- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V SRISHANANDA CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.629 OF 2025 (IO) BETWEEN: 1. SMT. SUNEETA SHARMA D/O LATE SUSHEELA SHARMA AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, R/AT #166, 15TH CROSS, MALGAL VILLAGE, NAGARBHAVI 2ND STAGE, BENGALURU-560 072. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. V. LAKSHMINARAYANA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. MANOJ S.N., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. MR. H.N. RAJESH S/O H.G. NARAYANASWAMY, AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS, R/AT #28, 6TH 'A' CROSS, AMARJYOTHINAGAR, BENGALURU-40. 2. SMT. SUSHEELA SHARMA (SINCE DEAD R/BY HER LRS) SANTHOSH KUMAR SHARMA AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, S/O LATE JAGAN RAM SHARMA, 3. GANESH SHARMA AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS R Digitally signed by MALATESH K C Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 S/O SANTHOSH KUMAR SHARMA, 4. SUNIL KUMAR AGED ABOUT 21 YEARS S/O SANTHOSH KUMAR SHARMA 5. SMT. SHOBHA SHARMA AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS W/O LATE SUNIL JAIN, 6. AKASH BABU AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS S/O LATE SUNIL JAIN, 7. PREETHI JAIN @ PREETHI SHARMA AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS D/O LATE SUNIL JAIN RESPONDENT NOS.2 TO 7 ARE RESIDING AT G-11, GOLDEN ARCHIS, F.G. BLOCK, NEXT TO PRAGIL HOTEL LAVELLA ROAD, BENGALURU-560 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. PUTTIGE R. RAMESH, SENIOR COUSNEL FOR SRI. K. NARAYAN SWAMY, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1 IN CP 17691/2025; NOTICE TO R2 TO R7 IS DISPENSED WITH VIDE COURT ORDER DATED 10.10.2025) THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 115 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDRUE, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 29.07.2025 PASSED BY THE LEARNED XXV ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU (CCH-23) IN O.S.NO.5984/2011 ON I.A.NO.XI (ANNEXURE-A) AND ETC. - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V SRISHANANDA ORAL ORDER Heard Sri. V.Lakshminarayana, learned Senior Counsel for Sri. Manoj S.N., learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Puttige R.Ramesh, learned Senior Counsel for Sri. K.Narayan Swamy, learned counsel for the contesting respondent. 2. The present revision petition is filed by defendant no.1 in O.S.No.5984/2011 challenging the validity of the dismissal of the application filed under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. 3. Facts in the nutshell, which are utmost necessary for disposal of the present revision petition are as under: 3.1 A suit in O.S.No.5984/2011 came to be filed by the contesting respondent with the following prayer in - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 respect of following immovable property (hereinafter referred as suit property): "WHEREFORE, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass a Judgment and decree in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants: a) Declaring that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule property b) For mandatory injunction directing the defendants to demolish the temporary sheds compound wall constructed on the suit schedule property; c) Directing the defendants to deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule) property to the 'Plaintiff; d) For permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property; e) For costs of the suit; and To grant such other reliefs that this Hon'ble court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, including the cost of this proceedings, in the interest of justice and equity. SCHEDULE ALL THAT PIECE AND PARCEL of the property bearing Site Nos. 15 to 24, Katha No 31/3. Khaneshhmari No. 166 of Malgal. Village, Yeshwanthapura Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, measuring East to West 80 feet and North to South 150 feet, bounded on: - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 East by : 25 feet road West by : 25 feet road North by : Remaining property in the same Assessment Number. South by : Road Along with six temporary sheds with asbestos sheet roof." 3.2 For the sake of convenience and certainty, paragraph nos.4 to 11 of the said suit is called out hereunder as learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner laid emphasis on the contentions in those paragraphs for advancing the case of the petitioner: "4. However, to the shock and surprise of the plaintiff, the defendant No. 1 in collusion with defendant No. 2 who are none other than the daughter and mother respectively, have filed the suit in Os No. 3080/2002 before this Hon'ble Court, which is pending before CCH No.23 for specific performance for execution of the sale deed from erstwhile owners of the schedule property who are being impleaded as defendants 1 to 4 and also from defendant No. 5 in the said suit. ie., in O.S. No. 3080/2002 and also the plaintiff in O.S. No. 3080/2002 herein who was defendant No. 6 in O.S. No. 3080/2002 By Suppressing the material facts - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 the defendant No.1 herein the plaintiff in O.S. No.3080/2002 claiming ownership of the suit schedule property have obtained an exparte order of temporary injunction at the hands of this Hon'ble Court on 10.5 2002. On receipt of the notice from this Hon'ble court, the plaintiff herein being the defendants No. 6 in the said suit in O.S. No. 3080/2002 appeared and contested the suit and to the application for vacating filed objections temporary injunction and after hearing the parties at length on IA No.2 and 3 in the said suit, this Hon'ble Court vacated the exparte order of temporary injunction and ordered to maintain status quo all the disposal of the suit by its order dated 19.11.2002. 5. It is submitted that the defendants after obtaining the exparte temporary injunction on 10.05.2002 in O.S. No. 3080/2002, have put p shed and compound wall on the suit schedule property. It is application of the and the submitted that though the defendant No.1 9Plaintiff in O.S. No. 3080/2002) for temporary injunction was rejected in the said suit, the defendants are asserting possession over the suit schedule property Since the Plaintiff being a law not resist the illegal acts of the abiding Citizen, could defendants in putting up the construction of shed compound wall on the suit - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 schedule property. Since plaintiff is not, if a position to resist the illegal acts of the defendants who are ladies and also it is a fact that only to scare away the plaintiff, the defendants themselves have filed number of criminal complaint and one such complaint was filed on 28.5.2002 against the plaintiff was registered as FIR No.61/2002 at Gnanabharathi Police Station, in the said complaint, the defendants contends that they were constructing the compound wall the suit schedule property. 6. It is submitted that the defendants have lodged several complaints as stated above against the Plaintiff only to harass him and to establish their illegal possession over the suit schedule property and in the said complaint FIR No.61/2002 they have admitted that they are putting up construction of the compound wall. This Hon'ble court also while disposing of IA No. 2 and 3 on 19.11.2002, in O.S.No.3080/2002, observed that the suit schedule property is #vacant site. Therefore, the action of the defendants in asserting illegal possession over the suit schedule property is not just and proper. 7. It is submitted that as stated above the plaintiff could not prevent the illegal acts of the defendants in putting up construction on the suit - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 schedule property because the defendants are ladies. Notwithstanding the pendency of O.S. No.3080/2002, the plaintiff is filing possession defendants. of the suit schedule this suit for property from the defendants. 8. It is submitted that, in spite of vacating of the temporary injunction order and ordering of maintaining the status quo on 19.11.2002 in O.S No.3080/2002 on 27.02.2003, the defendants have started putting up construction on the suit schedule property by putting up five temporary sheds illegally. It is submitted that ob noticing the illegal construction of 5 sheds by the defendants in addition to existing shed on the suit schedule property, the plaintiff lodged police complaint. The jurisdictional police by their intimation dated 28.02.2003 advised the defendants to stop construction, as there is an order of status quo from this Hon'ble court, in OS No.3080/2002. In fact the plaintiff also filed application in IA No.5, in OS No.3080/2002 under order 39 rule 2A of the code of civil procedure for punishing the defendants for having put up 5 sheds on the suit schedule property by wilfully disobeying the order of status quo dated 19.11.2002 in OS No.3080/2002. The said sheds and compound wall are also required to be demolished since the said construction was not in - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 accordance with law and also there is no sanctioned plan for the construction of the said shed as the defendants are not the owners of the suit schedule property. Na Authority has given any license or permission for construction of the said sheds. Further the actions of the defendants in putting up construction subsequent to 19.11.2002, is a clear the orders No.3080/2002. passed by this case of violation of in OS No.3080/2002. 9. It is submitted that the possession and 2 in the suit schedule Hence, the defendants of defendants property is illegal and unlawful are required to deliver possession of the suit schedule property to the temporary demolishing constructed by vacant the after sheds, and compound wall suit them. Hence, this for mandatory injunction and for possession of the schedule property. 10. that, the It is submitted that in view of the fact defendants with help of antisocial elements continue to interfere with the possession of the suit schedule property and the plaintiff could not resist the illegal acts defendants as they were ladies, it is just and necessary to order of the permanent prevent the defendants from such illegal acts. Therefore, it is just and necessary to grant an injunction restraining the defendants or anybody - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 claiming through them further contending anything or creating third party interests on the suit schedule property. Without there being an order of permanent injunction at the hands of this Hon'ble court it is difficult to prevent the defendants high handedness. 11. The cause of action for the suit arose on, 28.05.2002 and 27/02. 2003 when the defendants put up Construction on the schedule property and on subsequent on the schedule property and on subsequent dates, within the Jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court." 3.3 The suit property was revenue sites bearing Nos.15 to 24 in Khata No.31/3, Khaneshhmari No.166 of Malgal Village, Yeshwanthpura Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk. The property has now come within the jurisdiction of Burhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (for short 'BBMP'). 3.4 Revision petitioner claims title to the said property based on an unregistered Power of Attorney and affidavit dated 01.07.1985 executed by the then owner of - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 the suit property in view of the embargo on registering the revenue sites. 3.5 Subsequently, when the ban for registering the regular sites were lifted, the original owner was contacted for execution of the regular sale deed and when there was a refusal, a suit in O.S.No.3080/2002 came to be filed on the file of Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore for specific enforcement of the Power of Attorney and the affidavit contents against the original owner by the revision petitioner. 3.6 Incidentally, the present plaintiff was party defendant no.6 in the said suit. Revision petitioner herein was successful in getting an order of temporary injunction in the said suit. Pursuant to the suit summons issued in the said suit, 6th defendant who is the first respondent in the present revision petition and plaintiff in O.S.No.5984/2011 appeared before the Court and brought to the notice of the Court that he is the owner of the suit - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 property by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 15.10.2001 and the interim injunction that is temporary injunction granted in favour of the revision petitioner stood vacated. But there was an order of status quo. It is the contention of the first respondent who is plaintiff in O.S.No.5984/2011 that, despite the vacating of the temporary injunction, revision petitioner highhandedly constructed sheds in the suit property and constructed a compound wall without there being any plan and license as admittedly he was not owner of the property to get sanctioned plan and license and filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A for having violated the order of status quo in the said suit. 3.7 No orders were passed on the said application and it is submitted at the bar that said suit in O.S.No.3080/2002 came to be dismissed on 27.02.2012. 3.8 When there was a cloud with regard to the title to the suit property raised by the revision petitioner during - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 the pendency of the said suit in O.S.No.3080/2002, first respondent/plaintiff decided to seek a declaration about his title to the suit property based on the registered sale deed dated 15.10.2001. 3.9 Paragraph nos.4 to 11 referred to supra not only make out the basic facts to maintain the suit, but also the cause of action to file the suit in O.S.No.5984/2011 in clear and categorical terms. 3.10 Pursuant to the suit summons received in O.S.No.5984/2011, the first defendant appeared before the trial Court, filed detailed written statement denying the plaint averments in toto. First defendant maintained that she is the owner of the property by virtue of the Power of Attorney and the affidavit and said Power of Attorney was an agency coupled with interest and therefore she was in possession of the suit property in favour of mother of the revision petitioner who in turn executed a registered gift deed in favour of the revision petitioner. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 3.11 Defendant no.1 also filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) to reject the plaint supported by an affidavit. In the affidavit, the relevant paragraphs to support the rejection of the plaint are paragraph nos.6 to 11. 3.12 The application was opposed by the plaintiff by filing the detailed written objections and learned trial Judge after noting the rival contents of the parties and contents of the plaint, dismissed the said application filed by defendant no.1. 4. Being aggrieved by the same, defendant no.1 has filed the present revision petition on the following grounds: • The learned Trial Court refused to exercise the power under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC where a statutory bar of limitation is ex facie apparent from the plaint itself. Such refusal is a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction, warranting revisional interference. - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 • The impugned order dated 29.07.2025 passed in I.A. No. XI in O.S. No. 5984/2011 is illegal and unsustainable in law, as the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that on the plaintiff's own pleadings, the right to sue, if any, first accrued in the year 2002 and again in 2003, when the plaintiff claims interference and encroachment by the defendants. Once such accrual is pleaded, Article 58 of the Limitation Act squarely applies and the limitation of three years expired well before the filing of the suit in 2011. The plaint therefore disclosed a statutory bar on the face of it and ought to have been rejected at the threshold. • The Trial Court committed a jurisdictional error in holding that since an issue on limitation had already been framed at an earlier stage of the suit, the question of limitation could not be decided under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. It is settled law that the mere framing of issues does not take away the jurisdiction or duty of the Court to reject a plaint which is ex facie barred by law. The framing of issues cannot revive a plaint which suffers from an incurable bar on the face of the pleadings. • The Trial Court acted with material irregularity in treating the existence of an issue on limitation as a justification to defer the matter to trial, when in fact - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC obliges the Court to examine the plaint averments alone and reject the plaint if the bar is evident without recourse to evidence. By deferring the issue, the Trial Court has undermined the very legislative purpose of the provision, namely, to prevent futile trials in barred suits. • The finding of the Trial Court that the plaint discloses a continuing cause of action is patently erroneous. The plaint itself specifically refers to acts of interference and dispossession alleged on 28.05.2002 and 27.02.2003. These averments establish, on the plaintiff's own narrative, that the cause of action had fully accrued on those dates. A plea of continuing cause cannot be artificially imported to enlarge limitation when the pleadings themselves restrict the claim to past, definite events. • That the alleged Sale Deed dated 15.10.2001 is invalid in law for want of compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 32A of the Registration Act, 1908 (as amended by Act 48 of 2001). The said amendment, effective from 24.09.2001, requires that every person executing or claiming under a document relating to immovable property shall affix both his/her passport-size - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 photograph and fingerprints on the instrument presented for registration. In the present case, although fingerprints alone are found, the absence of photographs amounts to a substantive statutory defect and not a mere irregularity. The Hon'ble High Courts have consistently held that non-compliance with Section 32A renders the registration void: see Pavakkal Noble John v. State of Kerala (Ker. HC, 2010) (holding that a Sub-Registrar is "statutorily bound to refuse registration" where photo and fingerprint of both parties are not affixed); G.D. Subramaniam v. Sub-Registrar (Madras HC, 2009) and Latif Estate Line India Ltd. v. Hadeeja Ammal (Madras HC, 2011), where it was reiterated that registration without photographs and fingerprints is illegal; and Sri Manjunath Shetty v. BDA (Karnataka HC, 2017), where this Hon'ble Court emphasized that deeds registered "against the provisions of Section 32A" cannot be sustained. • Accordingly, the impugned Sale Deed, executed after Section 32A had come into force but lacking mandatory photographs, is not a validly registered document in the eyes of law and cannot confer any right, title, or interest upon the claimant. • The impugned order is contrary to the controlling ratio in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 (2020) 7 SCC 366, Para 26 to 28 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a plaint must be rejected at the threshold when, taking the averments in the plaint at their face value, the suit is barred by limitation, and that courts must prevent abuse of process by excising suits that are "deadwood" from inception. • The Petitioner further submits that, the test in Dahiben is a classic demurrer, assuming every fact pleaded in the plaint to be true, is the suit maintainable in law, applying that test here, the plaint itself pleads the first accrual of the alleged infringement/denial on 28.05.2002 and 27.02.2003 yet the suit for declaration was instituted only in 2011, squarely attracting Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. No saving plea of later first-accrual, fraud (8.17), acknowledgment (8.18) or payment (S.19) is set up in the plaint to extend limitation. On a plain reading of the plaint and annexures without traveling to the written statement or defence evidence, the statutory bar is ex facie discernible. In such circumstances, Dahiben mandates rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC the impugned order notwithstanding the facial bar amounts to abetting an abuse of process and is a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. The learned Trial Court, by declining to apply the Dahiben standard and by - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 treating a facial bar as a matter for evidence merely because an issue stood framed earlier, has misdirected itself in law. Therefore, the impugned order warrants the interference of this Hon'ble Court. • The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Raghwendra Sharan Singh v Ram Prasanna Singh, (2020) 16 SCC 601, Para 7 clearly held that, considering the averments in the plaint and the bundle of facts stated in the plaint, we are of the opinion that by clever drafting the plaintiff has tried to bring the suit within the period of limitation which, otherwise, is barred by law of limitation. Therefore, considering the decisions of this Court in T. Arivandandam (T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467) and others, as stated above, and as the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation, the plaint is required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. 