2025:HHC:17748 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 191 of 2025 Reserved on: 26.05.2025 Date of Decision: 05.06.2025. Kamal Chand and others ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. and others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Mr. Pooja Verma, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1- State. Mr. Vaibhav Chauhan, Advocate, for respondents No.2 and 3. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 29 of 2024, dated 22.6.2024, registered at Police Station Kupvi, District Shimla, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 3(1)(r)(s), 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:17748 3(2)(va) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities), 1989 (SC&ST Act) and consequent proceedings pending before the learned Special Judge, Shimla, titled State of HP Vs. Kamal Chand and others. It has been asserted that the investigation is complete and the police have filed a charge sheet before the Court. The informant and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 belong to the same village. They settled the matter with the petitioners with the intervention of respectable persons of the society. No fruitful purpose would be served by continuing with the prosecution. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. 2. Statements of the informant and injured were recorded on 27.3.2025, in which they stated that they had entered into the compromise with the accused voluntarily, and they did not want to proceed further with the matter because of the compromise effected between the parties. 3. I have heard Ms. Pooja Verma, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate 3 2025:HHC:17748 General, for respondent No.1-State and Mr. Vaibhav Chauhan, learned counsel for respondents No.2 and 3. 4. The Compromise Deed (Annexure P-3) mentions that the parties have compromised the matter voluntarily with their free will and consent, and the informant had no objection in case the complaint filed by him is ordered to be compromised based on the compromise. 5. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramawatar v. State of M.P., (2022) 13 SCC 635 that ordinarily the Court should be extremely circumspect while dealing with the offences arising out of the special statutes such as SC/ST Act, however, where it appears to the Court that the offence is not covered under the SC/ST Act but is primarily private or civil, the Court can exercise its power to quash the proceedings based on the compromise. It was observed:- 16. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to 4 2025:HHC:17748 various atrocities at the hands of upper castes. The courts have to be mindful of the fact that the Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste- based atrocities. 17. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing based on a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a “special statute” would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482CrPC. 18. Adverting to the case in hand, we note that the present appellant has been charged and convicted under the unamended Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act [ Section 3(1) (x) of the Act stands substituted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26- 1-2016.], which was as follows: “3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.—(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe— *** (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;” 5 2025:HHC:17748 19. We may hasten to add that in cases such as the present, the courts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that the complainant-victim has entered into the compromise on the volition of his/her free will and not on account of any duress. It cannot be understated that since members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe belong to the weaker sections of our country, they are more prone to acts of coercion, and therefore ought to be accorded a higher level of protection. If the courts find even a hint of compulsion or force, no relief can be given to the accused party. What factors the courts should consider would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 20. Having considered the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case in light of the aforestated principles, as well as having meditated on the application for compromise, we are inclined to invoke the powers under Article 142 and quash the instant criminal proceedings with the sole objective of doing complete justice between the parties before us. We say so for the following reasons: 20.1.Firstly, the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act is to deter caste-based insults and intimidations when they are used with the intention of demeaning a victim on account of he/she belonging to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community. In the present case, the record manifests that there was an undeniable pre- existing civil dispute between the parties. The case of the appellant, from the very beginning, has been that the alleged abuses were uttered solely on account of frustration and anger over the pending dispute. Thus, the genesis of the deprecated incident was the aforestated civil/property dispute. Considering this aspect, we are of the opinion that it would not be incorrect to categorise the occurrence as one being overarchingly private in nature, having only subtle undertones of 6 2025:HHC:17748 criminality, even though the provisions of a special statute have been attracted in the present case. 20.2 Secondly, the offence in question, for which the appellant has been convicted, does not appear to exhibit his mental depravity. The aim of the SC/ST Act is to protect members of the downtrodden classes from atrocious acts of the upper strata of society. It appears to us that although the appellant may not belong to the same caste as the complainant, he too belongs to the relatively weaker/backward section of the society and is certainly not in any better economic or social position when compared to the victim. Despite the rampant prevalence of segregation in Indian villages whereby members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community are forced to restrict their quarters only to certain areas, it is seen that in the present case, the appellant and the complainant lived in adjoining houses. Therefore, keeping in mind the socio-economic status of the appellant, we are of the opinion that the overriding objective of the SC/ST Act would not be overwhelmed if the present proceedings were quashed. 20.3. Thirdly, the incident occurred way back in the year 1994. Nothing on record indicates that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident had transpired between the parties. The State Counsel has also not brought to our attention any other occurrence that would lead us to believe that the appellant is either a repeat offender or is unremorseful about what transpired. 20.4. Fourthly, the complainant has, on her own free will, without any compulsion, entered into a compromise and wishes to drop the present criminal proceedings against the accused. 7 2025:HHC:17748 20.5. Fifthly, given the nature of the offence, it is immaterial that the trial against the appellant had been concluded. 20.6 Secondly, the appellant and the complainant parties are residents of the same village and live in very close proximity to each other. We have no reason to doubt that the parties themselves have voluntarily settled their differences. Therefore, in order to avoid the revival of healed wounds and to advance peace and harmony, it will be prudent to effectuate the present settlement. 6. A similar view was taken in Ramgopal v. State of M.P., (2022) 14 SCC 531 wherein it was held:- 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the State(s) at a considerable length. The questions of law concerning the power of a High Court to quash proceedings emanating from non-compoundable offences which have no impact or depraving effect on the society at large, on the basis of a compromise between the accused and the victim complainant, are no longer res integra and the same have been authoritatively settled by this Court in the affirmative. The learned counsel for the appellants and complainant(s) in both the appeals have, therefore, heavily counted on the compromise/settlement between the parties and seek quashing of the criminal prosecution in its entirety. The learned State Counsel, without controverting the factum of compromise, vehemently opposed such a recourse and asserted that no substantial question of law is involved in these appeals. 