examined by the claimants and to examine witnesses on its behalf to rebut the evidence for higher compensation, the appellant is entitled to be heard in support of the determination of just and proper compensation. In this view, the need to implead the appellant as a party-respondent in the pending appeals in the High Court does not arise.” [Underlined to supply emphasis] p. 30 31. The principles enunciated in Nevely Lignite (supra) have been reiterated in the subsequent decisions as would be indicated herein. In Union of India v. Special Tehsildar (ZA) : 1996(2) SCC 332 the Supreme Court allowed the prayer of the beneficiary to be impleaded as a party in the regular First Appeals pending before the High Court following U.P. Awas Evam Vikash Parishad (supra) (paras 10 and 11 of the SCC). “10. It is an admitted case that the appeals are pending against the order passed by the subordinate court on reference having been made under Section 18 of the Act. The appellants wanted to be impleaded as a party in the said appeals. The proper and the only course which should have been adopted was to have applied to the appellate court for being impleaded as a party. Instead of doing this, writ petitions for writs of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India were filed. Presumably, it must have been contended that the appellants should have been impleaded as respondents as they were interested parties because the acquisition was being effected at their expenses and for their benefits. Further, no effective relief could, possibly, have been sought by the appellants against the respondents. What was, in fact, desired by the appellants was an order of the Court for being impleaded in the appeals which were pending before the High Court. The collateral proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not have been instituted and as already p. 31 observed, the only remedy which was available to the appellants was to apply, in the pending appeals, to be impleaded as a party by moving an appropriate interim application. The High Court unnecessarily entertained writ petitions and gave a detailed judgment on the question which, in fact, it could not consider when dealing with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This question should have been considered only if the proper application was filed in the pending appeals for being impleaded as a party. We may here observe that while dealing with merits of the case, the High Court did not have the benefit of the judgment of this Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad case [(1995) 2 SCC 326] and the other judgments referred to therein. 11. For the reason that the writ petition for being impleaded as a party in regular first appeals, which were pending, was not a proper remedy, the said writ petitions filed by the appellants have to be dismissed. Such dismissal will not be regarded as affecting the rights of the appellants in applying to the High Court by moving proper applications in the pending appeals for being impleaded as a party. Such applications may, if the appellants desire, be filed within two months and in case, the same are filed, they will be considered and disposed of by the High Court in accordance with law, keeping in view the law laid down by this Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad case [(1995) 2 SCC 326] and the other decisions which had been relied upon therein.” [Underlined to supply emphasis] 32. In Delhi Development Authority vs. Bhola Nath Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. and others : (2011) 2 SCC 54 : AIR 2011 SC 428 both U.P. Awas Evam Vikash p. 32 Parishad (supra) and Nevely (supra) were followed and applied holding that Delhi Development Authority was a person interested within meaning of S.3(b) therefore, entitled to participate in proceedings before Land Acquisition Collector as well as before High Court in the subsequent appellate proceeding when the High Court enhanced the compensation at the instance of land owners. It was observed that the High Court erred in enhancing compensation without directing the land owners to implead Delhi Development Authority to enable it to contest the case, (Paragraphs 25, 29, 32 and 42 to 44 of SCC) : “25. The definition of the expressions “local authority” and “person interested” are inclusive and not exhaustive. The difference between exhaustive and inclusive definitions has been explained in P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology [1995 Supp (2) SCC 348] in the following words : (SCC p. 356, para 19) “19. … A particular expression is often defined by the legislature by using the word ‘means’ or the word ‘includes’. Sometimes the words ‘means and includes’ are used. The use of the word ‘means’ indicates that ‘definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition’. (See Gough v. Gough [(1891) 2 QB 665 (CA)] ; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. LAA No. 34 of 2014 Page 33 of 48 Ltd. v. Labour Court [(1990) 3 SCC 682 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 71] , SCC p. 717, para 72.) The word ‘includes’ when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the clause declares that they shall include. The words ‘means and includes’, on the other hand, indicate ‘an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions’. [See Dilworth v. Commr. of Stamps [1899 AC 99 : (1895- 99) All ER Rep Ext 1576] (Lord Watson); Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P. [(1989) 1 SCC 164 