37. The Petitioner humbly submits that, this Hon'ble Court in CRP No. 620/2023 in the case of Smt. M. Prabhakumari v. Narayanaswamy. DD on 29-08-2024, clearly held that, when the bar of limitation is ex facie evident on a meaningful reading of the plaint along with the documents relied upon, the court must exercise power under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC and reject the plaint, rather than defer the issue to trial under - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 the rubric of a "mixed question". This Hon'ble Court emphasised (i) the demurrer test, assume the plaint facts to be true and ask whether the suit is maintainable in law; (ii) registered instruments and the plaint-annexed documents may be looked at to locate the point from which limitation begins to run (iii) once the first accrual is revealed on the plaint itself, Article 58 applies and successive/continuing effects do not revive limitation; (iv) issue- framing/remand do not dilute the court's threshold duty to "nip in the bud" suits that are time-barred or illusory by clever drafting. Applying that ratio here, the plaint itself pleads 28-05-2002 and 27-02- 2003 as the first infringing dates, yet the suit for declaration was filed only in 2011, with no saving plea of later first accrual, fraud, or acknowledgment • The plaint relies on orders dated 19.11.2002 in parallel litigation and alleged NCR/complaint dated 28.05.2002, thereby acknowledging that the controversy and the defendants' claim/possession were known to the plaintiff in 2002-2003. The Court erred in treating later events as generating a fresh declaratory cause • The Trial Court has failed to apply the "first accrual" test under Article 58 of the Limitation Act. The law is clear that in a suit for declaration, limitation - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 begins when the right to sue first accrues, i.e., when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to the plaintiff's rights. In the present case, the plaint specifically avers such threats and denials in 2002 and 2003. Hence, the suit instituted after nearly a decade is hopelessly time-barred. • The Trial Court ignored the plaintiff's admission in the plaint that disputes between the parties arose contemporaneously in 2002, when complaints were made and sheds were erected. Such admission in pleadings is binding and sufficient to establish limitation. Once the plaint itself narrates the dates of accrual, the Court has no jurisdiction to overlook the statutory bar. • The Trial Court further failed to consider that the relief of declaration sought by the plaintiff forms the very foundation of the consequential reliefs of mandatory injunction, recovery of possession and permanent injunction. Once the relief of declaration is barred by limitation, the consequential reliefs cannot independently survive as they are entirely dependent on the declaratory foundation. The rejection of the declaratory claim would necessarily render the suit non-maintainable in toto. - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 • The impugned order is vitiated by complete non- application of judicial mind. The learned Judge dismissed the application on a cursory observation that limitation is a matter of evidence, without undertaking the mandatory exercise of reading the plaint as a whole to determine whether the statutory bar is evident. Such mechanical rejection of an Order VII Rule 11(d) application defeats the object of the provision. • The Trial Court erred in misconstruing the order of remand passed by this Hon'ble Court in MFA No. 3388/2015. The remand order specifically restored the suit to file and directed disposal on merits while leaving all contentions open. There was no restriction placed on the Trial Court's jurisdiction to decide preliminary issues including an application under Order VII Rule 11. Treating the remand as a prohibition against threshold adjudication amounts to misinterpretation of this Hon'ble Court's order. • The Trial Court wrongly subordinated legality to expediency. The observation that the suit had been remanded for speedy disposal and therefore the plaint should not be rejected at threshold reflects fundamental misdirection in law. Speedy disposal can never be a substitute for proper application of - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11. Expediency cannot override legality. • The Trial Court has thereby failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. Once the plaint discloses a statutory bar, the Court is bound to reject it; the discretion of the Court is limited and mandatory language of "shall" in Order VII Rule 11 leaves no scope for postponement. By refusing to act, the Court has abdicated jurisdiction, which vitiates the impugned order. • The learned Trial Court erred in awarding costs of Rs.5,000/-against the Petitioner, despite the fact that the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) was bona fide, raised a pure question of law and was supported by pleadings and documents. The award of costs is arbitrary, penalizes the exercise of a statutory right and compounds the injustice. • The Trial Court acted in a routine and perfunctory manner without examining the pleadings in their proper context. The very purpose of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is to enable Courts to weed out barred claims at inception so as to save judicial time and prevent harassment to the opposite party. By refusing to exercise this power, the Trial Court has acted contrary to legislative intent. - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 • The impugned order has the effect of compelling the Petitioner to undergo a protracted trial in a suit which is ex facie barred. This results in wasteful prolongation of litigation and causes serious prejudice to the Petitioner, who is made to face a stale and unenforceable claim. • The Trial Court misapplied the principle that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. While this principle holds true where accrual dates are disputed or uncertain, in the present case, the plaint itself unequivocally pleads the dates of accrual in 2002 and 2003. Where the plaint itself discloses the relevant facts, no factual enquiry is necessary and the plaint must be rejected on demurrer. • The Trial Court failed to appreciate the doctrine of constructive res judicata and abuse of process. The plaintiff, having earlier filed O.S. No. 1941/2002 and other proceedings relating to the very same property and disputes, cannot be permitted to institute a fresh suit after lapse of a decade. Such conduct amounts to re-litigation and forum shopping, which the Court is duty-bound to prevent. • The Petitioner further submits that, the plaintiff himself instituted O.S. No. 1941/2002 for injunction against D1, evidencing knowledge and first accrual - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 in 2002. Yet, in objections to I.A. XI, respondent/plaintiff asserts he was "not a party" to that suit. This approbate-reprobate is a material contradiction undermining bona fides and confirms the Article 58 bar. • The plaintiff predicates his claim on a alleged registered sale deed dated 15.10.2001, There is no photos of the vendor and purchaser in sale deed, previous owner never come to sub registrar, with the absence previous owner has respondent executed the sale deed in his name, During his sale deed in 15.10.2001 it was mandatory to add photos in sale deed, asserting that he was placed in possession and that, thereafter, khata, tax payments, and a building plan/licence dated 19.03.2002 stood in his name. The plaint itself pleads that disputes and alleged acts by the defendants arose contemporaneously; specifically, the plaint refers to events on 28.05.2002 i.e., complaint and 27.02.2003 alleged erection of five additional sheds, thereby identifying, in the plaintiff's own words, the points in time when the supposed encroachment/denial of his asserted rights crystallised. • The Petitioner further submits that Smt. Sunita Sharma and Smt. Susheela Sharma have instituted - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 PCR No. 8268/2013 before the learned Magistrate alleging that the Respondent-accused had stolen the original title documents pertaining to the suit schedule property, including the unregistered GPA and other connected documents, from their residence in the year 2002. It is further submitted that in the year 2010, the Respondent again visited the complainants' residence, openly displayed the said original documents, and demanded a sum of 250,00,000/- for their return, coupled with threats to murder, this incident was also video-recorded. In one such recording, the Respondent has categorically admitted: "your original documents is with me, and if the Judge comes to know this, he will send me to jail." The said video recording has been duly produced in PCR No. 8268/2013, examined and authenticated by the Head of Digital Forensics, who certified that the recording is genuine, not morphed, and that the voice therein belongs to the Respondent. The recording stands marked before the learned Magistrate Court and forms part of the judicial record. These facts clearly establish the Respondent's unlawful possession of the originals, his mala fide intent, and his threats against the complainants. This approbate-reprobate conduct constitutes a material contradiction which undermines the Respondent's bona fides and further confirms the bar under Article 58 of the Limitation - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 Act, which the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate. • The impugned order disregards binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Hon'ble Court which hold that where a plaint discloses a bar of limitation, the Court has no discretion but to reject it at threshold. The Trial Court's refusal to apply settled law amounts to perversity and material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction. • The Trial Court failed to bear in mind that limitation is not a mere technical defense but goes to the root of jurisdiction. Entertaining a suit barred by limitation is itself without jurisdiction, and any decree passed therein would be a nullity. Hence, the plaint should have been rejected forthwith. • The impugned order suffers from perversity in that it considers irrelevant aspects, such as earlier framing of issues and directions for speedy disposal, while disregarding the most material aspect, namely, the plaintiff's own admissions of accrual in 2002 and 2003. This selective appreciation of pleadings renders the order wholly unsustainable. • The learned Trial Court failed to protect the Petitioner from vexatious and stale litigation. By refusing to apply Order VII Rule 11(d), the Court - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 has in effect permitted the plaintiff to keep dead claims alive, thereby exposing the Petitioner to harassment and undue burden contrary to the rule of law. • The Trial Court failed to invoke its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to prevent abuse of the process of Court. The institution of a suit nearly a decade after the pleaded accrual, coupled with multiple previous proceedings between the parties, clearly demonstrates mala fide and abuse, which ought to have been curbed at inception. • The impugned order has resulted in miscarriage of justice as it allows a legally barred suit to proceed to trial. The Trial Court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is a material irregularity falling within the revisional jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under Section 115 CPC. • The failure to reject the plaint despite the bar of limitation constitutes both failure to exercise jurisdiction and illegal exercise of jurisdiction, thereby warranting interference by this Hon'ble Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to ensure that the subordinate Courts act within the bounds of law. - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 • The Trial Court also failed to consider that the suit is barred not only by limitation but also by laches and delay. The plaintiff, despite being aware of the dispute since 2002, chose to institute the present suit only in 2011, thereby disentitling himself to equitable reliefs such as declaration and injunction. • The impugned order, in effect, sanctions continuation of a vexatious proceeding contrary to law, resulting in grave injustice to the Petitioner. It is arbitrary, perverse, contrary to settled principles and therefore liable to be set aside by this Hon'ble Court in exercise of jurisdiction revisional and supervisory jurisdiction & required Court fee is 20/- paid as per SCH II ART 11(Q)(iii) of KCF & SV Act. 5. Sri. V. Lakshmiarayana, learned Senior Counsel reiterating the grounds urged in the revision petition contended that the plaint is to be rejected as prayer numbers (b) to (d) could not have been the subject matter of the suit in O.S.No.5984/2011. 6. To buttress his arguments, he would contend that when an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A came to be filed before the Court where O.S.No.3080/2002 was - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 being adjudicated, a separate suit for the same prayer of restitution of the property which has been lost in O.S.No.3080/2002 could not have been prayed and therefore, the prayer (b) to (d) will have to fail automatically in view of Section 144 (2) of CPC. 7. Sri. V.Lakshminarayana would further contend that irrespective of dismissal of O.S.No.3080/2002, enquiry under Order XXXIX Rule 2A should continue and relief if any for the first respondent/plaintiff is only in the said suit in law of clear bar of a separate suit as is contemplated under Section 144 (2) CPC. 8. The next limb of argument that has been canvassed before the Court on behalf of the revision petitioner is that the main relief of declaration is not maintainable in view of the fact that the said relief is barred by limitation. 9. He would further contend that when the application for temporary injunction was being argued, the - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 revision petitioner has specifically stated that he is claiming the right over the suit property by virtue of a registered gift deed executed by his mother pursuant to the General Power of Attorney executed by the erstwhile owner which was not a mere agency, but agency coupled with interest. Therefore the cause if any for the plaintiff to seek the relief was at least from the date of vacating the injunction order in O.S.No.3080/2002 and within three years there from. 10. As such, the suit filed in the year 2011 itself is per se barred by limitation and as such, the main relief of declaration should fall in the case on hand and as such the ancillary reliefs should also automatically fall. 11. Therefore, it is the argument on behalf of the revision petitioner that the learned trial Judge failed to understand the scope and ambit of Order VII Rule 11(d) and wrongfully dismissed the said application without - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 proper and cogent reasons, resulting in miscarriage of justice and sought for allowing the revision. 