1 KSR, J & SRS, J Crl.A.No.712 of 2018 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI WEDNESDAY, THIS THE THIRD DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE SPECIAL DIVISION BENCH PRESENT HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SURESH REDDY And HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI CRIMINAL APPEAL No.712 of 2018 JUDGMENT: (per Justice K.Suresh Reddy) Sole accused in S.C.No.139 of 2015 on the file of the Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chittoor is the appellant. He was tried and convicted by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chittoor under Section 302 IPC and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for ‘LIFE’ and also to pay a fine of Rs.500/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one month. 2. Gravamen of the charge is that, on the intervening night of 24/25.11.2014 at about 12.30 a.m, the accused beat his wife by name S.Shahanaz @ Shanu (hereinafter referred to as deceased) and poured kerosene on her body and set fire to her in his house bearing door No.15- 1655, Laloo garden, Chittoor causing her death, thereby committed offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. 3. Case of the prosecution as emanated from the evidence of prosecution witnesses, briefly, is as follows: 2 KSR, J & SRS, J Crl.A.No.712 of 2018 i) The accused and the material prosecution witnesses are residents of Chittoor Town. The deceased was none other than the wife of the accused. P.Ws 1 and 2 are brothers, P.Ws 3 and 4 are daughters of the deceased respectively. P.Ws 5 to 7 are the neighbours of the accused and deceased. P.Ws 8 and 9 are the relatives and P.W.10 is the friend of the deceased. ii) The marriage between the accused and the deceased was performed in the year 1999 and it was a love marriage. The couple blessed with three daughters P.Ws 3 and 4 and another. The accused initially used to work as lorry escort in Amararaja factory. iii) The accused used to consume alcohol regularly and harassing the deceased. While so on the intervening night of 24/25.11.2014, the accused came in a drunken state. At that juncture, there was a quarrel between the accused and the deceased. During the said quarrel, the accused poured kerosene and set fire to her with a match stick. Unable to bear the burns, the deceased raised hue and cry. Immediately, the accused poured water on the deceased and put off the flames. On hearing the cries of the deceased, their children woke up and informed the same to P.Ws 1 and 2. Then P.Ws 1 and 2 came there and the injured was shifted to Government Hospital, Chittoor. iv) P.W.21 Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government Hospital, Chittoor admitted the injured in burns ward and provided treatment. He sent an intimation Ex.P.19 to the learned Magistrate for recording statement of the deceased. Having received Ex.P.19 intimation, P.W.18 IV Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Chittoor went to the hospital at about 02.05 a.m. 3 KSR, J & SRS, J Crl.A.No.712 of 2018 and recorded a statement Ex.P.22 from the injured. P.W.21 endorsed on Ex.P.22 about the state of mind of the deceased. Said endorsement was marked as Ex.P.20. v) On the same day, P.W.21 sent another intimation Ex.P.23 to the police. P.W.19 Sub Inspector of Police, Chittoor I Town Police Station, having received intimation Ex.P.23, went to the hospital and recorded a statement Ex.P.24 from the injured. He returned to the police station and registered a case in Cr.No.158/2014 under Section 307 IPC on the basis of Ex.P.24. vi) On 25.11.2014 at about 8.30 a.m., P.W.19 visited the Government Hospital and recorded statements of P.Ws 1 to 4. Thereafter, he proceeded to the scene of offence and prepared a rough sketch Ex.P.27 at the scene of offence. He seized M.Os 1 to 3 at the scene of offence under Ex.P.26 in the presence of P.Ws 14 and 15. He recorded statements of P.Ws 5 to 7. vii) On 02.12.2014, he arrested the accused near the District Court compound in the presence of P.W.16 and another who was remanded to judicial custody. While undergoing treatment, the deceased succumbed to injuries on 04.12.2014. P.W.19 received information through P.W.1 on 05.12.2014 about the death of the deceased. Having received the information from P.W.1, he altered the F.I.R from Section 307 to 302 IPC and altered F.I.R is marked as Ex.P.28. Further investigation was taken over by the Inspector of Police P.W.20. viii) On 05.12.2014, P.W.20 visited the Government Hospital at about 12.50 p.m. He held inquest over the dead body in the presence of P.Ws 11 to 4 KSR, J & SRS, J Crl.A.No.712 of 2018 13. Inquest report is marked as Ex.P.32. He sent the dead body for postmortem examination. ix) P.W.17 Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government Headquarters Hospital, Chittoor conducted autopsy over the dead body. He opined the cause of death was due to burns leading to septicemia shock and death. He issued postmortem certificate Ex.P.18. After completion of investigation, the successor of P.W.20 filed charge sheet. 4. In support of its case, the prosecution examined P.Ws 1 to 21, marked Ex.P.1 to P.22 and exhibited M.Os 1 to 3. When the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he denied the incriminating material appearing against him. Relying on Exs.P.22, P.24 and P.31 dying declarations, learned Sessions Judge convicted the accused as aforesaid. 5. Heard Sri G.Vijaya Saradhi, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Marri Venkata Ramana, learned Additional Public Prosecutor. We have carefully perused and analyzed the entire evidence on record. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contends that P.Ws 1 to 4 in their evidence have stated that the deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene. He further contends that in the dying declaration Ex.P.22, the deceased has stated the time of pouring kerosene at about 9.30 p.m. on 24.11.2014. Whereas according to Ex.P.24 and P.31 dying declarations, the incident took place at about 12.30 a.m. on the intervening night of 24/25.11.2014. He further contends that there are number of inconsistencies in Exs.P.22, P.24 and P.31 and, as such, no reliance can be placed on those 5 KSR, J & SRS, J Crl.A.No.712 of 2018 dying declarations as they were not corroborated by any other evidence. He further contends that all the material prosecution witnesses and also all the witnesses examined for the inquest, arrest and observation reports did not support the prosecution and they were declared as hostile. As such learned counsel states that there is no legal evidence to connect the accused with the alleged offence prays to allow the Criminal Appeal by setting aside the Judgment of the learned Sessions Judge. 7. On the other hand Sri Marri Venkata Ramana, learned Additional Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the Appeal contending that though P.Ws 1 to 16 did not support the prosecution, the dying declarations Exs.P.22, P.24 and P.31 are reliable. He further contends that the dying declarations can also form sole basis for convicting the accused. Of course, if the said dying declarations inspire confidence of the Court, it can be taken as sole basis for convicting the accused. 8. He further contended that in Ex.P.22, the deceased has categorically narrated the incident. In Ex.P.22, the deceased has stated that the accused was addicted to consuming alcohol and also having extra marital relationship with other women. She also stated that the accused did not take care of her and her children. It is further stated in Ex.P.22 that when she questioned the accused as to why he is consuming liquor regularly, he poured kerosene on her and set fire to her. When she raised cries, the accused poured water and put off the flames. Thereafter she was shifted to hospital. The same version has been spoken to by her in the other two dying declarations Exs.P.24 and 6 KSR, J & SRS, J Crl.A.No.712 of 2018 P.31. As such, Exs.P.22, P.24 and P.31 can be relied and sought to dismiss the appeal by confirming the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. 9. We have carefully analyzed the three dying declarations Exs.P.22, P.24 and P.31. As already pointed out all the witnesses P.Ws 1 to 16 did not support the prosecution. There remain the only evidence of Doctors, Investigating officers and the Judicial Officer i.e. P.W.17 to P.W.21. 10. To brief its case, the prosecution has mainly relying on the dying declaration Ex.P.22 recorded by the learned Magistrate P.W.18. P.W.18 in his evidence has categorically stated that he went to the hospital at about 2.00 a.m. on 25.11.2014 and recorded Ex.P.22 dying declaration from her. P.W.18 in his evidence further stated that the patient was conscious and coherent while recording the statement. He further stated that he has also taken endorsement Ex.P.20 and P.21 from the Doctor P.W.21. 11. P.W.19 one of the investigating officer also stated in his evidence that on 25.11.2014, having received intimation Ex.P.23, went to the hospital and recorded statement Ex.P.24 at about 8.30 a.m. He further states in his evidence that on the same date at about 12.30 p.m once again she went to the hospital and recorded another dying declaration Ex.P.31 from the injured. In all these dying declarations, the version spoken to by the deceased was consistent except with regard to the time in Ex.P.22. The time mentioned in Ex.P.22 as 9.30 p.m. is may be due to mistake or as she was suffering from severe burns. Admittedly by 9.30 p.m. nothing has happened and the 7 KSR, J & SRS, J Crl.A.No.712 of 2018 accused was not even present in the house. As such the same may be a mistake in mentioning the time as 9.30 p.m. Except that mistake, all the three dying declarations are consistent and they are inspiring confidence of the court particularly Ex.P.22. As such we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the accused is responsible for the burns of the deceased. 12. Coming to the nature of the offence, admittedly even according to the dying declaration, the accused poured kerosene and set fire to the deceased. In all the three dying declarations, the deceased has specifically stated that immediately accused poured water and put off the flames. As such, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination be said that the accused was having intention to kill the deceased. 13. Further even according to the dying declarations, incident is preceded by a quarrel between the accused and the deceased. Further according to the Doctor P.W.17 who conducted postmortem, the cause of death was due to burns leading to septicemia shock and death. As such the burns are not direct cause for death of the deceased. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on a decision reported in between Maniben vs. State of Gujarat1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said Judgment held as follows: The dying declaration of the deceased, which is produced by Mr. Trivedi, Executive Magistrate, at Exhibit 15 indicates that while deceased was returning home after fetching water, the appellant had set her terylene clothes on fire by means of a burning wick of rags. The factum of recording of the FIR as also the 1 (2009) 8 Supreme Court Cases 796 8 KSR, J & SRS, J Crl.A.No.712 of 2018 dying declaration is also not disputed. As per the Judgment and Order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Gondal, the appellant/accused was taken into custody on 15.6.1985 to undergo the sentence and was released on 07.09.1989 on expiry of the sentence. The post-mortem report of the deceased was placed on record during the trial and Dr. Tarlikaben, who conducted the post-mortem examination was also examined as a witness in the trial. The