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 56] , SCC p. 170, para 11.] The use of the words ‘means and includes’ in Rule 2(b) would, therefore, suggest that the definition of ‘college’ is intended to be exhaustive and not extensive and would cover only the educational institutions falling in the categories specified in Rule 2(b) and other educational institutions are not comprehended. Insofar as engineering colleges are concerned, their exclusion may be for the reason that the opening and running of the private engineering colleges are controlled through the Board of Technical Education and Training and the Director of Technical Education in accordance with the directions issued by the AICTE from time to time.” xxx xxx xxx 29. Undisputedly, DDA is an authority constituted under Section 3 of the 1957 Act for promoting and securing development of Delhi according to plan and for this purpose it has the power to acquire, hold, manage and dispose of land and other property, to carry out building, engineering, mining and other operations, to execute works in connection with supply of water and electricity, disposal of sewage, p. 34 etc. Therefore, it is clearly covered by the definition of the expression “local authority”. xxx xxx xxx 32. Section 50(2) represents statutory embodiment of one of the facets of the rules of natural justice. The object underlying this section is to afford an opportunity to the local authority or company to participate in the proceedings held before the Collector or the court for determining the amount of compensation and to show that claim made by the landowner for payment of compensation is legally untenable or unjustified. This is possible only if the Collector or the court concerned gives notice to the local authority or the company concerned. If notice is not given, the local authority or the company cannot avail the opportunity envisaged in Section 50(2) to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. Therefore, even though the plain language of that section does not, in terms, cast a duty on the Collector or the court to issue notice to the local authority or the company to appear and adduce evidence, the said requirement has to be read as implicit in the provision, else the same will become illusory. xx xx xx 42. In view of the above discussion, we hold that: (i) DDA falls within the definition of the expressions “local authority” [Section 3(aa)] and “person interested” [Section 3(b)] of the Act; (ii) DDA was entitled to participate in the proceedings held before the Land Acquisition Collector; (iii) the failure of the Land Acquisition Collector to issue notice to DDA and give an opportunity to it to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation payable to the landowners was fatal to the award passed by him; p. 35 (iv) DDA was entitled to notice and opportunity to adduce evidence before the Reference Court could enhance market value of the acquired land entitling the respondents to claim higher compensation and, as no notice or opportunity was given to DDA by the Reference Court, the judgments rendered by it are liable to be treated as nullity; (v) the Division Bench of the High Court also committed serious error by further enhancing the amount of compensation payable to the contesting respondents without requiring them to implead DDA as party-respondent so as to enable it to contest their prayer for grant of higher compensation. 43. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court as also the judgments of the Reference Court are set aside and the matters are remitted to the Reference Court for deciding the two references afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties, which shall necessarily include opportunity to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. The Reference Court shall decide the matter without being influenced by the observations contained in the judgment of the High Court and this judgment. 44. In view of the above conclusions, the cross- objections filed on behalf of the Union of India and the Land Acquisition Collector in CAs Nos. 6564 and 6565 of 2001 are disposed of as infructuous. However, as the judgments of the Reference Court and the High Court have been set aside and a direction has been given for fresh determination of the amount of compensation payable to the respondents, the Union of India and the Land Acquisition Collector shall be free to participate in the proceedings before the Reference Court.” [Underlined to supply emphasis] p. 36 33. In Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation v. Santosh Janba Warghane and another : (2019)12 SCC 650, the principles laid down in Nevely Lignite (supra) were reiterated and were applied to hold that the petitioner Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation being beneficiary of land acquisition is a necessary party and could file an appeal against award passed by reference court. The contrary decision of the High Court was reversed as the High Court had refused to grant leave to appeal to the Corporation against the award passed by the reference court. 