1 2025:CGHC:38182 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 419 of 2002 1 - (Deleted ) Dhansai (Died Through Lrs) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 12-03-2025 1.1 - Sonmati Wd/ Late Sukhdev Das Aged About 55 Years R/o Bandhanpur Tehsil Pathalgaon District Jashpur (C.G.) 1.2 - Bikesh Kumar Ekka S/o Late Sukhdev Das Aged About 27 Years R/o Bandhanpur Tehsil Pathalgaon District Jashpur (C.G.) 1.3 - Premkumar S/o Late Ratturam Aged About 48 Years R/o Bandhanpur Tehsil Pathalgaon District Jashpur (C.G.) 1.4 - Ishwar S/o Late Ratturam Aged About 40 Years R/o Bandhanpur Tehsil Pathalgaon District Jashpur (C.G.) 1.5 - Bhima S/o Late Ratturam Aged About 35 Years R/o Bandhanpur Tehsil Pathalgaon District Jashpur (C.G.) ... Appellants versus 1 - (Deleted ) Bijal (Died Through Lrs) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 12- 03-2025 1.1 - Raimon Wd/o Late Bijal Aged About 65 Years R/o Bandhanpur Tehsil Pathalgaon District - Jahspur (C.G.) 1.2 - Kunu S/o Late Bijal Aged About 45 Years R/o Bandhanpur Tehsil Pathalgaon District - Jahspur (C.G.) ... Respondents For Appellants : Mr. Shobhit Koshta, Advocate For Respondents : Mr. Arun Kumar Shukla, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment On Board 2 01-08-2025 1) Appellants have preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of CPC against the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Raigarh, in Unregistered First Appeal (Civil) dated 04.10.2002, whereby the application moved by the appellants/defendants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was rejected and the appeal was dismissed. 2) This appeal was admitted for hearing by this Court vide order dated 21.02.2014 on the following substantial question of law:- “Whether the first appellate Court is justified in dismissing the first appeal filed by the appellant/defendant as barred by limitation by recording a perverse finding?” 3) Facts of the present case are that the original plaintiff filed a suit for ownership inter alia on the ground that he belongs to the “Uraon” caste and is a tribal person governed by the Hindu law. It was pleaded that the suit property was the ancestral property, and he claimed a half share of it. Defendants filed a written statement, and the learned Trial Court framed issues and, after appreciating the material placed on record, decreed the suit. Appellants/defendants preferred a first appeal before the learned District Judge, Raigarh, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 93 days. In the application, the defendants stated that they had been proceeded ex parte before the Trial Court and the judgment was passed on 31.07.2001. It was further stated that when they received the execution notice from the concerned Tehsildar, they approached their counsel, collected documents and preferred the first appeal. 4) Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants submits that the delay 3 was properly explained by the appellants before the learned appellate Court, and an affidavit was also filed in support of the said application. He further submits that the learned appellate Court ought to have condoned the delay. He has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Co-ordinate Bench in the matter of Ramdayal Sahu Versus Dashmat Bai reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Chh 2239. 5) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents/plaintiffs would oppose. He submits that there was an inordinate delay of 93 days in filing the appeal, and the period of delay was not properly explained; therefore, the application moved by the appellants was rightly rejected. 6) Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7) Perusal of the order passed by the learned appellate Court would show that the appellants/defendants were proceeded ex parte on 24.07.2001, and thereafter, the judgment and decree were passed by the learned Trial Court on 31.07.2001. It is further observed that the appellants failed to file an affidavit of their counsel, namely L.N. Dewangan, to substantiate their contention, and finally, the learned Appellate Court rejected the application for condonation of delay. 8) In the matter of Ramdayal Sahu (supra), the Co-ordinate Bench held as under:- 10. The Supreme Court in the matter of Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer held that sufficient cause means a cause for which a party could not be blamed for his absence. A party should not have acted with negligence or lack of bona fides. Degree of proof is less in case of good cause whereas it is higher in case of sufficient cause. 11. In the matter of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that if the party who has applied for extension of period shows that the delay was due to any of the facts mentioned in the 4 explanation that would be treated as sufficient cause, and after it is treated as sufficient cause, the question may then arise whether discretion should be exercised in favour of the party or not. 12. Likewise, in the matter of Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, the Supreme Court has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act gives the courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. 13. In the matter of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, the Supreme Court has held that the legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. In paragraph 3 of the report it has been held as under: - The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 5 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. …" 14. Thereafter, in the matter of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that there is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. The words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Reiterating the principles of law laid down in Shakuntala Devi Jain (supra) and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, their Lordships observed as under: - "9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter 6 when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (supra) and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality (supra). 7 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 15. Thereafter, in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. It has been observed as under: - "11. ... The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. …" 16. In the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the guidelines summarising the obligation of the court while dealing with application for condonation of delay and approach to be adopted while considering grounds for condonation, which are as under: - "21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing 8 with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 9 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 17. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters." 18. Thereafter, in the matter of Manoharan v. Sivarajan and others, the Supreme Court followed the principle of law laid down in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra). 19. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions would show that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly indicated that a liberal approach in considering the 10 application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has to be adopted and appeal has to be decided on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. "Sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice especially when the delay is not deliberate and outcome of mala fide. 9) Taking into consideration the facts of the present case, the reasons assigned in the application for condonation of delay and the law laid down by the Co-ordinate Bench in the matter of Ramdayal Sahu (supra), the order passed by the learned first appellate Court is not sustainable in the eyes of the law and is hereby set aside. 10) In view of the above, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellants, and this second appeal stands allowed. The delay caused in filing the first appeal is hereby condoned, and the first appeal is restored to its original number. 11) Parties are directed to appear before the appropriate first appellate Court on the 28th August, 2025. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE Ajinkya Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2025.08.04 14:28:53 +0530