said documentary and oral evidence of the doctor, as adduced, that he also treated the patient and conducted the post-mortem examination made it crystal clear that the deceased remained under treatment in hospital for 8 days and died after 8 days of the incident in question. The deceased was admitted in the hospital with about 60% burn injuries and during the course of treatment developed septicemia, which was the main cause of death of the deceased. It is, therefore, established that during the aforesaid period of 8 days the injuries aggravated and worsened to the extent that it led to ripening of the injuries and the deceased died due to poisonous effect of the injuries. We find that the view taken by the trial court was a cogent and plausible view and, therefore, we hold that the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court is justified. Considering the totality of the circumstances and the fact that the appellant is of 85 years of age and had undergone the sentence imposed by the trial court under the provisions of Section 304 Part II of IPC, we set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant imposed by the High Court of Gujarat and restore the judgment and order passed by the trial court. Since the appellant has already undergone the sentence imposed by the trial court she shall not be re- arrested unless required in connection with any other case. Bail bonds shall stand discharged. This shall not be the precedent for other cases.” 15. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied on another decision of this Court in between Chilaparthi Veerraju Wg. Dt and others vs. State of A.P. represented by P.P.2 . It was held in the above judgment as follows: “When a case with similar set of facts came up for consideration before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Maniben v. State of Gujarat (1st supra), the Court held as under: 2 2025 SCC OnLine AP 1964 9 KSR, J & SRS, J Crl.A.No.712 of 2018 “14. …From the aforesaid evidence on record it cannot be said that the appellant had the intention that such action on her part would cause the death or such bodily injury to the deceased, which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the case cannot be said to be covered under clause (4) of Section 300 of IPC. We are, however, of the considered opinion that the case of the appellant is covered under Section 304 Part II of IPC.” In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the Terylene clothes of the deceased were set on fire by means of a burning wick of rags. The deceased remained under treatment in hospital for eight days and died thereafter. She had sustained about 60% burn injuries and also developed septicemia, which was the main cause of death. The evidence on record proved that the action of the accused in throwing the burning wick was preceded by a quarrel between the deceased and the accused. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that it could not be said that the accused had the intention to cause death or such bodily injury to the deceased which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Supreme Court therefore opined that the case could not be said to be covered under clause 4 of Section 300 IPC. The conviction was accordingly reduced to one under Section 304 Part II IPC. The Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in “Girigowda @ Doddagirigowda, S/o.Thimmegowda Vs. State of Karnataka” dealt with a case where the death was due to Septicemia, as a result of burn injuries sustained by the injured. It was a case where the deceased sustained 42% – 44% burn injuries. While dealing with the said aspect, the Court held that death is not a direct consequence of the act of the accused; that PW17 has given his opinion that the death was due to Septicemia as a result of poisoning and inhaling of the smoke, which has entered into the lungs and heart of the deceased. Therefore, it is submitted by him that offence does not fall under Section 302 or Section 304 of IPC and it falls under Section 326 IPC, since the death is not the direct consequence of the act of the accused.” 16. In the case on hand also, the cause of death of the deceased was mainly due to septicemia i.e. infection of the wounds. If only proper treatment was given, deceased might have survived. As the burns are not direct cause for the death of the deceased and as the accused himself put off 10 KSR, J & SRS, J Crl.A.No.712 of 2018 the flames by pouring kerosene and as the deceased survived for ten (10) days, the offence committed by the appellant would fall squarely under Section 304 Part II IPC. The appellant has already served nearly six (06) years of imprisonment. In view of the same, we are inclined to allow the appeal in part. 17. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed in part. The conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chittoor in S.C.No.139 of 2015 under Sections 302 IPC, is hereby set aside. Instead, the appellant/accused is convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced to the period already undergone by him while maintaining the fine amount. As the appellant was granted bail by this Court vide I.A.No.01 of 2023 on 08.5.2023 in terms of Batchu Rangarao & Others v. State of A.P3, the appellant/accused herein is directed to surrender before the trial Court and complete the formalities. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed. ________________________ JUSTICE K.SURESH REDDY ___________________________ JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI Date: 03.9.2025 RD 3 {2016(3) ALT (Criminal) 505 (AP)} 11 KSR, J & SRS, J Crl.A.No.712 of 2018 HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SURESH REDDY And HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI CRIMINAL APPEAL No.712 of 2018 (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice K.Suresh Reddy) Date: 03.9.2025 RD