34. The principles those have been laid by the Supreme Court, indicated and discussed above are summarized herein : (i) The right conferred by Section 50(2) of the L.A. Act, 1894 carries with it the right to be given adequate notice by the L.A. Collector as well as the reference Court before whom the acquisition proceedings are pending. (ii) The proviso to Section 50(2) only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive p. 37 the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the L.A. Collector or by the reference Court to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the L.A. Act. (iii) Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226. (iv) The local authority is entitled to be impleaded as a party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the L.A. Collector and oppose enhancement of the said amount and also adduce evidence in that regard. (v) In the event of enhancement of amount of compensation by the reference Court if the Government does not file an appeal the local authority can file an appeal, against the award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the Court. LAA No. 34 of 2014 Page 38 of 48 (vi) In an appeal in the High Court as well as in the Supreme Court filed by a person having an interest in land seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the reference Court the local authority should be impleaded as a party and is entitled to be served notice of the said appeal. (vii) A Company for whom land is being acquired has the same right as a local authority under Section 50(2) the principles applicable to a local authority as noted above would also apply to a Company. (viii) The operation of Section 3(b) in conjunction with sub-section(2) of Section 50 of the L.A. Act cannot be limited within a narrow compass. The right given under sub-section (2) of Section 50 is in addition to and not in substitution of or in derogation to all the incidental, logical and consequential rights flowing from the concept of fair and just procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice. (ix) The beneficiary who undoubtedly bears the burden of compensation is an interested person within the p. 39 meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act and is also a proper party if not a necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC. It would be error of law if it is held that a beneficiary Company is not a person interested. (x) The definition of expression “local authority” and “person interested” are inclusive and not exhaustive. Inclusive definition used in a statute enlarge the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the clause declares they shall include. (xi) Denial of the right to be impleaded as a party and to be heard a person interested is in negation of fair and just procedure offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (xii) Section 50(2) represents statutory embodiment of one of the facets of the rules of natural justice. The object underlying this section is to afford an opportunity to the local authority or company to participate in the p. 40 proceedings held before the L.A. Collector or the court for determining the amount of compensation and to show that claim made by the landowner for payment of compensation is legally untenable or unjustified. 35. The intervenors rely on the decision rendered by a coordinate Bench in Pitambar Sahoo v. Angul-Sukinda Railway Limited : 2016 (2) ILR Cut. 212, 2016(II) OLR 27, wherein the coordinate Bench dealt with in extenso the memorandum of understanding/concession agreement in extenso to hold that by the agreement entered between the East coast Railway and the intervenors was liable to indemnify all actions, suits, claims, demands and proceedings, it was held that the one who is under obligation or liable to indemnify against all actions, suits, claims, demands and proceedings has a right to be heard in it which has become more expedient when neither Ministry of Railway, Govt. of India nor the East coast Railways have been impleaded as a party to the reference. The decision of the coordinate Bench has p. 41 attained finality as it has not been challenged/altered by any subsequent decision. Therefore, this Court is not required to go again into the said issues as in the elaborate order the coordinate Bench considered the MoU/concession agreement entered into between the Railways and the petitioner-Company the scope and interpretation of various clauses of the MoU/agreement and also the fact remains that Pitambar Sahoo (supra) has dealt with the self-same land acquisition process i.e. the notification for acquisition of land U/s.4(1) of the LA. Act, 1894 vide Notification No.26720 dated 07.07.2010 for acquisition of land of the Angul-Duburi-Sukinda New B.G. Rail Link Project for East Coast Railways. 36. The reliance of the appellants on Gregory Patrao v. Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd.: (2022) 10 SCC 461 is of no avail. In Gregory Patrao (supra) it was held that the allottee of land by the beneficiary for whom the land was acquired cannot be a person interested. In the case at hand Eastcoast Railway and/or p. 42 the Angul-Sukinda Railway Company are themselves the beneficiaries/project proponents. They are not subsequent allottees of the land that was acquired. 37. In the present case East coast Railway and/or the Angul-Sukinda Railway Company are the project proponents/beneficiary. To oppose the participation of the Company in the proceeding before the referral Court only argument made by the appellant is that Angul-Sukinda Railway Company entered into a memorandum of understanding with the East coast Railway regarding execution of the project. It is not the case of the appellants that Angul-Sukinda Railway Company and/or East Coast Railway are post-acquisition allottee of land to apply the principle of Gregory Patrao (supra). 