2025:JHHC:28188 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 1174 of 2021 ---- Rajkumar Sahu, S/o Late Banwari Sahu, R/o Or. No. B-55, Regional Hospital Colony Dhori, Near Shiv Mandir, P.O. & P.S.- Bermo, District- Bokaro, Jharkhand. … Petitioner -versus- 1. Central Coalfields Limited through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director, having its office at Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O. G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District - Ranchi, Jharkhand; 2. The Director Personnel, having its office at Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O. G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District - Ranchi, Jharkhand; 3. The General Manager, Dhori Area, Central Coalfields Limited, having its office at Bermo, P.O. and P.S. Bermo, District - Bokaro, Jharkhand.. … Respondents ---- CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J. ---- For the Petitioner : Ms. Jasvindar Mazumdar, Advocate For the Respondent(s) : Ms. Darshana Poddar Mishra, Advocate : Ms. Diksha Dwivedi, Advocate ---- 19/ 01.09.2025 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Petitioner, in this writ petition, has prayed for the following reliefs:- (a) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/ direction(s) particularly a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order of punishment dated 10.09.2019 bearing reference no. GMD(D)/PD/19-20/1494 (Annexure-20 hereto) whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service; (b) Further direction upon the concerned respondent for quashing the order of punishment dated 10.02.2021 bearing reference no. CCL/P&IR/Estt./2020-21/314 (Annexure-23 hereto) whereby the appeal preferred against the order dated 10.09.2019 is being affirmed by the Respondent No. 2; (c) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/ direction(s) or particularly a writ in the nature of mandamus for a direction upon the respondent authorities to pay all retiral dues along with consequential benefits; 3. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed in Cat.-I post on 23.04.1986 and later promoted to the post of Office Superintendent. The petitioner was asked vide Memo No. GM(D)/PD/16-17/456 dated 15.06.2017 to submit documents which he had furnished at the time of securing his employment as well as family documents, to which the petitioner replied on 18.06.2017 that all the documents had been submitted in the office of General Manager, Dhori at time of his employment. Later on, the petitioner was asked vide letters dated 2025:JHHC:28188 2 21.09.2017, 12.04.2018 and 21.04.2018 to appear physically along with the documents before the authority. The petitioner again submitted his reply that all the papers regarding employment had already been submitted in the office of General Manager, Dhori. The respondent authorities then issued memo of charge dated 01.02.2019 to the petitioner alleging that he had secured employment by impersonating as the son-in- law of Dharam Digar, an employee of Dhori Colliery thereby the conduct of the petitioner amounts to misconduct under Clause 26.1 and Clause 26.9 of the Certified Standing Order of Central Coalfields Limited. Later on, the said memo of charge was withdrawn citing technical reasons on 03.05.2019 and another memo of charge dated 03.05.2019 was served upon the petitioner alleging the same charge. The petitioner made a detailed reply to the said memo of charge stating that he had been offered employment after due verification of his character and antecedents. Enquiry proceedings were conducted and the allegations levelled against the petitioner were found to be true. A second show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 24.08.2019 to which he submitted his reply on 27.08.2019. Thereafter, punishment of dismissal from service was imposed by the respondent authorities vide Reference No. GM(D)/PD/19- 20/1494 dated 10.09.2019. The petitioner preferred a departmental appeal on 19.09.2019 and made several reminders to the appellate authority but no reasoned order was passed. Then the petitioner preferred writ application being W.P.(S) No. 333 of 2020 wherein the court directed the appellate authority to take a decision within 12 weeks from the date of representation. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of dismissal. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner puts forth his arguments stating that the petitioner got married to Meena Devi, who is the daughter of Late Dharam Digar. Wife of Late Dharam Digar, Sohagi Devi, had written to the Mining Superintendent that her husband died on 22.10.1984 and her son in law namely, RajKumar Sahu should be appointed on compassionate ground. The counsel further submits that the charges were not proved in the departmental enquiry and hence, the order of dismissal is illegal and arbitrary. 5. Learned counsel representing the respondents submits that the conduct of the petitioner of impersonating himself as the son-in-law of 2025:JHHC:28188 3 Dharam Digar amounts to misconduct under Clause 26.1 and Clause 26.9 of the Certified Standing Order of Central Coalfields Limited. 6. After hearing the counsel for the parties and perusal of the records, I find that the petitioner was dismissed from service for having entered into employment of Central Coalfields Limited fraudulently. The petitioner was accorded with all the reasonable opportunities to defend the charges levelled against him, however, the enquiry officer found the charges as proved. The petitioner had intentionally concealed the fact of his relationship with Dharam Digar and fraudulently entered into employment. Further, after going through the appellate order, I find that it has been taken note of by the appellate authority that the enquiry officer has recorded the statement of Churput Digar during the enquiry proceedings who stated that he is the only son of Late Dharam Digar and he had no step siblings and no sister whether full blooded/half blooded or adopted. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner has misrepresented. From the aforesaid facts, I am of the view that the petitioner did not approach the court with clean hands. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again reiterated the principal that “he who seeks equity must do equity”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Tomorrowland Ltd. v. Housing & Urban Development Corpn. Ltd.” reported in (2025) 4 SCC 19 has held as under: “56. It needs no emphasis that whosoever comes to the court claiming equity, must come with clean hands. The expression “clean hands” connotes that the suitor or the defendant have not concealed material facts from the court and there is no attempt by them to secure illegitimate gains. Any contrary conduct must warrant turning down relief to such a party, owing to it not acting in good faith and beguiling the court with a view to secure undue gain. A court of law cannot be the abettor of inequity by siding with the party approaching it with unclean hands. This also brings to mind the oft-quoted legal maxim—he who seeks equity must do equity.” It is well settled that High Courts have very limited scope under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, it cannot act as an appellate authority and re-evaluate findings of fact or the adequacy of evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “State of Rajasthan v. Bhupendra Singh” reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908 has held as under: “23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res 2025:JHHC:28188 4 integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3-Judge Bench stated: ‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’” In this case, I find that the departmental proceeding was conducted in accordance with law following the principles of natural justice. The petitioner has been given full opportunity to place his defence. There has been no violation of any statutory rule. Further, the appellate order is a well-reasoned order which requires no interference of this court. 8. In view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the facts of the case, I find no merit in this writ petition, calling for any interference with the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority, which are under challenged in this writ petition. 9. This writ petition, is accordingly, dismissed. 10. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stands disposed of. (ANANDA SEN, J.) Tanuj