9. Before scrutinising the facts of these cases and rephrasing the scope of powers exercisable by a High Court under Section 482CrPC, it would be apropos to illuminate the following principles laid down by a three- Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh case [Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC 8 2025:HHC:17748 (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988] : (SCC pp. 342-43, para 61) “61. … the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation, but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power, viz., (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercising such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc., cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominately civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the 9 2025:HHC:17748 wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”(emphasis supplied) 10. The compendium of these broad fundamentals structured in more than one judicial precedent, has been recapitulated by another three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, para 15 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706] elaborating : (SCC pp. 704-705, para 15) “15. … 15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and 10 2025:HHC:17748 when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. 15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of a compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4.*** 15.5.While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.”(emphasis supplied) 11. True it is that offences which are “non- compoundable” cannot be compounded by a criminal court in the purported exercise of its powers under Section 320CrPC. Any such attempt by the court would amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320CrPC, which is the exclusive domain of the legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Section 320CrPC, which may justify its wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket of “compoundable” offences, which have been consciously 11 2025:HHC:17748 kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of Section 320CrPC is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Section 482CrPC. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasons, can press Section 482CrPC in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any court and/or to secure the ends of justice. 12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482CrPC, even if the offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach to ensure that the felony, even if it goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyse the very object of the administration of the criminal justice system. 13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature can be annulled irrespective of the fact that the trial has already been concluded or the appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. The societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck post-conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the 12 2025:HHC:17748 extraordinary power under Section 482 of the CrPC would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard- and-fast line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482CrPC may lead to rigid or specious justice, which, in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, para 29 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] and Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, para 15 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706]. 14. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy, cannot be construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potential to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences through a quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a “settlement” through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty man escape if it can be avoided”. xxxxxx 19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section 320CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences “compoundable” within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482CrPC or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised 13 2025:HHC:17748 carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: 19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of the society; 19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any; 19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of the society; 19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any; 19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; and 19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations. 20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in both the appeals. We say so for the following reasons: 20.1. Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorised as purely personal or having overtones of criminal proceedings of a private nature. 20.2 Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the appellants have been convicted, does not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing it would override public interest. 20.3. Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against the appellants had been concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed. 20.4. Fourthly, the parties, on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and 14 2025:HHC:17748 voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s). 20.5. Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both cases took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the parties. 20.5. Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both cases took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the parties. 20.6.Sixthly, since the appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any ill will and have no vengeance against each other. 20.7. Seventhly, the cause of administration of the criminal justice system would remain unaffected on acceptance of the amicable settlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the appellants; more so, looking at their present age. 7. Thus, it is permissible to quash the FIR based on the compromise effected between the parties in cases registered under the SC/ST Act. 8. This Court had also quashed the FIR based on the compromise effected between the parties in cases registered under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of 15 2025:HHC:17748 Atrocities) Act, 1989 in Abdul Rehman and others vs. State of H.P. 2022 STPL 9771 HP, Nar Singh and others vs. State of H.P. 2022 (3) Him. L.R. 1374, Bantu Ram vs. State of H.P. 2021(3) Shimla Law Cases 1441 and Vinod Kumar and others vs. State of H.P. 2018 (1) Shim. LC 256. These judgments are binding on this Court. 9. A perusal of the FIR shows that the incident had occurred on the spur of the moment. The informant, respondents no. 2 & 3 and the petitioners were involved in the incident. It was a private matter and did not affect society. The parties want to resolve their differences and reside peacefully; therefore, the FIR can be quashed based on the compromise effected between the parties. 10. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and the FIR No. 29 of 2024, dated 22.6.2024, registered at Police Station Kupvi, District Shimla, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)(va) of Prevention of Atrocities, 1989 (SC&ST Act) and consequent proceedings pending before the learned Special Judge, Shimla, 16 2025:HHC:17748 titled State of HP Vs. Kamal Chand and others are ordered to be quashed. 11. Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also pending applications, if any. 12. Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this judgment, downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh before the authorities concerned, and the said authorities shall not insist on the production of a certified copy but if required, may verify passing of the order from Website of the High Court. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 5th June, 2025 (Chander)