38. In considered view of this Court the argument of the appellants to apply Gregory Patrao (supra) or Satish Kumar Gupta and others v. State of Haryana and others: (2017) 4 SCC 760 fails in view of the fact that East coast Railway and/or Angul-Sukinda Railway Company are not post acquisition allottees of land. They p. 43 are the immediate beneficiaries of land acquisition. They are the project proponents/requisitioning authority. Significantly, it has also to be noted that the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned AGA for the Special LAO did not point out how by impleading the project proponent East Coast Railway and/or the S.A. Rly Company (ASLR Ltd) the appellants-land losers or the Special Land Acquisition Officer would have been prejudiced/will be prejudiced in any manner in the proceeding before the Court below. The stand taken by the State representing the Special LAO opposing participation by the Railway/S.A. Rly. Company defies logic, as a Special LAO can not have any interest apart from disbursing the amount of compensation determined or enhanced to be paid as compensation. 39. It has to be noticed that U.P. Awas Evam Vikash Parishad (supra) is a constitution Bench decision rendered by five Hon’ble Judges and Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. (supra) rendered by three Hon’ble p. 44 Judge, still hold the field. The decisions in Gregory Patrao and Satish Kumar Gupta (supra) rendered by Bench of two Hon’ble Judges did not differ from earlier decisions of the constitution Bench or three Judge Bench and only held that earlier decisions are not applicable to post acquisition allottees. It has also to be noticed that the coordinate Bench in Pitambar Sahoo (supra) has applied the principles laid in U.P. Awas Evam Vikash Parishad (supra), Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. (supra) and also considered Gregory Patrao(supra) and Satish Kumar Gupta (supra). Learned AGA though argued regarding applicability of Gregory Patrao(supra) but it was also not disputed that East coast Railway being the beneficiary/project proponent/requisitioning authority was not made a party before the referral court under section 18 of the L.A. Act. 40. As a result of the above discussions the award dated 05.08.2014 in L.A. Misc. Case No.125 of 2013 decided by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), p. 45 Kamakhyanagar is set aside and quashed. The L.A. Misc. Case No. 125 of 2013 is restored to file for adjudication afresh. The parties in the present case i.e. the appellants and the intervenors shall appear before the learned court of jurisdiction i.e. the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kamakhyanagar or any other court that could be assigned the matter. The learned Court shall act upon production of the website copy of this order. 41. The intervenors shall file application for impletion as necessary party before the learned court that would be in seisin of the matter. The learned Court shall allow application to enable the intervener to participate in the proceeding. The appellants can appear through their learned counsel immediately on restoration. As the matter is remanded to the learned referral court for adjudication afresh the Court shall afford an opportunity to the intervenor and/or the railways to file their written statement regarding enhancement of the p. 46 award and shall also allow them to adduce evidence and produce witness in accordance with law. 42. The learned court shall also issue notice to the present appellants if they do not appear. The learned Senior Counsel for intervener refers to the Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC to submit that date may be fixed before the learned court below. It is directed the parties shall appear before the court on 01.07.2025. The court shall fix a date for further hearing of the matter. The matter shall proceed on each date without granting any unnecessary adjournments. It is also directed that all the parties i.e. appellants, intervenors, SPV and Railway shall cooperate in the proceeding in achieving an early disposal. 43. It is submitted by Mr. Panda that the amount as directed to be enhanced in the judgment dated 04.07.2014 has been deposited by the railways on 29.06.2015. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the intervenors disputes the same. He brings to the notice of this Court p. 47 that the said fact is not on record as part of the pleadings in the appeal nor indicated in the affidavit dated 30.09.2022 filed by the appellants. In such view of the matter it can not be held that the Railways have deposited any amount towards the enhancement of award. However, as alleged, if at all any amount towards enhanced compensation has been deposited, the necessary legal consequences shall follow. In such scenario the learned of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kamakhyanagar/the learned Court that would take up the L.A. would do the needful in accordance with law, as would be expedient, just and proper. 44. It is further clarified that no part of this judgment and order remanding the matter for adjudication upon participation of all the parties shall be treated in any manner to be expression of any opinion on the merits of the respective claims and contentions of the parties. p. 48 45. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with the aforesaid directions. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. (M.S. Sahoo) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 5th May, 2025/dutta