1/6 2025:CGHC:11960 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR REVP No. 46 of 2025 1 - Laxminarayan Gayakwad S/o Setram Gayakwad Aged About 31 Years Category - Sc, R/o. Village - Lacchanpur, Post - Bitkuli, Tehsil - Bhatapara, Thana - Karhi Bazar, District - Balodabazar - Bhatapara Chhattisgarh. Presently Posted As Constable. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Home, Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya, P.S. And Post - Rakhi, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Director, Director General Of Police (D.G.P.), Police Head Quarter (P.H.Q.) Sector-19, Ps. And Post - Rakhi, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 3 - Chhattisgarh Professional Examination Board (Vyapam), Through Secretary, Vyapam Bhavan, North Block, Sector -19, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents For Petitioners : Mr. Shyam Kumar, Advocates For Respondent : Dr. Saurabh Pandey, Dy. Advocate General and Mr. Sanjeev Pandey, Dy. Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas Order on Board 11.03.2025 1. The default pointed out by the Registry is overruled. 2. The petitioner has filed the present review petition under Order Section 114 of Civil Procedure Code being aggrieved by the KISHORE KUMAR DESHMUKH Digitally signed by KISHORE KUMAR DESHMUKH Date: 2025.03.11 16:37:13 +0530 2/6 impugned order dated 20.05.2024 (Annexure - P/1) passed in WP(S) No. 3393 of 2023 for review of the order. 3. The Petitioner in review petition has contended that out of total 975 posts advertised by the State female candidates could have applied for 728 posts only as the post of Platoon Commander was exclusively reserved for male candidates and 30% of posts reserved for female candidates is 218.40, as such only 4368 female candidates should have been selected for appearing in the mains examination whereas after the order passed by this Court on 20.05.2024 the respondents have initiated the proceedings wherein they have called upon the candidates of ex-servicemen for second stage of final selection process. 4. The learned counsel for the State opposing the submissions would submit that the respondent State in pursuance of direction given in the order dated 20.05.2024 by this Court have initiated the proceedings and would submit that after following the reservation roster as well as reservation given to the ex-servicemen and have called the 370 male candidates who will find place next below the list of candidates who have been called for second stage of selection process and their physical proficiency test and interview has been conducted, and results of the selected candidates are to be issued in final stage. It has been further contended that in the garb of clarification of the order, they are attempting a new case and if any irregularity has been committed then it is for challenge before the appropriate forum. It has been further submitted that since this Court in its order has directed for additional 370 male 3/6 candidates in the original candidates i.e 4755+370 which comes to 5125. Accordingly, after adding these 370 posts, 20 posts have to be increased for ex-servicemen to maintain the quota of reservation provides for ex-servicemen as per the rules, thus, they have followed the due process of law and no illegality or irregularity from the face of the record has been committed by them to recall or review the order. Thus, no ground for review is made out by the petitioner and would pray for rejection of review petition with cost. 5. Considering the submissions that since reservation for woman candidates in Platoon Commander post has been quashed by this Court the post will be filled up by male candidates and it will be proportionately distributed among the various categories including the ex-servicemen, therefore, there is no apparent mistake on the face of the record which has necessitated this Court to recall or review the order. Even otherwise, law with regard to review and its ground for review has been well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of S. Tirupathi Rao vs. M. Lingamaiah decided on 22.07.2024 reported in MANU/SC/0727/2024 in paragraphs 11 to 17, 20 and 21 has held as under:- “11. While proceeding to determine the correctness of the impugned order vis-a-vis the exercise of review jurisdiction, we ought to remind ourselves of certain cardinal principles. The exercise of review jurisdiction is not an inherent power given to the court; the power to review has to be specifically conferred by law. In civil proceedings, review jurisdiction is 4/6 governed by Section 114 read in conjunction with order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure and the court has to be certain that the elements prescribed therein are satisfied before exercising such power. This Court in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati MANU/SC/0810/2013 : 2013:INSC:526 : (2013) 8 SCC 320 has succintl observed that: 19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure. 12. That the provisions contained in Section 114 and Order XLVII of he Code of Civil Procedure relating to review of an order or decree are mandatory in nature and any petition for review not satisfying the rigours therein cannot be entertained ex debito justitiate, by a court of law, is trite. 13. There is a plethora of decisions analysing the statutory provisions governing the exercise of review jurisdiction; however, we would be referring to a few of them for the purpose of the present exercise. Suffice it to note that despite legal proceedings having commenced with institution of the civil suit as far back as in 1953, the present controversy has, as its source, a writ petition between the first Respondent and the Tahsildar preferred in 2009. Although the explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes it clear that provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply to proceedings Under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is authority in abundance that the principles flowing from the Code of Civil Procedure may safely be taken as a guide to decide writ proceedings but to the extent the same can be made applicable. 14. To put it plainly, Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides three grounds for review: 1) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed, or order made; or 2) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or 3) for any other sufficient reason, which must be analogous to either of the aforesaid grounds. 15. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Paulose Athanasius MANU/SC/0003/1954: 1954:INSC:72: AIR 1954 SC 526, this Court approved the view that the third ground "any other sufficient cause" must mean a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to the first two grounds. The same view has been reiterated in a recent decision of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd. MANU/SC/0488/2024. This Court affirmed that the scope of the third ground had to be narrowly construed so as to not traverse beyond the orbit of the first 5/6 two grounds. 16. Since the Division Bench (review) invoked the first clause, we hasten to emphasize that an applicant seeking review on the basis of discovery of new evidence has to demonstrate: first, that there has been discovery of new evidence, of which he had no prior knowledge or that it could not be produced at the time the decree was passed or the order made despite due diligence; and secondly, that the new evidence is material to the order/decree being reviewed in the sense that if the evidence were produced in court when the decree was passed or the order made, the decision of the court would have been otherwise. Ultimately, it is for the court to decide whether a review sought for by an applicant, if granted, would prevent abuse of the process of law and/or miscarriage of justice. 17. When the ground for review sought is that of discovery of new evidence, this Court in State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta MANU/SC/3011/2008: 2008:INSC:759: 2008) 8 SCC 612 has clarified that the same must be evidence which should be materially important to the decision taken. The following passage is instructive: 21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier. 20. This Court in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma V. Aribam Pishak Sharma MANU/SC/0004/1979: (1979) 4 SCC 389 while clarifying the ambit of the review jurisdiction has categorically held that a decision cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous on merits, since that would fall squarely within the province of a court exercising appellate jurisdiction. 21. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury MANU/SC/0098/1995: (1995) 1 SCC 170, this Court affirmed the ratio in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (supra) and further expounded that review proceedings were not by way of an appeal, and would have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was further held that an error apparent on the face of the record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking of the record, obviating the need for long-drawn reasonings on two possible opinions. This Court 6/6 in Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik MANU/SC/8039/2006: 2006:INSC:159: (2006) 4 SCC 78, while reiterating the decisions in Meera Bhanja (supra) and Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (supra), drew out the narrow contours within which review jurisdiction of this Court had to be exercised and held that Order XLVII, Code of Civil Procedure does not allow for the rehearing of a dispute merely because a party had not highlighted all aspects of the case.” 6. Considering the facts of the case and also considering the law on review, I am of the view that the petitioner is unable to point out any apparent mistake on the face of the order passed by this Court which may be a ground to review the order passed by this Court. Thus, the review petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed. Sd/- (Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge Deshmukh