12. In support of his contentions, Sri.V.Lakshminarayana, learned Senior Counsel would place on record the following judgments and invited the attention of this Court to the relevant paragraphs in those judgments: i. VALLABH DAS V. DR. MADAN LAL AND OTHERS reported in 1970 (1) SCC 761 relevant paragraphs read as under: "5. Rule 1 of the Order 23, Code of Civil Procedure empowers the courts to permit a plaintiff to withdraw from the suit brought by him with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of that suit on such terms as it thinks fit. The term imposed on the plaintiff in the previous suit was that before bringing a fresh suit on the same cause of action, he must pay the costs of the defendants. Therefore we have to see whether that condition governs the institution of the present suit. For deciding that question we have to see whether the suit from which this appeal arises is in respect of the same subject-matter that was in - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 litigation in the previous suit. The expression “subject-matter” is not defined in the Civil Procedure Code. It does not mean property. That expression has a reference to a right in the property which the plaintiff seeks to enforce. That expression includes the cause of action and the relief claimed. Unless the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are the same as in the first suit, it cannot be said, that the subject-matter of the second suit is the same as that in the previous suit. Now coming to the case before us in the first suit Dr Madan Lal was seeking to enforce his right to partition and separate possession. In the present suit he seeks to get possession of the suit properties from a trespasser on the basis of his title. In the first suit the cause of action was the division of status between Dr Madan Lal and his adoptive father and the relief claimed was the conversion of joint possession into separate possession. In the present suit the plaintiff is seeking possession of the suit properties from a trespasser. In the first case his cause of action arose on the day he got separated from his family. In the present suit the cause of action, namely, the series of transactions which formed the basis of his title to the suit properties, arose on the death of his adoptive father and mother. It is true that both in the previous suit as well as in the present suit the factum and validity of - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 adoption of Dr Madan Lal came up for decision. But that adoption was not the cause of action in the first nor is it the cause of action in the present suit. It was merely an antecedent event which conferred certain rights on him. Mere identity of some of the issues in the two suits do not bring about an identity of the subject-matter in the two suits. As observed in Rukhma Bai v. Mahadeo Narayan, [ILR 42 Bom 155] the expression “subject-matter” in Order 23 of the Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure means the series of acts or transactions alleged to exist giving rise to the relief claimed. In other words “subject-matter” means the bundle of facts which have to be proved in order to entile the plaintiff to the relief claimed by him. We accept as correct the observations of Wallis, C.J., in Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi [ILR 39 Mad 987] that where the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are not the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit, the second suit cannot be considered to have been brought in respect of the same subject-matter as the first suit." ii. DAHIBEN V. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI reported in (2020) 7 SCC 366 relevant paragraphs read as under: "23. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the plaint and documents filed - 35 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 therewith, as also the written submissions filed on behalf of the parties. 23.1. We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under: “11. Rejection of plaint.—The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases— (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9: Provided that the time fixed by the court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied - 36 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” (emphasis supplied) 23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. 23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted. 23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 - 37 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 GLH 823] this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words : (SCC p. 324, para 12) “12. … The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.” 23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to. 23.6. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the averments in the plaint [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] , read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. - 38 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 23.7. Order 7 Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under: “14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.—(1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint. (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (3) A document which ought to be produced in court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. (4) Nothing in this Rule shall apply to document produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.” (emphasis supplied) - 39 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 23.8. Having regard to Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11(a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint. 23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. 23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. 23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] which reads as : (SCC p. 562, para 139) - 40 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 “139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.” 23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. [Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co., (2007) 5 SCC 614] the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman [D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman. 23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. 23.14. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the court at any stage of the - 41 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557] . The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain case. 23.15. The provision of Order 7 Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (e) are made out. If the court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the court has no option, but to reject the plaint. 26. Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, prescribe the period of limitation for filing a suit where a declaration is sought, or cancellation of an instrument, or rescission of a contract, which reads as under: "Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period beings to run 58. To obtain any other declaration Three years When the right to sue first accrues. 59. To cancel or set aside an Three years When the facts entitling the - 42 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract. plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him." The period of limitation prescribed under Articles 58 and 59 of the 1963 Act is three years, which commences from the date when the right to sue first accrues. 27. In Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 484] this Court held that the use of the word “first” between the words “sue” and “accrued”, would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued." - 43 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 iii. NIKHILA DIVYANG MEHTA AND ANOTHER V. HITESH P. SANGHVI AND OTHERS reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 779 relevant paragraphs read as under: "26. In the present case, the plaintiff not only categorically states that he acquired knowledge of the Will and the Codicil in the first week of November, 2014 but also that the cause of action for the suit first arose on 04.02.2014 and lastly on 21.10.2014. The suit was filed on 21.11.2017. As such on the own averments of the plaintiff, the suit was instituted beyond limitation attracting Order VII Rule 11 (d) CPC. 27. The submission that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and that it cannot be decided without allowing the party to lead evidence is of no substance. In the present case, we have earlier noted that the suit was admittedly instituted on 21.11.2017 whereas according to the plaint averments the cause of action first arose on 04.02.2014. Even assuming that the cause of action last arose in the first week of November, 2014, the suit ought to have been filed by 07.11.2017. The suit was filed on 21.11.2017. It was ex-facie barred by limitation for which, no evidence was required to be adduced by the parties. The above issue is purely an issue of fact and in the admitted facts as per the - 44 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 plaint, allegations stand concluded for which no evidence is needed. 28. The other contention that the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the Will and Codicil in the first week of November, 2014, but that was not a complete knowledge as probably he could read the same subsequently. In dealing with the submission, the appellate Court distinguished between “having knowledge” and “full knowledge” to hold that the suit is not barred by limitation as the limitation would reckon from the date of full knowledge. It is a complete fallacy to make any distinction between “knowledge” and “full knowledge”. First of all, the limitation has to run from the date when the cause of action first accrued and not any subsequent date for the cause of action. According to the plaintiff himself, the cause of action for the suit had arisen much earlier. Secondly, the plaintiff has not pleaded any date on which he acquired complete knowledge and that such argument is only an afterthought and appears to be a simple creation of the first appellate Court. 29. Lastly, the first appellate Court has ruled that in the suit, the plaintiff has claimed different reliefs and even if the plaint is barred by limitation in respect of one of the reliefs, it cannot be rejected in toto. The aforesaid submission is also without substance as upon the plain reading of the prayers - 45 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 made in the plaint, it is apparent that the primary relief claimed therein is to declare the Will and the Codicil to be null and void and also all subsequent proceedings thereto. In addition to it, the plaintiff has claimed permanent injunction. The other reliefs are dependent upon the first relief and cannot be granted until and unless the plaintiff succeeds in the first relief. Therefore, once the plaint or the suit in respect of the main relief stands barred by time, the other ancillary relief claimed therein also falls down." iv. MALLAVVA V. KALSAMMANAVARA KALAMMA reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3846 relevant paragraphs read as under: 9. It is not in dispute that the trial court even while dismissing the suit held the plaintiffs to be the absolute owner of the suit schedule properties. It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff came to be non- suited as the appellants herein (original defendants) were found to be in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties and the plaintiffs had failed to seek relief of possession of the suit properties as scheduled in the plaint. Thus, so far as title to the property is concerned, the plaintiff was able to establish that she was the absolute owner of the suit schedule properties. In - 46 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 the First Appeal filed by the legal heirs of the original plaintiffs, the plaint was permitted to be amended and added the prayer for recovery of the possession from the defendants came to be added. It is true that as regards the findings on title and ownership, the defendants filed cross-objections before the First Appellate Court and those were looked into and dismissed. However, as stated above notice was issued by this Court only to consider the issue of period of limitation. 18. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is corresponding to Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908, wherein it is stated that the plaintiff who based his case on title has to prove not only title, but also possession within 12 years of the date of suit. The said Article has undergone a metamorphic change in view of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The vital distinction between Articles 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is that as per Article 142 of 1908 Act, the plaintiff has to prove not only title, but also possession within 12 years of the date of suit, whereas, as per Article 65 of 1963 Act, a suit for possession based on title has to be filed within 12 years when possession becomes adverse to the concerned plaintiff. - 47 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 32. In C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808, it has been laid down that in a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief. In fact, a suit for a declaration of title to immovable property would not be barred so long as the right to such a property continues and subsists. When such right continues to subsist, the relief for declaration would be a continuing right and there would be no limitation for such a suit. The principle is that the suit for a declaration for a right cannot be held to be barred so long as Right to Property subsist." v. PADHIYAR PRAHLADJI CHENAJI (DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES V. MANIBEN JAGMALBHAI (DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS reported in (2022) 12 SCC 128 relevant paragraph no.17 reads as under: "17. Therefore, once the suit is held to be barred by limitation qua the declaratory relief and when the relief for permanent injunction was a consequential relief, the prayer for permanent injunction, which was a consequential relief can also be said to be barred by limitation. It is true that under normal circumstances, the relief of permanent injunction sought is a substantive relief and the - 48 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 period of limitation would commence from the date on which the possession is sought to be disturbed so long as the interference in possession continuous. However, in the case of a consequential relief, when the substantive relief of declaration is held to be barred by limitation, the said principle shall not be applicable." vi. RAJPAL SINGH V. SAROJ (DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND ANOTHER reported in (2022) 15 SCC 260 relevant paragraph no.14 reads as under: "14. The submission on behalf of the original plaintiff (now represented through her heirs) that the prayer in the suit was also for recovery of the possession and therefore the said suit was filed within the period of twelve years and therefore the suit has been filed within the period of limitation, cannot be accepted. Relief for possession is a consequential prayer and the substantive prayer was of cancellation of the sale deed dated 19-4- 1996 and therefore, the limitation period is required to be considered with respect to the substantive relief claimed and not the consequential relief. When a composite suit is filed for cancellation of the sale deed as well as for recovery of the possession, the limitation period is required to be considered with - 49 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 respect to the substantive relief of cancellation of the sale deed, which would be three years from the date of the knowledge of the sale deed sought to be cancelled. Therefore, the suit, which was filed by the original plaintiff for cancellation of the sale deed, can be said to be substantive therefore the same was clearly barred by limitation. Hence, the learned trial court ought to have dismissed the suit on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. As such the learned first appellate court was justified and right in setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court and consequently dismissing the suit. The High Court has committed a grave error in quashing and setting aside a well- reasoned and a detailed judgment and order passed by the first appellate court dismissing the suit and consequently restoring the judgment and decree passed by the trial court." vii. RAGHWENDRA SHARAN SINGH V. RAM PRASANNA SINGH (DEAD) BY LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES reported in (2020) 16 SCC 601 relevant paragraphs read as under: "7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions on exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the facts of the case in hand and the averments in the plaint, we are of the - 50 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 opinion that both the courts below have materially erred in not rejecting the plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. It is required to be noted that it is not in dispute that the gift deed was executed by the original plaintiff himself along with his brother. The deed of gift was a registered gift deed. The execution of the gift deed is not disputed by the plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that the gift deed was a showy deed of gift and therefore the same is not binding on him. However, it is required to be noted that for approximately 22 years, neither the plaintiff nor his brother (who died on 15-12-2002) claimed at any point of time that the gift deed was showy deed of gift. One of the executants of the gift deed, brother of the plaintiff during his lifetime never claimed that the gift deed was a showy deed of gift. It was the appellant herein-original defendant who filed the suit in the year 2001 for partition and the said suit was filed against his brothers to which the plaintiff was joined as Defendant 10. It appears that the summon of the suit filed by the defendant being TS (Partition) Suit No. 203 of 2001 was served upon Defendant 10- plaintiff herein in the year 2001 itself. Despite the same, he instituted the present suit in the year 2003. Even from the averments in the plaint, it appears that during these 22 years i.e. the period from 1981 till 2001/2003, the suit property was - 51 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 mortgaged by the appellant herein-original defendant and the mortgage deed was executed by the defendant. Therefore, considering the averments in the plaint and the bundle of facts stated in the plaint, we are of the opinion that by clever drafting the plaintiff has tried to bring the suit within the period of limitation which, otherwise, is barred by law of limitation. Therefore, considering the decisions of this Court in T. Arivandandam [T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467] and others, as stated above, and as the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation, the plaint is required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. 8. At this stage, it is required to be noted that, as such, the plaintiff has never prayed for any declaration to set aside the gift deed. We are of the opinion that such a prayer is not asked cleverly. If such a prayer would have been asked, in that case, the suit can be said to be clearly barred by limitation considering Article 59 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, only a declaration is sought to get out of the provisions of the Limitation Act, more particularly, Article 59 of the Limitation Act. The aforesaid aspect has also not been considered by the High Court as well as the learned trial court. 