1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 85 of 2024 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station-Tumgaon, District- Mahasamund (Cg) ... Appellant versus 1 - Arvind Prahare S/o Shri Late Ramlal Prahare, Aged About 35 Years R/o Ward No. 12, Pitiyajhar, Thana And District-Mahasamund (Cg) 2 - Mahendra Jain S/o Shri Shantilal Jain, Aged About 38 Years R/o College Road, Clubpara, Ward No. 20, Thana And District - Mahasamund (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. HAPS Bhatia, PL For Respondent(s) : None Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput Judgment on Board 25.08.2025 1. This appeal under section 14 (A) (1) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 (for short ‘SC/ST Act’) has been filed by the appellant/State against the judgment dated 12.05.2023 passed by the learned court of Special Judge (SC/ST), Mahasamund (CG) in Special (Atrocities) (for short ‘trial Court’) in Criminal Case No. H-03/2020, whereby the respondents have been acquitted from the charge punishable under Sections 354, 332, 186 and 294 of the Indian Panel Code, 1860 (for short IPC) and also under Section 3 (1) (xi) of the SC/ST Act. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 19.11.2014, while the prosecutrix, a Women Constable posted at the Prevention of Human Trafficking Unit, was on duty at Sirpur for maintaining law and order during the visit of M.L.A. Dr. Vimal Chopra, she was allegedly manhandled, assaulted, and abused by the respondents, including caste-related abuse. On her written complaint dated 20.11.2014, an FIR HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Digitally signed by HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Date: 2025.09.12 17:55:22 +0530 2 was registered, investigation was conducted, and charge sheet was filed against the respondents for offences under Sections 354, 332, 186, 294 of the IPC and Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST Act. 3. During trial, the prosecution examined eight witnesses. However, upon appreciation of evidence, the trial court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly acquitted the respondents by judgment dated 12.05.2023. 4. On due appreciation, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused (respondents herein) on the aforesaid offences. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned Trial Court has erred in not appreciating the evidence in its proper perspective and has recorded an acquittal on technical grounds. The evidence of the prosecutrix and other witnesses clearly establishes that the respondents attempted to outrage her modesty, obstructed her in discharge of official duty, and further, respondent No. 2 abused her in public with reference to her caste, despite knowing that she belongs to the Scheduled Caste community. He submits that that the Trial Court failed to consider that defective investigation does not by itself justify acquittal when substantive evidence is available. The prosecution witnesses consistently supported the case both in examination-in-chief and cross-examination, and their testimonies were wrongly discarded. He further submits that the impugned judgment suffers from misappreciation of evidence, is perverse, and ignores the gravity of the offence and the conduct of the respondents. Therefore, the order of acquittal dated 12.05.2023 is illegal, unsustainable, and liable to be set aside. 6. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the documents on record. 7. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 10 SCC 461 observed that an appellate Court entertaining an appeal from the judgment of acquittal by the trial Court though entitled to re-appreciate the 3 evidence and come to an independent conclusion, it should not do so as a matter of routine. It has been held in paragraph 9 as under - “Before concluding, we would like to point out that this Court in a number of cases has held that an Appellate Court entertaining an appeal from the judgment of acquittal by the trial court though entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and come to an independent conclusion, it should not do so as a matter of routine. In other words, if from the same set of evidence two views are possible and if the trial court has taken one view on the said evidence, unless the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the trial court is either perverse or such that no reasonable person could come to that conclusion or that such a finding of the trial court is not based on any material on record, it should not merely because another conclusion is possible reverse the finding of the trial court. [See : M/s. Mohanlal Hargovind Dass vs. Ram Narain & Ors. (1979 (3) SCC 279), State of Punjab vs. Balraj Singh alias Chhajju (1978 (3) SCC 129), State of Maharashtra vs. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar (1981 (3) SCC 199) and Ram Kumar Pandey vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975 (3) SCC 815)]. In the instant case also we find that the trial court had taken a view which the High Court has not held to be either perverse, unreasonable or a finding which is not based on evidence, still on re-appreciation of the evidence, the High Court came to a different conclusion which on facts of this case and on the basis of the ratio of the law laid down by this Court in the above cited cases cannot be sustained.” 8. In the case of M.C.Ali and anr. v. State of Kerala, (2010) 4 SCC 573, it has been observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal and placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 in which it has been held as under - 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; 4 (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 9. Learned trial Court has meticulously discussed the evidence available on record in respect of all the offences which has been charged against the respondents and after analysis of the evidence of the witnesses, in paragraphs 60 & 61 gave following finding:- “60. From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the prosecution evidence does not satisfactorily establish that the accused persons used criminal force upon the prosecutrix with the intent to outrage her modesty; that the prosecutrix, being a public servant discharging her official duties, was voluntarily assaulted to deter her from performing such duties; that obstruction was caused in the lawful discharge of her duty; or that the prosecutrix was abused with obscene language in a public place. Further, it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused Mahendra Jain, not being a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, used criminal force upon the prosecutrix, a woman belonging to the Scheduled Caste community, with intent to outrage her modesty. The prosecution evidence thus does not provide 5 conclusive and cogent proof of the offences alleged against the accused. On the contrary, the defence has successfully established a reasonable probability giving rise to doubt. Consequently, issues No. 2 to 5 are answered in the negative as “not proved.” 61. In view of the above, it stands that the charges under Sections 354, 332, 186, and 294 of the Indian Penal Code against accused Arvind Prahre and Mahendra Jain, as well as the charge under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (as amended by Act No. 01 of 2016) against accused Mahendra Jain, have not been proved. Accordingly, the accused persons Arvind Prahre and Mahendra Jain are acquitted of the said charges.” 10. The question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court warrants any interference by this Court. 11. Upon due consideration of the evidence on record and the reasons assigned by the learned Trial Court, this Court finds no illegality or perversity in the acquittal of the respondents. The prosecution evidence, being inconsistent and lacking cogency, fails to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents used criminal force with intent to outrage the modesty of the prosecutrix, obstructed her in discharge of official duty, or abused her by referring to her caste. The Trial Court has rightly extended the benefit of doubt, and this Court finds no ground to interfere. Accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed and the judgment of acquittal is affirmed. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge H.Ansari