Serial No. 25 Reg. Cause List HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR CRM(M) 436/2022 c/w CRM(M) 16/2023 NOOR MOHAMMAD BHAT AND ORS … Petitioner(s) Through: Mr. Z.A Wani, Advocate Vs. UNION TERRITORY THROUGH POLICE STATION KUPWARA AND ORS. ...Respondent(s) Through: Mr. Faheem Shah, GA Mr. Sami Lone, Advocate CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JAVED IQBAL WANI, JUDGE ORDER 18.08.2025 1. Upon coming of the instant petitions for consideration, it came to be pointed out by the counsel appearing for the parties that the instant petitions have been filed by the petitioners for quashing of cross FIRs got registered by them against each other arising out of a civil dispute inter- se the parties pertaining to immovable property/ies and its inheritance thereof, claimed to be related as brothers and sisters. 2. According to the counsel for the contesting parties, a deed of compromise stands executed inter-se them resolving their said disputes and differences amicably outside the Court, and, that in furtherance of the said amicable settlement, the statements of the contesting parties stand recorded by the Registrar Judicial, Srinagar in terms of order passed by the Court on 07.07.2025, in which statements the parties have acknowledged and endorsed said the amicable settlement of the inter-se disputes. 3. The appearing counsel for the parties, thus, would seek disposal of the instant petitions and consequent quashing of the FIRs impugned in the instant petitions, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court from time to time in this regard. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. In regard to quashing of FIR on the basis of an amicable settlement in respect of a cognizable and non-compoundable offence, law is no more res- integra and stands settled by a series of judgments passed by the Apex Court including in case titled as Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303 reproduced hereunder:- In Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303, judgments in B.S. Joshi (supra) and Nikhil Merchant (supra) were considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court and it has found that the view taken in aforesaid two cases by this Court is correct. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment in Gian Singh (supra) read as follows: " 57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. 59. B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705] do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji this Court has compounded the non- compoundable offences indirectly ?We do not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment. 61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings." 8. In view of the principle laid down by this Court in the aforesaid cases, we are of the view in the disputes which are substantially matrimonial in nature, or the civil property disputes with criminal facets, if the parties have entered into settlement, and it has become clear that there are no chances of conviction, there is no illegality in quashing the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. read with Article 226 of the Constitution. However, the same would not apply where the nature of offence is very serious like rape, murder, robbery, dacoity, cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, cases under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and other similar kind of offences in which punishment of life imprisonment or death can be awarded. After considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that learned Single Judge did not commit any error of law in quashing the FIR after not only the complainant and the appellant settled their money dispute but also the other alleged sufferers entered into an agreement with the appellant, and as such, they too settled their claims. 5. Having regard to the aforesaid position of law inasmuch as the issue involved in the petition and other record attached there with and also the aforesaid submissions of the appearing counsel for the parties, the instant petitions deserves to be allowed. 6. Accordingly the petitions are allowed and the impugned FIR No. 227/2022 dated 10.09.2022 of P/S Kupwara and FIR No. 126/2022 dated 15.05.2022 of P/S Kupwara are quashed. 7. Disposed of. (JAVED IQBAL WANI) JUDGE SRINAGAR: 18.08.2025 “S.Nuzhat”