9. Now, so far as the application on behalf of the original plaintiff and even the observations made - 52 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 by the learned trial court as well as the High Court that the question with respect to the limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, which can be decided only after the parties lead the evidence, is concerned, as observed and held by this Court in Sham Lal N.V. Srinivasa Murthy as well as in Ram Prakash Gupta considering the averments in the plaint if it is found that the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation, the same can be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC." viii. SALIM D. AGBOATWALA AND OTHERS V. SHAMALJI ODDHAVJI THAKKAR AND OTHERS reported in (2021) 17 SCC 100 relevant paragraphs read as under: "11. As observed by this Court in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy [P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy, (2015) 8 SCC 331 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 100] , the rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 is a drastic power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. Therefore, the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power are stringent and it is especially so when rejection of plaint is sought on the ground of limitation. When a plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action only at a particular point of time, the - 53 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 same has to be accepted at the stage of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11. 12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar, the plea regarding the date on which the plaintiffs gained knowledge of the essential facts, is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold." ix. MADANURI SRI RAMA CHANDRA MURTHY V. SYED JALAL reported in (2017) 13 SCC 174 paragraph no.7 reads as under: "7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since the power - 54 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage." x. BRAHMA NAND PURI V. NEKI PURI SINCE DECEASED REPRESENTED BY MATHRA PURI AND ANOTHER reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 313 paragraph no.8 reads as under: - 55 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 "8. Pausing here, we might mention that Mr Chatterji referred us to the circumstance that during the pendency of the appeal in this Court Neki Puri had died and that certain others who, he stated, had even less claims to the Mahantship were in possession of the property and that seeing that the appellant was admittedly a Gurbhai it would be most inappropriate that his rights should be overlooked and a stranger permitted to squat on the property. We consider this submission is devoid of force. The plaintiff's suit being one for ejectment he has to succeed or fail on the title that he establishes and if he cannot succeed on the strength of his title his suit must fail notwithstanding that the defendant in possession has no title to the property, assuming learned counsel is right in that submission. As pointed out in Mukherjea's Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust, Second Edn., p. 317: “The party who lays claim to the office of a Mohunt on the strength of any such usage must establish it affirmatively by proper legal evidence. The fact that the defendant is a trespasser would not entitle the plaintiff to succeed even though he be a disciple of the last Mohunt, unless he succeeds in proving the particular usage under which succession takes place in the particular institution. - 56 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 We, therefore, dismiss this aspect of the case from consideration." xi. HARDESH ORES (P) LTD V. HEDE AND COMPANY reported in (2007) 5 SCC 614 paragraph no.25 reads as under: "25. The language of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is quite clear and unambiguous. The plaint can be rejected on the ground of limitation only where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Mr Nariman did not dispute that “law” within the meaning of clause (d) of Order 7 Rule 11 must include the law of limitation as well. It is well settled that whether a plaint discloses a cause of action is essentially a question of fact, but whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is whether the averments made in the plaint, if taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed. The averments made in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 is applicable. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the - 57 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction of words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. As observed earlier, the language of clause (d) is quite clear but if any authority is required, one may usefully refer to the judgments of this Court in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I and Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn." xii. RAMESH DUTT AND OTHERS V. STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS reported in (2009) 15 SCC 429 paragraph no.14 reads as under: "14. Title in or over an immovable property has many facets. Possession is one of them. Unless there exists a statutory interdict, a person in possession may transfer his right, title and interest in favour of a third party. (See Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra." xiii. SHRI MUKUND BHAVAN TRUST AND OTHERS V. SHRIMANT CHHATRAPATI UDAYAN RAJE PRATAPSINH MAHARAJ BHONSLE AND ANOTHER in CIVIL APPEAL NO.14807 OF 2024 relevant paragraphs read as under: "23. Further, in the aforesaid suit, Respondent 1 also sought possession of the suit properties based on title. As per Article 65 of the Limitation - 58 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 Act, 1963, the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title can be sought within twelve years. From the records, it is evident that the possession of the subject properties was initially with the Government of Maharashtra, then with the Gonsavis and thereafter with Defendant 1 and it can be safely said that at least for a century, Respondent 1 nor his predecessors have been in possession of the properties after the grant of Inam. The plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant- defendant or the State for possession within twelve years. We have already held that the title claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation and therefore, the claim for possession is also barred and consequently, the relief of recovery of possession is also hopelessly barred by limitation. 26. At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful of the position of law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record. However, in cases like this, where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, the courts should not be hesitant in granting the relief and drive the parties back to the trial court. We again place it on record that this is not a case where any forgery or fabrication is committed which had recently come to - 59 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 the knowledge of the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff and his predecessors did not take any steps to assert their title and rights in time. The alleged cause of action is also found to be creation of fiction." xiv. P.KUMARAKURUBARAN V. P.NARAYANAN AND OTHERS reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 975 paragraph no.13 reads as under: "13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in reversing the well-reasoned order of the trial Court warrants interference. The trial Court had rightly held that the issue of limitation necessitated adjudication upon evidence, particularly in view of the appellant's assertion that the Power of Attorney executed by him did not confer any authority upon his father to alienate the suit property and that the impugned transaction came to his knowledge only at a much later point in time. In such circumstances, the determination of limitation involved disputed questions of fact that could not be summarily decided without the benefit of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to reject the plaint solely on a prima facie assumption that the suit was barred by limitation, without undertaking any examination as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was demonstrably false or inherently improbable in - 60 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 light of the record. In the opinion of this Court, such an approach amounts to an error of law and constitutes a misapplication of the well-established principles governing the exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents are inapplicable, being factually distinguishable." xv. SMT. M.PRABHAKUMARI V. SRI.NARAYANASWAMY AND OTHERS (Civil Revision Petition No.620/2023, High Court of Karnataka) relevant paragraphs read as under: "4.11. By relying on Dahiben’s case, he submits that the documents produced along with the plaint would also have to be read along with the plaint for the purpose of consideration of application under Rule 11 of Order 7. The contents of the sale deed executed in favour of defendant No.8, if taken into consideration, would establish the date on which the sale deed was executed and the starting period of limitation. 4.12. He relies on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in C.S.Ramaswamy vs. V.K.Senthil and Ors, more particularly 7.6, 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: - 61 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 7.6. From the aforesaid, it can be seen that most of the cause of actions alleged are much prior to /prior to the execution of the registered Sale Deeds. 7.7. Even the averments and allegations with respect to knowledge of the plaintiffs averred in paragraph 19 can be said to be too vague. Nothing has been mentioned on which date and how the plaintiffs had the knowledge that the document was obtained by fraud and/or misrepresentation. It is averred that the alleged fraudulent sale came to the knowledge of the plaintiffs only when the plaintiffs visited the suit property. Nothing has been mentioned when the plaintiffs visited the suit property. It is not understandable how on visiting the suit property, the plaintiffs could have known the contents of the sale deed and/or the knowledge about the alleged fraudulent sale. 7.8. Even the averments and allegations in the plaint with respect to fraud are not supported by any further averments and allegations how the fraud has been committed/played. Mere stating in the plaint that a fraud has been played is not enough and the allegations of fraud must be specifically averred in the plaint, otherwise merely by using the word “fraud”, the plaintiffs would try to get the suits within the limitation, which otherwise may be barred by limitation. Therefore, even if the submission on behalf of the respondents – original plaintiffs that only the averments and allegations in the plaints are - 62 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 required to be considered at the time of deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is accepted, in that case also by such vague allegations with respect to the date of knowledge, the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to challenge the documents after a period of 10 years. By such a clever drafting and using the word “fraud”, the plaintiffs have tried to bring the suits within the period of limitation invoking Section 17 of the limitation Act. The plaintiffs cannot be permitted to bring the suits within the period of limitation by clever drafting, which otherwise is barred by limitation. At this stage, a recent decision of this Court in the case of Raghwendra Sharan Singh (supra) is required to be referred to. In the said decision, this Court had occasion to consider all earlier decisions on exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which are considered by this Court in paragraphs 6.4 to 6.9 as under:- “6.4. In T. Arivandandam [T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467], while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and the decree of the trial court in considering such application, this Court in para 5 has observed and held as under: (SCC p. 470) “5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in - 63 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits.” 6.5. In Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society [Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706], this Court in para 13 has observed and held as under: (SCC p. 715) “13. While scrutinising the plaint averments, it is the bounden duty of the trial court to ascertain the materials for cause of action. The cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff the right to relief against the defendant. Every fact which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to get a decree should be set out in clear terms. It is worthwhile to - 64 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 find out the meaning of the words “cause of action”. A cause of action must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue.” 6.6. In ABC Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies [(1989) 2 SCC 163], this Court explained the meaning of “cause of action” as follows: (SCC p. 170, para 12) “12. A cause of action means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff.” - 65 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 6.7. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable [Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137] in paras 11 and 12, this Court has observed as under: (SCC p. 146) “11. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. 12. The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 of the Code. (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V.Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467].)” 6.8. In Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy [Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174], this Court has observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 178- 79, para 7) “7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are - 66 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised by the court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since the power conferred on the court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint - 67 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.” 6.9. In Ram Singh [Ram Singh v. Gram Panchayat Mehal Kalan, (1986) 4 SCC 364], this Court has observed and held that when the suit is barred by any law, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to circumvent that provision by means of clever drafting so as to avoid mention of those circumstances, by which the suit is barred by law of limitation.” 7.9 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions on exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to the facts of the case on hand and the averments in the plaints, we are of the opinion that both the Courts below have materially erred in not rejecting the plaints in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. The respective suits have been filed after a period of 10 years from the date of execution of the registered sale deeds. It is to be noted that one suit was filed by the minor, which was filed in the year 2006, in which some of the plaintiffs herein were also party to the said suit and in the said suit, there was a specific reference to the Sale Deed dated 19.09.2005 and the said suit came to be dismissed in the year 2014 and immediately thereafter the present suits have been filed. Thus, from the averments in the plaint and the bundle of facts - 68 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 stated in the plaint, we are of the opinion that by clever drafting, the plaintiffs have tried to bring the suits within the period of limitation, which otherwise are barred by limitation. Therefore, considering the decisions of this Court in the case of T. Arivandandam (supra) and other decision of Raghwendra Sharan Singh (supra), and as the respective suits are barred by the law of limitation, the respective plaints are required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 4.16. Lastly, he relies upon the decision of this Court in Durga Projects and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., more particularly paragraph 6, 7 and 8 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for reference: 6. If the plaint is subjected to scrutiny, it appears that the plaintiffs have founded the reliefs mainly contending that the GPA dated 23.01.2002 was the only document executed by them and their father in favour of defendants 1 & 2. They say that they had to join in execution of the GPA with their father on the insistence by the defendants 1 & 2. The argument of petitioners Counsel is that the plaintiffs have deliberately suppressed two important transactions namely execution of an agreement of sale and an affidavit, which were contemporaneous transactions. The petitioners Counsel has produced these documents. In the background of well established principle that only plaint must be seen - 69 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 for deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, a question, whether these two transactions can be considered? would obviously arise. As has been pleaded by the plaintiffs, if GPA was the only document that came into existence as 23.01.2002, definitely, the plaintiffs case that they are entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property becomes an issue to be decided after recording evidence, if not they must fail at the threshold. Now if para 10 of the plaint is meaningfully read, what the plaintiffs have stated is that GPA is an independent transaction and no consideration was paid for execution of the said GPA. That means they do not want to state anything about agreement of sale and the affidavit. The plaint appears to have been drafted cleverly suppressing the material facts. This Court, in a situation like this, has already taken a view in the case of R. Satishkumar Singh v. Sri.Ram Singh [ RFA 653/2014.] , that suppression of facts by the plaintiff may be a ground for rejection of plaint. The High Court of Patna in the case of Bhagirathprasad Singh @ Bachcha Babu v. Ram Narayan Rai @ Ram Narayan Singh [2010 SCC OnLine Pat 737, AIR 2010 Pat 189.] , has held as below: “9. I find no force in the submission raised on behalf of the plaintiffs - opposite parties. No doubt, as per the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for the purposes of determining the question of rejection of plaint on the other grounds - 70 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 mentioned therein, it is the plaint that has to be looked into, but the question is that if the plaintiffs have deliberately suppressed the material facts, the disclosure of which is required bylaw to be made in terms of Order VI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether it was open for the court concerned to proceed with the trial and decide the suit after framing issues. The order dated 20.11.2006 was challenged by the plaintiffs- judgment debtors themselves before this Court and the civil revision was dismissed by a reasoned order dated 1.5.2008. Thus, this fact was well known to the plaintiffs and they were duty bound in law to disclose the same which they have not done. Order VI Rule 2(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly stipulates that the pleadings should contain the material facts. It has been observed by the Apex Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137 that omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement or plaint becomes bad. Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down an independent remedy made available to the defendant to challenge the maintainability of the suit itself irrespective of his right to contest the same on merits. The real object of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to keep out of courts irresponsible law suits and in case Court is prima facie persuaded of the view that the suit is an abuse of the process of the court, in the sense that it is a - 71 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 bogus and irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be exercised”. (emphasis supplied) 7. Therefore, in this case it is apparent that material facts are suppressed and the cause of action that the plaintiffs have claimed can be said to be illusionary and there by Order VII Rule 11(a) of CPC can be invoked. 8. As regards limitation, in Para 38 of the plaint it is clearly stated that the cause of action arose on 18.03.2005, 29.03.2007 and 15.06.2016. 18.03.2005 is the date when the first defendant executed a sale deed in favour of third defendant. That means, the cause of action first arose on 18.03.2005. This is a suit for declaration and possession. Just because possession is claimed, 12 years period of limitation is not available. Unless the sale deeds are set aside and the plaintiffs' title is declared, they are not entitled to possession. Declaration is the main relief in the circumstances pleaded. Article 58 of the Limitation Act is applicable and therefore the limitation is to be reckoned from the first date; the subsequent dates pleaded do not extend the limitation period. In the case of Khatri Hotels Private Limited v. Union Of India [(2011) 9 SCC 126.] ,it is held as below. - 72 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 “30. While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word ‘first’ has been used between the words ‘sue’ and ‘accrued’. This would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued." xvi. C.KUNHAMMAD V. C.H.AHAMAD HAJI reported in AIR 2001 KERALA 101 paragraph no.8 reads as under: "8. Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that eventhough the property to be recovered is not described in the plaint, it can be easily identified, as the property through which the pipe line was drawn. In order to grant an effective decree, the plaintiff has to specify the property with the necessary particulars in the plaint. Therefore, the trial Court has gone wrong in decreeing the suit for recovery without specifying the property to be recovered. Learned counsel for the plaintiff also submitted that he is entitled to get a decree of mandatory injunction under - 73 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 S. 39 of the Specific Relief Act. A mandatory injunction can only be granted where the plaintiff shows very strong probability upon the facts that grave damages will accrue to him in the future and the damages will not be a sufficient or adequate remedy for the damages caused. In the decision in Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris (1970) AC 652 the house of Lords while dealing with mandatory injunction held as follows: “Where the defendant has acted without regard to his neighbour's rights, or has tried to steal a march on him or has tried to evade the jurisdiction of the Court or, to sum it up, has acted wantonly and quite unreasonably in relation to his neighbour he may be ordered to repair his wanton and unreasonable acts by doing positive work to restore the status quo even if the expense to him is out of all proportion to the advantage there by accruing to the plaintiff.”" xvii. STATE OF KERALA V. UNION OF INDIA reported in (2024) 7 SCC 183 relevant paragraphs read as under: "12. The globally acknowledged golden principles, collectively known as “the triple-test”, are followed by the courts across the jurisdictions as the prerequisites before a party can be mandatorily injuncted to do or - 74 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 to refrain from doing a particular thing. These three cardinal factors, that are deeply embedded in the Indian jurisprudence as well, are: 12.1. A “prima facie case”, which necessitates that as per the material placed on record, the plaintiff is likely to succeed in the final determination of the case; 12.2. “Balance of convenience”, such that the prejudice likely to be caused to the plaintiff due to rejection of the interim relief will be higher than the inconvenience that the defendant may face if the relief is so granted; and 12.3. “Irreparable injury”, which means that if the relief is not granted, the plaintiff will face an irreversible injury that cannot be compensated in monetary terms." xviii. VASANTHA (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE V. RAJALAKSHMI ALIAS RAJAM (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES reported in (2024) 5 SCC 282 relevant paragraphs read as under:" "40. In Saroop Singh v. Banto (two-Judge Bench), this Court observed that Article 65 states that the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to - 75 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 the plaintiff but commences from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse. Further relying on Karnataka Wakf Board v. Union of India (two-Judge Bench), it observed that the physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases related to adverse possession. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blend of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession; (b) what was the nature of his possession; (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party; (d) how long his possession has continued; and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to prove his adverse possession. 41. This Court in Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan (two-Judge Bench), reiterating the observations made in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma (two-Judge Bench) in respect of the concept of adverse possession observed that efficacy of adverse - 76 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 possession law in most jurisdictions depends on strong limitation statutes by operation of which, right to access the court expires through efflux of time. As against the rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one's right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time but also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under a claim of right or colour of title. 42. In Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. ESI Corpn., (two-Judge Bench) while discussing the object of the Limitation Act, this Court opined that : (SCC pp. 865-66, para 7) “7. … The law of limitation appertains to remedies because the rule is that claims in respect of rights cannot be entertained if not commenced within the time prescribed by the statute in respect of that right. - 77 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 Apart from the legislative action prescribing the time, there is no period of limitation recognised under the general law and therefore any time fixed by the statute is necessarily to be arbitrary. A statute prescribing limitation however does not confer a right of action nor speaking generally does not confer on a person a right to relief which has been barred by efflux of time prescribed by the law. The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims while this is so there are two aspects of the statutes of limitation the one concerns the extinguishment of the right if a claim or action is not commenced with a particular time and - 78 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 the other merely bare the claim without affecting the right which either remains merely as a moral obligation or can be availed of to furnish the consideration for a fresh enforceable obligation. Where a statute, prescribing the limitation extinguishes the right, it affects substantive rights while that which purely pertains to the commencement of action without touching the right is said to be procedural.” (emphasis supplied)" xix. KAVITA TREHAN (MRS.) AND ANOTHER V. BALSARA HYGIENE PRODUCTS LTD. reported in (1994) 5 SCC 380 paragraph no.16 reads as under: "16. The Law of Restitution encompasses all claims founded upon the principle of unjust enrichment. ‘Restitutionary claims are to be found in equity as well as at law’. Restitutionary law has many branches. The law of quasi-contract is “that part of restitution which stems from the common indebitatus counts for money had and received and for money paid, and from quantum meruit and quantum valebant claims”. [See The Law of Restitution — Goff & Jones, 4th Edn., page 3.] Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., page 434 states: - 79 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 “Common Law. Any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to prevent a man from retaining the money of, or some benefit derived from, another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now recognised to fall within a third category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution. For historical reasons, quasi-contract has traditionally been treated as part of, or together with, the law of contract. Yet independently, equity has also developed principles which are aimed at providing a remedy for unjustifiable enrichment. It may be that today these two strands are in the process of being woven into a single topic in the law, which may be termed ‘restitution’.” xx. MAHIJIBHAI MOHANBHAI BAROT V. PATEL MANIBHAI GOKALBHAI AND OTHERS reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 319 paragraph no.24 reads as under: "24. The second objection is that if the view of the High Court is correct, Section 144 would become - 80 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 redundant, as Section 47 of the Code covers the same field. Even under the Act of 1882 there were two sections, namely, Section 583, corresponding to some extent, to Section 144 of the present Code, and Section 244, corresponding to Section 47 of the present Code. Even so, there was a conflict under the old Code as regards the scope of restitution and also as regards the question of the bar of a suit in a civil Court. Section 144 was enacted to avoid the conflict, to clarify the doubts, and to define the powers of the Court. Sub-section (2) of Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was enacted to obviate any further debate on the question of bar of a suit." xxi. MAQBOOL ALAM KHAN V. MST KHODAIJA AND OTHERS reported in 1966 SCC OnLine SC 205 paragraph no.3 reads as under: "3. The appellant rests his claim of title to the land upon an alleged oral gift by Najma. Khodaija disputes the factum and validity of the gift. In rejoinder, the appellant contends that by the doctrine of lis pendens Khodaija is constructively bound by the final decree passed in Title Suit No. 127 of 1939 in the presence of her predecessor-in-title, Latafat and that the decree conclusively declared his title to the land on the basis of the oral gift by Najma. Khodaija gives a twofold answer to this contention. She says - 81 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 that (1) by the decree in Title Suit No. 126 of 1944 she was held not to be a party to Title Suit No. 127 of 1939 and she is therefore not bound by the decree passed in that suit, and (2) by the order of the High Court dated January 24, 1949 and the final order of the Munsif dated June 28, 1949 passed in the proceedings for restitution under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure it was finally declared that she was not bound by the decree in Title Suit No. 127 of 1939. These contentions of Khodaija are sound and should be accepted. The compromise decree in Title Suit No. 126 of 1944 provided that Khodaija's name be expunged from the category of defendants in Title Suit No. 127 of 1939, and in other respects the decree in that suit would stand. The purpose of the compromise decree was that Khodaija's name should be expunged from the array of parties in Title Suit No. 127 of 1939, so that she would not be bound by the decree in that suit either actually or constructively. On a construction of this decree, the High Court held on January 24, 1949 in the proceedings for restitution that Khodaija's claim for restitution fell within the purview of Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that “as a result of a compromise, the decree was set aside as against her”. By his final order dated June 28, 1949 the Munsif directed restitution on the basis of this finding. In Mahijibhai v. Manibhai [(1965) 2 SCR 436] this Court by a majority held that an - 82 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 application for restitution under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an application for execution of a decree. The principle of res judicata applies to execution proceedings. It follows that Khodaija is not bound by the decree in Title Suit No. 127 of 1939 and is entitled to reagitate all the questions in issue in that suit." xxii. SOUTH EASTERN COAFIELDS LTD. V. STATE OF MP AND OTHERS reported in (2003) 8 SCC 648 relevant paragraphs read as under: "27. Section 144 CPC is not the fountain source of restitution, it is rather a statutory recognition of a pre-existing rule of justice, equity and fair play. That is why it is often held that even away from Section 144 the court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do complete justice between the parties. In Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari Their Lordships of the Privy Council said: (AIR p. 271) “It is the duty of the court under Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to ‘place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed’. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the court to - 83 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved.” Cairns, L.C. said in Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompte de Paris (ER p.125) “[O]ne of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression, ‘the act of the court’ is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the court as a whole, from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest court which finally disposes of the case.” This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it (A. Arunagiri Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami [(1971) 1 MLJ 220] ). In the exercise of such inherent power the courts have applied the principles of restitution to myriad situations not strictly falling within the terms of Section 144. 28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of the court; the “act of the court” embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court would not - 84 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the court; the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the court and the act of such party. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the court not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the court pronounces its judicial verdict which does not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. Whenever called upon to adjudicate, the court would act in conjunction with what is real and substantial justice. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the court shall be undone and the gain which the party would have earned unless it was interdicted by the order of the court would be restored to or conferred on the party by - 85 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 suitably commanding the party liable to do so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach the courts, persuading the court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to be heard and determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of the court withholding the release of money had remained in operation." xxiii. CITIBANK N.A. V. HITEN P.DALAL AND OTHERS reported in (2016) 1 SCC 411 relevant paragraphs read as under: - 86 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 "14. In Lakshmi Amma, the Madras High Court noticed certain Privy Council judgments and also the contention that Section 144 CPC providing for restitution would apply only to cases where in execution of a decree passed by one court, a benefit is received by the decree-holder and thereafter that decree is reversed or set aside subsequently by a competent court, then in such cases the court should place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such a decree which was varied or set aside. However, on the facts of that case the claim of the plaintiff-appellant for restitution was turned down. In the other Madras High Court judgment in S. Chockalingam the right of a bona fide purchaser for value was upheld in para 30 of the judgment and thereafter in para 31 reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Bhagwant by extracting the following passage:(S. Chockalingam case, SCC OnLine Mad) “… ‘14. … The doctrine of restitution which is that on the reversal of a judgment the law raises an obligation on the party to the record who received the benefit of the erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he had lost and it is the duty of the court to enforce that obligation unless it is shown that restitution would be clearly contrary to the interests of justice.’ - 87 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 (Bhagwant Singh case [(1953) 1 SCC 101 : AIR 1953 SC 136 : 1953 SCR 559] , AIR p. 139, para 14)” 15. In Surendra Lal, the Calcutta High Court explained that it is the duty of the court under Section 144 CPC to place the parties in the earlier position after a decree executed in favour of one be varied or reversed. But it was clarified that : (SCC OnLine Cal para 6) “6. … in assessing what a party may have lost or of what he may have been deprived during his dispossession the law takes into account not what he could have made but what his opponent did in fact make or could with reasonable diligence have made.” This conclusion was predicated on the reasoning that in a vast majority of cases it would be hypothetical, remote and uncertain to find out what the party subjected to dispossession could have made if it was left in possession. 19. In the ultimate analysis we find that the law on restitution under Section 144 CPC is quite well settled. It vests expansive power in the court but such power has to be exercised to ensure equity, fairness and justice for both the parties. It also flows - 88 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 from more or less common stand of parties on the principle of law that for ascertaining the value of the property which is no longer available for restitution on account of sale, etc., the court should adopt a realistic and verifiable approach instead of resorting to hypothetical and presumptive value. It is also one of the established propositions that in the context of restitution the court should keep under consideration not only the loss suffered by the party entitled to restitution but also the gain, if any, made by other party who is obliged to make restitution. No unmerited injustice should be caused to any of the parties." xxiv. K.N. KRISHNAPPA V. T.R.GOPALKRISHNA SETTY BY LRs reported in ILR 1996 KAR 2520 relevant paragraphs read as under: "10. Sub-section (1) of Section 47 makes it clear that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representative, which relates to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree has to be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. Under sub-section (3), the question whether any person is or is not the representative of a party shall be determined by the executing Court. Explanation II(a) and (b) make it dear that a purchaser of - 89 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit. Delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of Section 47 as laid down by clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 47. 11. As laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision, the question relating to delivery of possession to the auction purchaser or his representatives, by the judgment debtor or his representatives, is a matter relating to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of Section 47 CPC. Sub-section (1) of Section 47 prohibits determination of such questions by way of a separate suit and mandates that such questions shall be determined only by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. 12. Section 47 C.P.C. received a liberal construction from the Supreme Court in Smt. Nandarani Mazumdar v. Indian Airlines [(1983) 4 SCC 461 : AIR 1983 SC 1201.] . A suit was treated as an application under Section 47 and relief was granted to the decree holder. The decree-holder therein obtained a decree - 90 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 for maintenance and subsequently filed a suit after the death of her husband for declaration of charge on the estate of the deceased husband. Having regard to the fact that the decree holder was a widow, the Supreme Court felt that a account of some procedural error, the widow should not be deprived of the fruits of an order of maintenance and granted relief as a measure of ex debito justitiae and treated the suit as an execution petition. The facts of this case are totally different. The sale was confirmed and Sale Certificate was issued on 17.10.1957 whereas the suit was filed in the year 1979. No reasons are forthcoming for the enormous delay in seeking delivery of possession. The appellant pleaded that the suit property underwent enormous change during the past two decades prior to the filing of the suit and constructions are put up at considerable cost. The ratio in the above decision cannot be applied to this case. 13. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the suit is barred under sub-section (1) of Section 47 and it is not open to the Court to treat the suit as an application under Section 47(2) which was not in existence on the date of the suit. I accordingly hold that both the courts below were in error in decreeing the suit. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The decrees of the courts below are set aside. - 91 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 JEPT: 15.3.1996 An oral application is made requesting grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. As no substantial question of law of general importance is involved in this appeal, leave refused. ORDER ON I.A. This application is filed by the appellant for restoration of possession of the suit property under Section 151 C.P.C. The appellant states that he was dispossessed by the respondents pursuant to an exparte order dated 15.2.1996 in Ex. 79/93 by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Kolar after the dismissal of the appeal by this Court on 1.2.1996 for default, after the appeal was restored on 12.2.1996. This application is opposed by the respondents, contending that the application is not maintainable as Section 144 C.P.C. is applicable and also on the ground that such on application does not lie in this Court and that it is only the Trial Court which can be approached in that regard. The execution of the decree of the courts below was stayed by this Court by an order dated 18.11.1993. On 1.2.1996, the appeal was dismissed - 92 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 for default and along with the appeal, the interim orders also stood vacated. On 3.2.1996, an application was filed for restoration of the appeal. The appeal was restored by an order dated 12.2.1996. After the dismissal of the appeal for default the respondents moved the Court for execution of the decree and on 16.2.1996 the appellant was got evicted pursuant to the decree. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that no execution could have taken place after the restoration of the appeal and hence the appellant should be put back in possession. The learned Counsel for the respondents contends that the application is not maintainable and an application for restoration should be filed only in the executing Court. With the restoration of the appeal on 12.2.1996, the interim order of stay was automatically restored and was in force from 12.2.1996. No execution could have taken place after 12.2.1996. As the appellant was evicted in execution of the decree only on 16.2.1996, the appellant should be put back in possession. The inherent powers of this Court under Section 151 C.P.C. can be invoked for restoring the parties to their position in which they were, prior to the execution. The power of restitution - 93 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 is not confined to Section 144 C.P.C. as the Court has inherent power to grant restitution in exercise of the powers under Section 151 C.P.C. as held by this Court in Hameed and Hameed Enterprises v. Nicky's Parlour. The application is therefore allowed and the appellant will be put back in possession of the suit schedule properties from which he was evicted in execution of the decree." xxv. INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in (2011) 8 SCC 161 relevant paragraphs read as under: "188. In a relatively recent judgment of this Court in Amarjeet Singh v. Devi Ratan the Court in para 17 of the judgment observed as under: (SCC pp. 422-23) “17. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of its own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the court. The - 94 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a fact situation the court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised, as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the court.” 189. In another recent judgment of this Court in Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania this Court in para 15 observed as under: (SCC p. 446) “15. No litigant can derive any benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges into the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the court. The fact that the case is found, ultimately, devoid - 95 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 of any merit, or the party withdrew the writ petition, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a situation the court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised, as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by the delayed action of the court." 196. On consideration of pleadings and relevant judgments of the various courts, following irresistible conclusions emerge: (i) The judgment of the Apex Court has great sanctity and unless there are extremely compelling, overriding and exceptional circumstances, the judgment of the Apex Court should not be disturbed particularly in a case where review and curative petitions have already been dismissed. (ii) The exception to this general rule is where in the proceedings the Judge concerned failed to disclose the connection with the subject-matter or - 96 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 the parties giving scope of an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affected the petitioner. (iii) The other exception to the rule is where the circumstances incorporated in the review or curative petition are such that they must inevitably shake public confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice if the judgment or order is allowed to stand. These categories are illustrative and not exhaustive but only in such extremely exceptional circumstances can the order be recalled in order to avoid irremedial (sic irremediable) injustice. 197. The other aspect which has been dealt with in great detail is to neutralise any unjust enrichment and undeserved gain made by the litigants. While adjudicating, the courts must keep the following principles in view: (1) It is the bounden duty and obligation of the court to neutralise any unjust enrichment and undeserved gain made by any party by invoking the jurisdiction of the court. (2) When a party applies and gets a stay or injunction from the court, it is always at the risk and responsibility of the party applying. An order of - 97 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 stay cannot be presumed to be conferment of additional right upon the litigating party. (3) Unscrupulous litigants be prevented from taking undue advantage by invoking jurisdiction of the court. (4) A person in wrongful possession should not only be removed from that place as early as possible but be compelled to pay for wrongful use of that premises fine, penalty and costs. Any leniency would seriously affect the credibility of the judicial system. (5) No litigant can derive benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a court of law. (6) A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs. (7) Litigation should not be permitted to turn into a fruitful industry so that the unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. (8) The institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by delayed action of courts." - 98 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 xxvi. ESTATE OFFICER, HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS V. NIRMALA DEVI in CIVIL APPEAL NO.7707 OF 2025, paragraph no.75 reads as under: "75.Mandatory injunction by its nature embodied under Section 39 of the 1963 Act is discretionary. The granting of mandatory injunction is a matter of judicial discretion of the court and it can be granted only in a case which falls strictly within the four corners of the provision Section 39 of the Act 1963. The two elements which govern Section 39 of the Act 1963 for the grant of mandatory injunction are (1) the necessity to prevent breach of an obligation by the intervention of the court and (is) that such acts should be of that nature capable of enforcement by the court. Yet another ingredient is also available which is crucial in the matter of grant of mandatory injunction that it should be amenable for exercise of judicial discretion'. A relief which is not amenable for exercising judicial discretion of the Court cannot be granted by way of a mandatory injunction. It should satisfy not only breach of an obligation and the necessity of its prevention, but also the availability of judicial discretion to be exercised. A mere breach of an obligation or necessity to prevent the same alone cannot he brought under the purview - 99 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 of mandatory injunction unless the same is amenable for exercising discretion by the Court." xxvii. STATE OF KERALA V. UNION OF INDIA reported in (2024) 7 SCC 183 relevant paragraphs read as under: "14. In that sense, prohibitory injunctions are forward-looking, such that they seek to restrict a future course of action. Conversely, mandatory injunctions are backward-looking, because they require the defendant to take an active step and undo the past action. [Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham, (1970) 3 WLR 348] Since mandatory injunctions require the defendant to take a positive action instead of merely being restrained from performing an act, they carry a graver risk of prejudice for the defendant if the final outcome subsequently turns out to be in its favour. For instance, in the example above, preventing the demolition of a structure for the time being cannot be perceived to be on the same pedestal as mandating the demolition of a construction. While the former may still be undone i.e. the defendant may still be compelled to demolish the structure should the plaintiff succeeds in his final claim, undoing the latter i.e. rebuilding the construction, would cause graver injustice. The courts are, therefore, relatively more cautious in granting mandatory injunction as - 100 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 compared to prohibitory injunction and thus, require the plaintiff to establish a stronger case. 15. Reverting to the facts of the case in hand, the plaintiff State has sought mandatory injunction and not a prohibitory one. Instead of arguing that the defendant Union of India should refrain from imposing a net borrowing ceiling during the next FY, the plaintiff has applied for a backward-looking injunction i.e. for an injunction to undo the imposition of the net borrowing ceiling that covered various liabilities and to restore the position that existed before such ceiling. Hence, the plaintiff is required to meet a higher standard for the triple-test of interim relief as mentioned in para 12 above of this order. 16. Coming to the first factor i.e. the prima facie case, the plaintiff State has raised various substantive questions of constitutional interpretation. Generally speaking, the phrase “prima facie case” is not a term of art and it simply signifies that at first sight the plaintiff has a strong case. According to Webster's International Dictionary, “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence”, which in turn means the evidence that is sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact unless rebutted." - 101 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 xxviii. BHIM RAO SWAMI RAO DESAI V. LAXMIBAI AND ANOTHER reported in ILR 1965 MYSORE 358 relevant paragraphs read as under: "5. Before referring to the decided cases, it would be necessary to carefully examine the provisions of Section 144(1) of the C.P.C. An analysis of that section shows: (a) Where and in so far as a decree or order is varied or reversed; (b) the Court of first instance, shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied or reversal; (c) and, for this purpose, the court may make any orders, including orders for the refused of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation or reversal. The first part contained in (a) above sets out condition on which are dependent the other matters set out in the sub-section. That condition is, that a - 102 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 decree or order must become varied or reversed. If that condition is satisfied, a duty is cast, under the second part (shown under (b) above), on the court of the first instance to cause restitution to be made. Under the last part of the sub-section (shown under (c) above), the court is empowered to make any orders for the purposes of discharging its duty of causing the restitution to be made. It will be noticed that it is not stated anywhere in Section 144(1) that the variation or reversal of the decree or order, must have resulted from any judgment or order made by a superior court acting in appeal or revision. The duty of the court to cause restitution to be made has not been made to depend on the condition that the variation or reversal should be the result of proceedings in appeal or in revision. On a plain reading of the language of the sub-section, it appears that where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed, the duty on the part of the court arises to cause restitution to be made, on application by any party entitled to such restitution. The narrow view, taken by some of the courts is due to placing emphasis on the expression ‘the court of first instance’ in section 144(1). It is said that this expression implies that the variation or reversal (of the decree or order), must be by a superior court - 103 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 acting in appeal or revision. But, there seems to be no good reason for drawing such an inference. Section 583 of the Code of 1882 (which corresponded to present Section 144) was as follows:— “When a party entitled to any benefit (by way of restitution or otherwise) under a decree passed in an appeal under this chapter desires to obtain execution of the same, he shall apply to the court which passed the decree against which the appeal was preferred; and such court shall proceed to execute the decree passed in appeal, according to the rules hereinbefore prescribed for the execution of decrees in suits.” That old section pertained to execution of decree of appellate courts. Section 144 has been placed in Part XI under the heading ‘Miscellaneous’, in the Code of 1908. It will be noticed that there is no reference in Section 144(1) either to any court of appeal or to the court which passed the decree. Instead, the reference is to the ‘court of first instance.’ As long back as the year 1917, a Full Bench of the Old Chief Court of Mysore repelled the contention that the words ‘the Court of first instance’ necessarily implied interference only by a superior Court. The learned Chief Judge, while delivering the opinion of the Full Bench, explained as to why these - 104 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 words were inserted is (Puttanna v. Puttachary). This is what he has stated: “…………..I take it that the words ‘the court of first instance’ ought not to be read as necessarily involving the interference of a Superior court. The words were inserted in the Code in consequence of difficulty which arose under Sections 583 and 587 of the former Code in cases where the variation or reversal was by a Court of Second Appeal, and are not I think intended to restrict the application of the section to cases in which one court varies or reverses the decree of another.” That the expression ‘the court of first instance’ need not necessarily be equated to ‘trial court’, is seen from a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Ratanchand v. Multanmull . Tukol, J. who delivered the judgment of the Court has stated as follows at page 428:— “The expression is obviously distinguishable from the expressions ‘trial Court’ and ‘executing court’ which are indicative of the function of the court. So giving the words contained in the expression their normal meaning and bearing in mind the object of Section 144, it will have to be interpreted as meaning the court which can effectively give the relief by way of restitution to the party making the application; - 105 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 such a court need not in all cases be idential with the ‘trial court’, since the court which made the payment or delivered the property may be some other court. ……………………………………………. ……………………………………………. It would therefore be clear that the court of the first instance’ contemplated by Section 144 is that Court which paid the amount or delivered the property into the possession of the person who by a subsequent decree or order of a competent court is found to be not entitled to the same and it is only such Court that can set matters right.” It is thus clear, that merely on the basis of the expression ‘the court of first instance’, it cannot be reasonably contended that the variation or reversal (of the decree or order) contemplated in section 144, must necessarily be a variation or reversal effected by a superior Court, to put such a construction, would be to read into the section words of limitation which are not actually there. A Full Bench of the Patna High Court (Maqdool Alam Khan v. Mt. Khodaija Begum rejected the contention that the expression ‘the court of first instance’ contemplated the variation of the reversal of the decree only by a superior court; Ramaswami J., who delivered the leading judgment, stated as follows at page 184:— - 106 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 “In my view, there is no warrant for construing the section in this limited sense. The phrase ‘varied or reversed’ in the present section is unqualified and ought to receive its full force and effect. It is an established rule that words of limitation are not to be read into a statute if it can be avoided.” Further on, that learned Judge has stated as follows:— “For the application it was suggested that the phrase ‘varied or reversed’ was used in a technical sense, that the phrase exclusively meant that variation or reversal of decree should be by appeal in the same proceeding. In my opinion, this argument is unfounded and there is no reason to hold that the phrase is used in such a restricted technical sense. A decree may be varied or reversed not only by an appeal but by revision to a superior court which may either affirm, set aside or modify the decree. A court may review its own decree and set it aside. If a decree is obtained by framed or granted by a court that has no jurisdiction, such a decree may doubtless be varied or reversed by a suit brought in a different court.” In (Ankamma v. Punnayya), Patanjali Sastri J. (as he then was), has taken the view that Section 144 would be applicable, provided the decree is varied or - 107 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 reversed, however the variance or reversal has been effected, and that it is not necessary that the variance or reversal must be in appeal. Section 144 embodies the principle that one of the first and highests duties of all courts is to take that the act of the court does no injury to the suitors. In (L. Guran Ditta v. T.R. Ditta), the Privy Council has pointed out that the duty of the court when awarding restitution under Section 144 of the Code is imperative, and that it shall place the applicant in the position in which he would have been if the order had not been made. Section 144 has been enacted with a view to shorten litigation and afford speedy relief. The section does not say that the variation or reversal must be by a superior court; all that is required for the purposes of Section 144 is, that the decree or order must have been varied or reversed. There is no justification for limiting the scope of that section by reading into it words of limitation which are not there. In a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court (Jagendra nath Singh v. Hira Sahu), Malik J. who delivered the leading judgment, has stated as follows at page 255:— “The most common method is to file an appeal or, where the decree is not appealable, a revision in a superior court which may either affirm, set it aside or - 108 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 modify the decree. In that case, no doubt the decree has been either ‘affirmed’, ‘varied’, or ‘reversed’. A Court may also review its own decree and in that case it sets aside its previous decree. It will be noticed that there is no question, then of a superior and an inferior court as the Court had itself passed the decree. If a decree has been obtained by fraud or has been obtained against a person who was loot properly represented or has been passed by a Court that had no jurisdiction, it may be possible to have it varied or reversed by another Court. There seems to be no reason why restitution under Section 144 should be confined only to the case where the decree has been ‘varied’ or ‘reversed in appeal or revision and has not been ‘varied’ or ‘reversed’ by any Court by any of the other modes.” In a later decision (Vindhyachal v. Board of Revenue, a Division Bench of that High Court has held that Section 144, C.P.C., applies to all cases in which a decree or order is varied or reversed and when that in the case, any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise is entitled to be placed in the position which he would have occupied but for such decree or order which has been varied or reversed. The learned Judges have, in that context, further observed that a decree or order may be varied or reversed in appeal or in revision, or in some other - 109 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 proceedings, or in a separate suit, or even by subsequent legislation. The above decision of the Allahabad High Court has been followed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a case (Hariram v. Pooransingh). In a decision (Ettiyathi Madhavan v. Ouseph Thomas), it has been held that variation or reversal by the court which passed the decree will also entitled the party, who got the benefit, to secure the necessary relief under the section. 6. From a consideration of the above authorities and on a careful examination of the language of Section 144(1), I am satisfied that the said sub- section is wide enough to cover cases in which restitution is sought, consequent on an ex parte decree being set aside. I am also satisfied that this view does not in any way offend the principle underlying this sub-section. I do not see any real difference between the expression ‘reversed’ and the words ‘set aside’. There is no justification to exclude from the ambit of Section 144(1), cases in which restitution is sought consequent an ex parte decree being set aside. At page 186 of the Full Bench decision of the Old Mysore Chief Court (Puttanna v. Puttachari), it is stated as follows:— - 110 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 “It may be that the defendant's failure to appear is often not due to any fault of the plaintiff : the defendant may miss a train, or meet with an accident on his way to court, or be misled by a mistake in the summons, or misinformed by an official of the court; but even so, there does not teem to me to be any reason why he should suffer when the court can put the parties back in the position which they would have occupied but for the decree. The decree is set aside because the court would not have made it without hearing the defendant had it known all the circumstances and the true view seems to be that once set aside the decree not only is of no authority to support further execution, but cannot be relied on in support of acts done under it before it was set aside. It is anulled and must be dealt with as if it never had any force at any time, at any rate as between the plaintiff and the defendant. I think therefore that Section 144 is applicable and should be applied to the case before us……….” I find myself in agreement with this reasoning." xxix. BINAYAK SWAIN V. RAMESH CHANDRA reported in 1965 SCC OnLine SC 350 relevant paragraphs read as under: - 111 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 "4. The question presented for determination in this case is whether the appellant was entitled to restitution of his properties purchased by judgment- debtor in execution of the decree passed by the District Judge on the ground that the decree was set aside by the High Court and the suit was remanded for rehearing and fresh disposal under the provisions of Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code which states as follows: “144. (1) Where and insofar as a decree or order is varied or reversed, the court of first instance shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed; and, for this purpose, the court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation or reversal.” On behalf of the respondents Mr Aggarwala made the submission that after the suit was reheard a decree was passed in favour of the respondents and - 112 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 that decree was eventually affirmed by the High Court, and the appellant was, therefore, not entitled to restitution under the provisions of this section. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. The properties of the appellant were sold in execution at the instance of the respondents who were executing the ex parte decree passed by the District Judge on March 9, 1943. In this execution case, the properties of the appellant were sold and the respondents got delivery of possession on May 17, 1946. It is true that the suit was eventually decreed after remand on August 27, 1954 by judgment of the High Court, but we are unable to accept the argument of the respondents that the execution sale held under the previous ex parte decree which was set aside by the High Court, is validated by the passing of the subsequent decree and therefore the appellant is not entitled to any restitution. It is evident that the application for restitution was filed by the appellant in 1947 in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 34 of 1947 before the passing of a fresh decree by the High Court in the second appeal. At the time of the application for restitution, therefore, the appellant was entitled to restitution, because on that date the decree in execution of which the properties were sold had been set aside. We are of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to restitution notwithstanding anything which happened subsequently as the right to claim - 113 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 restitution is based upon the existence or otherwise of a decree in favour of the plaintiff at the time when the application for restitution was made. The principle of the doctrine of restitution is that on the reversal of a decree, the law imposes an obligation on the party to the suit who received the benefit of the erroneous decree to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost. This obligation arises automatically on the reversal or modification of the decree and necessarily carries with it the right to restitution of all that has been done under the erroneous decree : and the court in making restitution is bound to restore the parties, so far as they can be restored, to the same position they were in at the time when the court by its erroneous action had displaced them from. It should be noticed, in the present case, that the properties were purchased by the decree-holder himself in execution of the ex parte decree and not by a stranger auction-purchaser. After the ex parte decree was set aside in appeal and after a fresh decree was passed on remand, the sale held in execution of the ex parte decree becomes invalid and the decree-holder who purchased the properties in execution of the invalid decree is bound to restore to the judgment-debtor what he had gained under the decree which was subsequently set aside. The view that we have expressed is borne out by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Zain-Ul-Abdin Khan v. - 114 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 Muhammad Asghar Ali Khan [ILR 10 Allahabad 166] in which a suit was brought by the judgment-debtor to set aside the sale of his property in execution of the decree against him in force at the time of the sales, but afterwards so modified, as the result of an appeal to Her Majesty in Council, that, as it finally stood, it would have been satisfied without the sales in question having taken place. The judgment-debtor sued both those who were purchasers at some of the sales, being also holders of the decree to satisfy which the sales took place, and those who were bona fide purchasers at other sales, under the same decree, who were no parties to it. The Judicial Committee held that, as against the latter purchasers, whose position was different from that of the decree- holding purchasers, the suit must be dismissed. At p. 172 of the report, Sir B. Peacock observed as follows: “It appears to Their Lordships that there is a great distinction between the decree-holders who came in and purchased under their own decree, which was afterwards reversed on appeal, and the bona fide purchasers who came in and bought at the sale in execution of the decree to which they were no parties, and at a time when that decree was a valid decree, and when the order for the sale was a valid order.” - 115 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 The same principle has been laid down by the Calcutta High Court in Set Umedmal v. Srinath Ray [ILR 27 Cal 810] where certain immovable properties were sold in execution of an ex parte decree and were purchased by the decree-holder himself. After the confirmation of the sale, the decree was set aside under Section 108 of the Civil Procedure Code 1882 at the instance of some of the defendants in the original suit. On an application under Section 224 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882 having been made by a prior purchaser of the said properties in execution of another decree, to set aside the sale held in execution of the ex parte decree the defence was that the application could not come under Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, and that the sale could not be set aside, as it had been confirmed. It was held by the Calcutta High Court that the ex parte decree having been set aside the sale could not stand, inasmuch as the decree-holder himself was the purchaser. At p. 813 Maclean, C.J. stated: “As regards the second point viz. whether, notwithstanding the confirmation, the sale ought to be set aside, the fact that the decree-holder is himself the auction-purchaser is an element of considerable importance. The distinction between the case of the decree-holder and of a third party being the auction-purchaser is pointed out by Their - 116 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Nawab Zainalabdin Khan v. Mahommed Asghar Ali [ILR 10 Allahabad 166] and also in the case of Mina Kumari Bibee v. Jagat Sattani Bibee [ILR 10 Cal 220] , which is a clear authority for the proposition that where the decree-holder is himself the auction-purchaser, the sale cannot stand, if the decree be subsequently set aside. I am not aware that this decision, which was given in 1883, has since been impugned.” The same view has been expressed in Raghu Nandan Singh v. Jagdis Singh [14 Calcutta Weekly Notes, 182] where it was held that if an ex parte decree has been set aside, it cannot by any subsequent proceeding be revived and if a decree is passed against judgment-debtors on rehearing, it is a new decree and does not revive the former decree. The same opinion has been expressed in Abdul Rahaman v. Sarafat Ali [20 Calcutta Weekly Notes 667] in which it was pointed out that as soon as an ex parte decree was set aside, the sale, where the decree-holder was the purchaser, falls through and was not validated by a fresh decree subsequently made. The same principle was reiterated by the Bombay High Court in Shivbai Kom Babya Swami v. Yesoo [ILR 43 Bom 235] . In that case, an ex parte decree was passed against the defendant, in - 117 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 execution of which the defendant's house was sold and purchased by the plaintiff decree-holder. The ex parte decree was subsequently set aside; but at the retrial, a decree was again passed in plaintiff's favour. In the meanwhile, the defendant applied to have the sale of the house set aside. It was held, in these circumstances, by the Bombay High Court that the previous sale of the house in execution under the previous decree which had been set aside should itself be set aside as being no longer based on any solid foundation; but subject in all the circumstances to the condition that the defendant should pay up the amount due under the second decree within a specified time. 5. On behalf of the respondents reference was made to the decision of this Court in Lal Bhagwant Singh v. Rai Sahib Lala Sri Kishen Das [(1953) 1 SCC 101 : (1953) SCR, 559] . But the ratio of that case has no application to the present case. It should be noticed that the decree in that case was affirmed at all stages of the litigation except that the amount of the decree was slightly altered from Rs 3,88,300 and odd to Rs 3,76,790 and odd which amount was ultimately decreed by the Privy Council in the appeal which the judgment-debtor preferred from the decision of the Oudh Chief Court which restored the decree of the trial Judge who decreed a sum of Rs - 118 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 3,88,300. It was held by this Court that Privy Council had merely restored the amended decree without altering the provisions as to payment by instalments or extending the time for payment by instalments and its decree did not in any way alter the position of the parties as it stood under the amended decree, and, the sale was not in consequence of any error in a decree which was reversed on appeal by the Privy Council and so the judgment-debtor was not entitled to restitution. In the present case the material facts are manifestly very different." xxx. R.K.ROJA V. U.S.RAYUDU AND ANOTHER in CIVIL APPEAL NO.5540 OF 2016 paragraph no.5 reads as under: "5. We are afraid that the stand taken by the High Court in the impugned order cannot be appreciated. An application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be filed at any stage, as held by this Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner and others ... "The trial court can exercise the power at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. ...". The only restriction is that the consideration of the application for rejection should not be on the basis of the allegations made by - 119 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 the defendant in his written statement or on the basis of the allegations in the application for rejection of the plaint. The court has to consider only the plaint as a whole, and in case, the entire plaint comes under the situations covered by Order 7 Rules 11(a) to (f) CPC, the same has to be rejected." xxxi. CHURCH OF CHRIST CHARITABLE TRUST & EDUCATIONAL CHARITABLE SOCIETY V. PONNIAMMAN EDUCATIONAL TRUST reported in (2012) 8 SCC 706 relevant paragraphs read as under: "10. Since the appellant herein, as the first defendant before the trial Judge, filed application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code for rejection of the plaint on the ground that it does not show any cause of action against him, at the foremost, it is useful to refer the relevant provision: Order 7 Rule 11 CPC “11.Rejection of plaint.—The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases— (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to - 120 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9: Provided that the time fixed by the court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp paper shall not be extended unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and not - 121 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject the same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial. 11. This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under: (SCC p. 560, para 9) “9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit—before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement - 122 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.” It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the Court to scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express." xxxii. SALEEM BHAI AND OTHERS V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS reported in (2003) 1 SCC 557 relevant paragraphs read as under: "9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked - 123 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court. The order, therefore, suffers from non- exercising of the jurisdiction vested in the court as well as procedural irregularity. The High Court, however, did not advert to these aspects. 10. We are, therefore, of the view that for the aforementioned reasons, the common order under challenge is liable to be set aside and we, accordingly, do so. We remit the cases to the trial court for deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the basis of the averments in the plaint, after affording an opportunity of being heard to the parties in accordance with law." - 124 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 xxxiii. TAYABBHAI M.BAGASARWALLA AND ANOTHER V. HIND RUBBER INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. AND OTHERS reported in (1997) 3 SCC 443 paragraph no.28 reads as under: "28. The correct principle, therefore, is the one recognised and reiterated in Section 9-A — to wit, where an objection to jurisdiction of a civil court is raised to entertain a suit and to pass any interim orders therein, the Court should decide the question of jurisdiction in the first instance but that does not mean that pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction, the Court has no jurisdiction to pass interim orders as may be called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the court from passing any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. The interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that this Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the court to modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain situations, it would be its duty to modify such orders or make appropriate - 125 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 directions. For example, take a case, where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise; in such a case, the Court should, while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in force, these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the Court on the question of jurisdiction." xxxiv. I.T.C. LIMITED V. DEBTS RECOVERY APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND OTHERS reported in (1998) 2 SCC 70 paragraph no.13 reads as under: "13. We may state that in the context of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, a contention that once issues have been framed, the matter has necessarily to go to trial has been clearly rejected by this Court in Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi (SCC p. 324) as follows: (SCC para 12) “In substance, the argument is that the court must proceed with the trial, record the evidence, and only after the trial … is concluded that the - 126 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 powers under the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing appropriately with the defective petition which does not disclose cause of action should be exercised. With respect to the learned counsel, it is an argument which is difficult to comprehend. The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court….” The abovesaid judgment which related to an election petition is clearly applicable to suits also and was followed in Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath. We therefore hold that the fact that issues have been framed in the suit cannot come in the way of consideration of this application filed by the appellant under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC." 13. Per contra, Sri. Puttige R.Ramesh, learned Senior Counsel representing the contesting respondent would invite the attention of this Court to the affidavit contents which was filed in support of the application filed under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC wherein defendant has specifically contented that the suit should have been filed within 12 years and the same has been considered by the - 127 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 learned trial Judge in the impugned order in paragraph no.10. Therefore the contentions now urged on behalf of the revision petitioner that the suit should have been filed within three years and as such, the suit is barred by limitation per se cannot be countenanced in law. 14. Sri. Puttige R.Ramesh, would also contend that the remedy for taking necessary punitive action available under Order XXXIX Rule 2A cannot be equated as restitution of the possession as is contemplated under Section 144 of CPC inasmuch as scope of Section 144 CPC is to get back the possession of the property on the pretext of a wrong order or an order which is incapable of being passed by a competent Court. As such, scope of Section 144 CPC is altogether different and enquiry contemplated under Order XXXIX Rule 2A is yet another dimension in a civil proceedings and therefore, the argument put forth on behalf of the revision petitioner cannot be countenanced in law to non-suit the plaintiff in maintaining the suit in present suit in O.S.No.5984/2011. - 128 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 15. In support of his arguments, he would place reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Karam Singh vs. Amarjit Singh reported in LAWS(SC)-2025-10-45 (2025 SCC OnLine 2024). 16. He would invite the attention of this Court to paragraph nos.17 to 19 in the said decision which are called out hereunder for ready reference: "17. Apart from above, the suit was not for a mere declaration of the will being null and void but for possession as well. The plaintiff claimed title over the suit land by natural succession and sought possession based on title. Where a suit is for possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title, the limitation period is 12 years when the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiff (vide Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act) 18. In Indira v. Arumugam and Anr., (1998) 1 SCC 614. this court held that when the suit is based on title for possession, once the title is established based on relevant documents and other evidence, unless the defendant proves adverse possession for the prescriptive period, the plaintiff cannot be - 129 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 nonsuited. Consequently, when a suit is instituted for possession, based on title, to defeat the suit on the ground of adverse possession, the burden is on the defendant to prove adverse possession for the prescriptive period. This, therefore, in our view, cannot be an issue on which the plaint could be rejected at the threshold. Moreover, the plaintiffs herein, had clearly disclosed that they had been contesting the will in the mutation proceedings which culminated in the year 2017. The suit was instituted within three years thereafter to declare the mutation entry illegal. Thus, considering that mutation proceedings are summary in nature, the institution of the regular suit questioning the same is not ex facie barred by law[See: Jitendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802, Faqruddin (Dead) through LRs v. Tajuddin (Dead) through LRs, (2008) 8 SCC 12; Rajinder Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir & others, (2008) 9 SCC 368]. 19. That apart, where several reliefs are sought in suit, if any one of the reliefs is within the period of limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected as barred by law by taking recourse to Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC[See. Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1208]." - 130 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 17. Having heard the arguments of both sides, this Court perused the matter on record including the principles of law enunciated in the decisions relayed on behalf of the parties. 18. Few facts which are utmost necessary to be borne in mind while considering the rival contentions of the parties are that the revision petitioner claims the right by virtue of a registered gift deed from her mother who had the power to gift under an unregistered Power of Attorney dated 01.07.1985 said to have been executed by the erstwhile owner of the suit property in view of the ban on registering the revenue sites. 19. Whereas the plaintiff in O.S.No.5984/2011 (first respondent in this revision petition) based his claim on a registered sale deed dated 15.10.2001. 20. In fact while vacating the temporary injunction in O.S.No.3080/2002 filed by the revision petitioner seeking specific enforcement of the Power of Attorney (as - 131 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 if it is a contract of agreement to sell) against the original owner, the title of the first respondent in this revision petition was taken note of by the trial Court. Said order has become final. Thereafter an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A came to be filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.5984/2011. 21. It is submitted at the bar that the suit in O.S.No.3080/2002 ultimately was dismissed on 27.02.2012. However no order is passed on application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC. 22. As such, to appreciate the argument put forth on behalf of the revision petitioner that the only relief for the first respondent to get back to the possession of the property which has been lost in violation of the status quo order passed in O.S.No.3080/2002, which is the relief that is claimed as relief nos.(b) to (d) in the plaint by resorting to 144 CPC, it is just and necessary for this Court to cull - 132 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 out Section 144 CPC and Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC. Those provisions read as under: "144. Application for restitution.—(1) Where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the Court which passed the decree or order] shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied, reversed, set aside or modified; and for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of the decree or order. Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section (1), the expression “Court which passed the decree or order” shall be deemed to include,— - 133 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 (a) where the decree or order has been varied or reversed in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, the Court of first instance; (b) where the decree or order has been set aside by a separate suit, the court of first instance which passed such decree or order. (c) where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute, it,the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree or order was passed were instituted at the time of making the application for restitution under this section, would have jurisdiction to try such suit. (2) No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-section (1)." "XXXIX Rule 2A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction.—(1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under rule 1 or rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such - 134 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto." 23. On close reading of the aforesaid provisions, these two provisions would not telescope into each other nor it would serve the same purpose. 24. Order XXXIX Rule 2A the scope and ambit is to take necessary action including the punishment of the person who violates the interim order of injunction or status quo granted in a duly constituted suit by either sending him to civil prison or to attach his property or both - 135 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 and thereafter warn him from violating the interim order in future. 25. On close reading of the language employed in Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC, it is crystal clear that the Court may have the power to order for demolition of the structure if any by holding an enquiry, but that would not give a scope for a party to get back into the possession of the property. 26. All that Order XXXIX Rule 2A contemplates is to bring the suit property into 'status quo ante'. 27. Whereas, on close reading of Section 144 CPC, an inherent power is carved out under the CPC to undo an illegal act committed in the guise of an order of Court. In other words, it speaks of restitution of the property for a person who is legally entitled for the same and on some pretext or on a wrong order, his possession has been taken away through the process known to the Court. - 136 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 28. In other words, Section 144 of CPC would not be a substitute for a prayer for declaration where a person has lost possession on account of an act attributable to a party to the suit and not attributable to the Court proceedings. 29. This is the fine and subtle distinction between the two provisions. 30. While appreciating the argument that is put forward governing the field of application of Section 144 CPC and bringing out to the notice of the Court that a separate suit under Section 144(2) is not maintainable if a person has not obtained the remedy under Section 144 CPC by Sri. Lakshmi Narayana, in the present case, the said argument would not hold the water for the simple reason that the scope of enquiry under Order XXXIX Rule 2A which did not attain finality for whatever be the reasons in O.S.No.3080/2002 in view of the dismissal of the said suit on 27.02.2012. - 137 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 31. Having said thus, the only consequence would be the first respondent/plaintiff is entitled to get his grievances redressed in a duly constituted suit which has been done by the plaintiff by filing the O.S.No.5984/2011. 32. The suit relief was thus opposed on two grounds primarily, one is that such a suit itself is not maintainable in view of the earlier proceedings between the parties and on the ground of limitation. 33. As could be seen from the observations made by the learned trial Judge in paragraph no.10 of the impugned order, when the revision petitioner himself has pleaded that the suit should have been filed within 12 years, it should not now be allowed to be contented by the defendant that suit is barred by time as admittedly the suit is filed in the year 2011 when taken into consideration that the earlier suit filed by him in O.S.No.1941/2002 as the date of cause of action. - 138 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 34. Therefore, the contentions urged on behalf of the revision petitioner that the suit is hopelessly barred by time at least for the purpose of enquiry under Order VII Rule 11, this Court is of the considered opinion that it is not a ground to reject the plaint. 35. Having said thus, since the operations of provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 2A and Section 144 are altogether different, the argument put forth on behalf of the petitioner that the main relief should fall and automatically the subsequent prayers (b), (c), (d) of the plaint in the prayer column should fall automatically cannot also be countenanced in law in view of the fact that the action that is attributable in the case on hand by the plaintiff is to the revision petitioner and not to any Court proceedings. Thus, viewed from any angle this Court does not find any good grounds to allow the revision petition. 36. Now, adverting to the decisions that has been relied on by the parties, there cannot be any dispute as to - 139 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 the principles of law enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions relied on by both the parties. 37. However, a discussion in detail in this revision petition on each of the decisions, in the considered opinion of this Court, is unnecessary as it may tend to prejudice the rights of the parties in the pending trial one way or the other. Recording a finding that too in the revisional jurisdiction in respect of a factual aspect which is to be adjudicated by the trial Court in a full-fledged trial is totally uncalled for and it would not be expected from a revisional Court to form an opinion even for the limited purpose of disposing of the revision petition. 38. Thus, if this Court withholds recording a finding on the decisions placed on by the parties and allow the parties to participate in the trial and to canvass their respective contentions in accordance with law in the pending trial would be a safer remedy for the parties than - 140 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:54392 CRP No. 629 of 2025 inviting a finding from this Court that too in the revisional jurisdiction. With that observation, following: ORDER i. The civil revision petition is meritless and hereby dismissed. ii. No order as to cost. iii. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed opinion on the merits of the rival contentions of the parties in any manner including the title to the suit property of the parties as is pleaded by them and parties are at liberty to canvass the same in the suit in accordance with law. Sd/- (V SRISHANANDA) JUDGE PGG